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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This study examines the treatment of asylum seekers in the UK and France. The need for 
such a study arises from the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the 
commitment of EU states to give protection to people fleeing persecution (they are all 
signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention) and, on the other, the increasingly restrictive 
policies on asylum adopted by those same states. In order to understand asylum-seeker 
perspectives I interviewed asylum seekers in the UK, though not in France due to my 
increasing deafness, and I interviewed stakeholders in both countries who could give me 
both official and asylum-seeker perspectives. Documentation was provided by asylum 
seekers and their supporters, NGOs in the field and government sources. I find that the 
restrictive agenda of the two states has undermined their commitment to the Refugee 
Convention as they place asylum policy in the context of immigration controls rather than 
of protection. Consequently, in both countries a discourse develops, laws are made and 
practices arise which undermine the right to asylum and deny protection to many who need 
it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection or exclusion? 
I identify the problem to be addressed in this research in the following terms. The asylum 
policies of European Union (EU) states have become increasingly restrictive over the past 
two decades and those states justify their restrictive policies on a number of grounds, 
including alleged abuse of the asylum system by those seeking to circumvent legal 
immigration controls, the perceived need to limit numbers on economic grounds, fears that 
social cohesion may be threatened, that the state‘s resources will be drained, and the need 
to defend the country from terrorists. But the same states also claim to take seriously their 
obligations under the Refugee Convention and other international instruments, including 
the European Convention on Human Rights. I want to know, therefore, whether the asylum 
policies and practices of two EU states (the UK and France) enable them to fulfil their 
obligations, under the Refugee Convention, to protect victims of persecution and uphold 
the right to asylum, or whether those states undermine that right through an increasingly 
restrictive agenda which prioritises immigration control over protection. It seemed 
important to look at individual states, for EU policy reflects the interests and 
preoccupations of its member states and I chose two of them. I chose the UK and France 
because I am familiar with both of them: I was born in the UK and have a good knowledge 
of UK politics and society; I lived in Paris from 1990 to 1995 and understand something of 
France from that experience. I also chose France because, while it is broadly similar to the 
UK, it has a different approach to questions of immigration, ethnic minorities, integration 
and citizenship, and I wondered if that might lead to different outcomes in asylum policy. 
    In terms of broad similarities, both countries are relatively stable liberal democracies; 
both were early industrialisers and have similar economic systems and socio-occupational 
structures; both had large empires and lost them in the years following the Second World 
War; both were countries of immigration after the war because of their need for labour in 
the task of post-war reconstruction and both received immigrants from their colonies and 
former colonies. Moreover, their colonial histories were likely to be factors in their 
response both to the early post-war immigrants and to the later asylum-seeker arrivals. 
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    The differences between the two countries on questions of immigration are that the UK 
has adopted a multicultural approach which recognises ethnic minorities within society and 
seeks to manage them through race-relations policies and legislation; the French reject race 
and ethnicity as categories of identification and the aim of the state is rather to assimilate 
immigrants into French society and culture – in the words of Noiriel, to turn ―immigrants 
into Frenchmen [sic]‖ (1996:xxviii). At the outset I wondered whether one approach might 
better enable fulfilment of Refugee Convention obligations than the other. Ultimately I 
found outcomes in both countries to be similar. Their common experience of empire had 
engendered a discourse which resulted in racist immigration controls and discrimination in 
both countries in the decades following the Second World War. The details of how that has 
happened in each country are different (chapters 2 and 3) but the end product remains. In 
the years when asylum became an issue, the perceptions which created ―Fortress Europe‖ 
(1.7) helped to keep such a discourse alive and update it. So a narrative quickly developed 
about asylum seekers which categorised them as economic migrants in disguise (4.2, 4.5, 
5.3.1) and therefore a ―security problem‖ for EU states (1.7). Hence the restrictive agenda 
and prohibitive asylum procedures examined in this study. 
   The examination of the two systems rests on a critical review of academic and policy 
literature, as well as original empirical research. The latter consisted of in-depth, qualitative 
and transcribed interviews with refugees in the UK and relevant stakeholders in both 
countries. My original intention to interview refugees in France foundered on my 
increasing deafness, which made conducting interviews with French respondents too 
difficult. Thus, although I interviewed three French stakeholders, my account of the French 
system lacks the testimony of refugee participants which is part of my account of the UK 
system. Nevertheless, I believe I provide enough evidence of how the French system works 
to make the account worthwhile. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
I start with an overview of the history of refugee protection in the modern world. Then, 
after looking at policy on immigration and race in each country since the Second World 
War (chapters 2-3), I examine each system in its national context (chapter 4), seeking to 
show how asylum seekers are treated, and what it is like to negotiate the asylum process, in 
each country (chapters 5-9). I look at procedures and practices, from the original 
application for asylum through to the asylum interview and the decision-making process, 
INTRODUCTION 3 
and on to rights of appeal and the final stage (for refused asylum seekers) of detention and 
deportation. I also look at issues of accommodation and support during the process and 
legal representation. In chapter 10 I review the evidence for the restrictive agenda, discuss 
whether there is any justification for it and suggest the broad lines of an alternative. 
 
  
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE MODERN WORLD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1   Introduction 
In this chapter I provide some background to the issue of refugees, with particular reference 
to the current sense of crisis on the question in the states of the European Union. I 
emphasise the fact that refugees are not voluntary migrants but are forced to flee their own 
countries (1.3). I outline the history of refugee protection from the early twentieth century 
through to the end of the Second World War and the experience of the Cold War (1.4), and 
then describe the increase in refugee numbers following the collapse of the Soviet and East 
European regimes. I then discuss how debt and the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes affected the Third World and helped to increase the flow of refugees (1.5). I 
show how the EU states saw increasing refugee flows as a crisis for themselves and began 
to construct Fortress Europe. I discuss the Refugee Convention and its interpretation by the 
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1.10.1-1.10.2), 
as well as the standards set up by the EU for the treatment of refugees (1.10.3). Finally I 
briefly indicate some of the contradictions present in the asylum policies of the UK and 
France (1.11). I begin, however, with the words of refugees themselves as they describe 
their experience of fleeing their home countries to find shelter elsewhere. 
 
1.2    Refugee voices 
When I was about the age of seven, it was either grow up fast or die fast. Growing up fast is realising there’s 
no time for playing  … If I would act childish and went playing outside then you could have two sisters and 
one brother dead … you see little kids outside playing around and getting shot  … We moved out at night. 
There were guys waiting for you right outside the door. So we moved out at twelve o’clock at night when 
everybody’s sleeping and it’s quiet. Loaded up, us and a couple of other families who wanted to move. There 
was nothing we could talk about. We were all afraid, all quiet. We just kept clothes and food. So we just left 
the house almost full. – Muhiddin Abu, Somalia 
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My house in Somalia … well, it was right in the centre where everything was happening  … one time we were 
eating dinner … it was just really calm, my Mom is telling a story … and out of nowhere this bullet comes 
like, flying by, and scrapes my sister’s hand, you can still kinda see the scar there. – Naima Margan, Somalia 
 
The military attacked our village at night. We were all sleeping. Suddenly there was the sound of gunfire and 
I ran outside. My parents were not around. Many people were killed in front of me. I ran away … and joined 
a group of people that were fleeing … In the group I saw my uncle … I asked him if he knew where my 
parents were, but he said don’t worry about your parents, we’ll find them, but right now we need to find a 
safe place. I didn’t know if my parents were alive or dead. I just thought at least I was safe with my uncle. – 
John Makol, Sudan
1
 
 
Sometimes the special units disguise themselves as guerrillas and speak to us in Kurdish. But we aren’t 
fooled. My friend replied in Turkish. They may kill you and say you were a terrorist, or they kill you and say 
the terrorists did it. Either way, they kill you. You can’t win. – Rêso, a Kurd from Turkey2 
 
These refugee voices represent the flesh and blood behind the statistics provided on 
refugees by governments, international organisations and other agencies across the world. 
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention (the primary international benchmark for the 
treatment of refugees), a refugee is someone who, 
 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (Convention & Protocol 
1996:16). 
 
But the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
includes ―asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced people, returned refugees, and 
stateless persons‖; thus, at the beginning of 2004, there were 17,084,100 people ―of 
concern‖ to UNHCR (Refugees by Numbers 2004:1, 2). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 All the above quotations available at http://www.beyondthefire.net 
2
 Author interview, cited in Mouncer (2000), p. 37. 
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1.3    Forced to flee 
Asylum seekers and refugees are not voluntary migrants but have been forced to flee. It 
takes a lot to make people leave their homes, and most, even under severe pressure, do not 
do so. Amongst the poor – a category of people usually thought most likely to become 
immigrants into Europe – ―the overwhelming majority stay at home‖ (Harris 2000). Most 
people who move either do so within their own country (becoming, in legal terms, 
internally displaced persons) or, if they do cross borders (thus becoming refugees), stay in 
the same region. Their attachment to home, the costs of travel, the demands of family and, 
often, a political commitment to change in their country all prevent further movement and, 
having reached a place of safety, they may immediately start planning to return. Indeed, 
such planning 
 
can start even before they have abandoned their homes. In Rwanda, for example, it 
is reported that many refugees buried tools in the ground and hid their supply of 
seeds when they left for Tanzania and Zaire, so that they would have access to some 
basic agricultural inputs if they were able to repatriate in the near future (UNHCR 
1997:150). 
 
Only a minority cross continents or reach the wealthy developed countries of Western 
Europe. 
    In 1999, ―[c]onflict and systematic human rights violations were the root cause of most 
displacements‖ (Loescher 2001:3). In 2001, the British Medical Journal listed some of the 
experiences likely to have been endured by those who had managed to reach the UK and 
apply for asylum. They included (Burnett & Peel 2001: 486): 
 
… massacres and threats of massacres, detention, beatings and torture, rape and 
sexual assault, and witnessing death squads and torture of others; being held under 
siege, destruction of homes and property and forcible eviction, disappearances of 
family members or friends; being held as hostages or human shields; and landmine 
injuries. 
 
Abdul Rashid, a 17-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan, described his experience 
(Oxfam 2000): 
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My father [had] a tobacco shop. At one o‘clock he came back from the shop to have 
a meal with my mother and my sister. I was at school but I could hear all the 
fighting. At two o‘clock I came home and saw what had happened. My whole street 
had been destroyed. There was nothing left. No father, no mother. My home was 
finished. When I saw this I fell to the ground. I was in hospital for one month. I 
couldn‘t speak at all – I couldn‘t even make a sound. After one month I started to 
speak again, very, very slowly. It is still difficult for me to speak. 
 
Yet in the current climate of opinion in Western Europe, the forced nature of refugees‘ 
migration is hardly taken seriously.  The more or less steady growth in numbers of refugees 
worldwide in recent years has created a sense of crisis and led to restrictive policies 
towards refugees both at EU level and at the level of individual states. Such policies seem 
to conflict with the principles of the Refugee Convention. 
 
1.4   Refugee protection to the end of the Cold War 
The Refugee Convention is based on ―the principle that human beings shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination‖ (Convention & Protocol 
1996:15). We are not intended to take this as mere rhetoric, for the preamble to the 
Convention appeals to two foundation documents of the post Second World War world as 
authorities: the United Nations (UN) Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. These rights include the right to life, liberty and security of the person; the right not 
to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or to arbitrary arrest; 
and the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries. All these rights are universal – 
they come bearing no distinction due to race, colour, gender, language, religion or opinion, 
and no distinction based on country of origin. Moreover, the Convention arose out of the 
UN‘s ―profound concern for refugees‖ and its desire to achieve ―the widest possible 
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms‖ by refugees (ibid.). The Convention‘s 
principles are supported and reinforced by the EU, which in turn sets its own standards: the 
Tampere European Council 1999 reaffirmed the EU‘s ―absolute respect of the right to seek 
asylum‖, the importance of ―ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution‖, and aimed 
at minimum standards for refugee reception and protection (Tampere 1999, para. 13). 
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     The Refugee Convention was born halfway through a century which had already seen a 
number of refugee crises. Refugee numbers rose in the years following the First World War 
and by 1926 Europe had 9.5 million refugees, most coming from Russia in the wake of the 
1917 revolutions, the subsequent civil war and the rise of Stalinism, and many coming from 
Italy after the fascist takeover in 1922. Fear in face of these numbers ―contributed to a rush 
to erect protective barriers‖, but it was also increasingly clear that ―there were special 
international migrants who urgently needed protection and assistance‖ (Zolberg et 
al.1989:18). In 1921 the League of Nations established the post of ―High Commissioner on 
Behalf of the League in Connection with the Problems of Russian Refugees in Europe‖. It 
was seen as a temporary post. But the High Commissioner‘s office could not confine itself 
to the Russians and, as authoritarian nationalism grew in an increasingly unstable Europe 
and the Great Depression of 1929 began to bite, refugee assistance began to look like a 
permanent feature of the international landscape. 
    After the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, a steady stream of mainly Jewish 
refugees fled Germany and the countries under its occupation. During the Second World 
War it is estimated that some 30 million Europeans were displaced. At the end of the war, 
―eleven million survivors were outside their country and in need of assistance‖ (ibid.:21), 
and this in a Europe marked by hunger, starvation and disease. On 26 January 1946, The 
Economist predicted that ―the poor urban populations of Europe … are all condemned to go 
hungry this winter‖ (cited Armstrong et al. 1984:22). The article quoted the prediction of 
the Director-General of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration that, in Warsaw 
alone, ―ten thousand people will die of starvation‖. In Hungary, he said, ―deaths from 
famine may reach a million‖; in Austria ―in some towns … there is already starvation‖. The 
article identified other ―plague spots‖ – ―Northern Italy, the Ruhr, Berlin and most large 
towns in Germany‖. This ―bare recital‖, The Economist warned, did not cover ―those grisly 
companions of starvation – tuberculosis, dysentery, typhoid and typhus, rickets – nor the 
appalling figures for maternal and infant mortality.‖ 
    Nevertheless, by means of various ad hoc measures, and with the experience of ―relief 
and refugee‖ administrations set up during the war, the refugees began to be settled. In 
1946 the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was established to deal with ―the last 
million‖ (Zolberg et al. 1989:22). Again, its existence was seen as temporary. 
    But as the IRO‘s task neared completion it became clear that the issue of refugees would 
not go away. The Cold War between the Communist East and the capitalist West made 
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Europe a major theatre in that war, with refugee flows moving from East to West. So when 
UNHCR replaced the IRO in 1949 its focus, like its predecessor‘s, was on Europe, and the 
Refugee Convention was created under its auspices in 1951. During this period, Western 
Europe seemed to have no problem in accepting refugees. ―In the receiving countries of the 
West‖, notes UNHCR, ―anyone arriving from the Soviet Union or one of its allies was 
automatically granted some form of asylum; no detailed scrutiny of their reasons for 
leaving was felt necessary‖ (UNHCR 1993:8-9). The reason was simple: refugees had 
become 
 
important symbols in the ideological rivalry of the Cold War. ―Escapees‖ who 
crossed over to the West ―voted with their feet‖ and represented a significant 
political and ideological asset for the West (Loescher 2001:7). 
 
    But things would change. In the short term it became clear that the primary focus on 
Europe could not be maintained for long. The decisive shift came with UNHCR‘s decision 
to give assistance to Tunisia and Morocco as they coped with refugee flows from Algeria 
during that country‘s war of independence with France (1954-62). With this decision 
behind it, the organisation‘s focus moved increasingly towards the Third World, where 
―[v]iolent decolonization, as well as post-independence civil strife and warfare in Africa, 
generated vast numbers of refugees‖ (Loescher 2001:9). As the Cold War itself spread to 
the Third World, with East and West vying for influence among the newly independent 
countries, ―by the 1980s virtually all of the UNHCR‘s activity occurred in the developing 
world‖ (ibid.:10). 
 
1.5    Refugee protection after the Cold War 
In the longer term the Cold War would come to an end – but refugee flows did not. The 
overthrow of the East European Communist regimes and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
created fears in Western Europe of an influx of immigrants from the East. The economic 
crises arising from the Soviet Union‘s collapse led to the creation of 1.2m refugees and 
internally displaced persons (Hayden 1998:165); the break-up of Yugoslavia led to war and 
ethnic cleansing from Croatia to Kosovo and, between 1992 and 1995, 2.7m people were 
displaced as a result of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Stubbs 1998:192). But the increase 
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in refugee numbers was not confined to these areas. In 1999 the World Refugee Survey 
counted 35 million displaced people worldwide (cited Loescher 2001:3). 
    Much of the increase during this period was due to the collapse of regimes which had 
been supported by one or other side during the Cold War and which were now cynically 
abandoned, leading to the ―international marginalization of previously strategic areas in the 
developing world‖ (Suhrke 1997:232). But the real problems for the Third World 
originated even earlier than this – and the Western states were deeply implicated in their 
genesis. For the high levels of lending to the Third World by the developed countries in the 
mid 1970s stopped when the recession of that decade began to bite, leaving Third World 
countries with a debt crisis. By the 1980s, intervention by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) was seen as a solution. But Hewitt argues that such 
interventions ―appear to have hindered rather than helped the situation‖ (Hewitt 1996:233). 
According to the South Commission,
3
 the stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes imposed by these institutions had the aim of achieving ―a quick, short-term 
improvement in the balance of payments‖ (cited ibid.:234) and the primary concern was to 
safeguard the interests of international commercial banks. But, the Commission argued, the 
programmes ―did not provide for sufficient external financial support to permit adjustment 
to occur and endure‖ and they were ―generally shaped by a doctrinaire belief in the efficacy 
of market forces and monetarist policies‖ (cited ibid.). This last marked a shift from the 
Keynesian economic perspectives of high government spending and state intervention to a 
neoliberal approach which reduced the role of the state, controlled the money supply and 
relied on the market to allocate resources. Thus, within this context, structural adjustment 
meant ―cuts in public spending and changes in relative prices [which] had devastating 
effects on vital public services like health and education, with especially harmful 
consequences for the most vulnerable social groups‖ (cited ibid.). Now the declining ability 
of states to provide subsistence and their increasingly repressive response to protest led to 
social disintegration, war and ―wholesale escape abroad‖ – an increase in the flow of 
refugees (Zolberg et al. 1989:44). 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The South Commission was established in 1987 in the wake of the non-aligned summit meeting of 1986. It 
consisted of prominent individuals from the Third World (the South), from different backgrounds and of 
different political persuasions. Its chair was former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. It was regarded as a 
moderate voice on Third World issues. 
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1.6    Crisis in the EU 
Despite the involvement of the developed states and their institutions in creating these 
disasters, the EU states saw the situation primarily as a crisis for themselves rather than for 
the refugees. Their response was to seek ways of excluding refugees from their borders. 
The context for this is to be found in the EU integration project – ―the inclusion of all the 
most wealthy capitalist nation states in a single European market‖ (Miles & Thränhardt 
1995:5) and four factors which accompanied it. First, ―[t]he fact that European integration 
was in full swing when the Cold War unexpectedly ended led to increased uncertainty as to 
the identity of Europe‖ (Delanty 1995:141), for the enemy against which Europe had 
defined itself for four decades had disappeared and a new definition was needed. Secondly, 
European business and European politicians were facing the realities of competition with an 
increasingly dominant US. Thirdly, they had to contend with ―the emergence of the 
assertive capitalisms of East Asia‖ (Marfleet 1998:80). The rapidly developing economies 
of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were hailed in the West as ―miracles‖ 
of economic development.  But although they were described as ―tigers‖ by their admirers, 
they were also called ―dragons‖ – a word containing undertones of apprehension on the part 
of those who faced their competition.  Fourthly, the integration agenda was meeting 
opposition, which came both from the far right and from mainstream national politicians. 
The EU has always been an association of nation states and 
 
the national ideologies of member states have long been premised upon ideas about 
the distinctiveness of each vis-a-vis ―rival‖ European entities. Hence the EU has 
itself been a forum for competition between politicians of member states who wish 
to prove their vigour by championing specific national agendas around all manner 
of issues – exchange rates, agricultural quotas, fishing rights, commercial standards, 
military relations (Marfleet 2001:79). 
 
Marfleet argues that the resulting cynicism and chaos have proved to be ―fertile ground for 
the extreme right, which has viewed the Union as an arena for the assertion of popular 
national projects‖ (ibid.). Right-wing parties attempted to arouse popular hostility towards 
European national or regional groups which they claimed were privileged by the EU or 
parasitic upon it. ―An integrated Europe‖, notes Delanty (1995:142-3),  
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was commonly felt not to be a ―unified‖ Europe simply because as a free-trading 
bloc it is too small to provide each of its member states with equal access to 
markets. An integrated Europe would inevitably benefit a privileged select group of 
states … with high unemployment in greatly disadvantaged peripheries. 
 
Mainstream national politicians were worried about the extent to which the far right were 
able to mobilise electorates around these ideas.  
    These questions were being raised at a time when ―[s]ocial democratic parties were 
undergoing a rapid loss in electoral appeal, the conservative parties were finding it 
increasingly difficult to solve a major crisis in capitalism, unemployment was reaching an 
all-time high and recession had set in‖ (ibid.:141). The EU states‘ response was to pursue a 
European identity with the potential to encourage racism. A crisis developed, involving 
economics, politics and issues of national identity. Marfleet argues that the need to 
legitimise the integration project led to ―an urgent exploration of ‗Europeanness‘ – of 
notions of Europe that can be a basis for identification with the EU‖ (2001:79-80). This 
would not mean a denial of national loyalties but ―a pan-continental identity which can 
contain conflicting nationalisms‖ (ibid.:80). For Delanty, ―Europe‖ then becomes a kind of 
metanarrative, ―a transcendent point of unity beyond the nation state [with] the power of 
social integration‖ (1995:145). What, then, of immigrants, including asylum seekers, who 
come from outside the EU? We shall see how in the decades following the Second World 
War, both in the UK (chapter 2) and France (chapter 3), immigrants who came to work 
faced racism and discrimination. It seems that history is now repeating itself in the context 
of asylum, for what emerged from the search for European identity was Fortress Europe. 
 
1.7    Fortress Europe 
European integration is usually described in terms of free movement and open borders but 
integration is about exclusion as well as inclusion. Liberalisation allows citizens of the EU 
to move freely within its borders, and this is not seen as a threat to the security of the Union 
or any of its member states – on the contrary, it is essential to the EU‘s free-market 
priorities. But people on the peripheries of the EU are indeed seen as threatening, and 
immigration to Europe, especially from the Third World, has thus become a ―security 
problem‖ (Huysmans 1995:53). After 1989 and the collapse of the Communist regimes, 
there were worries about how to justify the continued role of the security agencies, so 
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crucial during the Cold War. Now, in the context of EU integration, their position seemed 
assured as Europe became preoccupied with immigration from beyond its borders (Geddes 
2000:26).  Harris (1995:85) highlighted the new insecurity felt by politicians and officials 
in the EU, noting that at one stage 
 
upwards of a dozen intergovernmental bodies were examining the issues involved, and 
there were over one hundred ministerial and official meetings on the question [of 
immigration].  All this suggests a society so insecure, so vulnerable, that a handful of 
foreigners … can overturn it. 
 
Yet this perceived crisis in Europe was no crisis at all compared with that in the Third 
World. Castles and Miller (1998:91) spell out the facts: by 1995, there were 2.6 million 
refugees in the developed countries of Europe, N. America and Oceania. There were five 
million in Asia, 6.8 million in Africa: 
 
Iran had 2.2 million refugees and Pakistan 1.1 million, mainly from Afghanistan. 
Some of the world‘s least developed areas had huge refugee populations: 1.7 
million in Zaire, 88,300 in Tanzania, 727,000 in the Sudan and 553,000 in Guinea. 
It is still the poorer countries which bear the brunt of the world refugee crisis. 
 
1.8    Stemming the flow 
1.8.1   Schengen and Dublin 
The EU states remained in crisis mode and continued to tighten restrictions on asylum 
seekers‘ entry. Much of this took place within the framework of the Schengen border 
system. The process which established the Schengen Convention had begun as early as 
1985 but it was not fully achieved and implemented until 1996. It gave effect, on the one 
hand, to the abolition of the EU‘s internal border controls and, on the other, to the 
strengthening of its external borders, thus dealing with the ―security problem‖. All the EU 
states signed up to it except Ireland, Denmark and the UK, the latter because it was even 
more hard line on border controls than its partners: it insisted on retaining its own controls 
over anybody travelling to Britain from within the EU. By 1999, however, having achieved 
an opt-out on this basis, the UK was participating fully in other Schengen activities, many 
of which show a preoccupation with areas of illegality: they include the Schengen 
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Information Service (SIS) (a computerised database through which information on 
prohibited immigrants, wanted persons and stolen vehicles is exchanged); sanctions against 
airlines, shipping companies, etc., carrying asylum seekers without travel documents; and 
analysis of intelligence on organised gangs of people smugglers. While these are legitimate 
concerns, their effect is to shift the focus of asylum policy away from the realities of forced 
migration on to lawbreaking and criminality. As Mitchell and Russell argue (1996:60-61), 
the SIS is one element in a package which will ―enhance considerably the effectiveness of 
the policing of migrants and asylum seekers across Europe‖ and in the process be ―liable to 
criminalise arbitrarily, without adequate means of defence, an increasing number of 
economic and political migrants‖. 
    The 1990 Dublin Convention created another obstacle for asylum seekers: it specified 
that an asylum application must be made in the first EU country of arrival. If you apply in 
the UK, for example, but you have passed through France, you may be refused or sent back 
to France to be dealt with. It is no defence to explain that you were in the hands of a courier 
and had no control over your destination; that you have friends or relatives in the UK but 
do not know anybody in France; that you have some knowledge of English but not of 
French. Further, under the Dublin Convention, if your application is refused in one EU 
country it will automatically be refused in all others. This goes against the usual 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, i.e. that it requires every signatory state to 
consider all applications for asylum made on its territory. 
 
1.8.2   Visas 
Visa requirements are used in an attempt to prevent migration at source. Hayter shows that, 
since the mid 1980s, it has been the practice of EU states to impose visas at times of 
refugee-producing emergencies in different parts of the world and thus avoid their 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. In 1985 the UK put visa restrictions on Sri 
Lankans after persecution of Tamils had intensified, Belgium imposed visas on the main 
refugee-producing countries in 1986, Sweden and Norway on Chileans in the late 1980s, 
and Denmark on Romanians in 1989, the year that the UK did the same to Turkish 
nationals after a particularly virulent round in the Turkish government‘s persecution of the 
Kurds resulted in an increase in asylum claims. In 1991 France imposed transit visas on 
eleven refugee-producing countries: not only could people from these countries not 
disembark in France, they could not even pass through as transit passengers without visas. 
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In 1994, when refugee numbers from Sierra Leone and Côte d‘Ivoire were increasing, the 
UK imposed visas – and did the same to Colombia in 1997. In March 1998, when 56 
Kosovans had claimed asylum at Heathrow airport after landing as transit passengers, the 
UK invented a new kind of transit visa, the direct airport transit visa (DATV), to prevent 
such claims being made. DATVs were subsequently ―applied to 14 other countries, 
including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia‖ (Hayter 2000:75). 
 
1.8.3    Casting doubt and policing abroad 
Outside this legal framework, the EU states have used two main procedures in order to keep 
people out. First, they routinely cast doubt on asylum seekers‘ accounts of their 
experiences. This passage from a UK Home Office letter (cited Asylum Aid 1999:1), 
rejecting an asylum seeker‘s application, is an example of the practice: 
 
You state that the men drove you to a place one and a half hours away and told you 
to run before they opened fire on you. The Secretary of State … considers that if the 
men had intended to kill you they would have done so straight away rather than give 
you a chance to escape. 
 
Secondly, the EU states try to prevent people fleeing persecution in the first place by 
sending airline liaison officers not only to transit countries, where refugees in flight often 
stop before moving on, but also to refugee-producing countries themselves. They turn away 
people who have no documents and those whose documents they decide are false (Hayter 
2000:85, 98). Such collaboration with oppressive regimes in the persecution of their people 
undermines the right to asylum. 
 
1.9   Anti-terrorism legislation 
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 led to 
security becoming an even higher priority in the US and Europe and impacted on all 
migrants, including asylum seekers. New legislation was enacted in several European 
countries, with worrying consequences for civil liberties and the right to asylum. The UK 
government enacted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 but found itself in 
trouble in 2004 when 
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the House of Lords declared the indefinite detention without charge of foreigners 
suspected of involvement in international terrorism under powers requiring a 
derogation from [the European Convention on Human Rights] to be discriminatory 
and disproportionate in nature and incompatible with the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention (Gil-Robles 2005:6). 
 
The government allowed the relevant provisions to expire and did not renew them. 
However, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 also generated concerns. Ben Ward of 
Human Rights Watch argued: ―First we had indefinite detention, now we have curfews 
and tagging – but still without trial. That hardly counts as progress. The government 
refuses to acknowledge a basic truth: punishment without trial is unacceptable, no matter 
what‖ (Human Rights News, 16 March 2005).  
 
1.10    Standards and human rights 
Where does this leave the Refugee Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and other international standards relating to the treatment of refugees? Most states argue 
that restrictive laws and procedures are necessary in order to exclude ―unsubstantiated‖ 
claims and identify terrorist suspects and that their obligations under the Convention are 
fulfilled in the protection of ―genuine‖ refugees. This may not breach the Convention. But 
we shall see that the restrictive asylum regimes in the UK and France undermine, rather 
than guarantee, the right to asylum. 
 
1.10.1    Interpreting the Convention 
Questions also arise about the Refugee Convention itself. For although, in principle, it 
seems to establish the primacy of refugee protection, in its detail and in practice it has 
proved to be ambiguous and open to a variety of interpretations. So although UNHCR 
―advocates that governments adopt a rapid, flexible and liberal process‖ when dealing with 
asylum applicants because it recognises ―how difficult it often is to document persecution‖ 
(UNHCR 2003:2), its interpretation of the Convention contradicts this stance. In its 
definition of a refugee, the Convention‘s reference to persecution ―for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion‖ 
(Convention & Protocol 1996:16) suggests the possibility of group persecution and a 
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collective refugee experience.  But, when interpreted by UNHCR, the definition turns out to 
be based on a concept of persecution in which the burden of proof falls on the individual 
asylum seeker. Thus people ―who apply for refugee status normally need to establish 
individually that their fear of persecution is well-founded‖ (UNHCR 2003:3), i.e. they must 
provide evidence that it is not just their social group, members of their political party or 
people who share their religion or ethnicity who are in danger but themselves as 
individuals. A ―flexible and liberal process‖ becomes less likely as governments demand 
this rigorous standard of proof.  
    Discussions about whether to adopt a collective or an individual definition of persecution 
had taken place before the Convention was drafted. Even before the IRO had been set up 
concerns were expressed that a broad or collective definition would end up ―multiplying the 
number of refugees ad infinitum‖ (Vernant 1953:6-7). State officials at the time were 
resisting Sir John Hope Simpson‘s 1939 definition of a refugee as someone who ―has left 
his former territory because of political events there …‖ (cited, Zolberg et al. 1992:21). 
This remained a live issue: the author of a UNHCR-sponsored study in 1953 pointed out 
that ―the mere fact that a man has left his country solely because political events there were 
not to his liking does not suffice to confer on him the status of refugee‖ (Vernant 1953:6). 
The solution was to stipulate ―persecution‖ as the key criterion and put the burden of proof 
on the shoulders of the asylum seeker: ―the political events which in the country of origin 
led to his departure must be accompanied by persecution or the threat of persecution against 
himself or at least against a section of the population with which he identifies himself‖ 
(ibid.:7). In the end, the Refugee Convention, as interpreted by UNHCR, put the burden of 
proof on the individual asylum seeker. 
 
1.10.2    UNHCR 
Ambiguities between text and interpretation should not come as a surprise: UNHCR is the 
creation of the UN member states and continually finds itself under pressure from these 
states, especially the most powerful and the largest donors. Loescher reminds us that there 
has ―hardly ever been a time in the UNHCR‘s history when governments‘ foreign policies 
or strategic interests did not affect their stance towards the Office [of the High 
Commissioner]‖ (2001:6). During the Cold War, ―American leaders considered refugee 
policy too important to permit the United Nations to control it‖ (ibid.:7). Today‘s pressures 
are different, but they are just as strong. During the last decade and a half, under pressure 
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from states, UNHCR has shifted its attention from local integration projects, educational 
programmes and the promotion of refugee participation to an emphasis on repatriation as 
the preferred solution to the refugee problem. It does, of course, say that repatriation should 
be ―wholly voluntary‖, that it should take place ―in conditions of safety and dignity‖ and 
that UNHCR is against ―repatriation under duress‖ (UNHCR 1997:147). Nevertheless 
―governments everywhere were also becoming more restrictionist and were exerting 
pressure on the UNHCR to encourage and promote the return of refugees to their home 
countries as quickly as possible‖ (Loescher 2001:17). This pressure was successful. 
Loescher cites the return of refugees from Bangladesh to Burma, and from Tanzania and 
former Zaire to Rwanda and Burundi, as ―illustrations of situations in which the UNHCR 
cooperated with host governments to return refugees home before conditions had become 
safe‖ (ibid.:17). UNHCR cooperation with the UK government in the repatriation of 
Albanian Kosovans after the 1999 Kosovo war is another example. The repatriation was 
against the advice of all the relief agencies in the area, a House of Commons committee and 
the Refugee Council in the UK (Mouncer 2000:58). 
    The evidence is that, although UNHCR has managed, at different times in its history, to 
achieve some autonomy, it has little political authority of its own. But, as Loescher points 
out, it does have ―considerable moral authority and legitimacy‖ and there is ―no other UN 
agency where values and principled ideas are so central to the mandate and raison d’être of 
the institution or where some committed staff members are willing to place their lives in 
danger to defend the proposition that persecuted individuals need protection‖ (2001:1). In 
other words, they are seriously committed to the human rights principles referred to in the 
preamble to the Convention. 
 
1.10.3    EU standards 
There are also questions to be raised about EU standards. The 1999 European summit of 
heads of state or government at Tampere, Finland, set out a framework for EU policies and 
legislation on asylum and immigration in the light of the Amsterdam Treaty, which came 
into force the same year. The Treaty established the need to have binding minimum rules in 
these areas and Tampere promised much and was seen by the European Council on 
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Refugees and Exiles (ECRE
4) as ―an important watershed‖ in refugee protection (ECRE 
2004:7). The Tampere Presidency Conclusions affirmed (Tampere 1999): 
 
 the ―absolute respect of the right to seek asylum‖ (para 13) 
 the need to ensure that nobody is sent back to persecution (para 13) 
 the need for ―a more vigorous integration policy‖ (para 12) 
 the EU‘s commitment to ―an open and secure European Union, fully committed to 
the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human rights 
instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity‖ 
(para 4). 
 
    But the first phase of negotiations on the Tampere principles (the five years to 2004) was 
seen by ECRE as disappointing. It described the intergovernmental negotiations of these 
years as driven not by the spirit of Tampere but ―by most European governments‘ aim to 
keep the number of asylum seekers arriving as low as possible and by their concerns to 
tackle the perceived abuses of their asylum systems‖ (ECRE 2004:3). The emphasis on the 
need to combat illegal immigration has been ―to the detriment of … adequate safeguards 
for refugee protection‖, to the point that ―the act of seeking asylum in Europe has 
effectively been criminalised‖ (ibid.:4). ECRE tries to be positive: ―Recognition of the 
1951 Refugee Convention within EU legislation as the standard of reference reaffirms its 
continuing relevance as the instrument of refugee protection‖; the fact that all EU states are 
required to grant asylum to those who qualify under the Convention and to grant subsidiary 
protection to others is also positive, as is the recognition that non-state actors may also be 
agents of persecution. But for ECRE the record of this first phase of negotiations is almost 
unrelieved bad news, since ―[t]he ‗absolute respect of the right to seek asylum‘ … has been 
totally undermined‖ (ibid.). After five years, access to fair and efficient asylum procedures 
across Europe was not guaranteed, since member states had given themselves rights of 
derogation from the very few safeguards that had actually been agreed. Integration was 
often undermined by denial of financial and other support and by the fact that people with 
subsidiary protection had fewer rights than those with full refugee status. ECRE concluded 
that ―the last five years represent a missed opportunity to focus on the protection and 
                                                 
4
 ECRE is a network of refugee-assisting non-governmental organisations. Its aim is to promote the protection 
and integration of refugees in Europe. 
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integration of refugees rather than deterrence, and to set standards in line with international 
refugee and human rights law‖ (ibid.:3). In the negotiations, the EU member states 
 
pursued their narrow national agendas at great cost to refugees and to the building 
of a fair and efficient European protection system. This took place in a generally 
deteriorating public climate of growing hostility towards asylum seekers and 
refugees, and widespread irresponsible media reporting compounded by a lack of 
political leadership at national level (ibid.:3). 
 
ECRE thus reminded governments of the principles they had signed up to but found easy to 
forget. 
 
1.11   Contradictions 
At a time when the UK and France were both claiming success for their different 
approaches, their responses to Europe‘s ―asylum crisis‖ negated such claims. A new 
generation of immigrants was arriving and was being met with hostility, discrimination and 
racist stereotyping. In the UK, there was self-congratulation after the Macpherson Report 
on the Stephen Lawrence case (2.16) led to the government‘s undertaking to make race-
relations legislation applicable to the police, the prison system and the immigration service. 
Home Office minister Paul Boateng was optimistic about the future. In the past, he said 
(Race Card, 7 November 1999), 
 
there was a real question as to whether or not Britain was ever going to be a 
multiracial, multicultural society. You still, in the old days, got the impression that 
some people felt that it was all a bad dream and one day they would wake up and all 
the black folk would be gone … repatriation was on the agenda. That‘s no longer 
the case. We are a multiracial society. The question now is the extent to which we 
make a success of it. 
 
At the same time, however, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 had taken asylum 
seekers out of the social security system and denied them the right to cash benefits. It was 
the first of New Labour‘s asylum, immigration and nationality statutes and, in contrast to 
Boateng, Labour MP Diane Abbott compared the stance of the Blair government 
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unfavourably with the approach of an earlier leader of the Labour Party (Race Card, 7 
November 1999): 
 
Hugh Gaitskell would be shocked to imagine a Labour government … putting 
forward immigration and nationality legislation of the character that we are 
currently putting forward, but that‘s how much things have deteriorated since the 
sixties. 
 
    France‘s contradictory moment came after the rise of the sans-papiers movement in 
1996. The sans-papiers (people without residence permits, work permits, passports and 
other ID-related papers) received wide publicity in 1996 when a group of sans-papiers 
collectives and their supporters organised demonstrations, occupations and hunger strikes 
to draw attention to their plight and support their claims for regularisation.  These events 
raised public awareness of the sans-papiers and helped to produce something of a backlash 
against right-wing anti-immigrant views. When France‘s multi-ethnic football team won 
the 1998 World Cup, it was seen as ―embodying the very spirit and achievement of French 
ideas of citizenship and integration‖ (Favell 2001:xvii). Yet during this period the French 
state was also engaged in an exercise of national protection and of exclusion. As the state 
denied basic means of support to the minority of ―illegals‖ who were asylum seekers, Le 
Monde reported that the collège des médiateurs, set up to solve the problem, had deplored 
administrative practices which hid their attacks on the right to asylum behind ―excessive 
demands for proof of persecution … completely impossible [for its victims] to provide‖5 
(cited Noiriel 1998:viii). 
 
1.12    Conclusion 
We have seen how refugees are migrants who have been forced to flee their home countries 
to seek refuge abroad (1.3), and how refugee protection became a permanent feature of the 
international scene during the twentieth century (1.4). We saw how, during the Cold War, 
refugees from the Communist East were welcomed in Western Europe (1.4). When the 
Cold War ended, however, refugee flows increased – both from the former Communist 
states and the Third World (1.5). A sense of crisis then developed in the EU states and they 
                                                 
5
  …exigence exorbitante de preuves de la persécution … radicalement impossibles à fournir.  
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began to set up barriers against asylum seekers (1.6-1.8) and this undermined the right to 
asylum. UNHCR insistence that the burden must be on individual asylum seekers to prove 
their case (1.10.1) also undermines that right, contradicting UNHCR‘s own plea for a 
―flexible and liberal‖ asylum process (1.10.1). We saw that EU standards on the treatment 
of asylum seekers were themselves undermined by the EU states‘ aim to keep asylum 
arrivals as low as possible (1.10.3). Finally, in terms of the two countries studied here, I 
suggested that the response of the UK and France to the perceived asylum crisis 
contradicted their commitment to protection under the Refugee Convention. 
    In chapter 2 I examine the history of immigration in the UK after the Second World War, 
when large-scale immigration began in the context of post-war reconstruction. 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
 
IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN THE UK SINCE THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1    Introduction 
The British race-relations approach to immigration, race and citizenship is called by the 
French the ―Anglo-Saxon model‖ (primarily a reference to the UK and the United States) 
and contrasted sharply with their own model of republican citizenship (see chapter 3). The 
term ―Anglo-Saxon model‖ seems to assume that certain principles and a theory lie behind 
the UK approach. While these are not absent, I argue that its successes and failures need 
rather to be understood in the light of its pragmatic origins. I argue that its failures can be 
traced to an original failure by politicians to counter racism in British politics and society. 
Its successes, on the other hand, may be traced to the determination of the ethnic minorities 
themselves and the anti-racist movement to fight for equality. I begin this history, however, 
at the end of the Second World War, where we find a contradiction between an 
acknowledged need for workers and concerted attempts by the state to exclude black and 
Asian people from the UK‘s colonies and former colonies. We will examine the racism 
which underlay these attempts, the way the state overcame a number of obstacles to racist 
immigration controls and the discrimination which followed under governments of the left 
and the right. We will examine the race-relations approach to immigration and the 
contradiction at its heart and the weaknesses of the liberal agenda set out by Roy Jenkins. 
We will see how racism continued to thrive as well as the successes of the struggle against 
it by its victims and their supporters. We will then see how racist notions were revived in 
the context of asylum. 
 
2.2    Reconstruction 
The task of reconstruction in the UK after the Second World War was massive and 
daunting: many workers had been killed in the fighting and much of the country‘s 
infrastructure and industry had been destroyed in the bombing. Moreover, the government 
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was committed to social change, for the people had demanded not just victory but a better 
world. The politicians remembered how the First World War had been followed by the 
Russian Revolution and Quintin Hogg (later Lord Hailsham) warned the House of 
Commons in 1943 that ―if you do not give the people social reform, they are going to give 
you social revolution‖ (Philo, G. (undated), p.2). As Hobsbawm notes (1995:161): 
 
Nobody dreamed of a post-war return to 1939 … as statesmen after the First World 
War had dreamed of a return to the world of 1913. A British government under 
Winston Churchill committed itself, in the midst of a desperate war, to a 
comprehensive welfare state and full employment. 
 
2.3    Civis Britannicus sum 
Such a project would require much work and many workers, and the story of how the job 
was eventually done is usually told in terms of the willing recruitment of black and Asian 
workers from the colonies and ex-colonies to augment the labour force. As more and more 
colonies achieved independence, imperial rhetoric about British rule over an empire ―on 
which the sun never sets‖ gave way to a Commonwealth rhetoric used by both the Labour 
and Conservative parties for many years following the war. Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell 
told his party conference in 1961 (Race Card, 24 October 1999): 
 
I believe with all my heart that the existence of this remarkable, multiracial 
collection – association – of independent nations, stretching across five continents, 
covering every race, is something that is potentially of immense value to the world. 
 
More specifically, in 1954, Henry Hopkinson, Conservative minister of state at the Colonial 
Office, declared (cited Hayter 2000:44) that colonial subjects‘ right of free entry into the 
UK was 
 
not something we want to tamper with lightly … We still take pride in the fact that a 
man can say civis Britannicus sum [I am a British citizen] whatever his colour may 
be and we take pride in the fact that he wants to and can come to the mother 
country. 
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Indeed, for at least a century no distinction had been made between citizens of the British 
Empire regarding their right to enter Britain. The reasons for this were economic and 
political: from the middle of the nineteenth century ―the economic imperatives of the free 
flow of goods, labour and services within the Empire enhanced the feeling that such 
distinctions were likely to be detrimental to broad imperial interests‖ (Spencer 1997:53). In 
the post-war period Britain wanted to foster good relations with the newly independent 
countries in order to keep a foothold, particularly in terms of economic power, in the 
regions of the world it once ruled. These were the realities which underlay the softer talk of 
the Commonwealth and the continued right of free entry into Britain for all its members – 
and it was against this background that the British Nationality Act 1948 was introduced. 
Carter et al. argue that its purpose in defining UK and Colonies citizenship was not to 
reaffirm rights of free entry but to ―curb colonial nationalism‖ (1993:57). Nevertheless, 
within this context, the Act did confirm those rights. 
 
2.4    “… we cannot force them to return …” 
The post-war reality, however, proved to be very different from the rhetoric. The 1945 
Labour government attempted from the beginning to limit the number of black and Asian 
Commonwealth and colonial citizens allowed into the country. It resorted to administrative 
methods of control, many of doubtful legality and most of them secret. The government‘s 
first action was to ensure the early repatriation of the black workers who had been urgently 
recruited from the colonies during the war. It also set about discouraging them from 
returning. This was true in the case of about a thousand Caribbean technicians and trainees 
recruited to work in war factories in Merseyside and Lancashire. In April 1945 an official at 
the Colonial Office had minuted that, because they were British subjects, ―we cannot force 
them to return‖ – but it would be ―undesirable‖ to encourage them to stay (Spencer 
1997:39). The Ministry of Labour managed to repatriate most of them by the middle of 
1947. Then, in order to discourage them from returning, an official film was distributed in 
the Caribbean 
 
showing the very worst aspects of life in Britain in deep mid-winter. Immigrants 
were portrayed as likely to be without work and comfortable accommodation 
against a background of weather that must have been filmed during the appallingly 
cold winter of 1947-8 (ibid.:32). 
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2.5    Redistribution of labour and recruitment from Europe 
But the need for labour remained and the government tried to solve the problem in two 
ways – neither of which involved importing labour from the colonies. First, it tried to 
increase labour mobility within the existing population and, secondly, it imported labour 
from Europe. 
    A Ministry of Labour report (Harris 1993:16) had predicted before the end of the war 
that there would not be sufficient mobility of labour within the country to face the 
challenges of the post-war world. Workers would have to be more willing to move into 
sectors where they were needed most. Virtually no one could be excluded, for everyone had 
to be part of the reconstruction project, even the unskilled and those ―below normal 
standards‖ (ibid.). In 1947 the government issued an invitation for people to go to their 
local labour exchanges to register themselves. Some incentives (in the form of Ministry of 
Labour hostels and training) were provided, plus the threat of prosecution (ibid.:18-19). 
The presenter of the radio programme Can I Help You? entered into the spirit of the 
government‘s intentions: ―The hope is … to comb out from plainly unessential [sic] 
occupations people who could be better employed; and to get the genuine drones in all 
classes to earn their keep …‖ (ibid.:17). Attlee had hoped that this project would provide 
what he had identified as the ―missing million‖ workers (ibid.) but six months later only 
95,900 of the ―drones‖ had responded (1993:17-18). Moreover, one source of home-grown 
labour had hardly been tapped in this exercise: women, essential during the war, were now 
told to go back to the home and make way for the men returned from battle. There were 
still sectors where women might work (e.g. textiles) but, as Harris notes, ―their ability to do 
so was greatly hampered by the reluctance of the government to maintain the war-time 
level of crèche provision‖ (ibid.). Thus an important source of labour was largely excluded. 
    In the case of immigration from Europe, the government set up Operation Westward Ho 
in 1947 in order to recruit labour from four sources: Poles in camps throughout the UK, 
displaced persons in Germany, Austria and Italy, people from the Baltic states and the 
unemployed of Europe (ibid.:19). It was partly knowledge of this recruitment which 
inspired pleas to the British government from the governors of Barbados, British Guiana, 
Trinidad and Jamaica. Each of these territories was suffering from high unemployment, 
with consequent discontent among their populations, and the governors wrote to London 
arguing that Britain could solve its own problem and theirs by accepting these workers into 
the UK. In response to this, an interdepartmental working party was set up which decided 
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that there was no overall shortage of labour after all. Spencer records that the working 
party‘s minutes display ―entirely negative attitudes to colonial labour‖ (1997:40): 
 
One senior official at the Ministry of Labour expressed the view that the type of 
labour available from the empire was not suitable for use in Britain and that 
displaced persons from Europe were preferable because they could be selected for 
their specific skills and returned to their homes when no longer required. Colonial 
workers were, in his view, both difficult to control and likely to be the cause of 
social problems. 
 
2.5.1    “… the object is to keep out coloured people” 
Opposition to black and Asian immigration continued throughout the next decade, with 
successive British governments seeking to justify legislation to control it. Hayter observes 
that the delay in introducing the legislation ―was caused by the difficulty of doing so 
without giving the appearance of discrimination‖ (2000:46). There is no doubt, however, 
about the racist nature of the intent to do so. From 1948 onwards various working parties 
and departmental and interdepartmental committees were set up to report on the ―problems‖ 
of accepting black immigrant workers into the UK. All of them were created in the hope of 
providing evidence that black immigrants were bad for Britain. There was the 
―Interdepartmental Working Party on the employment in the United Kingdom of surplus 
colonial labour‖, chaired by the Colonial Office; the Home Office based ―Interdepartmental 
Committee on colonial people in the United Kingdom‖; the ―Cabinet Committee on 
colonial immigrants‖; and the one that really gave the game away: the ―Interdepartmental 
Working Party on the social and economic problems arising from the growing influx into 
the United Kingdom of coloured workers from other Commonwealth countries‖. 
    Committees reported, cabinets discussed their findings and much correspondence passed 
between ministers and departments. Lord Salisbury (Lord President of the Council and 
Leader of the House of Lords) wrote in March 1954: ―It is not for me merely a question of 
whether criminal negroes should be allowed in … it is a question of whether great 
quantities of negroes, criminal or not, should be allowed to come‖ (Carter et al. 1993:65). 
Lord Swinton, secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, saw a difficulty and wrote to 
Salisbury (Spencer 1997:64): ―If we legislate on immigration, though we can draft it in 
non-discriminatory terms, we cannot conceal the obvious fact that the object is to keep out 
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coloured people.‖ In the case of the ―old Dominions‖ (i.e. the ―white‖ Commonwealth – 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand), he noted a ―continuous stream‖ of people coming to the 
UK ―in order to try their luck; and it would be a great pity to interfere with this freedom of 
movement‖ (ibid.:67). Moreover, such interference would undermine the strong ties of kith 
and kin between the UK and the ―white‖ Commonwealth. Swinton also believed that those 
strong ties would be further weakened by the development of a large ―coloured‖ 
community in Britain – declaring that ―such a community is certainly no part of the concept 
of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are 
attached‖ (ibid.:67-68). ―Swinton held the view strongly‖, wrote Spencer, ―that 
immigration legislation which adversely affected the rights of British subjects should be 
avoided ‗if humanly possible‘ and if it did become inevitable it was better for the 
legislation to be overtly discriminatory than to stand in the way of all Commonwealth 
citizens who wished to come to Britain‖ (ibid.:68). 
 
2.6    Obstacles to racist controls 
2.6.1    The Commonwealth connection 
It was not just concern for the ―white‖ Commonwealth which made governments delay 
legislating for controls until 1961. The UK‘s relationship with the Commonwealth as a 
whole was also a factor. In a period of decolonisation and the building of Commonwealth 
institutions, UK governments trod carefully. For example, openly discriminatory legislation 
―would jeopardise the future association of the proposed Federation of the West Indies with 
the Commonwealth‖ (ibid.:82). Politicians tried to persuade governments in the Caribbean 
and the Indian subcontinent to control the flow of migrants at source. They had some 
success in India and Pakistan, but not in the Caribbean. In 1958 Sir Henry Lintott, Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office, advised caution on the 
question of legislation. There had been calls for immigration controls in the wake of the 
Notting Hill riots (provoked by extreme right-wing groups). Sir Henry advised that in these 
circumstances immigration controls would imply that ―the British people are unable to live 
with coloured people on tolerable terms‖ (ibid.:102): 
 
This could be immensely damaging to our whole position as leaders of the 
Commonwealth which, in its modern form, largely draws its strength from its multi-
racial character. If, therefore, strong pressure develops for the introduction of 
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legislation to control immigration, I would hope that some way could be found to 
delay action and to permit passions to cool. 
 
These arguments were supported not only by many in the Conservative Party in the mid 
1950s but by the Labour Party too. In 1958 Arthur Bottomley spoke for the Labour front 
bench against legislation to control immigration (cited Foot 1968:251): 
 
The central principle on which our status in the Commonwealth is largely dependent 
is the ―open door‖ to all Commonwealth citizens. If we believe in the importance of 
our great Commonwealth, we should do nothing in the slightest degree to 
undermine that principle. 
 
With a House of Commons majority of only fifteen, the Conservative government was 
vulnerable. Similar considerations had applied in January 1955 when Home Secretary 
Gwilym Lloyd George presented his ideas for restrictive legislation to the cabinet. The 
cabinet judged that ―such a bill would not obtain the full support of the Conservative Party 
and would be opposed in the House by the Labour opposition and outside the House by the 
Trades Union Congress‖ (Spencer 1997:76). 
 
2.6.2    The working party evidence 
Another obstacle to immediate legislation was the fact that the working parties set up to 
provide evidence of the ―undesirability‖ of black immigrants failed to do so. They 
described ―coloured women‖ as ―slow mentally‖ and said that their ―speed of work‖ was 
unsatisfactory. They claimed there was ―a disproportionate number of convictions for 
brothel keeping and living on immoral earnings‖ among West Indian men and made 
references to ―the incidence of venereal disease among coloured people‖ (Race Card, 24 
October 1999). But they failed to make the case for immigration legislation. The committee 
with the specific mandate to investigate ―social and economic problems‖ relating to 
―coloured workers‖ must have been a particular disappointment. In August 1955 the 
committee‘s draft statement went to the cabinet. The allegation of a high incidence of 
venereal disease was included here – but only as a ―suggestion‖. The author of the report 
admitted that there were no figures to support the claim (Spencer 1997:78). Spencer 
summarises the committee‘s findings (ibid.): 
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Although ―coloured‖ immigration was running at the rate of about 30,000 a year … 
even those arriving most recently had found jobs easily and were making ―a useful 
contribution to our manpower resources‖. Unemployment … could not be regarded 
as a problem, nor could undue demands on National Assistance or the National 
Health Service … The immigrants were for the most part law-abiding except for 
problems with [cannabis] and living off the immoral earnings of women. Though 
the immigrants had not been ―assimilated‖ there was no evidence of racial tension 
and it was apparent that some ―coloured‖ workers in the transport industry had 
made a favourable impression. 
 
The same was true of the working party‘s reports between 1959 and 1961. ―Viewed 
objectively‖, writes Spencer, ―the reports of the Working Party consistently failed to fulfil 
the purpose defined in its title – to identify ‗the social and economic problems arising from 
the growing influx of coloured workers‘. In the areas of public order, crime, employment 
and health there was little noteworthy to report to their political masters‖ (1997:119). 
Moreover, the Treasury, when asked whether black and Asian immigration benefited the 
economy, ―gave the clear advice that on economic grounds there was no justification for 
introducing immigration controls: most immigrants found employment without creating 
unemployment for the natives and, in particular by easing labour bottlenecks, they 
contributed to the productive capacity of the economy as a whole‖ (Hayter 2000:48). 
    But, in the end, the working party managed to construct an argument for controls: 
―‗Assimilability‘ – that is, of numbers and colour – was the criterion that mattered in the 
end‖ (Spencer 1997:118). Between 1959 and 1961 there were large increases in the 
numbers of blacks and Asians entering the UK. At the beginning of the period there were 
around 21,000 entries a year; by the end they had risen to 136,000 (though much of this last 
figure may have been due to the fact that the government had signalled its intention to 
introduce legislation and larger numbers had decided to come in order to ―beat the ban‖). 
Working party officials compensated for their inability to find existing problems by 
predicting that they would arise later (ibid.:119): 
 
Thus in February 1961, whilst it was admitted that black immigrants were being 
readily absorbed into the economy, [officials predicted] ―it is likely to be 
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increasingly difficult for them to find jobs during the next few years‖. Further, it 
was doubtful if the ―tolerance of the white people for the coloured would survive 
the test of competition for employment‖. 
 
There would be ―strains imposed by coloured immigrants on the housing resources of 
certain local authorities and the dangers of social tensions inherent in the existence of large 
unassimilated coloured communities‖ (ibid.:118). The working party recommended 
immigration controls. It was ―prepared to admit that the case for restriction could not ‗at 
present‘ rest on health, crime, public order or employment grounds‖ (ibid.:120) but 
 
[i]n the end, the official mind made recommendations based on predictions about … 
future difficulties which were founded on prejudice rather than on evidence derived 
from the history of the Asian and black presence in Britain. 
 
Now there was just one obstacle impeding the introduction of controls. 
 
2.6.3    Public opinion 
One of the government‘s worries about introducing legislation had been the uncertainty of 
public opinion. Racist stereotyping in the higher echelons of government could also be 
found among the general population. Bruce Paice (head of immigration, Home Office, 
1955-1966), interviewed in 1999, believed that ―the population of this country was in 
favour of the British Empire as long as it stayed where it was: they didn‘t want it here‖ 
(Race Card 24 October 1999). It is true that hostility towards black people existed 
throughout the 1950s, and in 1958 the tensions turned into violent confrontation. In 
Nottingham and in the Notting Hill area of London there were attacks on black people, 
followed by riots, orchestrated by white extremist groups (Favell 2001:103). After these 
explosions racist violence continued but became more sporadic, ranging from individual 
attacks to mob violence (Fryer 1984:380). Nevertheless, for much of this period 
governments had not been confident that public opinion would be on its side when it came 
to legislation on immigration control. In November 1954 the colonial secretary wrote a 
memorandum expressing the hope that ―responsible public opinion is moving in the 
direction of favouring immigration control‖. There was, however, ―a good deal to be done 
before it is more solidly in favour of it‖ (cited Carter et al. 1993:66). In June 1955 cabinet 
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secretary Sir Norman Brook wrote to prime minister Anthony Eden expressing the view 
that, evident as the need was for controls, the government needed ―to enlist a sufficient 
body of public support for the legislation that would be needed‖ (cited ibid.). In November 
1955 the cabinet recognised that public opinion had not ―matured sufficiently‖ and public 
consent, conclude Carter et al., ―could only be assured if the racist intent of the bill were 
concealed behind a cloak of universalism which applied restrictions equally to all British 
subjects‖ (1993:68). 
 
2.7    Mission accomplished 
By 1961 the cloak was in place, and a Bill could be prepared. Home secretary R.A. Butler 
donned the cloak in a television interview: ―We shall decide on a basis absolutely 
regardless of colour and without prejudice,‖ he told the interviewer. ―It will have to be for 
Commonwealth immigration as a whole if we decide [to do it]‖ (Race Card, 24 October 
1999). He removed the cloak, however, when he explained the work voucher scheme at the 
heart of the Bill to his cabinet colleagues (cited Hayter 2000:47):  
 
The great merit of this scheme is that it can be presented as making no distinction 
on grounds of race or colour … Although the scheme purports to relate solely to 
employment and to be non-discriminatory, the aim is primarily social and its 
restrictive effect is intended to, and would in fact, operate on coloured people 
almost exclusively. 
 
The Bill passed into law and became the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. 
 
2.8    Plus ça change … 
Labour had opposed the 1962 Act throughout its passage through parliament – largely 
because it regarded the Act as incompatible with the Commonwealth ideal. Moreover, such 
principles were apparently non-negotiable: ―I do not care whether or not fighting this 
Commonwealth Immigration Bill will lose me my seat‖, declared MP Barbara Castle, ―for I 
am sure that the Bill will lose this country the Commonwealth‖ (Hayter 2000:46). The 
speech against the Bill by the Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, was admired even by some on 
the Conservative benches. Yet, once Labour had won the 1964 election, the new 
government set about making the Act even more restrictive. 
CHAPTER 2: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN THE UK 33 
 
2.8.1    Pressures 
Why should this have been so? There was pressure on the government from Whitehall. 
Bruce Paice had argued hard over the years for immigration controls. Even in retirement he 
was unable to conceal his contempt for the immigrants who came and the politicians and 
civil servants who allowed them to come for so long. ―How on earth people got the money 
to come here from places like West Africa and Barbados I‘ve no idea‖, he said in 1999 
(Race Card, 24 October). ―They never seemed to earn anything when they were there, and 
most of them I think didn‘t make much effort to earn anything much when they were here 
either.‖ He had tried to persuade senior officials that the solution was a simple one: 
 
I remember going to see Sir Arthur Hutchinson, Deputy Secretary, and I said all that 
was really needed was to give me the same powers about British subjects as I had 
about aliens. And he said in effect, ―Oh, don‘t be silly,‖ he said, you know, there 
couldn‘t be any question of such a thing. 
 
In 1962 Paice had his way: Commonwealth immigrants now had to queue with ―aliens‖ for 
permission to enter. ―The fact that I might be influencing, for good or ill, the lives of other 
people‖, he later commented, ―was to me just one of those things. It didn‘t cost me any 
sleepless nights. Somebody has to do this kind of job, and I was quite happy to do it‖ (ibid., 
24 October 1999). 
    There was also pressure from public opinion. When the debate on the Act began, support 
for immigration controls stood at 76%. But the Labour Party‘s campaign against the Bill 
changed the situation: by the end of its passage through the House of Commons, support 
for controls had fallen to 62% (Jenkins 1999). It looked as though a strong campaign had 
changed people‘s minds. Nevertheless a majority of 62% was still a majority – and Labour 
had to think of the next election. In fact, even before the Bill was passed, there were signs 
that Labour‘s commitment to the rights of free entry and settlement of Commonwealth 
citizens was less than firm. During the third reading of the Bill, Labour frontbencher Denis 
Healey hinted that controls might be necessary in the future (Hayter 2000:46). After 
Gaitskell‘s unexpected death the new leader, Harold Wilson, gave a further hint of change. 
While opposing the renewal of the Act in November 1963 he nevertheless told the House of 
Commons: ―We do not contest the need for control of Commonwealth immigration into 
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this country‖ (Foot 1968:252). When the election came in 1964 the Labour Party manifesto 
declared (ibid.:254): 
 
Labour accepts that the number of immigrants entering the United Kingdom must 
be limited. Until a satisfactory agreement covering this can be negotiated with the 
Commonwealth, a Labour Government will retain immigration control. 
 
2.8.2    Smethwick 
If this was the case before the election, tighter controls became inevitable after it. Labour‘s 
shadow foreign secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, had lost his seat in Smethwick, in the 
West Midlands, to a Conservative, Peter Griffiths. One of the slogans daubed on walls 
during the campaign became notorious in British electoral history: ―If you want a nigger for 
a neighbour, vote Labour.‖ Griffiths denied being the author, but added: ―I would not 
blame anyone who said that … it was a manifestation of popular feeling‖ (Foot 1970:68). 
Smethwick, like many similar inner-city areas, suffered housing shortages and other 
problems, due not to immigrants but to policy failures both at national and local levels. But 
Griffiths blamed immigrants – and Gordon Walker blamed the Conservatives for letting so 
many into the country (Race Card, 24 October 1999). At an election meeting in 
Birmingham, Wilson did manage to identify the real issue (Hayter 2000:50): 
 
There is a very real problem of overcrowding which the Government has neglected. 
We are not having this immigrant question used as an alibi for the total Tory failure 
to handle the problems of housing, slums, schools and education in this country. 
 
However, after the election the government set about tightening the controls. 
 
2.8.3    Collapse 
The Conservatives had enforced the Act fairly loosely – Commonwealth relations had to be 
managed and public opinion had to be nurtured. Once Labour gained power in 1964, 
however, restrictions were increased. From September work vouchers were only issued to 
people with firm job offers or specific skills. Such a policy favoured whites, as the working 
party in 1961 had suggested it would (Spencer 1997:116). Vouchers granted were limited to 
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8,500 a year in 1965. Restrictions on dependants included ―nephews and cousins and 
children over 16‖ (Spencer 1997:135-6): 
 
In future, dependants would be expected to produce either an entry certificate or 
appropriate documents to establish identity at the port of entry. This was the origin 
of the system of entry control which saw the posting – to those Commonwealth 
countries that were sources of immigration – of Entry Control Officers whose job 
was to validate evidence of identity and issue entry certificates. 
 
During the ensuing period of Labour government, restrictions became tighter, to the point 
that in 1969 The Economist declared that Labour had ―pinched the Tories‘ white trousers‖ 
(cited Hayter 2000:51). 
 
2.9    Race relations 
Beginning with these controls, the rest of the 1960s saw the development of a new 
approach to race and immigration in the UK: the race-relations approach. This was tacitly 
supported by the Conservatives, who were also worried by the uncertain consequences of 
the racial hatred stirred up at Smethwick. Conservative frontbencher Robert Carr saw the 
consensus between the two parties as ―a marriage … of convenience – not from the heart‖ 
(Race Card, 24 October 1999). Labour insisted that its liberal credentials were intact 
because the approach‘s emphasis on integration was the key to social peace, the mark of a 
―civilised society‖. But (crucially, and to justify the tightening-up of the Act) it would have 
to include immigration controls if it was to be successful. In 1965 Home Office minister 
Roy Hattersley expressed it thus: ―Integration without control is impossible, but control 
without integration is indefensible‖ (cited Favell 2001:104). When Roy Jenkins became 
home secretary in 1966 he laid out his policy stall in a speech which was to become a 
foundation text for the new approach. He emphasised the integration side of Hattersley‘s 
equation, defining it both negatively and positively (cited, ibid.): 
 
I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own 
national characteristics and culture. I do not think we need in this country a 
―melting pot‖, which will turn everyone out in a common mould, as one of a series 
of carbon copies of someone‘s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman. 
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He defined integration positively as ―cultural diversity, coupled with equality of 
opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance‖, and added: ―If we are to maintain any 
sort of world reputation for civilised living and social cohesion, we must get far nearer to 
its achievement than is the case today.‖ Here was the moral, political and social 
justification for his liberal agenda and the multicultural society that would evolve from it. 
    There was, however, a contradiction at the heart of the approach which has dogged it 
ever since: it is inconsistent to claim to want to celebrate cultural diversity in society on the 
one hand and discriminate against black and Asian immigrants on the other. Thirty-four 
years later Roy Hattersley admitted as much: ―If your immigration restrictions are too 
repressive you encourage bad race relations rather than encourage contentment and 
satisfaction, because you are saying, ‗We can‘t afford any more of these people here‘, and 
the implication is that there is something undesirable about these people‖ (Race Card, 31 
October 1999). The truth is that race relations policy was not the result of high principle (as 
suggested by Gaitskell‘s opposition to the 1962 Act or by Jenkins‘s exposition of his liberal 
agenda) but of the complete abandonment of principle after 1964. After Smethwick ―the 
government panicked‖, explained Barbara Castle. The tightening-up of restrictions by 
Labour was done ―out of political cowardice, not political conviction‖ (ibid.). So the whole 
liberal project had its origin in a surrender to racism. 
    This helps to explain the weakness of the first Race Relations Act in 1965 and the 
inadequacies of the second in 1968. The 1965 Act prohibited ―incitement to racial hatred‖ 
but did not cover discrimination in housing and employment, did not contain criminal 
sanctions against those who discriminated, and did not apply to the police. Sivanandan 
described it as ―a half-hearted affair which merely forbade discrimination in ‗places of 
public resort‘ and, by default, encouraged discrimination in everything else: housing, 
employment, etc.‖ (cited Fryer 1984:383). Moreover, the Race Relations Board, set up 
under the Act to provide for a conciliation process to deal with discrimination in public 
places, sent the wrong message: ―To ordinary blacks,‖ Sivanandan argued, such structures 
―were irrelevant: liaison and conciliation seemed to define them as a people apart who 
somehow needed to be fitted into the mainstream of British society – when all they were 
seeking was [sic] the same rights as other citizens‖ (cited ibid.). The ineffectiveness both of 
the Act and the Board is summed up by Hayter (2000:35): 
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The first person to be charged under this Act was Michael X, a black militant. When 
Duncan Sandys, a prominent Tory MP, attacked a government report on education 
by stating that ―The breeding of millions of half-caste children will merely produce 
a generation of misfits and increase social tension‖, the Race Relations Board was 
unable or unwilling to prosecute him. 
 
    The 1968 Race Relations Act went further by bringing employment and housing into its 
ambit, but its inadequacies were apparent (Hayter 2000:35): 
 
The Act introduced fines on employers who were found to discriminate on the 
grounds of race, and compensation, but not reinstatement, for the people 
discriminated against … but the enforcement powers of the Race Relations Board 
remained weak. 
 
Moreover, the anti-discrimination provisions still did not apply to the police. Jenkins had 
faced opposition from the police when discussing the first Act and in 1968 the new home 
secretary, James Callaghan, bowed to similar pressure (Race Card, 31 October 1999). 
    The year 1968 also saw the passing of another Commonwealth Immigrants Act. 
 
2.10    The Kenyan Asians 
The Kenyan Asians who came to the UK in 1967-68 were never called refugees but, 
effectively, that is what they were. Their presence in Kenya was part of colonial history and 
their departure a result of the decolonisation process in East Africa. After independence in 
1963 Kenya adopted a policy of Africanisation: in the civil service, Africans had to be 
rapidly promoted; in private firms, Africans had to be employed at worker and management 
levels. At the time of independence Asians had been offered Kenyan or British citizenship, 
and many of them chose British. But the 1967 Trade Licensing Act in Kenya made it illegal 
for non-citizens to trade in rural or outlying urban areas and in a wide range of goods, and 
many Asians were forced out of business.  Many turned to Britain for help. In 1963 the 
Conservative government, though fresh from passing the first Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act, reassured the Kenyan Asians that their UK citizenship was secure. In March 1968 the 
Labour government, though fresh from declaring its liberal agenda, cancelled this 
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agreement and passed a new Commonwealth Immigrants Act which removed their UK 
citizenship. 
 
2.11    Racist pressures 
There were, of course, the usual pressures on the government from Whitehall and 
diplomatic sources to take such action. Eric Norris, high commissioner in Kenya, had long 
ago decided that he did not want to see Asians settling in Britain.  In 1955, returning by 
ship from his stint in the diplomatic service in Pakistan, he looked down to the ship‘s lower 
deck (Race Card, 24 October 1999) and saw  
 
a lot of these immigrant families … and some of these children came out on to the 
deck, squatted and defecated, you know.  Well, that‘s what they did, you know, they 
went outside the house … and there they – that was the sort of problem we were 
having to deal with. 
 
Now, in 1968, Kenyan Asians were protesting outside his office in Nairobi, demanding that 
British promises be kept. ―They all had a touching faith‖, he later said scornfully, ―that we 
would honour the passports that they‘d got‖ (ibid.).  
    There were also pressures from political sources. A campaign had been launched by Tory 
MPs Duncan Sandys and Enoch Powell to keep the Kenyan Asians out. Sandys told the 
Conservative Party Conference in 1967, ―We are determined to preserve the British 
character of Britain. We welcome other races, in reasonable numbers. But we have already 
admitted more than we can absorb‖ (ibid.). Beyond the Conservative Party the far right 
National Front – whose preoccupations were with white British identity and the repatriation 
of black and Asian immigrants – were also stirring in the same pot. The government could 
have resisted these pressures with arguments similar to those it had deployed against the 
1962 Act. The broadsheet press, churches and students opposed the campaign against the 
Kenyan Asians and could have been called in aid. But the government gave in to the 
pressure. The Act was passed in 72 hours and rendered the Kenyan Asians‘ passports 
worthless. All UK passport holders were subjected to immigration controls unless they 
could claim a parent or grandparent born, naturalised or adopted in the UK. The Act also 
introduced new restrictions on the entry of Commonwealth citizens‘ families. 
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2.12    From capitulation … 
The government was following the logic of its original surrender to racism after 1964. 
Many years later James Callaghan, home secretary in 1968, suggested that the racist 
campaign had carried more weight than potential complaints from the Commonwealth 
about the Act: ―I wasn‘t unaware of the difficulties that would arise [about Britain‘s 
reputation abroad] but there were problems here [at home]. We had to balance those 
problems‖ (Race Card, 24 October 1999). In cabinet he argued on the basis of the Jenkins 
race-relations policy: if race relations can only work alongside strict immigration controls, 
the government had no choice but to introduce the Act. ―We must bear in mind‖, he wrote 
in a memo to the cabinet, ―that the problem is potentially much wider than East Africa. 
There are another one and a quarter million people not subject to our immigration control 
… At some future time we may be faced with an influx from Aden or Malaysia‖ (Hayter 
2000:53). 
    This second capitulation to a racist campaign had serious repercussions on the future 
course of policy in terms both of immigration and race relations. The Act did not satisfy the 
racist right – it spurred them on to demand more. Enoch Powell not only called for an end 
to black and Asian immigration and for subsidised repatriation but, in lurid terms, predicted 
an apocalyptic future if his advice went unheeded. In April 1968 he declared (cited Hayter 
2000:54): 
 
We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation, to be permitting the annual inflow of 
50,000 dependants who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the 
immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in 
heaping up its own funeral pyre … As I look ahead I am filled with foreboding. 
Like the Roman, I seem to see ―the River Tiber foaming with much blood‖. 
 
Favell argues that this speech led to the success of the liberal race-relations agenda, taking 
the Labour and Conservative parties into a new consensus on immigration and race 
relations which, in the years ahead, would establish ―a core set of legislation that has 
provided the basis for all further progressive social developments, and which despite 
occasional voices of dissent from the right, has never been in danger of being rescinded‖ 
(Favell 2001:106). This was because both parties saw the dangers of anti-immigrant 
violence and reaction that Powell might stir up and were fearful that bigger conflicts might 
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be ignited and threaten the unity of the ―United Kingdom‖. He argues that the resulting 
consensus may have saved that unity in the dangerous 1970s, which saw ―British politics 
torn by fundamental conflicts over devolution, Northern Ireland and open class warfare; 
nobody in the mainstream really wanted to add race and immigration to the boiling pot‖ 
(2001:106). 
    The reality, however, was that after Powell‘s intervention the immigration-control side of 
the equation dominated and the party leaders intensified the competition between them on 
the question. Conservative leader Edward Heath said that Wilson had not ―got a grip on the 
situation as far as fresh immigrants are concerned‖ and that therefore good race relations 
were impossible. Wilson in turn confirmed his commitment to controls in terms almost as 
apocalyptic as Powell‘s (Race Card, 31 October 1999): 
 
If we were to have an open door to them at the end of the day, then it would mean 
such an influx that our social services, our housing, our whole environment in some 
of our big towns and cities would be congested and overloaded, to the point where it 
would be impossible to carry out one of the most difficult problems any country‘s 
had to do in recent times, and that is to assimilate the immigrants among our own 
population. 
 
2.13    … to defeat 
Powell promoted and provoked racism, not consensus. Following his speech there were 
many racist attacks on individuals, and the National Front gained recruits: ―In many areas,‖ 
according to Fryer, ―Asians and West Indians now went in daily fear of their lives‖ (Fryer 
1984:385). In one Southall factory, records Hayter (2000:54), ―where members of the white 
workforce had, as in some other British factories, campaigned to keep out black workers, 
fascist sympathisers were emboldened by Powell‘s speech to carry out violent attacks on 
shop stewards sympathetic to Asian workers.‖ Dockers and Smithfield market porters 
demonstrated outside parliament in support of Powell. 
    Labour leaders gave no equivalent help to anti-racism. Foot argued (1970:142) that 
 
[t]hey had gone about their race relations work quietly and in private, without 
seeking to disturb the public. They had met in the Home Office, or in the homes of 
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committee chairmen to plan their next housing association or English language 
class. 
 
But Powell had set out deliberately to disturb the public and when he had finished 
(ibid.:143), 
 
the liberals in race relations discovered that they had no army to confront Powell‘s. 
They could muster a large number of letter writers to The Times … but the Labour 
Party did not contemplate calling a demonstration to counter the pro-Powell 
demonstration of dockers. 
 
    In 1970 Labour lost the general election. There were several reasons for this defeat. First, 
faced with economic problems, the government began to reduce its support for companies 
like Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS), which had been created in 1967 to save jobs on the 
Upper Clyde and maintain it as a shipbuilding area. In 1969, however, the government told 
the UCS workers that the only way to save the firm was through ―considerable reductions 
in manpower … and higher productivity‖ (Adams 1993:301). Secondly, the government set 
out proposals for trade union reform which would reduce union power in the workplace, 
and this provoked unease and division in the labour movement. One government minister 
saw a link between workers‘ fears and insecurity and the support of some of them for 
Powell. Taking a phrase coined by Wilson during the 1964 election, the secretary of state 
for technology, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, asked (cited ibid.:300-301): 
 
What is ―the white heat of the technological revolution‖? It‘s the unemployment of 
the miner … who‘s burnt by the blowtorch of technological change, because you 
don‘t need mines, you‘ve got nuclear power. Go to the docks where containerisation 
will reduce the demand for labour, and the white heat of the technological 
revolution is the docker going to the House of Commons to support Enoch Powell 
one week and Jack Dash [a Communist trade union organiser] the next. 
 
Thirdly, many within the Labour Party and many of its natural supporters were 
disappointed by its performance over the Kenyan Asians and the race issue. Hayter argues 
that eventually there was some recognition in the party that ―the rushed introduction of the 
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1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act had set back Labour‘s attempts to improve race 
relations, and that its unexpected defeat … might have had something to do with its failure 
to counter Enoch Powell‖ (Hayter 2000:55). In 1961 the Labour campaign against the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill began to change minds; in 1968 the inadequate response 
of Labour to racist pressures encouraged racism. 
    Favell‘s claim that Powell‘s speech produced a consensus which led to liberal reform is 
highly questionable. He is right to say that Jenkins‘s ―ideas by themselves would have been 
insufficient to pull through any kind of reform‖ (2001:104). Indeed, speed with which 
Labour surrendered again to racism demonstrated that the liberal agenda was a totally 
inadequate tool for dealing with it. But anti-racist ideas gained ground, not because an 
orator had conjured up disorder and forced politicians into a consensus at the top, but 
because the victims of racism themselves fought back (2.15). 
    Meanwhile, the Conservatives, in government between 1970 and 1974, passed the 
Immigration Act 1971, which gave preference to white, and further restricted black and 
Asian, Commonwealth immigrants. They passed no balancing race-relations legislation. 
 
2.14    The Immigration Act 1971 
The 1971 Act created two new categories of citizens: patrials and non-patrials. Patrials 
were mostly white (British or Commonwealth citizens born or naturalised in the UK or 
having a parent or grandparent who was). They were not subject to controls. Non-patrials 
were mostly black or Asian and were subject to controls. The Act brought ―new permanent 
primary migration from the Indian sub-continent, the Caribbean and Africa to the United 
Kingdom finally to a halt‖ (Spencer 1997:143). In addition ―[c]ategory A and B vouchers, 
allowing residence and family reunion, were finally abolished and replaced by temporary 
work permits which gave neither the right of permanent residence nor the right for the 
workers‘ families to enter‖ (Hayter 2000:54). The Act came into force on 1 January 1973. 
The UK joined the European Economic Community on the same day and Hayter comments 
(2000:55) that as a result 
 
200 million people were to have the right freely to enter and to settle in Britain. 
Although concern was expressed in some quarters that this might lead to an 
overwhelming invasion of Spanish and Portuguese waiters … there was virtually no 
populist or racist opposition to this innovation. 
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The commitment to immigration control was now virtually fulfilled; the commitment to 
good race relations was lagging sadly behind. 
 
2.15    Responses to racism 
Racist immigration rules continued into the 1970s, as did discrimination and police 
harassment of ethnic minorities. Parties of the far right began to gain ground, but anti-racist 
groups and black defence organisations, together with campaigns against discrimination, 
racial attacks and police harassment, also grew – and this proved to be crucial to bringing 
about change. For although Labour governments were in power between 1974 and 1979, 
and a Race Relations Act was passed in 1976, the immigration rules remained in place and 
the Act, while addressing a number of issues concerning discrimination, still left the race-
relations institutions more reactive than proactive and, crucially, did not include the police 
in its scope. 
    In terms of the immigration rules Clare Short (private secretary to immigration minister 
Alex Lyon in 1974) has described the problems faced by Asian men who wanted their 
families to join them in the UK (Race Card, 31 October 1999): 
 
… as the racist atmosphere had grown up in the country, [with] allegations of … 
people coming in wrongly – more and more hurdles and checks had been put into 
the system, and it became an encapping system that really put families through hell 
to prove that they really were the children and the wife of the man. 
 
The result was a 21-month waiting list for applicants from Pakistan. Alex Lyon tried to 
help individuals, but he was sacked for his pains. Campaigns and protests grew, drawing 
attention to the way the system worked and especially to the tests inflicted on women to 
establish their virginity or their patterns of childbirth. Anwar Ditta fought a successful six-
year campaign for her children to be brought from Pakistan to live in the UK. She described 
the tests on her as ―abuse by consent‖ (ibid.). Such public pressure not only ensured the end 
of the tests but raised public awareness about the issues. 
    In terms of police harassment some of the worst abuses were committed as the police 
applied the ―sus‖ laws – section four of the Vagrancy and Street Offences Act 1824.  This 
section allowed them to stop, search and arrest individuals ―on suspicion‖ of ―loitering with 
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intent‖ to commit an offence. The police were using these powers mostly against young 
blacks and Asians, making assumptions about them simply because they were black. Hayter 
notes that in 1979 Home Office research ―found that a black person was 15 times more 
likely to be arrested under the ‗sus‘ laws than a white person‖ (2000:35). In 1982 the 
deputy chair of the Police Federation, Basil Griffiths, explained his philosophy: ―There is in 
our inner cities a very large minority of people who are not fit for salvage … the only way 
in which the police can protect society is quite simply by harassing these people and 
frightening them so they are afraid to commit crimes‖ (ibid.:36). A campaign to abolish the 
―sus‖ laws was mounted by the black community and gained widespread support. Paul 
Boateng was a lawyer at the time and argues that ―the great strength of the Scrap Sus 
Campaign was that it came from the grassroots experience of a group of black women in 
Lewisham, and came in time to embrace black people, white people, churches, political 
parties …‖ (Race Card, 31 October 1999). Abolition was resisted both by the Home Office, 
who ―refused to accept that the sus law was either inherently discriminatory or being used 
in a discriminatory way‖ (ibid.), and by the Metropolitan Police. But after four years of 
campaigning the pressure forced Margaret Thatcher‘s Conservative government to repeal 
the laws in 1981 and campaigner Mavis Best had no doubt that ―the credit must go to the 
black community for this, and no one else‖ (ibid.). 
    The black community had been fighting its corner on many issues during these years: 
demanding an end to discrimination and marginalisation, and demonstrating against the 
racist, far-right National Front. In the 1980s, inner city riots in London, Birmingham, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle and Bristol drew attention to disadvantage in housing, 
education and employment, as well as to continued police harassment. Yet in the words of 
Wally Brown, an activist from Toxteth, Liverpool, ―The Thatcher government did very 
little in actually putting in real jobs, improving the housing, improving the quality of life 
for people in Toxteth‖ (Race Card, 31 October 1999). As for police harassment, Paul 
Boateng warned in 1983 that, in spite of a change of police rhetoric at the top, ―the impact 
of policing … remains completely unaltered: the same abuses occur, the same tensions 
exist, and indeed there‘s a growing alienation and bitterness‖ (ibid.). The 1980s also saw 
black Labour candidates elected to parliament, and local councils (mostly Labour) adopting 
anti-racist policies in their areas.  
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2.16    Stephen Lawrence and institutional racism 
When racists murdered black teenager Stephen Lawrence in London in 1993 his family 
fought hard for an enquiry – which was eventually set up in March 1998 and chaired by 
Lord Macpherson. The Macpherson Report was published in February 1999 and found that 
the Metropolitan Police had, during its investigation of the murder, shown itself to be 
―institutionally racist‖. This meant, according to Imran Khan (the Lawrence family‘s 
solicitor) that 
 
we are dealing not with individual prejudice but with power. That power is derived 
from racist laws, constitutional conventions, judicial precedents, institutional 
practices – all of which have the sanction of the state and the blessing of our 
establishment (Khan 2003). 
 
In the wake of the report, the government passed the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
2001, which finally applied race-relations law to the police. There was a feeling that a real 
change had taken place in British race relations: the Macpherson enquiry was ―a kind of 
truth commission in which official acknowledgment was finally given to the evil of racism 
which had been perpetrated for years on the black communities of this country‖ (ibid.). 
    But it was not enough. First, in spite of anti-discrimination laws, watchdogs (such as the 
Commission for Racial Equality – CRE), numerous councils for community relations and a 
statutory duty for public authorities ―to promote race equality‖ (Duty 2005), racism, 
discrimination and disadvantage have not been eliminated. According to the CRE in 2005, 
members of ethnic minorities were still more likely to be stopped, searched and arrested, to 
be victims of crime (including racial offences), and were disproportionately represented in 
the prison population (Criminal Justice 2005). Ethnic minorities are more likely to be in 
poor housing and live in deprived areas (Housing 2005). Members of ethnic minorities 
showed higher levels of unemployment, had lower incomes and a worse position in the 
labour market than whites and this was due, in part, to ―substantial levels of racial 
discrimination‖ (Labour Market 2005). Secondly, even as the 2001 Act was being passed 
and celebrated, the asylum laws introduced to cope with the perceived ―asylum crisis‖ told 
a different story – a story of racism revived, and aimed at the new asylum seekers. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN THE UK 46 
2.17    Asylum legislation and rules 
Asylum seekers were not mentioned in the various immigration measures during the post-
war period until the Immigration Rules 1980. Under these rules, asylum claims were to be 
assessed in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. While this might seem a 
positive development (refugees being treated as a special case), developments in the mid 
1980s suggest the emergence of policymaking based once more on a major contradiction: 
the UK recognised its international obligations to refugees but undermined those same 
obligations by means of regulations, procedures and legislation. So visa restrictions were 
imposed on nationals of countries producing high numbers of refugees (see 1.7), and by 
1996 there were 105 such countries. Moreover, in 1987 the Immigration (Carriers‘ 
Liability) Act imposed fines of £2,000 on airlines and ferry operators for every passenger 
without valid travel documents. This impacted heavily on refugees, since the urgency of 
flight, and fear of the authorities in their countries of origin, meant that many refugees 
lacked such documentation. 
    The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 and the Immigration Rules 1994 follow 
the same pattern. The Act incorporated the 1951 Refugee Convention into UK law and 
established certain rights of appeal. Yet this acknowledgement of Refugee Convention 
obligations and the apparent attempt to establish a fair process for meeting them ran 
alongside measures which undermined such commitments. First, the rights of appeal were 
themselves limited by the Act – indeed, the most important limitation was imposed simply 
on the basis of the home secretary‘s opinion: ―… if the Secretary of State has certified that, 
in his opinion, the person‘s claim is without foundation‖ no appeal is available beyond the 
Special Adjudicator (AIAA 1993, Sch 2, para 5(1)). Special Adjudicators ―do not have to 
be legally qualified‖ (Burgess 2001:169) but their judgment is final. They may refer a case 
back to the home secretary for reconsideration, but if he reaffirms his opinion there is no 
further appeal. After the 1993 Act the balance between meeting obligations and avoiding 
them shifted towards avoidance. Hayter notes that the Act ―was followed by an 
unprecedented increase in rates of refusal, from 14 per cent in the six months before the Act 
to 72 per cent after it, while the granting of Exceptional Leave to Remain … fell from 76 
per cent to 22 per cent of decisions‖ (2000:76). The restrictions and penalties increased 
under the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which extended the grounds for fast-tracking 
applications, abolished the right of appeal against removal to another EU country, 
introduced a list of ―safe‖ countries, many of them of doubtful safety (including India, 
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Pakistan, Romania and Nigeria – protests led to the removal of Nigeria). It removed the 
right to welfare benefits for those seeking asylum after entry and those pursuing an appeal, 
and it introduced sanctions on employers hiring anyone who did not have permission to 
work in Britain. 
    Although the Labour opposition had opposed the 1996 Act when it was introduced, once 
the party had won the 1997 election the government prepared even more restrictive 
legislation. Labour‘s retreat from opposition to the 1996 Act mirrored its retreat from 
opposition to the 1962 Act, and happened for the same reason – the fear of losing votes. 
Hayter argues that the attitude of Labour politicians towards asylum seekers ―parallels their 
attitude to criminals: Labour must demonstrate that it can be tougher towards them than the 
Tories were, and so remove one of the perceived electoral assets of the Tories‖ (2000:79). 
So the post-1997 legislation, regulations and other measures continued the restrictive trend 
begun by the Conservatives: 
     
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999    This Act set the tone for Labour‘s 
asylum policy into the new millennium. It ―gave extensive new powers to the home 
secretary and extended police powers to search, arrest and detain asylum seekers‖ 
(Sales 2007:148). It also introduced a duty on registrars to ―report suspicious 
marriages‖ (IAA 1999, s. 24) and a penalty of £2000 on lorry drivers for every 
passenger without documents (ibid., s. 32). The Act separated asylum seekers from 
mainstream welfare provision, setting their support levels below those of the 
mainstream and introducing the compulsory ―dispersal‖ of asylum seekers to 
allocated areas across the country, with accommodation provided on a no-choice 
basis. This system was to be managed by a new government agency, the National 
Asylum Support Service, which took over the direct role previously occupied by 
local authorities. It then subcontracted work both to them and to private housing 
providers and voluntary agencies. We will see (5.3.1) how these changes were 
driven by the primary aims of deterrence and restriction. 
 
The Nationality and Immigration Act 2002    This Act is best known for section 
55, under which people who have not managed to apply for asylum within three 
days of arrival in the UK may be refused all financial support and accommodation 
and thus left destitute. Although the government claimed that this measure was only 
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aimed at certain illegal categories, increasing numbers of asylum seekers fell foul of 
it and it is seen by many of them, and by many agencies, as a measure aimed at 
deterring applications (section 55 is dealt with in more detail below, 5.3.2). 
    The Act as a whole, writes Sales, set out ―to segregate asylum seekers further 
from mainstream society and to promote their speedy removal‖ (Sales 2007:149). It 
provided for induction and accommodation centres where asylum applicants would 
be housed while their claims were being processed (NIA 2002, s. 16), and where 
their children could be educated outside the mainstream education system. Sales 
noted that the establishment of accommodation centres was prevented by local 
campaigns against them (Sales 2007:149), but the aim of detaining most asylum 
applicants remained. The 2002 Act reflected the aims of the government, set out in 
its preceding White Paper (Secure 2001), to speed up appeals, set target figures for 
the deportation of refused applicants and facilitate an increased rate of removals 
(ibid.:65-66). With these ends in mind, the government announced a 40% increase 
in removal centre capacity (ibid:66). Indeed, detention – including detention of 
children – was to play a significant role in the UK asylum system in the following 
years. On 24 September 2005, according to Home Office figures, there were 1,695 
asylum detainees in the UK; 75 of them were under 18 (Asylum Statistics, 3rd 
quarter 2005:10). A 2005 report by the charity Save the Children estimated that 
―around 2,000 children are detained with their families every year for the purpose of 
immigration control‖, the length of detention ranging from seven to 268 days 
(Crawley & Lester 2005:viii).  
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004    Section 8 of this 
Act (see in more detail below, 6.5.13) made failure to produce a valid passport an 
offence (and by doing so arguably contravened Article 31 of the Refugee 
Convention), raised doubts about the credibility of applicants who fail to claim 
asylum when passing through a ―safe‖ country or who fail to answer certain 
questions to the satisfaction of Home Office caseworkers or other officials. Section 
9 excluded families with children from benefit if, after their final refusal, they failed 
to make arrangements to leave or volunteer for the government‘s voluntary returns 
programme. Families would then face destitution and their children could be taken 
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into local authority care (see below, 8.8). Section 26 of the Act reduced asylum 
seekers‘ rights of appeal and their access to the higher courts (see below, 7.2.1). 
 
NAM and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006    In 2005 the 
government announced a Five Year Strategy for Asylum and Immigration 
(Controlling 2005), including the New Asylum Model (NAM). New procedures 
would speed up the asylum process, involving shorter timescales, early 
―segmentation‖ of applicants into categories before the details of their cases were 
fully known, and an even wider use of detention. The Refugee Council was 
concerned that these changes would have a negative impact on the ability of asylum 
seekers to recover from trauma and prepare their cases, on their chances of adequate 
legal representation (Briefing NAM 2007, para. 4.2 (i)) and on their access to appeal 
procedures (ibid., para. 6.2), and it criticised the potentially arbitrary nature of 
―segmentation‖ (ibid., para. 4.2 (iii)). Moreover, refugee status would no longer be 
permanent but would now be ―granted on a temporary basis to be reviewed after 
five years in relation to the safety of the country of origin‖ (Sales 2007:151). The 
Refugee Council was concerned that people would be placed ―in limbo, unable to 
rebuild their lives for fear of having their refugee status withdrawn‖ (Briefing IAN 
2006:3). Much of this did not require new legislation but was implemented by 
means of Home Office rules and other instruments. Where legislation was needed it 
was provided in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. 
 
The UK Borders Act 2007    The bill which was to become the UK Borders Act 
2007 was announced to parliament before many of the provisions of the 2006 Act 
had come into force. As its title perhaps suggests, it emphasised the negative aspects 
of immigration and asylum. The Queen‘s speech of 15 November 2006 announced 
that ―A bill will be introduced to provide the immigration service with further 
powers to police the country‘s borders, tackle immigration crime, and to make it 
easier to deport those who break the law‖ (cited Sales 2007:151). The press release 
on the day of the bill‘s presentation to the House of Commons explained that these 
powers would include powers of arrest and detention and, in the context of asylum, 
powers to ―arrest those they believe to have fraudulently been acquiring asylum-
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support, and to exercise associated powers of entry, search and seizure.‖1 The UK 
Borders Act made no reference to the UK‘s Refugee Convention obligations to give 
protection within its borders to those who needed it. 
 
Sales concludes (2007:152) that, under both Conservative and Labour governments, asylum 
policy has continued  
 
to treat asylum seekers with suspicion, as a risk to society rather than as people 
themselves at risk. Policy has therefore aimed at excluding them from developing 
connections with mainstream society in order to remove them as easily and speedily 
as possible. 
 
2.18   Conclusion 
These developments are consistent with the history we have explored in this chapter. We 
saw discrimination against ethnic minorities from the beginning of the post-war period 
(2.4-2.5), with a determined attempt to ―keep out coloured people‖ culminating in the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. We saw how Roy Jenkins‘ ―liberal agenda‖ was 
weakened by fear of electoral defeat: Labour‘s capitulation to racism undermined its race-
relations approach, creating a contradiction between immigration controls and the claim to 
want to celebrate cultural diversity, and encouraged right-wing politicians like Enoch 
Powell to demand more concessions (2.9-2.12). On the positive side, we saw how ethnic 
minorities fought for equality and against discrimination and racism and how Stephen 
Lawrence‘s murder and his family‘s campaign for an enquiry led to race-relations law 
being applied to the police for the first time. Discrimination and inequality continued, 
however, and in the asylum legislation of the 1990s onwards racism was revived (2.17). 
    By 2003 Imran Khan believed that Labour‘s commitment to anti-racism had ―been 
neutralised by the most racist asylum and immigration legislation this country has ever 
seen‖ (Khan 2003). In chapters 5-8 we will examine the asylum process based on that 
legislation. We turn first, however, to France, which has a similar history under its 
―republican citizenship‖ approach. 
 
                                                 
1
 Home Office press release, 26 January 2007. 
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IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN FRANCE SINCE THE SECOND WORLD  
WAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The French have not adopted a race-relations agenda, for they see ―the institutionalisation 
of ‗race‘ as a sure way to separate people into distinct communities rather than ‗integrate‘ 
them, leading to divisions within society … rather than cohesion based on individuality, 
irrespective of origin‖ (Silverman 1992:3). The French way is not to recognise ethnic 
minorities but to ―nationalise‖ them, deny ethnic identities, and ―turn foreigners into 
Frenchmen [sic]‖ (Noiriel 1996:xxviii). I examine issues of immigration in France against 
this background, and begin, as in the case of the UK, with France‘s need for labour after the 
war, emphasising the strong opposition to the idea that France‘s colonies and former 
colonies should be sources for such a labour force (3.3). I explore arguments that took place 
about ethnic selection and questions of French national identity and how, when the needed 
immigrants began to arrive, they were treated as temporary labour and marginalised in 
French society (3.4-3.6). I argue that immigration controls were introduced not for 
economic reasons but because of notions of race, culture and ―ethnic balance‖, including 
claims that non-European immigrants could not easily assimilate into French society and 
that there were ―thresholds of tolerance‖ for the French which should be recognised and 
used to limit numbers (3.12-3.13). I describe the rise of protest against racism by its victims 
and their supporters (3.14) and the eventual passing of an anti-racist law (3.15). I show how 
the use of immigration controls contradicted the measures to promote integration (3.14) and 
that these contradictions have fed racism and encouraged the far right (3.17.2). I argue that 
the restrictive agenda on asylum has gained ground in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century and that President Sarkozy‘s policies hark back to earlier arguments about the 
―non-assimilability‖ of certain immigrants and the claimed need for ―thresholds of 
tolerance‖ (3.26). 
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3.2   Recovering from Nazi occupation 
UK politicians of all parties emerged from the war able to talk of victory over Nazi 
Germany and appeal to national pride. The French were deeply divided. The years of Nazi 
occupation and the collaborationist regime at Vichy were, says Taïeb, ―the dark years … a 
paroxysm of xenophobia and anti-Semitism‖1 (1998:63). The shadow cast by them was 
long – a book published in 1994 questioning President François Mitterrand‘s role during 
the Vichy regime forced him to defend his record in a high-profile television interview. In 
the decade following the war the leadership of the influential Movement Against Racism, 
Anti-Semitism and for Peace (MRAP) ―was much more sensitive to what it perceived as a 
post-Vichy rebirth of anti-Semitic sentiments‖ (Bleich 2003:119) than to problems of 
discrimination against the newly arriving post-colonial immigrants. 
 
3.3   A need for labour 
On 19 October 1945 the restrictive immigration measures of the Vichy period were 
repealed. The French government estimated that France would need 1.5 million immigrant 
workers over five years to help with the post-war reconstruction of France. Some even 
talked of three million, and the new president of France, General Charles de Gaulle, spoke 
of the need for ―twelve million babies within ten years‖2 (Taïeb 1998:64). Apart from the 
specific post-war situation, France had had a ―demographic deficit‖ for years. Taïeb puts it 
down to ―a certain Malthusianism and to losing wars‖3 (1998:37). Certainly, ―[s]ince the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, France was progressively overtaken by other countries 
in terms of the size of its population … From 1900 to 1939 the population of France had 
grown by only 3% compared with 72% in the United States, more than 30% in Germany 
and Italy, more than 20% in the United Kingdom‖4 (ibid.). However, the way France had 
tried to solve this problem meant that post-war policy would, as in the UK, ignore the 
female population as a source of labour. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 … les années noires … paroxysme de la xénophobie et de l‘antisémitisme. 
2
 …12 millions de bébés en dix ans … 
3
 … un certain malthusianisme et aux pertes des guerres. 
4
 Dès le début du XIXe siècle, la France est progressivement dépassée par d‘autres pays du point de vue de 
l‘importance de sa population … De 1900 à 1939, la population française n‘avait augmentée que de 3% 
contre 72% aux Etats-Unis, plus de 30% pour l‘Allemagne et l‘Italie, plus de 20% pour le Royaume-Uni. 
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3.3.1   Pronatalism 
Between the wars pronatalist ideas heavily influenced policy. Pronatalists were strongly 
nationalist, believing that a low birth rate would ―lead to the military and national decline 
of France‖ (Pedersen 1993:359). The French had to be made to produce babies (―il faut 
faire naître‖). This would be done by incentives where possible and coercion if incentives 
failed. During the Vichy regime coercion dominated. Pronatalist arguments were directed 
first at men. Nothing a man could do, argued Fernand Boverat, was more important than 
procreation: a man ―must know that all the accomplishments of his work, courage and 
genius will be inadequate to honor his name if, at the time when the fate of the land is tied 
to a recovery of the birthrate, he fails in the duty of transmitting life‖ (cited ibid.:362). The 
arguments put to women emphasised the joys of motherhood and relied on ―dubious 
medical evidence to argue that repeated childbearing improved women‘s health‖ 
(ibid.:364). Boverat regarded childless married women as lazy, frivolous and parasitical 
upon society (ibid.). 
    Pronatalism was influential across the political spectrum from the late 1920s. After 1934 
its influence grew, with the Chambers of Commerce endorsing ―family-based suffrage, the 
restriction of divorce, repression of abortion, and the return of mothers to the home‖ 
(ibid.:370), and the French cardinals appealing for more births in 1939. ―This chorus‖, 
writes Pedersen (ibid.), ―turned pronatalism into ‗common sense‘.‖ Under Vichy, birth 
control and abortion were banned and women were kept out of state employment. After the 
liberation de Gaulle continued Vichy‘s single-wage allowance, which during the 
occupation had helped the wives of prisoners but which now privileged families with a 
male wage earner and a dependent wife. This changed only slowly over the next 30 years. 
 
3.3.2   End of empire 
There was another source of labour which France could tap: like the UK, France  had an 
empire. Like the British, the French were facing decolonisation – which at first they 
strongly resisted: ―Initially, their instinct was to hold on to everything‖, writes Vadney 
(1992:99). ―Everything‖ included ―12 million square kilometres, with a population of 64 
million individuals, and we may speak of ‗a France of a hundred million inhabitants‘‖5 
(Yacono 1994:3). As a result of this reluctance to let their empire go, the French ―became 
                                                 
5
 … 12 millions de kilomètres carrés, peuplé de quelque 64 millions d‘individus et on peut parler de « la 
France de cent millions d‘habitants ». 
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involved in a series of disastrous wars‖ (Vadney 1992:99) and the war with Algeria ended 
by ―destroying the fourth republic and unsettling the early years of the fifth …‖ (Hayward 
1973:249). In the end France bowed to the inevitable and managed to secure its interests 
through wide-ranging agreements with most of its ex-colonies, as well as keeping some as 
overseas departments of France (départements d‘outre mer (DOM)) and some as overseas 
territories (territoires d‘outre mer (TOM)) – collectively known as DOM-TOM. The DOM 
are run as if they were departments in metropolitan France and their inhabitants are French 
citizens. The TOM have some autonomy but are run by a French administrator. All these 
areas, whether colonial, independent or DOM-TOM, were possible sources of labour for 
France in its drive towards post-war reconstruction. As in the UK, however, the idea met 
with immediate resistance. 
 
3.4   Ethnic selection 
Before the war the demographer Georges Mauco had suggested an assimilationist 
immigration policy using ethnic criteria. This was based on the idea that there were 
―degrees of assimilability among foreigners depending on their origin – whether national, 
religious or racial‖6 (Weil 2004:17) and Mauco argued that such criteria should be used in 
the selection of candidates for naturalisation. ―This racist policy‖, says Weil (ibid.), 
―triumphed under the Vichy regime.‖7 Mauco himself showed his true colours under that 
regime (ibid.:215), advocating ―‗a totalitarian government …‘, as well as a ‗fascist 
revolution‘, a third way between liberal democracy and communist revolution.‖8 He 
believed that the ethnic characteristics of Russians, Armenians and Jews ―made them, in the 
growing order, more and more unassimilable‖9 (ibid.). But these ideas did not disappear 
after France‘s liberation: in 1945 de Gaulle elevated Mauco to the post of secretary general 
of the High Commission on Population and the Family. Once installed, he ―proposed 
allowing the entry of populations he considered assimilable: 50% north Europeans, 30% 
south Europeans and 20% Slavs‖10 (Taïeb 1998:64). De Gaulle himself agreed (cited 
Noiriel 1988:39): 
                                                 
6
 … degrés d‘assimilabilité des étrangers selon leur origine – nationale, religieuse ou raciale … 
7
 Cette politique raciste triomphe sous le régime de Vichy. 
8
 …  « un gouvernement totalitaire … », ainsi qu‘une « révolution fasciste », troisième voie entre la 
démocratie libérale et la révolution communiste.  
9
 … les rendent, dans l‘ordre croissant, de plus en plus inassimilables … 
10
 … propose de faire venir des populations qu‘il considère comme assimilables : 50% d‘Européens du Nord, 
30% d‘Européens du Sud et 20% de Slaves. 
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Ethnically speaking, it is appropriate to limit the influx of Mediterraneans and 
Orientals who have, for half a century, profoundly modified the French population. 
Without going so far as to use a rigid system of quotas, as in the United States, it is 
desirable that priority be given to the naturalisation of Nordics (Belgians, 
Luxembourgers, the Swiss, the Dutch, the Danish, the English, the Germans, etc.). 
One may envisage a proportion of 50% for these elements.
11
 
 
    This proposal for ethnic selection is shocking and, at first sight, puzzling. It is shocking 
because France had just been liberated from Nazi occupation. The Nazis‘ notions of racial 
purity had led to deportations, concentration camps and gas chambers. That de Gaulle and 
Mauco still saw ethnic selection as an acceptable way forward seemed to suggest that 
France‘s elite had learned nothing from this period. The proposal is puzzling because, as 
Silverman notes (1992:19), the French Revolution ―is commonly seen as the triumph of a 
new concept of the nation‖: 
 
Armed with the enlightenment concepts of reason, will and individualism, the 
Revolution established the nation as a voluntary association or contract between 
free individuals. This concept of the nation triumphed over the other major model 
for the formation of modern nations, that of … a predetermined community bound 
by blood and heredity. 
 
3.5   “What is a nation?” 
De Gaulle‘s racially based programme seems to contradict a text regarded as ―the basis of a 
real national consensus‖12 (Noiriel 1988:27). In his lecture on ―What is a nation?‖ delivered 
at the Sorbonne in 1882, Ernest Renan asked what it is that makes a nation, and he 
explicitly rejected race as a contender. He argued that both the British and the French came 
from varied origins. In the case of the French, they ―are neither Gauls, Francs nor 
Burgundians. They came out of the great boiling pot presided over by the king of France, in 
                                                 
11
 Sur le plan ethnique, il convient de limiter l‘afflux des Méditerranéens et des Orientaux qui ont depuis un 
demi-siècle profondément modifié la composition de la population française. Sans aller jusqu‘à utiliser, 
comme aux Etats-Unis, un système rigide de quotas, il est souhaitable que la priorité soit accordée aux 
naturalisations nordiques (Belges, Luxembourgeois, Suisses, Hollandais, Danois, Anglais, Allemands, etc.). 
On peut envisager une proportion de 50% pour ces éléments. 
12
 … l‘objet d‘un véritable consensus national. 
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which the most diverse elements fermented‖13 (Renan 1928:296). So we are not talking 
zoology when we talk about the nation: ―… we don‘t have the right to go round the world 
feeling people‘s skulls, then taking them by the throat, saying, ‗You are of our blood; you 
belong to us!‘‖14 (ibid. 297). To be human is more than this – ―there is reason, justice, truth, 
beauty, which are the same for everyone‖15 (ibid.). Thus the nation exists not because of 
race (or religion, or language, or geography) but through ―consent, the clearly expressed 
desire to continue with the common life. The existence of a nation is … a daily plebiscite, 
just as the existence of an individual is a perpetual affirmation of life‖16 (ibid. 307-8). 
    So the nation is based on reason and will, and it seems to preclude ethnic selection. But 
Mauco‘s original proposals in 1932 were also based on Renan‘s text. Renan appeals not 
just to reason and consent but to a common ancestral past, ―[a] heroic past, a past of great 
men, a glorious past‖17 (Renan 1928:306). The nation is not just a daily plebiscite – it is ―a 
soul, a spiritual principle‖18 (ibid.). ―The worship of ancestors is the most legitimate 
worship of all; our ancestors have made us what we are‖19 (ibid.). Mauco suggests that if 
race is necessarily excluded as a category the nation‘s soul may still be threatened by 
immigration: ―The influence of foreigners from the intellectual point of view, although not 
clearly discernible, manifests itself especially as the opposite of reason, care, and a sense of 
balance and finesse which characterises the French people‖ (cited Silverman 1992:23). He 
suggests, says Silverman (ibid.), ―that the superiority of the French compared with 
foreigners lies not in any crude biological difference but in cultural and intellectual 
differences‖. Silverman argues that ―in the history of modern France the tradition of 
biological racism has probably been less prominent than that of a national/cultural racism‖ 
(ibid.:21). We should be clear, however, that the latter is no less venal than the former. 
Hayward describes as ―cultural self-confidence‖ the French conviction that ―just as she had 
assimilated the many diverse peoples that made up metropolitan France, she could convert 
                                                 
13
 Le Français n‘est ni un Gaulois, ni un Franc, ni un Burgonde. Il est ce qui est sorti de la grande chaudière 
où, sous la présidence du roi de France, ont fermenté ensemble les éléments les plus divers. 
14
 … on n‘a pas le droit d‘aller par le monde tâter le crâne des gens, puis les prendre à la gorge en leur disant : 
« Tu es de notre sang ; tu nous appartient ! » 
15
 … il y a la raison, la justice, le vrai, le beau, qui sont les mêmes pour tous. 
16
 … le consentement, le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune. L‘existence d‘une nation est 
… un plébiscite de tous les jours, comme l‘existence de l‘individu est une affirmation perpétuelle de vie. 
17
 Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire … 
18
 … une âme, un principe spirituelle. 
19
 Le culte des ancêtres est de tous le plus légitime ; les ancêtres nous ont fait ce que nous sommes. 
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any people in the world into French citizens‖ (1973:248). He cites Boissy-d‘Anglas, in 
1794, in similar vein (ibid.): 
 
―The Revolution was not only for Europe but for the Universe … There can only be 
one right way of administering: and if we have found it for European countries, why 
should [the colonies] be deprived of it?‖ 
 
Thus the French justified empire in terms of a ―civilising mission‖. But this ―soft‖ racism 
had a hard core: in Algeria, for example, where French rule was ―at its most oppressive‖ 
(Clayton 1994:25), the Algerians had no effective political representation, were heavily 
exploited and many of them were impoverished. They became in everyday parlance ―the 
dirty race‖20 (ibid.:25-26). In practice, throughout the empire, ―[t]he promise of equality 
through integration proved to be a hollow mockery‖ (Hayward 1973:249). So there seems 
to be little practical difference between ―crude biological‖ racism and ―cultural‖ racism. 
 
3.6   Regulation attempted 
It was against this background and the proposals of de Gaulle and Mauco that the 
ordonnance of 2 November 1945 (which set the legislative framework for immigration and 
residence) established the Office National d‘Immigration (ONI) under the auspices of the 
ministry of labour. Ethnic selection was strongly opposed by many and had been the 
subject of a bureaucratic struggle within government, particularly between Mauco and his 
High Committee on Population and the Family on the one hand and the ministry of justice 
and Pierre-Henri Teitgen, of the Bureau du Sceau, on the other. The Bureau dealt with 
naturalisation matters. In the end Mauco lost the battle over ethnic selection for 
naturalisation (Weil 2004:220-227). Teitgen managed to have decision-making moved 
away from the High Committee and integrated into the work of the ministry of justice. 
Mauco‘s defeat, however, did not mean an end to ethnic selection. Though the ordonnance 
of 2 November did not mention ethnic selection by name, its aim, writes Silverman, was ―a 
carefully monitored build-up of a new workforce, operating principally according to the 
criteria of ethnic and cultural ‗balance‘, assimilation and national cohesion‖ (1992:39). It 
created residence permits (cartes de séjour) of varying lengths – one year; one to three 
                                                 
20
 La sale race. 
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years; 10 years (automatically renewable) – and instituted ―a selection process in which 
Europeans would be encouraged to settle permanently whilst non-European immigration 
would be on a temporary contract basis‖ (ibid.:80). 
    In the end this ethnic selection by stealth failed. It failed, however, not because Mauco 
and his ideas had finally been defeated – they had not, as we shall see – but because, as 
events unfolded, France had little choice but to accept a wide range of immigrant workers. 
For one thing, European labour was slow to respond: de Gaulle‘s favoured ―Nordics‖ 
preferred the US or Canada; the Italians increasingly stayed at home to help with Italian 
industrialisation; recruitment in the Baltic states mostly failed; and ―if the French economy 
still recruited Italians … and more and more Spanish workers, this was not enough‖21 
(Taïeb 1998:65). Furthermore, the immediate needs of the employers could not be met 
under this scheme. The procedures which employers in search of foreign labour were 
required to follow were lengthy and complicated. In theory the scheme ensured a monitored 
immigration policy to meet specific economic needs; in practice, far from getting a 
reasonably quick fix, employers found themselves enmeshed in bureaucratic delays, with 
little chance of getting workers when they needed them. The consequence was that, instead 
of immigration increasing to a level capable of dealing with the task of reconstruction, the 
total immigrant population rose by a mere 1.3% annually between 1946 and 1954 and the 
number of foreigners in France actually fell from 4.2% to 3.6% (Silverman 1992:46). 
    However, the ONI was funded by the needy employers themselves and they soon 
discovered that direct recruitment was quicker and cheaper. For one thing, they could tap a 
source which needed no ONI regulation: Algerians were French nationals from 1947, 
possessing rights of entry and residence. But although immigration from Algeria rose (by 
32.5% annually) it was still not enough and, from the 1950s, ―employers and the state 
encouraged a massive immigration of labour – preferably single men, contrary to the 
wishes of some demographers – certainly through negotiations between states but also by 
illegal means‖22 (Taïeb 1998:65). 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 … si l‘économie française recrute toujours des Italiens … et de plus en plus d‘Espagnols, cela ne suffit pas. 
22
 … le patronat et l‘État encouragent l‘immigration massive de main-d‘œuvre – plutôt des célibataires 
contrairement aux vœux de certains démographes –, certes par des négociations d‘État à État mais aussi de 
façon clandestine.  
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3.7   The desperate search for labour 
The carefully state-regulated immigration regime slowly collapsed and economic needs 
were clearly in the driving seat. Talk of ―good elements‖ which might provide a long-term 
increase in the population was muted as employers sought labour indiscriminately – 
encouraged by the ministry of labour, ―who saw immigration as a temporary phenomenon 
responding to conjunctural requirements and not in competition with the domestic work-
force‖ (Silverman 1992:39). So ―it was by lorry- and coach-load that certain car industry 
employers went searching for Portuguese and Moroccan labour right up to the start of the 
1970s‖23 (Taïeb 1998:66). Many people arrived in France with tourist passports and stayed 
to work. Many arrived without documents, encouraged by the practice of retrospective 
regularisation. Employers sent representatives abroad to recruit labour – ―in Morocco, 
crowds of would-be migrants awaited visits from Félix Mora, the representative of the 
coalmining industry‖24 (Blanc-Chaléard 2001:62). 
    This promiscuous recruiting looks like good news – since it contradicted the racist 
assumptions of ethnic selection – but the reality was that racism, whether biological or 
cultural, had not disappeared in the rush to reconstruct France. Throughout this period 
immigrant workers were seen through a single lens: they were needed – and were 
exploitable and expendable because they were foreign. Their social needs were hardly 
considered, ―social policies targeted on immigration were virtually non-existent‖25 (Taïeb 
1998:66) and no thought was given to their integration into French society. 
 
3.8   Housing 
Housing illustrates these points. For the most part, the state did not involve itself in the 
housing of immigrants. True, it created SONACOTRAL
26
 in 1956 to build hostels for 
single, male, temporary Algerian workers; true, this soon became SONACOTRA, with a 
mandate covering all foreign workers, as the government attempted to combat the activities 
of unscrupulous landlords. But in reality the hostels (many of them in the city centres) 
contained only a small proportion of the foreign population. Instead housing, like 
                                                 
23
 C‘est par camions ou autocars entiers que certains recruteurs de l‘industrie automobile vont chercher des 
Portugais, des Marocains, et cela jusqu‘au début des années 1970. 
24
 … au Maroc, les foules de candidats au départ attendent les visites de Félix Mora, l‘envoyé des Houillères. 
25
 … les politiques sociales ciblées sur l‘immigration sont quasi-inexistantes … 
26
 Société Nationale de Construction pour les Travailleurs Algériens. 
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recruiting, was largely in the hands of the employers – ―in keeping‖, argues Silverman 
(1993:51), 
 
with the idea that the social aspects of the immigrant‘s life are subsumed within his 
economic function. A sort of feudal or plantation logic underpinned the relationship 
between employer and foreign worker. 
 
The French state gave priority to France‘s economic needs and enabled the recruiting of 
workers to meet them – but it did not consider the housing needs of immigrant workers as 
its major responsibility. The result was probably predictable: in the period following the 
First World War, Paris had been ―surrounded by a real belt of unsalubrious and unhygienic 
dwellings … where hundreds of thousands of immigrants from far and wide were crammed 
together‖27 (Noiriel 2002:30). Now, after the Second World War, the notorious ―shanty 
towns‖ (bidonvilles) were constructed around Paris and on the outskirts of all the big 
industrial cities of France. 
    A selection of some of the larger bidonvilles (figures published by Granotier in 1970) 
gives an idea of the numbers involved. In the Paris region there were 9,937 people in 
Nanterre, 4,803 in St Denis, 14,025 in Champigny. In northern France there were 3,800 
around Lille and 1,500 around Caen. In the south there were 7,006 living around Marseille, 
2,203 around Toulon and 1,662 around Nice (cited Noiriel 2002:31). While some native 
French also lived in these areas, other figures (also from Granotier) suggest that the shanty 
towns represented the marginalisation from mainstream France of much of the immigrant 
population: 92.2% of the population of the shanty towns across France were from 
immigrant groups; only 7.8% were native French. The two largest single groups were the 
North Africans (42.1%) and the Portuguese (20.6%) (cited Blanc-Chaléard 2001:69). This 
was in a period when ―the [national] building programme was making decent flats available 
to the majority of French people for the first time‖28 (ibid.). Immigrants, by contrast, 
―seemed then like symbols of social deprivation‖29 (ibid.:68). 
                                                 
27
 … encerclée par une veritable ceinture de logements insalubres … et dépourvus d‘hygiène, ou s‘entasse des 
centaines de milliers d‘immigrants de toute provenance. 
28
 … le mouvement de construction offre pour la première fois des appartements décents à la majorité des 
Français. 
29
 … s‘apparaissent alors comme les symboles de la misère sociale. 
CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN FRANCE 61 
    Blanc-Chaléard shows that a whole range of people – trade unionists, sociologists, 
Christian activists – had serious concerns at ―the social distress in which immigrants 
lived‖30 (2001:69). Articles and enquiries highlighted the problems experienced by 
immigrants. Television documentaries raised wider public awareness about conditions in 
the shanty towns, as did film director Jean-Luc Godard in his film La Chinoise, which 
showed the shanty town at Nanterre in its opening sequence (ibid.). 
     
3.9   Work 
Working life also illustrated the marginalisation of the immigrant population. ―The majority 
of tasks that needed performing‖, notes Silverman (1992:44), ―called for a very specific 
type of labour force, one that would, above all, be mobile, have no particular skills or 
qualifications and could easily be made redundant …‖ Immigrants typically found 
themselves in the lowest-paid jobs: in agriculture (as seasonal workers) and in the service 
sector (in hotels and restaurants). ―[T]he mining, metalworking and chemical industries‖, 
writes Blanc-Chaléard (2001:68), ―were dependent even more than before on the immigrant 
contribution. The semi-skilled and unskilled workers of the car industry … represented 
close to 20% of the immigrant population in 1970.‖31 But the building industry took the 
largest share: ―inseparably associated with the building site, the immigrant constructed the 
France of motorways and housing schemes‖32 (ibid.). 
    The unions might be expected to play a positive role here, although Witohl de Wenden 
points out that in 1956, after France had signed an immigration agreement with Spain, the 
Communist group in the National Assembly declared that the ―introduction of [foreign] 
workers was not in keeping with the ‗interests of our country‘‖ (cited Silverman 1992:173, 
n. 3). It is true that the CGT – the union affiliated to the Communist Party of France (PCF) 
– had declared its solidarity with immigrant workers from North Africa and was trying to 
recruit immigrants. Nevertheless the left had an ambivalent attitude towards immigration. 
Silverman observes that ―[a] frequent analysis of the Left and trade unions was that 
immigration was responsible for the persistence of outdated economic practices and was 
therefore a bulwark against the modernisation of the French economy‖ (ibid.). This 
argument blamed the shortcomings of the French economy on the presence of foreigners 
                                                 
30
 … la détresse sociale dans laquelle vivent les immigrés. 
31
 … les mines, la métallurgie, l‘industrie chimique dépendent plus qu‘avant encore de l‘apport immigré. Les 
OS et manœuvres de l‘industrie automobile … sont à près 20% des immigrés en 1970. 
32
 … figure inséparable du chantier, l‘immigré a construit la France des autoroutes et des HLM. 
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and thus ―perpetuated a dangerous myth surrounding the presence and role of the foreign 
worker in France‖ (ibid.). 
    The social problems arising from the marginalisation of immigrants would be ―ignored 
until the end of the 1960s or taken care of by charitable activities‖33 (Taïeb 1998:66). But 
during the 1960s there were signs that marginalisation was not inevitable: solidarity was 
possible between immigrant workers and French workers. 
 
3.10   Emerging solidarity 
Marginalisation into unskilled and menial jobs – what Blanc-Chaléard calls (2001:68) 
―exclusion by work‖34 – might have prevented solidarity with other workers. But other 
factors ran counter to such exclusion: during the 1960s the CGT and other unions were 
attempting, though with limited success, to recruit immigrants; there was considerable 
industrial unrest at the time and this also involved immigrants in the factories and in the 
mines. Although there was much disunity among the trade unions, which often led to 
inaction or defeat, there were also victories. The 1963 miners‘ strike spread to all mining 
areas, and involved all the unions, after the government tried to conscript the miners into 
the armed forces ―so that if the strike continued it would be in breach of military law‖ 
(Harman 1998:19). The dispute ended ―with a 12.5 per cent wage rise and an extra week‘s 
paid holiday‖ (ibid.). Moreover, many immigrants participated in the ―events‖ of May 1968 
– when student occupations and workers‘ strikes almost brought down the French 
government. 
 
3.11   The return of “ethnic balance” 
By the late 1960s a new policy framework was emerging in which governments would once 
more seek to limit immigration on ethnic grounds. As we have seen, ethnic arguments had 
been ignored during the frantic rush to recruit labour to meet the immediate needs of 
employers. During the Algerian war (1958-62) ―anti-Algerian sentiment ran high in 
Metropolitan France. It culminated in the violent October 1961 Paris marches that resulted 
in thousands of arrests and scores of dead and wounded‖ (Bleich 2003:116). Nevertheless, 
there was ―panic among employers who … feared a mass return home by Algerians‖35 
                                                 
33
 … ignorées jusqu‘à la fin des années 1960 ou prise en charge par l‘action caritative … 
34
 L‘exclusion par le travail. 
35
 … la panique chez les employeurs, qui craignaient … un reflux des Algériens. 
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(Blanc-Chaléard 2001:61) and this pointed to contradictions between political and 
economic concerns, since ―[f]or its part, the state did not like the idea of a growth in this 
immigration, which was too closely linked to the conflict‖36 (ibid.). 
    What particularly worried the French authorities following Algerian independence in 
1962, however, was that immigration seemed to be changing in character: it was becoming 
family immigration, rather than the single-male immigration that could be accommodated 
in SONACOTRA‘s hostels or hived off into shanty towns: in 1961 111,800 Algerians 
entered France, of which 9,000 were women and children; in 1963 there were 262,000 
entries, of which 34,500 were women and children (ibid.:65). It was beginning to look like 
immigration aimed at settlement. This challenged the ethnic and racial notion that some 
immigrants (non-Europeans) should be temporary and others (Europeans) permanent. 
Sayad (2004:71) argues that 
 
the classic distinction between ―labour immigration‖ and ―settler immigration‖ is, 
ultimately, no more than a disguised way of making … a distinction between an 
―assimilable‖ immigration … which will be rapidly … transformed into a ―settler 
immigration‖, and an inassimilable immigration … that can only be and remain … a 
―labour immigration‖. 
 
France negotiated a number of agreements with Algeria to limit immigration into France. 
These agreements reflected a common interest between the two governments: the French 
government did not want permanent Algerian settlement in France – French prime minister 
Georges Pompidou had described Algerian immigrants as a ―nomad population‖ (Blanc-
Chaléard 2001:63), not necessitating the enactment of social policies since they were not a 
long-term element in French society; the Algerian government, while wanting to benefit 
from the remittances which Algerian immigrants sent back home, did not want to lose its 
population permanently to France. 
  
3.12   Why controls? 
As the 1960s progressed, however, it became clear that the French government was 
concerned not just about permanent family immigration but about all Algerian immigration. 
                                                 
36
 De son côté, l‘État ne tient pas à voir se développer cette immigration trop liée au conflit. 
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In 1968, with rising public awareness of the social problems of immigrant communities, the 
government attempted to re-energise the ONI. In July it decided unilaterally to limit all 
further immigration from Algeria to 1,000 per month. It also abolished the practice of 
regularisation of unqualified workers and granted residence permits only to those who had 
already found a job. Although the new limit on Algerians proved to be a cut too far for the 
Algerian government (in December it persuaded the French to agree to 35,000 per year), 
these measures marked the beginning of a period not only of immigration restrictions but 
also of increasing controls over foreign workers already in the country. In 1972 Raymond 
Marcellin, the interior minister, and Joseph Fontanet, the minister of labour, produced the 
Marcellin-Fontanet circulars, which made regularisation dependent on possession of a one-
year work contract and proof of decent housing. Non-fulfilment of these conditions meant 
expulsion. This was clearly an attempt to clamp down on illegal immigrants 
(―clandestins‖). 
    The reasons behind these moves were not economic: the economic downturn linked, in 
part, to the oil crisis of the early 1970s was not yet a factor to be considered. When that 
crisis came, France responded by putting an end to immigration – but not until 1974. At the 
turn of the decade France still needed foreign labour and this was recognised, even 
celebrated, both by politicians and employers: the December 1969 issue of the Revue 
Politique et Parlementaire declared that, as an immediate economic resource, ―foreign 
labour has clearly been an important factor in economic stability. We might even go so far 
as to regret the fact that … this resource has not been even more substantial‖ (cited 
Silverman 1992:47). In 1970 the magazine L’Usine Nouvelle (The New Factory) praised 
immigrants‘ flexibility (cited ibid.:47-48): immigrant workers ―are extremely mobile, are 
willing to change firms and regions and, if needs be, go on the dole‖. They ―save on 
education costs (which are incurred by the country of origin)‖ and ―often pay more in taxes 
than they receive in allowances‖. Indeed, Fontanet himself declared in 1971 that ―the need 
for foreign workers is crucial‖ (ibid.:48). So we must look elsewhere for the rationale 
behind the new restrictions and rules – and we find it in the racist discourse of ―ethnic 
balance‖ and ―ethnic selection‖. 
  
3.13   “Thresholds of tolerance” 
Silverman (1992:73-78) cites three influential figures whose views were important to the 
change of policy: Corentin Calvez produced a report on ―the problem of immigration‖ for 
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the Economic and Social Council; Michel Massenet was head of the population and 
migration section of the Ministry of Labour; Maurice Schumann was the minister of social 
affairs. They all agreed that immigration needed to be controlled. This was not because 
France had no need of an immigrant workforce: ―nobody should underestimate‖, wrote 
Schumann in 1969, ―the economic and human value of immigration and the contribution of 
immigrants to the development of our country‖ (cited ibid.:76-7). It was the pattern of 
immigration, specifically the origins of the immigrants, which needed to be looked at: 
previous immigrants (Europeans) assimilated easily because of their ―cultural proximity‖ to 
the French; recent immigrants (North Africans, especially Algerians) were ―culturally 
distant‖ and could not easily assimilate. According to Massenet (cited ibid.:74), 
immigration had thus ―ceased to be a natural phenomenon, that is to say a process which 
gives rise to a spontaneous adaptation. The problems that immigration poses to our society 
put at risk society‘s future cohesion‖. Calvez thought that Algerians would form themselves 
into a ghetto, an ―unassimilable island‖ in France (cited ibid.:74). His report recommended 
that studies be undertaken on 
 
the thresholds of tolerance which should not be exceeded in the areas of housing, 
schools and the workplace; that is, thresholds necessary to maintain a suitable social 
balance, founded on the proportionate levels of foreigners, and variable according to 
the ethnic group (cited ibid.:74-5). 
 
Massenet seized on this idea and was ready to suggest some percentages (cited ibid.:75): 
 
In a primary school class, the presence of more than 20 per cent of foreign children 
slows down the progress of all the pupils. In a hospital, problems of coexistence 
arise when foreigners represent more than 30 per cent of the number of patients. In a 
block of flats, it is not wise to go beyond the proportion of 10 to 15 per cent of 
families of foreign origin when these families are not accustomed to life in a 
modern environment. 
 
The clampdown was clearly informed by these ideas. The government, however, did not 
bargain for the response it received from the immigrant communities: the invisibility of the 
victims was coming to an end. 
CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN FRANCE 66 
 
3.14   The beginnings of protest 
There had already been signs that this might happen. For most of the Trente Glorieuses the 
immigrant communities had been more or less invisible and, writes Blanc-Chaléard 
(2001:71), 
 
the majority of French people did not see the immigrants. Hidden in the shadowy 
zones of economic growth, immigrants felt this indifference as an additional denial 
of their dignity.
37
 
 
She quotes an Algerian immigrant on the relationship between the immigrants and the 
French: 
 
We didn‘t like to be seen, we hated ourselves … and, for their part, they didn‘t like 
to see us. They didn‘t like to know that we were there next door to them. They acted 
as if we did not exist.
38
 
 
In 1969, however, there were protest movements in SONACOTRA hostels against the 
deteriorating conditions; and in 1971 and 1972 ―Moroccans launched two major strikes in 
the Pennaroya lead-processing factories and started a media campaign claiming the ‗right to 
live‘‖ (ibid.:68). But the Marcellin-Fontanet circulars provoked the most wide-ranging 
protests yet – for the linking of residence permits with work permits affected not just new 
or prospective immigrants but every foreign worker: if you became unemployed you would 
be subject to deportation – however long you had lived and worked in France. There were 
immediate protests, which continued into the following year: 
 
hunger strikes in Valence, Toulouse, Paris, La Ciotat, Lyons, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, 
Mulhouse, Lille, Nice, Montpellier, Aix-en-Provence and St. Étienne; a strike of 
367 foreign workers in April 1973 at the Boulogne-Billancourt factory of Renault; 
                                                 
37
 … les Français, en majorité, ne voient pas les immigrés. Cachés dans les zones d‘ombre de la croissance, 
ces derniers ressentent cette indifférence comme un déni supplémentaire de dignité. 
38
 Nous n‘aimions pas être vus, nous détestions nous-mêmes … Et, de leur côté, ils n‘aimaient pas nous voir. 
On n‘aimait pas savoir que nous étions là à côté d‘eux. On faisait comme si nous n‘existions pas. 
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sit-ins in offices by foreign workers; and numerous demonstrations and meetings in 
Paris (Silverman 1992:49-50). 
    There were some signs that more positive government policies might be pursued. First, 
the attention the media gave to the bidonvilles made them an increasingly sensitive political 
issue, and provision of basic services (water, post, social services) had begun as early as 
1964. In January 1970, after five immigrant workers were asphyxiated in a fire at 
Aubervilliers on the outskirts of Paris, prime minister Chaban-Delmas ―promised to 
eradicate all bidonvilles by 1973‖ (Silverman 1992:50). Secondly, in 1972 a law was 
passed which ―at last allowed foreigners to become elected workplace representatives‖39 
(Blanc-Chaléard 2001:70). Thirdly, in July 1972 France‘s first anti-racism law was passed. 
But no fundamental change took place and it was the Marcellin-Fontanet circulars that 
really determined the response of the immigration movement: ―the measures which aimed 
at integration through extending the rights of foreigners in the country seemed to be 
undermined by the new measures of control which often made the position of foreigners far 
less secure‖ (Silverman 1992:51). In fact, the French were encountering the contradiction 
present in the UK‘s liberal agenda, expressed by Roy Hattersley (2.9): if you say you ―can‘t 
afford any more of these people here … the implication is that there is something 
undesirable about these people.‖ This implication was present not only in the circulars but 
in the agreement with Portugal to accept 65,000 Portuguese workers in contrast to the 
attempt to limit Algerian immigration to 1,000 per month. Furthermore, Chaban-Delmas‘s 
promise to abolish bidonvilles by 1973 was broken and by 1975 they had been partially 
replaced by ―cities of transit‖, 
 
solid barrack-like structures with a minimum of comfort, but set apart from [French] 
urban residential space. This ―lasting provisional arrangement‖ would constitute the 
life-setting of many children born of immigrants. The working groups put in place 
after 1965 to define overall policy were still stumbling when it came to housing
40
 
(Blanc-Chaléard 2001:70). 
 
                                                 
39
 … permit enfin aux étrangers de devenir délégués du personnel … 
40
 … baraquement en dur avec un minimum de confort, mais à l‘écart de l‘espace urbain résidentiel. Ce 
« provisoire qui dure » va constituer le cadre de vie de bien des enfants issus de l‘immigration. Les groupes de 
travail mis en place pour définir une politique d‘ensemble à partir de 1965 achoppent toujours sur la question 
du logement. 
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The ―cities of transit‖ were indeed ―provisional‖, yet ―lasting‖. Taïeb points out that they 
―were supposed to accommodate [families] for two years; but some were there for 25 
years‖41 (1998:89, n. 34). These cities were to become the ―banlieues difficiles‖ (―difficult 
suburbs‖) of later years. So this period saw a real politicisation of the immigrant 
movement; it also saw an increase in racist attacks. 
 
3.15   Racist attacks and an anti-racist law 
Racism was a particularly sensitive issue in France. Since the Vichy period there had been 
several proposals for an anti-racism law. They came not only from the trade unions, the 
PCF and the MRAP coalition but from parliamentarians on the left and the right. 
Successive governments had resisted them, arguing that racism hardly existed in France – 
why, they asked, legislate against something that does not exist? ―There are few traditions‖, 
declared the French representative on the UN Security Council in 1964, ―which are so 
much a part of the history of my country as the concept of equality between the races … 
Everywhere where French laws and mores are the rule, there is no racial discrimination. It 
has not even been forbidden because it is not necessary to do so‖ (cited Bleich 2003:125-6). 
At the turn of the decade this fiction was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain among 
signs of rising levels of racism in France. Taïeb may be right to say that ―[a]t the time, 
xenophobia was politically limited to a few tiny groups on the extreme right‖42 (1998:67) 
but it is also true that, while some people were exposing and condemning the 
marginalisation of immigrants, others were blaming the victims. Silverman (1992:108) 
shows how the bidonvilles were described, in political discourse and in the media, in 
 
a language which suggested that there was a correspondence between 
―underdeveloped‖ housing and ―underdeveloped‖ people; ―imported living 
conditions by an imported population‖ … The phenomenon of the ―bidonville‖ is 
detached from the surrounding political, economic and social context and located as 
a feature from the ―Third World‖ which has no part in French society. 
 
    Certainly, the seven-year war with Algeria had kept alive the idea of 
 
                                                 
41
 … devaient les accueillir pour deux ans ; mais certain y sont restes vingt-cinq ans. 
42
 A l‘époque, la xénophobie est politiquement limitée à quelques groupuscules d‘extrême droite … 
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the ―Arab‖ throat-slitter and procurer of women, the stereotypes of the foreigner, 
which we had already used about the Italians in the nineteenth century. But [now] it 
was a question of former [colonial] ―subjects‖, recently become enemies43 (Blanc-
Chaléard 2001:71). 
 
    There were several violent racial incidents in 1967 and 1969. The violence increased in 
1970 and 1971, mainly against Algerians, and the attacks included (Bleich 2003:130): 
 
drownings, firebombings, shootings, and a lynching. The ―affaire Djellali‖ of 
October 1971 focused high-profile attention on racism. Following the shooting [to] 
death of the fifteen-year-old Djellali Ben Ali in Paris, several thousand people 
marched against what was widely interpreted as a racist crime … 
 
Although the ministry of justice continued to claim that racism was not pervasive in France, 
Bleich shows that these incidents and protests and ―the persistent lobbying of a host of 
actors‖ put pressure on the government to rethink its opposition to an anti-racist law: 
―Antiracist human rights groups such as the MRAP continued to argue for legislation, and 
were joined in July 1971 by the influential CGT and CFDT unions, which criticized the 
government for not acting on the existing Parliamentary proposals‖ (ibid.:130-1). 
    Moreover, 1971 was the UN‘s International Year Against Racism, during which France 
signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. Louis Odru, PCF deputy in the National Assembly, declared that the 
Communist group did not believe that French legislation was in conformity with the 
recently signed Convention. Within the governing UDR party ―Alain Terrenoire openly 
questioned the government‘s position‖ (ibid.:131). In the Senate, Gaston Monnerville of the 
International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA) declared, ―if the 
Government thinks that French legislation is sufficient to protect … victims of racial 
discrimination, it is wrong‖ (ibid.:132). France‘s first anti-racism law was eventually 
adopted in July 1972, making racism a crime for the first time. 
                                                 
43
 … l‘« Arabe » égorgeur et proxénète, les stéréotypes de l‘étranger, dont on usait déjà pour les Italiens au 
19ème siècle. Mais il s‘agit d‘anciens « sujets », devenus récemment des ennemis. 
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    The law did not, unlike the UK laws, establish race-relations institutions. Bleich 
(ibid.:136) describes the four essential elements in the law as passed. First, it amended the 
press law of 1881 
 
to ban a wider variety of expressive racism,
44
 criminalizing not only racial 
defamation, but also provocation to racial hatred or violence … Second, it outlawed 
access racism
45
 for the first time by inserting two articles in the criminal code, 
punishing the use of race as a criterion in hiring, firing, or provision of goods and 
services … The third aspect amended the law … to enable the state to disband 
groups that seek to provoke or to promote expressive, access or physical
46
 racism. 
 
Finally, it enabled human rights and anti-racist groups to be civil parties in prosecutions 
against racism. 
    The law did not, however, end racism. Racist incidents continued in various regions of 
France and in 1973 the murder of a tram driver in Marseilles by a mentally disturbed 
Algerian sparked a new wave of anti-Arab violence with the result that seven North 
Africans were murdered in Marseilles alone. The situation was so bad that the Algerian 
government began to fear for the safety of Algerians in France. Silverman notes that 
Algeria had had similar concerns in 1971 when ―in twenty-five cases of violence the police 
did not proceed with investigations‖ (1992:174, n. 6). Now, one year after the passing of 
the anti-racism law, it was again concerned at ―the unwillingness of the authorities to 
prosecute the perpetrators of racist attacks‖ (ibid.:52). On 19 September 1973, therefore, 
the Algerian government stopped all emigration to France. It was against this domestic and 
international background that President Giscard d‘Estaing took office in July 1974. 
 
3.16   From Giscard to Mitterrand 
The immigration policies pursued by Giscard and his government were not new. They 
stressed controls plus integration and contained the contradictions inherent in such a 
package (2.9; 3.14). For this new government, however, immigration controls meant a 
                                                 
44
 In Bleich‘s terms, ―expressive racism is manifested through inflammatory statements or written expressions 
made against individuals or groups‖ (2003:9). 
45
 Bleich: ―Access racism involves discrimination in employment, housing, and provision of goods and 
services‖ (ibid.). 
46
 Bleich: ―… physical racism relates to attacks against persons or destruction of property motivated by racial 
hatred‖ (ibid.). 
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complete halt to all immigration into France. With the onset of economic recession, it is 
true, most West European countries had taken similar steps. The UK had done so in 1971 
(2.14) – but had only stopped primary immigration, not family reunification. In July 1974, 
however, France stopped both at a stroke. 
    Nevertheless Giscard wanted to be seen as governing from the centre ground and he 
expressed concern about the social problems and inequalities encountered by immigrants. 
He paid a presidential visit to a Marseilles bidonville and not only supported the election of 
foreigners as workplace representatives but, in the law of 18 July 1979, gave them voting 
rights in the election of judges to the industrial courts (the Prud‘hommes). In a speech on 
integration, again in Marseilles, he declared: ―These immigrant workers who are a part of 
our national economic community must have a place that is worthy, humane and fair in the 
French society that I am trying to organise‖ (cited Silverman 1992:54). The government 
announced a programme of ―insertion‖ – integration policies to be implemented largely 
through cooperation between the state and the municipalities, including more rights in line 
with those of French nationals, better housing, vocational training and other measures. 
    To the immigrant movement, however, this was once again an unconvincing 
performance, for alongside it ran not only the policy of bringing all immigration to an end
47
 
but also a determination to persuade immigrants already present (especially North Africans) 
to return to their countries. What amounted to a growing obsession with immigration 
controls, returns and expulsions was fuelled by rising unemployment – which reached one 
million in 1976. Lionel Stoléru, the secretary of state for foreign workers, ―[took] as his 
own the old equation ‗too many unemployed = too many immigrants‘ [and became] the 
politician of returns‖48 (Blanc-Chaléard 2001:75). Stoléru introduced the ―aide au retour‖ – 
a grant of 10,000 francs for each volunteer returnee. There was a low take-up of this offer 
and one major reason was related to the very immigration controls the government saw as 
central to its policy: 
 
                                                 
47
 The government‘s determination to achieve this is shown in its efforts to ban family reunification. The 1974 
attempt at a total ban was declared unconstitutional by the Council of State, and was then redefined and 
reintroduced with stringent conditions attached in 1976. Another attempt at a complete ban was overturned in 
1977. (See Silverman 1992:53, 56; Blanc-Chaléard 2001:74; Taïeb 1998:69.) 
48
 Reprenant  à son compte la vieille équation : trop de chômeurs = trop d‘immigrés, le nouveau sécretaire 
d‘État Lionel Stoléru sera l‘homme de la politique des retours … 
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When the borders were open, some tens of thousands of foreigners returned home 
all the more easily since they would be able, if the need arose, to come back to 
France. With the borders closed, they thought twice
49
 (Taïeb 1998:69). 
 
With the failure of this scheme, the government planned, in 1978, ―to impose [returns], 
hoping for 500,000 departures within five years – including children who had attained 
French nationality – that French workers would be able to replace‖50 (Taïeb 1998:69). This 
project also involved the removal of the right of immigrants to renew their residence and 
work permits. However, ―[d]enounced by institutions at the very heart of the Republic (the 
Council of State and the National Assembly), by politicians of the right and left, [this 
proposal] collapsed‖51 (Blanc-Chaléard 2001:75). Nevertheless, the government continued 
on its course almost undeterred. It introduced the Bonnet law of 1980, which tightened the 
rules of entry into France and extended expulsion orders to those found guilty of minor 
offences and those whose papers were not in order. 
    While these measures grew apace, the promised integration measures faltered. The 
programme to improve housing was underfunded and this meant that 
 
there was little improvement in housing and many immigrants continued to live in 
sub-standard accommodation. Certain municipalities refused to house more than a 
certain number of immigrants in the name of the theory of the ―threshold of 
tolerance‖ (Silverman 1992:55). 
 
Silverman shows how most of the other programmes associated with integration were 
starved of funds and that even the creation of the Office of Cultural Promotion, dedicated to 
representing cultural diversity, 
 
must also be seen against the background of continued social deprivation of 
immigrant communities, the persistence of inequalities between French nationals 
                                                 
49
 Quand les frontières étaient ouvertes, quelques dizaines de milliers d‘étrangers retournaient chez eux 
d‘autant plus facilement qu‘ils pourraient éventuellement revenir en France. Avec la fermeture, ils 
réfléchissent. 
50
 … les imposer en espérant 500,000 départs en cinq ans – y compris des enfants devenus de nationalité 
française – que des travailleurs français pourraient remplacer. 
51
 Dénoncé au sein même des institutions républicaines (Conseil d‘État, Assemblée nationale), par des 
hommes de droite comme de gauche, [ce projet] échoue. 
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and foreigners, and the evident lack of real will on the part of the administration to 
tackle these problems (ibid.). 
 
Not surprisingly, protests, strikes, hunger strikes and demonstrations continued throughout 
the decade, including a strike of 15,000 residents of SONACOTRA hostels which lasted 
from 1975 till 1980. 
 
3.17   Time for change? 
In 1981 the political scenery changed. In the second round of the May presidential 
elections, Socialist Party (PS) candidate François Mitterrand became president of France, 
achieving 51.75% of the vote against Giscard‘s 48.25%. It was his third bid for the 
presidency. His aim, expressed in his slogan ―changer la vie‖, was to ―change the life‖ of 
France. But there was still a government of the right in the National Assembly, with 
legislative elections not due until 1983. The president had the power to dissolve the 
Assembly and call elections and, although for over a century the left had considered 
exercise of this prerogative an abuse of presidential power, ―Mitterrand was happy to do it 
at once in order to secure a new majority for the Left‖ (Gildea 2002:215). 
 
3.17.1   Reform begun 
One month before the presidential elections Mitterrand had visited the hunger strikers in 
Lyons and, after the PS won the legislative elections, there was some expectation that the 
new government would include immigrants in its aim to ―change the life‖ of France. 
Certainly, under the new regime, as Taïeb argues (1998:70), the discourse changed. The 
new government‘s intention under prime minister Pierre Mauroy was 
 
to assert the rights and dignity of foreigners. Claude Cheysson, minister of exterior 
relations, talked about the debt owed by France to Algerian workers and the 
president … made a ―Third-Worldist‖ speech at Cancun (Mexico) with the intention 
of redefining North–South relations. The office of the secretary of state for 
immigrants launched a campaign on the theme ―Living Together‖ which 
emphasised that immigrants enriched the country.
52
 
                                                 
52
 … faire valoir les droits et la dignité pour les étrangers. Claude Cheysson, ministre des Relations 
extérieures, évoque la dette de la France vis-à-vis des travailleurs algériens et le president … prononce à 
CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN FRANCE 74 
 
In practice, too, there seemed to be signs of change – for example on the question of illegal 
immigrants. Their numbers had grown since the total immigration ban of 1974 – largely 
because, despite the ban, ―employers continued to hire migrants who, for their part, 
continued to come‖53 (Blanc-Chaléard 2001:74). The new government decided that, while 
keeping in place the penalties imposed on employers who hired ―clandestins‖, it would also 
embark on a programme of regularisation. The result was that out of 150,000 applications 
132,000 were accepted. 
    However, the new administration had not made a clean break with the past. For one 
thing, the old contradictions remained between a policy of integration and a hard line on 
controls and deportations. The law of 29 October 1981, notes Silverman (1992:60-1), 
―actually made the conditions for entry even more restrictive than the severe Bonnet law of 
1980 … whilst the number of expulsions rose from 2,861 to 8,482 between 1982-4 (and 
was 12,364 in 1986 …)‖. Thus the discourse had ―radically changed‖, in Taïeb‘s words, but 
―policy [changed] more timidly‖54 (1998:70). Furthermore, economic and political 
pressures began to put enormous strains on the new government‘s resolve to implement its 
wide-ranging reforms in most other areas of policy. 
 
3.17.2   Reform abandoned 
At the beginning ―the pace of reform was frenetic‖, writes Gildea (2002:215): the death 
penalty was abolished, a degree of autonomy was given to Corsica and 
  
[a] whole battery of measures was taken at once to enhance social equality and 
reflate the economy by increasing consumption. [A] … Tax on the Super-Rich was 
introduced. The ―break with capitalism‖ took the form of the nationalization of two 
holding companies, nine industrial groups, and thirty-six private banks. 
 
Such wholesale reform was to be short lived. For one thing, ―[t]he strategy of reflation was 
called into question not only by galloping inflation, a balance-of-payments crisis, and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Cancun (Mexique) un discours « tiers-mondiste » qui entend redéfinir les rapports Nord–Sud. Le secrétariat 
d‘État aux immigrés lance une campagne sur le thème « Vivre ensemble » qui souligne que les immigrés 
enrichissent le pays. 
53
 … les employeurs continuent d‘embaucher des émigrés qui, de leur côté, continuent de venir. 
54
 … le discours change radicalement mais la politique plus timidement … 
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budgetary deficit but by the constraints imposed by membership of the [European Monetary 
System] and the international trading community‖ (ibid.). At his inauguration ceremony 
Mitterrand had called in aid the memory of the socialist Popular Front prime minister of 
1936, Léon Blum, and had laid a wreath on his grave. Thirteen months later his own prime 
minister was telling him to follow other industrialised countries and opt for deflation 
instead of reflation. ―If not‖, said Mauroy, ―I shall be forced to quit, like Léon Blum‖ (ibid. 
216). The aim of ―reflation and socialism in one country‖, as Gildea describes it (ibid.:217), 
was finally abandoned after the PS‘s poor showing in the municipal elections of 1983 
during which the extreme right, and racist, Front National (FN) received 10% of the vote. 
The new immigration policy was now predictably under threat: the government‘s austerity 
measures and industrial restructuring were having an impact on the whole population, 
causing unemployment, strikes (many involving immigrants) and disturbances on the 
housing estates. They thus also fuelled arguments about immigration, identity and nation so 
dear to the FN. Taïeb argues (1998:70-1) that  
 
all this combined to bring about the emergence of the extreme right, which did not 
hesitate to talk of the impending ―Lebanonisation‖ of France – the Lebanon was 
then divided – and built its campaign on the equation ―immigration = 
unemployment + insecurity‖.55 
 
Even before the municipal elections the government had shown the fragility of its 
commitment to anti-racism. Pierre Mauroy had blamed a strike for prayer time at work on 
―religious and political groups whose action is based on criteria which have little to do with 
the social realities of France‖ (Silverman 1992:61). During the election campaign interior 
minister Gaston Defferre ―prided himself on being ideally placed [as mayor of Marseilles] 
to expel immigrants and fight against delinquency (thus suggesting and reinforcing the 
association between the two …)‖ (ibid.). The office of the secretary of state for immigrants 
produced a brochure as part of its ―Living Together‖ campaign (Living Together: the 
Immigrants amongst us
56
) but the government decided not to publish it. 
                                                 
55
 … tout cela concourt à l‘émergence de l‘extrême droite qui n‘hésite pas à parler de libanisation prochaine 
de la France – le Liban est alors déchiré – et construit sa campagne sur l‘amalgame : immigration = chômage 
+ insécurité. 
56
 Vivre Ensemble : les Immigrés Parmi Nous. 
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    When the FN‘s share of the vote reached 11% in the 1984 European elections the 
mainstream left could either condemn the rising level of racial attacks, and challenge the 
extreme right, or capitulate by trying for a consensus with the mainstream right. Like UK 
Labour governments in the 1960s (2.8) it chose the latter, emphasising the strict controls 
and integration measures inherited from Giscard. The controls side of this equation kicked 
in steadily over the next few years. The decree of 27 April 1984 reintroduced the ―aide au 
retour‖ in all but name – restyling it as ―aide à la réinsertion‖ – reinsertion, that is, into 
countries of origin and particularly aimed at workers made unemployed by the restructuring 
of industry. In December 1984 the government reintroduced controls on family 
reunification such that the legal right became ―virtually meaningless‖ (Silverman 1992:62-
3): ―The measure required the member of the family already residing in France to show 
proof of adequate housing at a time when immigrants occupied the worst housing stock and 
were more likely to be unemployed or in low-wage jobs than the French‖. So much for 
equality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals. 
    The policy of capitulation to the right had several consequences. First, it ―gave 
credibility to the idea that immigrants bore some responsibility for the crisis that France 
was going through‖57 (Taïeb 1998:71). Secondly, far from spiking the guns of the far right, 
it would instead ―open up perspectives for the Front National‖58 (ibid.). The FN could argue 
that mainstream politicians of both left and right agreed with its arguments but were afraid 
to adopt its solutions. While the main parties played with the contradictions of control and 
integration, the FN maintained its ―refusal to admit the possibility that immigrants might be 
assimilated into French society‖ (Gildea 2002:234). Whether it was the housing crisis, 
unemployment, rising crime or the undermining of French national identity (AIDS would 
later be added to the list), immigrants (specifically non-European immigrants) were 
responsible and should be repatriated. FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen argued that ―his 
enemies were the politicians of the established political parties, who failed to deal with 
these crucial issues, and the media, which waged a campaign of silence and vilification 
against him‖ (ibid.). The solution for France was to vote FN. 
    Thirdly, capitulation to the right caused embarrassment abroad for the government. As 
early as May 1982, under the supposedly liberal laws, 
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 … va accréditer l‘idée d‘une responsabilité des immigrés dans la crise que connâit la France … 
58
 … ouvrir des perspectives au Front national. 
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decrees concerning entry and residence rights led to such a large number of 
foreigners being refused entry that President Chadli of Algeria lodged a formal 
protest. Mitterrand was subsequently obliged to put an end to these excessively 
severe measures (Silverman 1992:60). 
 
Now, with the introduction of ―réinsertion‖, based on negotiations with countries of origin, 
the countries concerned refused to play ball, 
 
showing little enthusiasm for a project which encouraged a mass return of their own 
nationals at a time of economic hardship. This led to the scheme being introduced 
unilaterally by the French government (ibid.:62). 
 
    It was predictable that the government‘s decision to abandon reform would strengthen 
the political right – indeed, the parties of the mainstream right were willing to do deals with 
the extreme right against the PS when they thought they could gain by it. During the 1983 
municipals at Dreux, Normandy, the RPR and UDF parties operated a joint list with the 
FN, with the result that FN candidate Jean-Pierre Stirbois became deputy mayor. However, 
the rise of the FN and the government‘s backtracking also helped to mobilise a large anti-
racism movement: if the government would not stand up to the racists, the movement 
would. 
 
3.18   “Touche pas à mon pote” 
There were several high-profile demonstrations in the period 1983-5 and new organisations 
were formed, including SOS-Racisme, which had considerable success in anti-racist 
campaigns in schools and universities, and France Plus, whose aim was to achieve ―beur‖ 
electoral candidates in all parties. ―Beurs‖ were the descendants of Arab immigrant parents 
and, unless they declined it, automatically obtained French citizenship at the age of 
eighteen. The rise of the FN and the Mitterrand government‘s abandonment of reforms 
were bad news for them: ―trapped on forbidding estates, facing a high rate of 
unemployment, generally discriminated against, they were clearly not the equals of their 
French peers‖ even after attaining French nationality (Gildea 2002:168). In 1983 the singer 
Renaud wrote ―Deuxième Génération‖, a song about the most marginalised and deprived of 
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the beurs, putting these words into the mouth of ―Slimane‖, aged fifteen and living in the 
banlieue of La Courneuve (Renaud 1993:136): 
 
Nothing to gain, nothing to lose 
Not even life 
I love only death in this life of shit 
I love what is broken 
I love what is destroyed 
I love above all everything that makes you afraid 
Pain and the night ...
59
 
 
 In 1981 many beurs had taken part in hunger strikes at Les Minguettes, outside Lyons, and 
in 1983 were involved in organising a march from Marseilles to Paris under the slogan ―For 
Equal Rights – Against Racism‖. They ―managed to extract from the government a new 
ten-year residence permit for foreigners, automatically renewable, instead of the current 
three-year permit‖ (Gildea 2002:168). The movement grew and SOS-Racisme sought to 
mobilise the youth of France to block the FN‘s progress. The lapel badge in the shape of a 
hand, with the slogan ―Touche pas à mon pote‖ (―Hands off my mate‖), became a 
recognised symbol of the movement, which was supported by the singers Yves Montand 
and Renaud, and the comedian Coluche, among others. The movement persuaded 
Mitterrand to reconsider introducing votes for foreigners in municipal elections – a pre-
election promise which had become one of the casualties of the capitulation. 
    Whether the movement could have persuaded the government to return to its apparent 
ideals of 1981 remains an unanswered question – for in 1986 the PS lost the legislative 
elections and the right returned to government. The reasons for this defeat were similar to 
the reasons for the 1970 defeat of the Labour government in the UK. Just as Labour had 
abandoned its support for important industries in response to economic pressures and made 
concessions to racism, disappointing its key supporters and encouraging the racist right 
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 J‘ai rien à gagner, rien à perdre 
    Même pas la vie 
    J‘aime que la mort dans cette vie d‘merde 
    J‘aime c‘qu‘est cassé 
    J‘aime c‘qu‘est détruit 
    J‘aime surtout tout c‘qui vous fait peur 
    La douleur et la nuit … 
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(2.10-2.13), so the Mitterrand administration abandoned its reforms, made concessions to 
racism, encouraged the FN and confused its own supporters. The result was the defeat of 
the left and the election of an RPR/UDF government which included Charles Pasqua as 
interior minister. 
 
3.19   The first Pasqua law 
Pasqua, writes Gildea, had ―all the finesse of a New York cop‖ (2002:173). Defferre had 
implied a connection between immigration and delinquency (3.17.2); Pasqua made it 
explicit: his aim was ―to fight illegal immigration and imported delinquency‖60 (cited Taïeb 
1998:73). To that end the law of 9 September 1986 refused foreigners entry to the country 
unless they could show means of support, and reintroduced administrative expulsions 
(deportation without recourse to the courts), which had been abolished in 1981. In October 
1986 ―[t]elevision viewers were treated to the sight of 101 Malians being dragged onto a 
charter plane at Orly [airport]‖ (ibid:174). The word ―charter‖ became notorious and 
inextricably linked with the interior minister. Pasqua also wanted to abolish automatic 
citizenship at eighteen for the children of immigrants. Under Pasqua‘s proposal, they would 
have to apply for it and could be refused on grounds of ―criminal record, immorality, or 
inadequate assimilation‖ (ibid.). This proposal, together with a provision for a loyalty oath 
to the Republic, was opposed by the anti-racism movement, including SOS-Racisme, and 
100,000 students demonstrated against it in December 1986. It was also opposed by 
Mitterrand, who remained president in ―cohabitation‖ with the new government of the 
right. The proposals were therefore put on hold and referred to a commission chaired by the 
vice-president of the Conseil d‘État, Marceau Long. 
    There seemed little comfort for the left (or for the anti-racism movement) as the 1988 
presidential elections approached. Pasqua claimed that the mainstream right had common 
values with the FN in ―the defence of national identity‖61 (Taïeb 1998:73). Prime minister 
and RPR presidential candidate Jacques Chirac did not deny the commonality, but sat, 
statesmanlike, on the fence: ―France must‖, he intoned, ―be neither a mill nor a citadel‖62 
(cited ibid.). In the event, however, Mitterrand was re-elected and, for the second time, 
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 « … lutter contre l‘immigration clandestine et la délinquance importée … » 
61
  « … la défense de l‘identité nationale … » 
62
 « La France ne doit être ni un moulin ni une citadelle. » 
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dissolved the National Assembly, calling legislative elections which the PS won. 
―Cohabitation‖ was over. 
 
3.20   Contradictions 
One of the first tasks of the new government was to respond to the report of the Long 
Commission, which had reported in January 1988. While recommending an end to the 
automatic right to citizenship at eighteen, it rejected Pasqua‘s proposal on the refusal of 
applications for nationality. The PS government decided to set out its own policy stall, 
which seemed to mark a change from Pasqua‘s approach: 
 
The expulsions of foreigners born in France were stopped and … the residence 
permit was again renewable automatically and valid for ten years for the partners of 
French citizens, the parents of French children and people who had entered France 
under the age of ten or who had been resident for ten years
63
 (Taïeb 1998:74). 
 
The categories of people entitled to residence permits were broadened and foreigners 
appearing before residence commissions for renewal of their permits could have a lawyer 
present at the hearing. Nevertheless, argues Silverman (1992:66), the new government, 
under prime minister Michel Rocard, 
 
perpetuated the same contradictions around integration and control that 
characterised the immigration policy of previous socialist administrations in the 
1980s. The coupling of the terms ―rigour‖ and ―humanism‖ … in the law of August 
1989 on entry and residence rights for foreigners … was indicative of the need to 
legitimise all decisions with this contradictory discourse. 
 
That discourse continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Rocard talked of 
―‗[i]ntegration for those who are here legally … but firmness against illegals‘‖64 (cited 
Taïeb 1998:75). Even the right to family reunification was not immune: ―If [it] remains a 
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 Les expulsions d‘étrangers nés en France sont supprimées et … la carte de résident est à nouveau 
renouvelée quasi automatiquement et valable dix ans pour les conjoints mariés à des Français, les parents 
d‘enfant français, et les personnes entrées en France avant l‘âge de dix ans ou résident en France depuis dix 
ans. 
64
 Intégration pour ceux qui sont régulièrement installés … mais fermeté pour les clandestins. 
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right it will be subject to stricter conditions relating to accommodation and resources.‖65 
Moreover, ―[t]he right of asylum must not be abused.‖66 But, of course, ―[a]s a 
counterweight to this repressive side, the government intends to make naturalisations easier 
and pursue the fight against exclusion …‖67 (ibid.). Rocard, and his successor Édith 
Cresson, played integration to a left audience and controls to voters who might be tempted 
to vote for the mainstream right or the FN. They did not seriously counter either the racism 
of the FN or of the mainstream right. While Chirac, in 1991, comforted his own party and 
wooed FN sympathisers by talking of the ―noise and smells‖68 of immigrants and of an 
―overdose of foreigners‖69 (ibid.), the government sent its usual mixed messages. This did 
not help immigrants or beurs: it often ruined ―years of work in the difficult areas, infuriated 
[immigrant] associations and fed xenophobia‖70 (ibid.:76). 
 
3.21   Headscarves 
There had been a number of struggles for recognition of the right to practise Islam since the 
1970s: in 1975 there was a rent strike by North Africans for the right to prayer rooms in 
SONACOTRA hostels; in 1982 Citroën car workers went on strike to get prayer time on 
their working shifts. In 1989, however, the headscarves dispute raised questions of religion, 
identity and the Republic as never before. 
    Three Muslim girls at a college in Creil (Oise) were refused entry into the school unless 
they removed their Islamic headscarves (foulards). They refused and were excluded from 
the school. The Republic‘s schools, according to the principal, had an obligation to 
maintain their secular nature (la laïcité). Religious expression was allowed in private but in 
public institutions headscarves were seen as a form of proselytisation and could not be 
allowed. Once the question was raised it provoked a debate which has continued into the 
21st century. In 2003, as President Jacques Chirac made his own attempt to ban 
headscarves in schools, Madeleine Bunting asked in The Guardian how ―the clothing of 
schoolgirls [could] become an issue of such enormous symbolic weight that for 14 years it 
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 Si le regroupement familial reste un droit, il sera soumis à des conditions de logement et de ressources plus 
strictes. 
66
 « Le droit d‘asile ne doit pas être détourné. » 
67
 Pour faire contrepoids à ce volet répressif, le gouvernement entend faciliter les naturalisations et faire 
progresser la lutte contre l‘exclusion … 
68
 … des « bruits et des odeurs » … 
69
 … de « l‘overdose d‘étrangers » … 
70
 … « ruinent » souvent des années de travail dans les quartiers difficiles, déclenchent la fureur des 
associations et alimentent la xénophobie. 
CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN FRANCE 82 
has been the touchstone of a debate about the French constitution, about what it is to be 
French and how France should ‗integrate‘ its … Muslims‖ (Bunting 2003). Silverman 
suggests that the answer lies in France‘s construction of its Republican principles which, in 
their relation to Islam, he summarises thus (1992:112): 
 
Islam denotes religion whereas the secular Republic is beyond religion; Islam is a 
particularism whereas the secular Republic is neutral; Islam is obscurantist and anti-
rational whereas the secular Republic is founded on the rationalist principles of the 
Enlightenment. It is therefore through ―the school of the Republic‖ … that children 
can be saved from the obscurantist particularism of religion. 
 
This Republican arrogance had consequences: integration into the Republic had never 
delivered on its promises, since it left many beurs victims of discrimination and second-
class citizens. Now, as a result of the headscarves affair, many Muslims judged that their 
religion and their identity were at risk and saw the need to defend them. The education 
minister in 1989 was Lionel Jospin. His attempt to solve the problem was unconvincing: on 
the one hand he ruled that the students should be allowed back in school; on the other he 
raised the spectre of the ―Anglo-Saxon model of communities‖ against the ―individual 
French model‖ and concluded that there was ―no reason to change the French model‖ 
(Gildea 2002:175).  In this discourse, the ―French model‖ clearly had to be defended 
unequivocally, since the only alternative was the evidently discredited ―Anglo-Saxon 
model‖. Criticism of the current French approach was thus excluded and the headscarves 
issue remained a live one because important questions about Republican principles, 
national identity and the place of religion remained unaddressed. 
 
3.22   Pasqua again 
In 1993 the right won the legislative elections and Pasqua again became interior minister. 
The government linked immigration ―to fraud, abuse of procedures and ‗the crisis of the 
suburbs‘‖ (Taïeb 1998:76).71 It was time for a further dose of Pasqua laws. The laws of 24 
August and 30 December included (ibid.:76-77): 
 
                                                 
71
 … aux fraudes, aux détournements de procédures et à la « crise des banlieues ». 
CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN FRANCE 83 
 strengthened border checks 
 random internal ID checks of ―anyone suspected of being a foreigner‖ (Gildea 
2002:175) 
 restrictions on family reunification and the right to asylum 
 abolition of automatic attainment of French nationality at eighteen for children born 
in France of foreign parents: nationality now had to be applied for 
 denial of the right of asylum seekers‘ to put their claims to the French authorities if 
the Schengen agreement and the Dublin Convention were deemed to apply to their 
case. 
 
The Conseil Constitutionnel quickly declared null and void the provisions restricting the 
right to asylum, so Pasqua demanded that the constitution be changed. ―François Mitterrand 
caved in‖, writes Gildea (ibid.:176): ―On 19 November 1993, France witnessed the sorry 
sight of deputies and senators gathering at Versailles to revise the constitution, limiting the 
rights of man in order to placate racist opinion.‖ 
 
3.23   Asylum 
Asylum became an important issue from the end of the 1980s. In the 1970s many of the 
―boat people‖ fleeing Vietnam and Cambodia sought asylum in France because of France‘s 
historical colonial connections with Indo-China. Between 1975 and 1980 France accepted 
110,000 of them. The number of refugees worldwide, moreover, was set to increase: those 
included in the remit of UNHCR rose from 2.4 million in 1975 to 27.4 million in 1995. As 
we have seen (1.5, 1.6), the rise in numbers during these years fed perceptions of 
immigrants as a threat and a ―security problem‖ in the EU. Blanc-Chaléard (2001:86) 
argues that to the French, ―in the context of the closure of borders to economic 
immigration, political asylum seemed like the only open door, from which came an 
unprecedented increase in [asylum] applications.‖72 In 1989 PS prime minister Michel 
Rocard increased the resources of OFPRA, the agency responsible for dealing with asylum 
applications. But, in line with the perception that asylum was ―the only open door‖ to 
economic migration, he also set about speeding up the asylum process and raising the 
percentage rate of refusals. In 1991 a law was passed preventing asylum seekers from 
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 … dans le contexte de fermeture des frontières à l‘immigration économique, l‘asile politique apparaît 
comme la seule porte ouverte, d‘où une augmentation des demandes sans précédent. 
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working and in 1992 holding centres (zones d‘attente), where asylum seekers were to be 
kept if they claimed asylum on arrival, were installed at a number of airports, including 
Roissy-Charles de Gaulle near Paris. 
 
3.24   The sans-papiers movement 
Many asylum seekers were involved in the sans-papiers movement, which first came to 
public attention in 1996. The sans-papiers are people with no ID documents, no residence 
or work permits and no prospects of obtaining any – they are, by official definition, ―illegal 
people‖. Their campaign is for regularisation and they reject the term ―clandestins‖, calling 
themselves instead ―people without papers‖. They are, in fact, in a kind of limbo from 
which there is no escape: 
 
Foreigners who entered without contracts several years before, they nevertheless 
work in France and have formed attachments (are married to a French citizen or are 
parents of children born in France), which makes them ―undeportable‖ and at the 
same time ―unregularisable‖ (ibid.:87).73 
 
Asylum seekers are strongly represented in the movement. François Brun, a supporter of 
the sans-papiers, explains that, although asylum seekers have a temporary residence permit 
while their applications are being processed, once their application is refused they become 
sans-papiers, with no valid permit. So ―a part, a good part [of the movement] are those … 
who are called ‗failed asylum seekers‘, who have applied and been refused.‖74 
    In March 1996, 324 sans-papiers, including 80 women and 100 children, occupied the 
church of St Ambroise in Paris. After four days they were evicted but then occupied the 
church of St Bernard. In August 1,500 police broke into the church, evicted them, detaining 
many, and that evening 20,000 people demonstrated in their support. Most of the sans-
papiers were released and 103 were eventually given temporary papers; however, 19 of 
them were deported and two went to jail (Hayter 2000:144). Hunger strikes, 
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 Étrangers entrés sans contrat plusieurs années auparavant, ils travaillent pourtant en France et y ont lié des 
attaches (époux de Français, parents d‘enfants nés en France). Ce qui les rend à la fois « non-expulsables » et 
« non-régularisables ». 
74
 … une partie, une bonne partie, sont des gens qui sont … ce qu‘on appelle les déboutés du droit d‘asile, 
ceux qui ont fait demande et ceux qu‘on a refusé … [Research interview 17/8/2005.] 
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demonstrations, petitions and occupations continued, though in recent years the 
movement‘s activities have declined.75 
 
3.25   From Debré to Chevènement  
In 1996 Jacques Chirac won the presidential election, with the right still in power in the 
National Assembly. In February 1997 the government introduced the Debré laws (named 
after the new interior minister) in the Assembly. They were cast in the mould of the Pasqua 
laws and included (Blanc-Chaléard 2001:87; Hayter 2000:145; Taïeb 1998:80): 
 
 the abolition of the automatic renewal of 10-year residence permits 
 the substitution of one-year permits for certain residents, making their situation 
precarious and potentially illegal 
 an increase in surveillance measures, including the fingerprinting of all foreigners 
and raids on workplaces 
 an obligation on anyone offering hospitality to foreigners to obtain prior permission 
from the town hall and report back when their guests had left. 
 
    These measures never became law. President Chirac dissolved the National Assembly on 
21 April, called legislative elections, which the left won, and a new period of 
―cohabitation‖ began. The measures may not have survived in their original form in any 
case, since they had provoked widespread debate and opposition and large demonstrations 
against them. The campaign against the measures had opened with a petition by filmmakers 
calling for civil disobedience and there were ―massive demonstrations which were joined 
by hundreds of celebrities who announced their intention of breaking the law‖ (Hayter 
2000:145). 
    After the election Lionel Jospin became prime minister. As education minister he had 
given no clear lead during the headscarves affair (3.21); during the campaign against the 
Debré laws he again appeared ambiguous on immigration and the anti-racism movement: 
he did not want there to be, ―on the one hand, those who are afraid of unemployment, … of 
insecurity and who feel abandoned and, on the other, those who fight for human rights, 
struggle against racism and seem to abandon [these working people] or preach morality to 
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 Email from François Brun, 6 October 2005. 
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them.‖76 (cited Taïeb 1998:80). In his inaugural speech as prime minister, he announced a 
full review of ―[t]he legislation on nationality, the law on foreigners and immigration‖ 
(cited ibid.:83) and an inter-ministerial commission, headed by Patrick Weil, was asked to 
prepare a report on all these issues. However, Jospin did not announce the repeal of the 
Pasqua–Debré laws. The Weil report was delivered in August and certainly contained a 
number of positive recommendations, many of which the government took on board in the 
Chevènement law of 11 May 1998 (named after the new interior minister). The law 
included measures (Taïeb 1998:83; Blanc-Chaléard 2001:88) 
 
 to facilitate family reunification 
 to widen the categories of people with full entitlement to residence permits, without 
the condition of previous legal status 
 to create special permits for students, scientists and artists 
 to include as refugees not only those who had been persecuted by the state but all 
those who had been involved in ―action in the cause of liberty‖77. This partly 
answered the critics of the hurried 1993 change to the Constitution where this right 
was reduced to accommodate Schengen and the Dublin Convention (3.22). 
 
Yet the Pasqua–Debré laws were not repealed and visa requirements remained, as did 
random police checks and the practice of armed escorts taking deportees to the border 
as in Pasqua‘s time (3.19). Even the government‘s willingness to begin regularisation of 
sans-papiers turned out to be two-edged: out of the 150,000 sans-papiers who 
responded to Chevènement‘s invitation to apply, only around 75,000 were granted 
papers, and these were for only one year. Hayter describes (2000:145) how another 
63,000, 
 
most of whom had lived in France for many years, were refused and made 
subject to deportation. The Chevènement decree came to seem more like a trap 
than an offer, since the 63,000 had revealed their names and addresses and were 
faced with a choice of deportation or going back into hiding …  
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 « … d‘un côté, ceux qui ont peur du chômage, …de l‘insécurité et qui se sentiraient abandonnés et, de 
l‘autre, ceux qui se battraient pour les droits de l‘homme, lutteraient contre le racisme et sembleraient 
abandonner [ces classes populaires] ou [leur] faire la morale. » 
77
 … action en faveur de la liberté … 
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This regrettable outcome was a consequence of the insoluble contradiction between 
controls and integration. 
 
3.26   Into the new millennium 
Since 1998 the restrictive agenda on asylum has steadily gained ground in France. The law 
of 10 December 2003 marked the introduction of a major package of reforms which, by 
increasing the complexity of administrative and legal procedures, introducing ―safe third 
country‖ and ―safe country of origin‖ procedures and shortening deadlines and timescales 
made it more difficult for asylum seekers to lodge their claims and have them fully and 
fairly examined (see below, 4.5). The reforms, accompanied by a discourse which saw most 
asylum seekers as economic migrants posing as refugees, marked a move from a procedure 
based on rights to a procedure based on constraints (Réforme 2007:2). The use of the 
concept of a ―safe country of origin‖ and the introduction of subsidiary protection are 
examples of how the changes often worked to the detriment of asylum seekers: the ―safe‖ 
countries often proved less than safe (see below, 9.4.3.2) and subsidiary protection – unlike 
territorial asylum, which it replaced – was only granted for a year at a time, could be 
withdrawn and was granted at very low rates (see below, 4.6.1). There has been an 
increasing use of priority procedures, with their tighter deadlines, where decisions are often 
made without the benefit of an asylum interview (see below, 9.5.3). Asylum seekers may 
now lose their chance of being heard even on appeal due to the appeal commission‘s power 
to refuse applications by order (ordonnance), i.e. on documentary evidence only, without a 
hearing (see below, 9.6.4). The state has increased its control and surveillance of asylum 
seekers by making financial support dependent on accepting a place in a reception centre 
(see below, 9.4.4.1). Governments have set deportation targets, a practice which arguably 
compromises the objectivity of the decision-making process (see below, 9.7.1). 
    As in the UK (see below, 4.3.1), the negative discourse which accompanied the laws, 
decrees and circulars on which these policies were based set asylum firmly in the context of 
law-breaking and criminality (see below, 4.5). Dominique de Villepin, interior minister in 
2004, instructed the préfectures (local police headquarters) to be more diligent in checking 
asylum applications, particularly the addresses of applicants, in order to prevent them 
moving from one area to another in search of a more flexible préfecture (Zappi 2004:1), 
and to this end préfectures had to harmonise their procedures. This was part of ―the fight 
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against illegal immigration‖,78 which now had to become an ―absolute priority‖79 (ibid.). 
Stricter checks should operate on accommodation certificates, a more stringent pursuit of 
―fraud‖ was required as well as of networks of traffickers (ibid.). The regularisation of 
sans-papiers (3.24) was not to be used as a concession to end a ―trial of strength‖80 with the 
sans-papiers pressure groups (Zappi 2004:1). Instead, préfectures should ban collective 
action on the part of such groups and take immediate action against occupations and hunger 
strikes: ―the first hours or the very earliest days of such events are decisive‖, de Villepin 
told a meeting of French prefects (cited ibid.). 
    Such a discourse operated on immigration policy in general. In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
the new right-wing president, set out his policy aims to Brice Hortefeux, his minister for 
immigration, integration, national identity and co-development, in a letter which laid down 
the terms of Hortefeux‘s ―mission‖. Although Sarkozy made passing reference to the 
benefits of immigration, he presented it mainly as a dangerous business, a threat to the 
cohesiveness of the Republic, something to be ―controlled‖ and ―managed‖. ―Our country‖, 
he said, must only accept ―foreigners to whom a job can be given, who need training in 
France or who meet the needs of its economy‖81 (Sarkozy 2007:2). He insisted that 
immigration ―must be compatible with our capacity to receive them and with our broad 
social equilibrium‖ (ibid.:1), thus seeming to hark back to the ―thresholds of tolerance‖ and 
―assimilability‖ arguments of previous years (3.13), as did his insistence that one of the 
criteria for acceptance would be that of ―geographical origin‖ (Sarkozy 2007:2): ―Our 
country‖, he declared, ―cannot accept that foreigners who do not respect our values and 
who have no willingness to integrate should be permitted to settle in France‖ (ibid.). 
    A parliamentary bill based on this mission statement was adopted by the Assemblée 
Nationale in October 2007. Some of the most controversial provisions related to proposed 
immigrants under the right to family reunion (Projet 2007:1): 
 
 an evaluation would be made of their knowledge of the French language and ―of the 
values of the Republic‖82 while they were still in their country of origin. If they did 
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 … la lutte contrre l‘immigration clandestine … 
79
 … priorité absolue … 
80
 … épreuve de force … 
81
 … des étrangers auxquels [la France] peut donner un travail, qui ont besoin de se former en France ou qui 
répondent à ses besoins économiques. 
82
 …des valeurs de la République … 
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not pass the tests, a further evaluation would take place after a two-month training 
course 
 proposed immigrants from certain countries (a list to be established by decree) 
would be expected to undergo DNA tests to prove their identities as relatives of 
family members already in France 
 parents already resident in France whose children are granted entry would have to  
sign a contract agreeing to a training course on the rights and duties of parents in 
France. Failure to fulfil the contract may result in withdrawal of benefit and 
residence permits. 
 
The most contentious of these provisions was the DNA test. The tests ―would not be 
compulsory but there are fears that applicants who do not take them would have their cases 
rejected (Sandford 2007:1). Hostility to the tests came not just from the opposition parties 
of the left but also from the right-wing governing party itself (the Union for a Popular 
Movement (UMP)). A few days before the law was adopted one unnamed member of the 
government declared that the tests were ―contrary to our values‖ and that ―frankly I could 
not do Hortefeux‘s job‖ (Contestation 2007:1). They were, however, introduced for a trial 
period, to end on 31 December 2009. But Eric Besson, the new immigration minister 
appointed in January 2009, had strong reservations about the tests (Van Eeckhout 2009:1). 
In February he set up a feasibility study, then another after he judged that the conclusions 
of the first were ―unsatisfactory‖ (ibid.). He then concluded that a decree to apply the law 
could not be issued because the senate‘s modifications and amendments had rendered the 
measure unworkable (ibid.). In September 2009 he announced that he would not sign the 
decree to apply the measure because no means had been put in place to guarantee the 
confidentiality of the genetic material submitted by applicants (Van Eeckhout 2009:1). 
Besson at first seemed to favour a delay of one or two years before implementation, but he 
later declared that his preferred option was to ―give it up altogether … because in the end it 
serves no purpose other than to bring the image of France into disrepute‖ (France 24 
2009:1). 
    So at the end of the decade France was still sharply divided by questions of immigration 
and race. Yet, 11 years before, there had been hopes that such divisions might be overcome. 
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3.27   “Black-Blanc-Beur”? 
In the summer of 1998 there were claims that France had entered a new phase in its history, 
when it would be able to see itself as a diverse society, ―a France‖, in the words of Harlem 
Désir, ―rich in all its children whatever their origin‖ (cited Gildea 2002:177). France‘s 
multi-ethnic football team had won the World Cup and it seemed that the country had 
experienced a catharsis. Chirac and Jospin watched the match in the stadium and, on 
Bastille Day two days later, Chirac ―hailed his country‘s victorious team … as a beautiful 
image of France and of the strength of its multiracial society‖ (BBC News 1998). 
Discrimination, division and racism belonged to the past: philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, 
until then a strong supporter of assimilation, declared that ―from now on métissage [mixed 
race] is the message. France has nothing other to offer as a project than the vision of her 
own composition: the formula ‗Black-Blanc-Beur‘ replaces the old integration model, and 
diversity replaces culture‖ (cited ibid.). 
    However, the catharsis turned out to be little more than an emotional spasm and France‘s 
social harmony has proved very fragile indeed. Le Pen came second in the first round of the 
2002 presidential elections and in 2005 rioting broke out in the banlieues of France. The 
riots began in Clichy-sous-Bois when two boys, aged 15 and 17, died climbing an 
electrified fence while fleeing the police. They spread throughout France, with petrol 
bombs being thrown and cars set on fire. Interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy called the 
protesters ―scum‖ (la rocaille), but it became clear that Clichy was a catalyst for protesters 
with a range of grievances about discrimination, marginalisation, racism and inequality. 
―It‘s unfortunate‖, Nadir, from Aubervilliers, told the newspaper Le Monde (Bordenave & 
Kessous 2005), ―but we have no choice.‖83 According to sociologist Eric Macé (cited 
Baudry & Mazzorato 2005), among the causes of the riots were ―the highest unemployment 
rates in Europe, racist discrimination and growing urban marginalisation and, since the 
beginning of the 1990s, a stigmatisation of the youth of the working-class suburbs which 
makes them appear foreign to French society and constructs them as a menace …‖84 
    The fleeting hopes of 1998 seem foolish in this light. Zinedine Zidane, the football hero 
who scored two out of the three goals against Brazil, is no longer an icon to beurs. He came 
                                                 
83
 « C‘est malheureux, mais on n‘a pas le choix. » 
84
 … un chômage des jeunes le plus élevé d'Europe, des discriminations racistes et des relégations urbaines 
aggravées et, depuis le début des années 1990, une stigmatisation des jeunes des banlieues populaires qui les 
fait apparaître comme étrangers à la société française, qui les constitue en menace … 
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from the Marseilles bidonville of La Castellane but today ―[h]is image is too pure‖, one of 
the fans of the Paris-Saint-Germain (PSG) football team told Le Monde (Hussey 2006): 
 
He is afraid to say what he is, that he is a beur … like the rest of us. And to say the 
truth about what it is like to be an Arab in this society. 
 
The stands at PSG‘s ground are the scenes of what Hussey calls a 
 
civil war … between two sets of supporters. These are the predominantly white 
―Boulogne Boys‖ of the Boulogne Stand (who are alleged to have far-right links) 
and the mixed-race and Arab fans … who gather on the Auteuil terraces (ibid.). 
 
Football did not heal the social divisions of France. 
 
3.28   Conclusion 
We have seen that French governments after the war sought to limit immigration from their 
colonies and former colonies, amidst arguments about ethnic selection (3.4-3.6). When it 
became clear that such immigration was needed for post-war reconstruction immigrants 
were recruited by employers but regarded as temporary and they were marginalised in 
French society (3.7-3.9). Despite claims that distinctions on grounds of race are not made in 
the Republic, notions of ethnic selection, assimilability and thresholds of tolerance were 
raised repeatedly in the years that followed (3.11-3.13). As in the UK, contradictions arose 
between ideas of integration and immigration controls (3.14), and the concessions made to 
racist arguments have fed xenophobia and encouraged the far right (3.17.2). As in the UK, 
protests by immigrants and the anti-racist movement have led to some changes in policy 
(3.10; 3.14; 3.18) but, as the ―headscarves‖ dispute (3.21) and the sharp debates around the 
DNA tests (3.26) showed, the problem of racism in France has not yet been resolved and 
many of the latest arguments are around the question of asylum. 
    In chapter 4, I will examine the contexts in which asylum policy operates in the UK and 
France and outline the systems they have put in place for the assessment of asylum claims.  
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4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the contexts in which asylum policy operates in the UK and 
France and outline the systems they have put in place for the assessment of asylum claims.  
I begin by noting that asylum policy has become part of general immigration policy in both 
states and show how it is increasingly guided not by protection concerns but by economic 
and security imperatives, and I suggest that the freedom allowed by the Refugee 
Convention to individual states in determining refugee status has left a negative mark on 
the asylum processes of both countries (4.2). I show how both asylum policymaking by 
governments and the political discourse across party divisions in both countries focus on 
immigration controls rather than protection for victims of persecution and thus undermine 
the right to asylum (4.3; 4.5). I then outline the forms of protection, the frameworks of 
decision-making and the asylum processes of each country (4.4-4.6). I identify the key 
stages in asylum seeking and emphasise the traumatic nature for refugees of the experience 
of persecution and flight (4.7). 
 
4.2   Protection or control? 
The purpose of the Refugee Convention remains the same as it was at its inception: to 
provide a framework for the protection of victims of persecution. However, the economic 
and political fears outlined in chapter 1 (1.6-1.9) have led to asylum policies being placed 
in the context of immigration controls rather than of protection. The rising number of 
asylum seekers in the 1980s and 1990s was seen in the UK ―as evidence of an ‗asylum 
problem‘ by those seeking further controls [and asylum] became a key element in 
immigration control during the 1990s‖ (Sales 2007:145). 
 
In France (Bousquet 2006:3), 
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[a]s in most other European countries, confusion between the phenomenon of 
migration as a whole and the specific problem of refugees has reigned in people‘s 
minds and in the media for several years, but equally it has reigned in national 
policies. The specific question of asylum is not taken into account in an independent 
and appropriate fashion but vanishes into the general migration policy of the state, a 
policy guided above all by economic and security imperatives.
1
 
 
Bousquet spells out the consequences: ―This absence of a distinction between migration 
policy and asylum policy leads to a tightening of the asylum system as a whole via the 
reinforcement of strategies designed to curb immigration‖2 (ibid.). This undermines the 
right to asylum, since asylum seekers are subjected to immigration controls rather than 
offered the protection that states parties undertake to offer when signing and ratifying the 
Convention. 
    UNHCR and the Refugee Convention allow states considerable freedom to establish 
asylum procedures to suit themselves. The UNHCR Handbook explains that it ―does not 
deal with questions closely related to the determination of refugee status, e.g. the granting 
of asylum to refugees or the legal treatment of refugees after they have been recognized as 
such‖ (Handbook 1992, para. 24). Indeed, surprisingly, ―the granting of asylum is not dealt 
with in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol‖ (ibid., para. 25). Although 
determination of refugee status is mentioned in Article 9 of the Convention, it 
 
is not specifically regulated. In particular, the Convention does not indicate what 
type of procedures are to be adopted for the determination of refugee status. It is 
therefore left to each Contracting State to establish the procedure that it considers 
most appropriate, having regard to its particular constitutional and administrative 
structure (ibid., para 189). 
 
                                                 
1
 Comme c‘est le cas dans la plupart des pays européens, l‘amalgame entre le phénomène migratoire dans son 
ensemble et la problématique spécifique des réfugiés règne depuis plusieurs années dans les esprits et les 
médias mais également dans les politiques nationales. La question spécifique de l‘asile n‘est pas prise en 
compte de façon indépendante et appropriée, mais elle est noyée dans la politique migratoire génerale de 
l‘État, politique guidée avant tout par des impératifs économiques et sécuritaires. 
2
 Cette absence de distinction entre politique migratoire et politique d‘asile conduit au durcissement du 
système d‘asile dans son ensemble via le renforcement des stratégies destinées à freiner l‘immigration. 
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Not surprisingly, procedures ―vary considerably‖ between states, some using informal 
arrangements, some using general immigration procedures, others establishing specific 
refugee-status determination procedures (ibid., para. 191). In 1977, therefore, UNHCR 
recommended that ―procedures should satisfy certain basic requirements … which reflect 
the special situation‖ of refugees (ibid., para. 192) and went on to outline such requirements 
– e.g. what is required of immigration officers, the need for interpreters, access to UNHCR 
representatives, interviewing techniques, questions of credibility, rights of appeal (ibid., 
paras 192-204).  They are, however, only recommendations and have no legal force: simply 
―an attempt has been made to define certain principles that … have proved useful‖ (ibid., 
para. 220) and ―it is hoped that [they] may provide some guidance‖ (ibid., para. 223). The 
writers of the Handbook clearly hope that these principles will be followed and note that 
the High Commissioner for Refugees ―has always pleaded for a generous asylum policy in 
the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights‖ (ibid., para. 25). Unfortunately, 
the freedom of action allowed in relation to procedures has left a more negative mark on the 
asylum processes examined in this study. 
 
4.3   The UK context: tough laws and secure borders 
We have seen how people fleeing the Stalinist states were assumed in the West to have a 
right to protection (1.3). In the UK, indeed, following the Soviet invasion of Hungary 
during the 1956 uprising, the Conservative government was criticised for not welcoming 
more refugees: Conservative MP Peter Kirk argued that ―[i]n this extreme situation we 
should have said that the gates of Britain are wide open to any Hungarian who wanted to 
come‖ (Kushner & Knox 1999:245). Yet hardly any politician in the mainstream parties 
across the EU would use such language today. 
    The refugee experience today, however, likewise arises from the experience of 
persecution. In August 2000, for example, the top four originating countries for applicants 
in the UK were Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Afghanistan (Asylum Statistics: August 2000): 
 
 in Iraq, according to the UN Commission on Human Rights that year, there were 
―systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights‖ (cited 
Boukhari 2000), and arrests of political opponents by the ruling parties in the 
autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan were documented by Amnesty International, 
as were continued reports of political killings (AIR 2001:133) 
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 in Iran a clampdown on freedom of expression that year led to the arrest and 
imprisonment of scores of journalists, writers and human rights activists; there were 
reports of physical and psychological torture and the continued detention of 
hundreds of political prisoners (AIR 2001:129-30) 
 in Somalia there was no effective government, no central judicial or police system, 
and there was war in the south between clan-based militias in which large numbers 
of civilians were being killed (Atlas 2002:202; AIR 2001:217-9) 
 in Afghanistan arbitrary detention, torture and forced displacement were taking 
place in the context of the war between Taliban and anti-Taliban forces. Women 
were suffering oppression and abuse, did not have freedom of movement and were 
banned from education and employment. Moreover, the neighbouring states of Iran, 
Pakistan and Tajikistan had closed their borders to Afghan refugees (AIR 2001: 25-
26). 
 
There were 840 applications from Iraq, 615 from Iran, 595 from Somalia and 475 from 
Afghanistan – a total of 2,525, just over 39% of the total number that month of 6,430 
(Asylum Statistics: August 2000). Accounts of abuse, persecution and flight in such 
circumstances should be taken seriously and that is what the UK claims to do as a signatory 
to the Refugee Convention: ―The United Kingdom has a proud tradition of providing a safe 
haven for genuine refugees‖, the Home Office claimed in 2005 (Brief Guide 2005:1). ―We 
give all applications for asylum a fair hearing in accordance with our obligations under the 
Convention‖. Consequently, ―each claim is assessed on its own merits‖ (ibid.:2). However, 
these assurances are weakened by a discourse which focuses on reducing the number of 
entrants and increasing deportations. 
 
4.3.1 The virtues of restriction 
Announcing the asylum figures for the second quarter of 2004, immigration minister Des 
Browne boasted that there were ―fewer asylum applications in the whole of the last three 
months than for the single month of October 2002‖ (Downing Street 24/8/2004). This 
―success‖ had been ―achieved by bringing in tough new legislation to tackle abuse and cut 
delays, securing our borders, rolling out detection technology and UK immigration controls 
to foreign soil … introducing fast-track processing, ending in-country appeals for nationals 
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of safe countries and bringing in new visa regimes‖ (ibid.). Pride is taken in restricting 
applications, not in granting protection to victims of persecution. Reforms of the asylum 
system over recent years have concentrated almost exclusively on tightening controls. In 
March 2001, for example, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND)
3
 announced 
its priorities for the next financial year. Two of them would place asylum firmly in the 
context of criminality: new intelligence-led efforts by the Anti-Crime Squad to prevent the 
trafficking of refugees; and the creation of 1,800 new detention spaces. Others included a 
deportation target of 30,000 asylum seekers in the following 12 months and measures to 
―encourage voluntary returns‖ (Asylum Reforms 2001:1-2). Home secretary Jack Straw 
briefly acknowledged his Refugee Convention obligations (―Our long-term strategy is to 
provide protection for those fleeing persecution …‖) but quickly returned to his main 
concern (―… while deterring unfounded asylum claimants‖) (ibid.: 6). 
    The rationale behind this approach is broadly that, since primary immigration is now at 
an end following the immigration controls that began in the 1960s (2.8), the only route into 
the UK is through the asylum system. Hence the increase in numbers and the need to 
reduce them. On this reading, most asylum seekers have not been persecuted but come here 
for ―economic‖ reasons (to find work or claim benefits), and they apply for asylum in order 
to avoid legal immigration controls. Not surprisingly, mainstream political parties now 
compete electorally to demonstrate which of them is ―toughest‖ on asylum. The 
Conservative government laid claim to being the toughest in the 1990s, when the Labour 
Party opposed its 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act. Home secretary Michael Howard 
declared in 1995 (Race Card, 7 November 1999) that the UK was 
 
seen as a very attractive destination because of the ease with which people can get 
access to jobs and to benefits. And while, for instance, the number of asylum 
seekers for the rest of Europe are [sic] falling the number in this country are [sic] 
increasing [and] only a tiny proportion of them are genuine refugees. 
 
Social security secretary Peter Lilley told the Conservative Party Conference in 1995 
(ibid.): 
 
                                                 
3
 The body within the Home Office responsible for making initial decisions on asylum claims until 2005, 
when it was replaced by the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA). 
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Genuine political refugees are few. The trouble is our system almost invites people 
to claim asylum to gain British benefits. That can‘t be right – and I‘m going to stop 
it. Britain should be a safe haven, not a soft touch. 
 
The Labour government elected in 1997 soon abandoned its pre-election liberal stance and 
took on the mantle of toughness: Home secretary Jack Straw announced that his aim was to 
ensure that ―there will be less of an incentive for the bogus people to come here‖ (Guardian 
Unlimited, 9 February 1999). The phrase ―bogus asylum seekers‖ had usually been 
associated with the Conservatives and they continued to use it: party leader William Hague 
claimed in April 2000 that, ―for bogus asylum seekers, this government has turned Britain 
into the biggest soft touch in the world‖ (Barkham 2000). In May the Conservative 
manifesto for the local council elections asserted: ―Labour has made this country a soft 
touch for the organised asylum racketeers who are flooding the country with bogus asylum 
seekers‖ (ibid.). For its part, the Labour government tried briefly to revive its liberal image: 
Alistair Campbell, the prime minister‘s official spokesperson, declared that ―[t]he prime 
minister would never, ever allow the Labour Party to use that unpleasant, unfortunate 
phrase …‖ (ibid.). Nevertheless a similar concept found its way into Labour‘s asylum 
legislation: section 24 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 lays down procedures to 
be followed by registrars who suspect that a marriage they have been asked to formalise 
may be a ―sham‖ marriage (IAA 1999: s. 24). 
    This approach means that all asylum seekers are treated as suspect and leads to the 
measures of control and criminalisation described above, since the fault is said to lie with 
asylum seekers. Yet governments cannot prove their allegations of fraudulent claims, apart 
from citing their own refusal rates and the falling numbers of applicants. But the rate of 
successful appeals against refusal, the numbers of people who ―disappear‖ – or ―abscond‖, 
in the government‘s criminalising discourse (cited Appeals 2004:15, n. 32) –  rather than 
return to their countries of origin and the reports of arrests, torture or murder after enforced 
returns suggest that this argument is unsafe. The UNHCR Handbook recommends a safer 
approach in the examination of asylum claims which sees the process of ascertaining the 
facts as a responsibility shared between the examiner of the claim and the asylum seeker, 
with the examiner adopting a positive approach to the asylum seeker‘s account of his or her 
experience (Handbook 1992, paras 196,199). This is particularly important in the case of 
countries where human rights are known to be abused. One participant in this study – ND1 
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from Sudan – fled to the UK ―because Janjawid [militias supported by the Sudanese 
government] came for my village. And they want to kill me … All my family is died – 
killed by Janjawid.‖4 After the refusal of his asylum claim he told the Home Office: ―I 
don‘t want to go to Sudan. I know if today I went to Sudan I be killed.‖5 It is true, as the 
UNHCR Handbook states, that ―[i]t is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies 
on the person submitting the claim‖ (Handbook 1992, para 196). But, given the recent 
history of Sudan, another approach might have been safer in ND1‘s case than imposing a 
burden of proof: the UNHCR Handbook (para. 204) argues that 
 
it is hardly possible for a refugee to ―prove‖ every part of his case and, indeed, if 
this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognized. It is 
therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. 
 
4.3.2   Returned to danger 
For some people, claiming asylum is itself a dangerous act. In 2005 a Zimbabwean asylum 
seeker won an appeal ―on the basis that as a result of having claimed asylum in the UK in 
the first place, he had a ‗well-founded fear of persecution‘ if he returned to Zimbabwe‖ 
(Unsafe 2005). During court hearings in 2007 relating to the safety of returns to Zimbabwe, 
the Refugee Council‘s concern was that ―it has become clear how little is known about 
what happens to returnees and how difficult this is to establish‖ (Monitoring Proposal 
2007:4). Yet Home Office minister Baroness Scotland told the House of Lords in 2006: 
 
Where we refuse a claim and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dismisses any 
appeal we … consider that it is safe for that individual to return. This is one of the 
reasons why the Home Office does not routinely monitor the treatment of 
individuals once removed from the UK (cited ibid.). 
 
The Home Office does not routinely monitor; it does, however, routinely remove. In its 
policy review for 2006 it announced its intention to ―substantially expand our work to 
enforce our immigration laws, including removing those who are not entitled to be here, 
and to encourage and ensure compliance with those laws throughout the immigration 
                                                 
4
 Research interview, 22 May 2007. 
5
 Ibid. 
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system‖ (cited ibid.). Thus, despite repeated claims by successive governments to be 
committed to the Refugee Convention, the evidence suggests an emphasis on immigration 
controls rather than on protection for the victims of persecution.  
   
4.4   The UK system 
4.4.1   Different forms of protection 
Refugee status   If the BIA decides that your claim of persecution meets the requirements 
of the Refugee Convention you will be granted refugee status, having ―the same social and 
economic rights as UK citizens‖ with ―full access to medical treatment, housing, education 
and employment‖ (Brief Guide 2005:2). You will also have the right to ―apply for official 
support, known as benefits‖ (Leave to Remain 2008). Before 2005 refugee status was 
permanent and called indefinite leave to remain. Since 2005 refugee status has been 
temporary, reviewed after five years in order to establish the current situation in your 
country of origin. This is when you can apply for indefinite leave to remain. If it is granted 
your refugee status will be permanent, with no further reviews of conditions in your 
country of origin.  But if the BIA decides that there has been ―a significant and non-
temporary change‖ in your country of origin ―such that [you no longer have] a well-
founded fear of persecution‖ (Refugee Leave 2006:9-10), your refugee status will be ended 
and you must ―volunteer‖ to leave. If you do not, you will be deported. 
 
Humanitarian protection   This category of protection, together with discretionary leave 
(see below), replaced exceptional leave to remain in 2003. If it is granted you will be 
allowed to work and have access to welfare benefits. If the BIA decides that you are not 
entitled to refugee status on the grounds of persecution, it may grant humanitarian 
protection if it believes that ―you are at serious risk to life and person arising from the death 
penalty, unlawful killing, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖ 
(Humanitarian Protection 2005, paras 2.2-2.4), i.e. if Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) applies to your case. The difference between this and 
persecution appears to be that to qualify as a refugee you must have been persecuted for 
―Convention reasons‖ (1.1) and the treatment meted out to you must have been 
―sufficiently systemic‖ to amount to persecution (Humanitarian Protection 2005, para 2.4). 
From 2003 to 2005 humanitarian protection was granted for up to three years; since 2005, it 
has been for up to five years. At the end of that period you may apply for indefinite leave to 
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remain, which, subject to ―background, character and conduct checks‖, should be granted if 
you are still considered to be at risk in your country of origin, but if the BIA believes that 
you will no longer be at risk your humanitarian protection will be ended and you will be 
deported. 
    Both humanitarian protection and discretionary leave represent a reduction in the right to 
protection: ―These categories of leave‖, declared the IND in early 2005, ―will be used more 
sparingly than exceptional leave was‖ (Brief Guide 2005:2). The Asylum Policy Instruction 
(API) on humanitarian protection, which guides the practice of BIA interviewers and other 
officials making decisions on individual cases, makes this intention clear. Reference is 
made to the case of Kacaj (2001), where the judges, while recognising that someone may 
have been persecuted for a reason other than a ―Convention reason‖, found it ―difficult to 
envisage a sensible possibility that a breach of Article 3 could be established where an 
asylum claim failed‖ (cited Humanitarian Protection 2005, para 2.4). The API agrees: the 
treatment or punishment required to trigger humanitarian protection is in a ―narrow 
category‖ of actions and ―few cases are likely to fit this description‖ (ibid.). In the light of 
this advice, ―used more sparingly‖ seems an understatement. Certainly, in the period April 
to June 2003 (humanitarian protection was introduced on 1 April 2003) humanitarian 
protection and discretionary leave, taken together, were granted, in initial decisions, to 7% 
of asylum applicants (compared with 19% in the previous quarter). The rate rose slightly to 
9% by the first quarter of 2004 but by the third quarter of 2007 it was still only 12%. 
Refusal of all protection continued to be high in each of those quarters – 86%, 88% and 
71% respectively – and grants of refugee status continued to be low, at 7%, 4% and 17% 
respectively (Asylum Statistics 2003-2007). 
 
Discretionary leave   If you are not given refugee status or humanitarian protection you 
will be considered for discretionary leave. This could happen where deportation would 
breach ECHR Article 8 concerning your right to respect for private and family life. It may 
also happen because your medical condition or the ―severe humanitarian conditions‖ in 
your country of origin would mean that deportation would breach your ECHR Article 3 
rights (not to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment). If it is granted you will be allowed to 
work and will have access to welfare benefits. If this sounds like a liberal approach, the 
caveats and reservations under this category, as under humanitarian protection, break the 
illusion: for medical cases, we find that ―[t]he threshold for inhuman and degrading 
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treatment … is extremely high and will only be reached in truly exceptional cases involving 
extreme circumstances‖ (Discretionary Leave 2005, para 2.2). Indeed, ordinary 
caseworkers are told that they cannot grant discretionary leave in medical cases on their 
own initiative: ―Where it is proposed to grant leave under this category the case should be 
referred to a senior caseworker‖ (ibid.). With regard to ―severe humanitarian conditions‖, 
the API is sceptical that they would trigger a grant of discretionary leave – ―[t]here may be 
some extreme cases (although such cases are likely to be rare)‖ – so once again ―[w]here it 
is proposed to grant leave under this category the case should be referred to a senior 
caseworker‖ (ibid.). 
    Finally, while it is accepted that there may be ―other cases where removal would breach 
the ECHR‖ (ibid., 2.3), they too are thought to be few and far between. Thus a removal 
might ―give rise to an ECHR breach‖ other than of Article 3 or Article 8 (ibid., para 2.3), 
but ―[it] will be rare for removal to breach another Article of the ECHR without also 
breaching Article 3 and/or Article 8‖ and cases ―should be referred to a senior caseworker 
for approval‖ (ibid.). Outside of such cases, and the case of unaccompanied children, 
―[t]here are likely to be very few other cases in which it would be appropriate to grant 
discretionary leave to an unsuccessful asylum seeker‖ (ibid., para 2.5). Thus although 
―there remains scope to grant discretionary leave where individual circumstances … are so 
compelling that it is considered appropriate to grant some form of leave‖, there is even 
more scope for discretionary leave to be ―used more sparingly‖ than exceptional leave to 
remain. 
 
4.4.2   Objective decision-making: some observations 
In the UK the initial decision to grant or refuse asylum is taken within the Home Office – 
before 2005 by the IND, after 2005 by the BIA. All UK governments claim that decisions 
are made on a fair and objective basis. In 2007 home secretary Jacqui Smith wrote that BIA 
officials ―carefully consider all asylum and human rights claims on their individual merits 
in accordance with the United Kingdom‘s obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), using objective and 
published information.‖6 Nevertheless, the fact remains that decisions on asylum claims are 
                                                 
6
 Letter to Rt. Hon. Alan Johnson MP, 7 November 2007. I had requested Alan Johnson, my local MP, to ask 
the home secretary a number of questions arising from an answer given by Geoff Hoon, government chief 
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taken by the very minister and government department responsible for the increasingly 
restrictive asylum policy described above, with its emphasis on abuse, crime, detection 
technology and deportation targets, and this arguably compromises the objectivity of the 
decision-making process. The government‘s answer to this seems to be based on the 
training given to BIA staff and the asylum seeker‘s eventual access to an appeals process: 
caseworkers and immigration officers are ―trained to act under the 1951 Convention‖ (Brief 
Guide 2005:2); there is a ―right of appeal to the independent Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal (AIT) and, if appropriate, onwards to the Court of Appeal.‖7 Rights of appeal are 
seen as an important safeguard because of the assumed independence of the judiciary. So 
government ministers seek to reassure their critics by telling them that 
 
in many cases the final decision whether to grant asylum or other appropriate form 
of protection, in effect, will be taken by the AIT or sometimes a higher court. As 
well as considering appeals against individual decisions, the AIT also periodically 
issues ―Country Guidance‖ determinations that provide guidance for future 
Tribunals on the approach they should adopt in similar cases. These then feed into 
the development of country specific asylum policy …8 
 
Thus the AIT in particular plays an important role in ensuring fair decision-making. Yet 
there are problems at the appeal stage and I examine the way the AIT operates and the 
reliability of its conclusions in chapter 7. 
 
4.4.3   Outline of the asylum process 
The UK asylum process broadly involves: 
 
 a preliminary screening interview, when your identity and country of origin is 
established, typically at your port of arrival 
 a main asylum interview, when you will be asked why you have applied for asylum, 
usually conducted at asylum screening units (ASUs) in Croydon or Liverpool 
 a letter granting or refusing refugee status/humanitarian protection 
                                                                                                                                                    
whip in the House of Commons, during Question Time on BBC-1 on 20 September 2007. This letter was her 
reply. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
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 an appeal process in the case of refusal of refugee status, humanitarian protection or 
discretionary leave 
 deportation if your final appeal is refused. 
 
This broad outline of the asylum process holds true both under the system as it existed prior 
to 2005 and under the New Asylum Model (NAM), which came into full operation in 2005. 
None of the participants in this study was dealt with under NAM. NAM is, however, 
consistent with the government‘s restrictive agenda. Broadly, it speeds up the process and 
tightens restrictions and its effect has been to erode further the right to asylum and I take 
account of NAM in the course of this study. 
 
4.5    The French context 
Official discourse in France proclaims the French commitment to the right to asylum. Its 
history is often traced back to 1793 when the Constitution declared the Republic‘s 
readiness to grant asylum to ―foreigners banished from their country for the cause of 
liberty‖, with the nineteenth century seen as a ―liberal‖ period for refugees (Le Pors 
2005:12, 13). In the twentieth century, however, France‘s commitment was not so clear. 
    The growing number of refugees in Europe in the aftermath of the First World War 
prompted attempts to restrict them (1.4). Le Pors notes, however, that France ―gave a 
welcome to the Russian populations fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution‖9 (2005:19) and that, 
―[e]qually, the arrival of a workforce demanding little was welcome after the haemorrhage 
of the 1914-18 war‖10 (ibid.). But the Great Depression of 1929 led to xenophobia against 
refugees who were ―held responsible for all the social ills‖11 of the time (ibid.). After 1933, 
when Hitler came to power in Germany, France became less willing to sign agreements to 
protect refugees and introduced tighter border controls and stricter conditions of residence. 
Moreover, ―[c]ontrary to tradition, the [French] public authorities disgraced themselves by 
interning German, Spanish and Polish refugees, some of whom were handed over to the 
German authorities during the Occupation‖12 (ibid.). Since many of them were Jewish they 
were handed over to become victims of the Nazi Holocaust. Nevertheless, and despite the 
                                                 
9
 … accueille favorablement les populations russes fuyant la révolution bolchévique. 
10
 L‘arrivée d‘une main-d‘œuvre peu exigeante apparaît également la bienvenue après l‘hémorragie de la 
guerre de 1914-1918. 
11
 … à l‘origine de tous les maux sociaux. 
12
  À l‘encontre de la tradition, les autorités publiques se déshonorent en internant des réfugiés allemands, 
espagnol, polonais, dont certains sont remis aux autorités allemandes pendant l‘Occupation. 
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ambiguities on immigration and race described in chapter 3, France ratified the Refugee 
Convention in 1954 and its 1967 Protocol in 1971. 
    Those ambiguities continued to dog policy-making in France and, as we have seen 
(3.16), France halted both primary immigration and family reunification in the 1970s. It 
could not, however, easily renege on its obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
Nevertheless, a political discourse developed which began to accuse asylum seekers of 
―using the [Refugee Convention] to avoid immigration laws‖13 (Noiriel 2002:15). From the 
mid 1980s the growing number of refused claims reflected ―the increasingly restrictive 
attitude of OFPRA‖14 (ibid.). 
    Decourcelle claims that ―legislative reforms at the expense of foreigners are a French 
national sport‖15 (2005:139). ―With each change of government, and sometimes several 
times under the same government, they cannot resist adopting a new barrage of measures 
against immigrants and refugees‖16 (ibid.). One of the most recent and far-reaching of these 
reform packages was introduced in 2003. In the words of the Coordination française pour le 
droit d‘asile (CFDA),17 the law of 10 December 2003, ―starting from the position that most 
[asylum] claims were unfounded and that, in their great majority, people claiming refugee 
status were simply economic migrants, put in place a legal arsenal aimed at identifying the 
alleged ‗false claimants‘‖18 (Réforme 2007:1). 
    This presumption of guilt was not new: since the 1980s a distinction had been drawn 
between ―genuine‖ and ―false‖ refugees in France, between ―political refugees‖ and 
―economic refugees‖, between ―nice‖ and ―fraudulent‖ asylum seekers19 (Decourcelle 
2005:142). In 1998 the director of OFPRA described the work of the agency: ―A difficult 
job …: in all that is carried along in the flow of the river [we must] search tirelessly for the 
                                                 
13
 … d‘utiliser la Convention de Genève pour détourner les lois sur l‘immigration. 
14
 … l‘attitude de plus en plus restrictive de l‘OFPRA. (OFPRA is the agency responsible for dealing with 
asylum applications (the Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides – the French Office for the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)). 
15
 Les réformes législatives sur le dos des étrangers sont en France un sport national. 
16
 A chaque changement de gouvernement, parfois plusieurs fois pour un même gouvernement, on ne peut 
s‘empêcher d‘adopter de nouvelles rafales de mesures contre les immigrés et les réfugiés. 
17
 The French Coordination for the Right to Asylum. CFDA coordinates about 20 organisations with the 
common goal of defending and promoting the right to asylum and the status of refugees in the context of the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
18
 La loi du 10 décembre 2003, partant du postulat qu'une majorité des demandes n'étaient pas fondées et que, 
dans leur grande majorité, les personnes qui prétendaient au statut de réfugié n'étaient que des migrants 
économiques, a en effet mis en place un arsenal juridique visant à écarter les prétendus « faux demandeurs ». 
19
 « Vrai »/« faux » ; « réfugiés politique »/« réfugiés économique » ; « gentils »/« fraudeurs ». 
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gold nuggets of the Geneva Convention, the political refugees‖20 (cited ibid.:143). Gold 
nuggets, by definition, are rare. 
    In 2002 the government realised that OFPRA‘s resources were insufficient to deal with 
the numbers applying. The government set itself two tasks: to shorten the process and 
reduce the numbers. OFPRA‘s budget was increased, more staff were recruited and a major 
programme of clearing the backlog of cases was undertaken. Speed was of the essence, 
since President Chirac had ordered that the asylum process should now take no more than a 
month, not two, three or even four years as had been the case in the past. There were, on the 
one hand, bonuses for individual staff members calculated according to the number of 
dossiers examined and, on the other, threats of non-renewal of contracts for those who 
failed to meet their quotas (ibid.:147-8). Meanwhile, asylum seekers continued to arrive: 
 
During the year 2003, France examined 52,000 new claims for refugee status, to 
which must be added around 25,000 claims for territorial asylum [see subsidiary 
protection, 4.6.1], putting France in the lead among the countries of Europe. For the 
government there was no pride to be taken in this classification, quite the contrary. 
This number of asylum seekers was perceived as a millstone and even a disgrace, a 
proof of laxity compared with France‘s European partners who managed, by means 
of radical measures, to reduce the number of new refugees
21
 (ibid.:146). 
 
The government, however,  
 
deliberately started a process of massive rejection of asylum claims, which operated 
to restrict the flow … In the year 2003 alone, OFPRA refused nearly 60,000 claims, 
of which around 90% were confirmed on appeal by the Appeals Commission, an 
overall rejection rate of 85.2%, a historical record
22
 (ibid.:148). 
                                                 
20
 Métier difficile … : dans le flux que charrie la rivière, chercher inlassablement les pépites d‘or de la 
Convention de Genève, les réfugiés politiques. 
21
 Pour l‘année 2003, la France a eu à examiner 52.000 nouvelles demandes de statut de réfugié, auxquelles il 
faut ajouter 25.000 demandes d‘asile territorial, la plaçant ainsi en tête des pays européens. Pour le 
gouvernement, il n‘y a aucune fierté à tirer de ce classement, bien au contraire. Ce nombre de demandeurs 
d‘asile est perçu comme un boulet et même une certaine honte, une preuve de laxisme vis-à-vis des 
homologues européen qui ont réussi par des mesures radicales à faire baisser le nombre de nouveaux réfugiés. 
22
 … a délibérément engagé un processus de rejet massif des demandes d‘asile qui fonctionne à flux tendu … 
Rien que pour l‘année 2003, l‘OFPRA a prononcé près de 60.000 décisions de rejet, dont environ 90% ont été 
confirmées en appel par la Commission des recours, soit un taux de rejet global de 85,2%, le record 
historique. 
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The law of 10 December 2003 ―profoundly changed the procedure surrounding the right of 
asylum‖23 (Réforme 2007:2). The reforms represented a move ―from a procedure based on 
rights to a procedure based on constraints‖24 (ibid.). For CFDA, the state sought ―to 
prevent foreigners from lodging asylum claims by means of increasingly complex 
administrative and legal procedures‖25 (ibid.). For Decourcelle (2005:148), 
 
[t]he latest package of reforms … increases … the difficulties of examining an 
asylum claim, and this quite clearly in the name of the sacrosanct hunt for ―false‖ 
refugees. It is still the same logic: administrative procedures which pile up in order 
to filter the ―good‖ asylum claims. The examination process has since reached such 
a high degree of complexity that controlling it is more and more beyond even the 
administrators who have been given the job of applying it, and arbitrary and abusive 
practices multiply as a result.
26
 
 
There are now more special procedures which, if you are subjected to them, speed up the 
processing of your claim (Réforme 2007:2), e.g. ―priority‖ procedures for those whose 
claims are deemed ―fraudulent‖ or ―abusive‖, ―safe country of origin‖ procedures and ―safe 
third country‖ procedures. Timescales and deadlines in general within the process have 
been shortened, and human rights commissioner for the Council of Europe Alvaro Gil-
Robles noted that ―although until 2003 France was known for the length of its waiting 
periods during the asylum process, the serious shortening of deadlines introduced by the 
law raises questions about the quality of the speeded-up process‖27 (Gil-Robles 2006:57). 
                                                 
23
 … a profondément modifié la procédure encradrant le droit d‘asile. 
24
 … d‘une procédure de droit à une procédure de contrainte (original italics). 
25
 … empêcher les étrangers de déposer une demande d‘asile par le biais de procédures administratives et 
juridiques de plus en plus complexes. 
26
 La dernière reforme … augmente … les difficultés pour faire examiner  une demande d‘asile, cela bien 
évidemment au nom de la sacrosainte chasse aux « faux » réfugiés. C‘est toujours la même logique : des 
procédures administratives qui s‘empilent pour filtrer les « bonnes » demandes d‘asile. Le processus 
d‘examen a depuis franchi un tel degré de complexité que sa maîtrise échappe même de plus en plus aux 
administrations chargées de l‘appliquer, multipliant du coup les pratiques arbitraires et abusives. 
27
 … alors que jusqu‘en 2003, la France était caractérisée par la longueur des délais de traitement de la 
demande d‘asile, le fort raccourcissement introduit par la loi soulève des interrogations quant à la qualité du 
traitement accéléré.  
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He also noted, and deplored, the fact that ―the stricter idea of asylum, as currently practised 
in France, risks contravening the rights of genuine asylum seekers‖28 (ibid.:51). 
 
4.6   The French system          
4.6.1   Different forms of protection 
As in the UK, there is more than one form of protection available to asylum seekers in 
France. 
 
Refugee status   If OFPRA decides that your claim meets the requirements of the Refugee 
Convention or the right to constitutional asylum allowed for in the French Constitution, you 
will be given refugee status and a 10-year residence permit, renewable as of right, which 
includes permission to work and the right to most welfare benefits. The same status and 
rights are given to your spouse so long as you were married before you applied for asylum 
or, if you were married after applying, you have been married for at least a year and still 
live together. Constitutional asylum relates to the right to refugee status for ―everyone 
persecuted for their action in the cause of liberty‖.29 During the arguments about the second 
Pasqua laws (3.22), which reduced the rights of asylum seekers to have their cases heard in 
France, the Conseil Constitutionnel declared that one consequence of the provision in the 
Preamble to the Constitution was that all asylum seekers had the right to be heard. The 
subsequent changes to the Constitution to accommodate Pasqua marginalised this 
constitutional right but under the 1998 Chevènement law it was rehabilitated and is now 
one form of protection on offer in France. However, even before the second Pasqua laws, 
constitutional asylum ―existed for a long time without great practical consequences‖30 
(Ségur 1998:118). It is now sometimes considered in the context of ―subsidiary protection‖ 
(Le Pors 2005:53), a lower, less used and less secure category of protection and this 
practice seems to negate the purpose of constitutional asylum.  
 
Subsidiary protection   Under the 1998 Chevènement law, you could be granted ―territorial 
asylum‖ if it was considered that you did not meet Convention requirements for refugee 
                                                 
28
 … la conception plus stricte de l‘asile, actuellement pratiquée en France, risque de contrevenir aux droits 
des véritables demandeurs d‘asile. 
29
 … à toute personne persécutée en raison de son action en faveur de la liberté (line 4 of the Preamble to the 
1946 Constitution). 
30
 … est longtemps demeurée sans grande portée pratique. 
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status but that nevertheless your life and liberty were threatened in your country of origin or 
that you were in danger from inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to ECHR Article 3. 
In the 2003 asylum reforms, territorial asylum was replaced by subsidiary protection. It 
could be granted if OFPRA considered that, while not meeting Convention requirements, 
you would be in danger in your country of origin of suffering the death penalty, torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or, as a civilian, that you faced ―a serious direct and 
individual threat against [your] life or person because of generalised violence resulting 
from ... armed conflict‖31 (Guide 2005:5). Subsidiary protection carries the right to work. 
The same status and rights are given to your spouse, with the same conditions as for 
refugee status (see above). 
    However, subsidiary protection is granted at very low rates: OFPRA granted it to only 84 
people in 2004, 0.74% of the total granted some form of protection (Bousquet 2006:11-12). 
It is also a very insecure form of protection: it is granted for only one year, then renewable 
for another year and so on. But renewal ―may be refused at each expiry date if the 
circumstances justifying protection cease to exist or undergo a sufficiently profound 
change‖32 (CESEDA33 2008, art. L.712-3). Thus insecurity and uncertainty play a large part 
in the lives of its beneficiaries. 
 
4.6.2   Objective decision-making: some observations 
4.6.2.1   OFPRA 
OFPRA is the agency which decides whether to grant refugee status or other protection, or 
to refuse asylum altogether. It is deemed to have financial and administrative autonomy (Le 
Pors 2005:25) and to be independent of government (Decourcelle & Julinet 2000:71) – 
evidence of its credibility, according to its defenders. Unfortunately, that independence has 
always been questionable. Until 2004 it was under the supervision of the ministry of 
foreign affairs, its director a ministry official appointed by the government for a period of 
three years and having the title ―ministre plénipotentiaire‖, the highest rank in the 
diplomatic corps (ibid.:72). Since 2004 two government departments have been sharing 
supervision of OFPRA, so that it is now, writes Bousquet (2006:9), 
                                                 
31
 … une menace grave, directe et individuelle contre [votre] vie ou [votre] personne en raison d‘une violence 
généralisée résultant d‘une situation de conflit armé … 
32
 … peut être refuse à chaque échéance lorsque les circonstances ayant justifie l‘octroi de la protection ont 
cessé d‘exister ou ont connu un changement suffisamment profond. 
33
 Code de l’Entrée et du Séjour des Étrangers et du Droit d’Asile, the law relating to the entry and residence 
of foreigners and the right to asylum. 
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a hybrid administration, placed under the supervision of the ministry of foreign 
affairs [and] the interior ministry. Although charged with implementing the 1951 
Geneva Convention on refugees and given civil status and financial and 
administrative autonomy, this body is frequently accused by refugee support groups 
of being under the strong pressure of its supervising ministries and of being too 
sensitive to the government‘s migration policy concerns.34 
 
In fact, its ―financial and administrative autonomy‖ is doubtful, given that its budget comes 
by way of a government grant, which it shares with the CRR.
35
 Moreover, OFPRA‘s 
autonomy may be compromised in another respect: since holders of the office of director 
are members of the diplomatic corps, they are likely either to be on their way to a 
diplomatic post abroad or fresh from finishing a stint at an embassy, possibly in a refugee-
producing country. Decourcelle and Julinet (2000:72-73) suggest that relationships entered 
into during Michel Raimbaud‘s time as French ambassador to Mauritania may have 
influenced his decision-making as director of OFPRA in 2000. Writing in the OFPRA 
report for the year 1999, he mused: ―It is … difficult to understand … the influx of 
Mauritanians (786) who often refer to an old crisis of eleven years ago, the impact of which 
has largely ceased‖36 (ibid.:73). Decourcelle and Julinet comment: ―Political detainees and 
the victims of slavery who continue to expose the racist authorities in Mauritania will 
surely grow in number‖37 (ibid.). 
  
4.6.2.2   Appeals 
If OFPRA refuses refugee status, or the more temporary ―subsidiary protection‖, the 
asylum seeker may appeal to the CRR. Its president is a member of the Conseil d‘État, the 
                                                 
34
 … une administration hybride, placée sous la tutelle du Ministère des Affaires étrangères [et] le Ministère 
de l‘Intérieur. Bien que chargé de mettre en œuvre la Convention de Genève de 1951 sur les réfugiés et doté 
de la personnalité civile et de l‘autonomie financière et administrative, cet organisme est fréquemment accusé 
par le milieu associatif de subir la forte pression de ses ministères de tutelle et d‘être trop sensible aux 
tendances de la politique migratoire décidées par le gouvernement. 
35
 The CRR (Commission des recours des réfugiés), an administrative court set up to hear refugees‘ appeals 
against OFPRA decisions, is now the Cour nationale du droit d‘asile (CNDA), but is still widely referred to as 
the CRR and I have retained this title throughout. 
36
 Il est … difficile de comprendre … le flux des Mauritaniens (786) qui se réfère souvent à une crise vieille 
de onze ans dont l‘impact a largement cessé. 
37
 Les détenus politiques, les victimes de l‘esclavage qui continuent de dénoncer le pouvoir raciste 
mauritanien apprécieront sûrement … 
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highest administrative court in France, and is appointed by the Conseil d‘État‘s vice-
president. Thus we might expect the CRR to be independent of government and of OFPRA 
itself. However, several factors make this a questionable assumption: the CRR has a 
common budget with OFPRA, a grant provided by the government; many of the CRR‘s 
staff are supplied by OFPRA; and the CRR‘s judges‘ panels include an assessor appointed 
by the Administrative Council of OFPRA, representing the ministries sitting on that 
Council – foreign affairs, the interior, social affairs, justice, economics and finance –  and 
the office of the prime minister (Decourcelle & Julinet 2000:78; Le Pors 2005:25). 
Although the judges‘ panels also include a UNHCR representative, the point is well made 
by Decourcelle and Julinet that ―[t]his situation inevitably creates links of dependency 
between the CRR and OFPRA, whose decisions [the CRR] is supposed to judge 
objectively‖38 (2000:78). Moreover, since appeals before the judges‘ panels are appeals 
against decisions originally made by OFPRA, the presence of OFPRA assessors on the 
judges‘ panels ―goes against an elementary principle of law that ‗no one may be a judge 
and a party [in a case] at the same time‘‖39 (ibid.). The question of the independence of 
OFPRA and the CRR is especially relevant in the light of the restrictive agenda in France. 
 
4.6.3   Outline of the French asylum process 
The asylum process in France broadly involves: 
 
 arrival: if you ask for asylum at your port of arrival, you will stay in a holding area 
(zone d‘attente) until the Interior Ministry decides whether to grant you entry. If it 
decides to do so you will be given a safe-conduct pass to take to a préfecture (police 
headquarters) 
 application at the préfecture for temporary permission to stay in the country as an 
asylum seeker. This permission will take the form of a pass – autorisation provisoire 
de séjour (APS) – and a form to complete which you will send to OFPRA 
 the presentation of your application to OFPRA, including the completion of a form 
and an interview 
 an appeal to the CRR if you are refused by OFPRA 
                                                 
38
 Cette situation crée inévitablement des liens de dépendance entre la Commission des recours des réfugiés et 
l‘OFPRA, dont elle est censée juger objectivement les décisions. 
39
 … déroge à un principe élémentaire de droit qui proclame que « nul ne peut être juge et partie à la fois ». 
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 an appeal to the Council of State (Conseil d‘État) if you are refused by the CRR. 
 
4.7   Key stages in asylum seeking 
I identify six key stages in the experience of seeking asylum which apply to both countries: 
 
1. Persecution and flight. 
 
2. Reception and screening. 
 
3. Dispersal, support and accommodation, detention in some cases. 
 
4. Main asylum interview and initial decision. 
 
5. Appeals. 
 
6. Deportation, in the case of refusal. 
 
I combine the two experiences of persecution and flight. Persecution is the reason for flight 
and is usually a protracted experience involving several traumatic events. I give examples 
from among the UK participants in this research but the point is true for asylum applicants 
in both countries. Many participants said that war (in most cases some form of civil war) 
was at least one of the reasons that made them flee. Others cited ethnic persecution as a 
cause of their flight. Many had lived in fear of their lives (either from government agents, 
rival political parties, militias, gangs or simply the conditions of war) and many had known 
their own family members killed, some of them discovering their bodies.  
     Many undertook long and difficult journeys to escape, most not knowing their final 
destination, though some knew they were going to Europe. Many had no travel documents 
and made their way by lorry or car, sometimes walking for large stretches of the journey. 
They were typically accompanied by agents (traffickers), often describing them as ―mafia‖, 
whom they or their relatives or friends had paid to get them to safety. Many had false 
passports – again supplied by agents, who accompanied them on the journey by plane or 
boat. The agents typically confiscated the passports before the end of the journey and then 
disappeared. Some people travelled on regular flights with their own passports. 
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    The stress and trauma of both persecution and flight feed into the experience of the 
asylum process itself and both should be given due weight by officials and others during 
the asylum process. Shaw and Witkin (2004:6) explain that 
 
[o]n arrival, asylum seekers may be suffering from illness or injury resulting from 
events or conditions in their own country, or their hazardous journey to the UK. 
Some will be suffering psychological distress after the death, torture or 
―disappearance‖ of family members. 
 
Moreover, as UNHCR reminds each state party to the Refugee Convention (Handbook 
1992: para. 190), 
 
an applicant for refugee status is normally in a particularly vulnerable situation. He 
finds himself in an alien environment and may experience serious difficulties, 
technical and psychological, in submitting his case to the authorities of a foreign 
country, often in a language not his own. 
 
Four examples follow, from the top four originating countries in August 2000 mentioned 
above (4.3), of how the stresses of persecution and escape are likely to be combined on 
arrival. All four were participants in this study. 
 
Iraq 
Many Iraqi Kurds fled at this time because they were victims of the rivalry between two 
political parties in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone of Iraq: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP). S1 was one of them. He had 
originally been a member of the KDP but in a complicated series of events, during which 
he joined the Communist Party, he became a target not only of the KDP and the PUK but 
also of the Islamic Party (IMIK). His father was murdered by the KDP and his brother by 
IMIK, and during the latter attack S1 was shot in the leg. He fled Iraqi Kurdistan in 1999. 
    He did not know his exact destination, ―just I would like to stay Europe country … I 
knew the Europe country look after people‖.40 He went to neighbouring Iran, then to 
                                                 
40
 Research interview, 24 July 2006. 
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Turkey, where he paid an agent for a place in a lorry with five or six other people. After 
eight days in the lorry he arrived in the UK and immediately applied for asylum. 
 
Iran 
FS3 and his wife FS4 arrived in the UK in September 2000. They were members of a 
political party banned by the Iranian regime. FS3 had been arrested and tortured after a 
student demonstration in 1999. In detention, ―I was frequently slapped, kicked and beaten; 
my hands were burnt with cigarette ends … My body got used to beatings, but I could not 
cope with shouting, cries and screams of other victims. It affected my mental state.‖41 
Nevertheless, in 2000 he helped to organise another demonstration. The demonstrators 
were attacked and FS3 fled. He later learned that other members of his party had been 
arrested and one had been killed. FS3 and FS4 went into hiding and, after threats to FS4‘s 
father, were advised by their party leader to leave the country. An agent provided them with 
false passports and they travelled to Turkey, where they hid for six days. They then 
travelled by lorry for two days to an unknown country, where they were again given false 
passports and put on a flight to the UK. 
 
Somalia 
OH1 left Somalia in 2002. The civil war had resulted in her losing her home, and most of 
her possessions had been burned: ―Everything they stole. Whole house is stole. Somebody 
is living in our house.‖42 The journey to safety was arranged by an agent. OH1 travelled, 
with her two-year-old son, by car, plane and ship. She did not know her destination until 
the last leg of her journey, when the agent told her he was taking her to England. 
 
Afghanistan 
MS1 was a high school headmaster in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime and left in 
2001. His teaching had come to the attention of the authorities and he had been arrested 
twice. His father and brothers were also teachers and kept school books in the house. But 
the Taliban burned many school books – indeed, ―everything burned in Afghanistan, 
including my degree, including my passport.‖43 In the end drastic action was needed to 
                                                 
41
 FS3‘s witness statement, 22 April 2004, paras 9, 10. 
42
 Research interview, 17 January 2007. 
43
 Research interview, 13 October 2006. 
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preserve the books for the future: ―So what we did finally, we dig a big hole in the ground 
and we save those … books.‖44 Nevertheless he ended up in prison. With the help of a 
friend he escaped from prison and left the country. 
    He had no idea where to go, except that ―I would be happy to come to any European 
country: I mean, free countries … I‘d like to live in a freedom country‖.45 With the help of 
another friend, he paid an agent and left his family behind. He travelled with other people – 
in a plane, in cars, buses, trains and, finally, a lorry. They travelled mostly at night, the cars 
had blacked-out windows and most of the time he did not know where he was. In the UK 
the police stopped the lorry on the road from Dover to London and the passengers were 
discovered and arrested. It was only then that he realised he was in the UK. 
 
Conclusion 
I have suggested that both the UK and France see asylum policy as part of immigration 
control rather than as part of a duty to protect victims of persecution and that policymaking 
follows a restrictive agenda increasingly guided by economic and security imperatives 
(4.2). I have argued that this approach to asylum is made easier by the freedom allowed by 
the Refugee Convention to individual states in their determination of refugee status (4.2). I 
have shown how political discourse criminalises asylum seekers and puts their claims under 
suspicion and that this facilitates a restrictive asylum process which sets out not to protect 
but to reduce numbers, deport failed asylum applicants and discourage others from 
applying (4.3; 4.5). This approach downgrades the duty of both countries, as signatories to 
the Refugee Convention, to protect victims of persecution, and thus undermines the right to 
asylum. I show that the limited interpretation and use of humanitarian protection and 
discretionary leave (UK) and subsidiary protection (France) likewise undermine the right to 
asylum (4.4.1; 4.6.1). I also suggest that the decision-making processes in both countries 
are compromised in terms of objectivity by being too closely linked to government (4.4.2; 
4.6.2). Finally I link the experiences of persecution and flight, and argue that the effects of 
the combined trauma of these experiences should be taken into account by officials in both 
countries during the asylum process. 
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    We now turn to the question of what it is like to seek asylum in each of the two countries 
chosen for this study. In chapters 5-8 I deal with the experience of seeking asylum in the 
UK, looking at each stage of the process in the context of the procedures in place. In 
chapter 9 I examine the experience of seeking asylum in France. 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: EARLY STAGES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the reception and screening process, noting how delays, lengthy 
procedures and the conduct of the screening interview make it a stressful process, in which 
the traumatic experience of persecution and flight is often ignored (5.2). I examine the 
system of providing accommodation and financial support and argue that its aims are 
deterrence and immigration control rather than protection (5.3), and that therefore it 
undermines the right to asylum. I show how the denial of support under section 55 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the lack of asylum screening units 
across the UK leave people destitute and unable to access the asylum process. I look at the 
growing use of detention within the UK‘s fast-track system and argue that these processes 
ignore the needs of asylum seekers, facilitate their removal and likewise undermine the 
right to asylum (5.3.5). 
 
5.2   Reception and screening 
Both under the system in place until 2005 and under the New Asylum Model, procedures 
may vary according to whether the application is made on arrival or some time afterwards 
(an ―in-country‖ application). Most of the sample in this study applied at their port of 
arrival, where they had a ―screening interview‖ the same or the following day. The 
screening interview is not presented by the Home Office as a major event. It is an ―initial‖ 
interview whose purpose is simply to ―screen applicants to establish their identity and 
nationality with interpreters present if necessary‖ (Brief Guide 2005:1). It is, according to 
the European Migration Network, ―a brief screening interview [for asylum seekers] in order 
for the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) to verify their identity as far as 
possible, take their fingerprints and provide them with evidence that they have made an 
application‖ (EMN 2005:4). ―At this stage,‖ the Refugee Council explains, ―you should not 
be asked to give details about why you wish to apply for asylum‖ (Information 2003:1). If 
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you have no resources and nowhere to stay, you will also be able to apply for financial 
support and accommodation. 
    This should be good news. I have suggested that recently arrived asylum seekers are 
likely to be experiencing the combined stresses of persecution and escape (4.7). BIA 
immigration officers should be aware of the need for sensitivity in their dealings with 
asylum seekers. They have special instructions for dealing with children, victims of torture, 
people who have been traumatised, mentally disturbed claimants and potential suicides 
(API – Interviewing 2006, para 15). Yet asylum seekers often describe a long and stressful 
screening process. 
 
5.2.1   Queues, delays and ID procedures 
The stress often begins before the interview itself. OH9 applied on arrival and had to wait 
alone in a room ―all the night, until the morning … I was on a chair. And I look – no one sit 
with me.‖1 OH13, his wife, and five children aged between five and 14 years, arrived 
during the Christmas holiday 2004: ―It was round evening time … there was not enough 
staff and … around 18 hours – all night I was there – no bed, no chairs … because there 
was full, so we were on the floor.‖2 OH7 applied in country some time after her arrival. She 
went to Croydon with her two small children at 6 a.m., queued all day and left without an 
interview: ―At the end of the day they say, ‗No more today, come back tomorrow.‘‖3 The 
first day was particularly stressful: ―You sit like this [folds arms] and – you understand? – 
you are not happy. Because you are think what they – what they do? They say you ‗OK‘? 
Or they refuse you?‖ She was worried to such a degree that she was sick and they 
threatened to remove her from the building. Not wanting to return to the back of the queue 
she managed to recover her composure. On the third day she got an interview. 
    Once begun, the process is a long one partly because of the ID procedures involved: the 
asylum seeker‘s details and photograph are included on an application registration card 
(ARC) together with their fingerprints, taken ―to guard against fraud and multiple 
applications‖ (Brief Guide 2005:1). The ARC is then issued to the asylum seeker and serves 
as an identity card. The applicant often has to wait for lengthy periods as this process 
unfolds. MS1 was kept in a room at Heathrow airport: he was ―not allowed to go outside – 
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3
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it is around ten hours … During this ten hours they interviewed me ... they needed to check 
my luggage, taking fingerprints, taking photograph for the ID.‖ S7 thought that his 
interview and the ID preparation together took about six hours. 
 
5.2.2   Screening interview 
The screening interview itself is not likely to be brief or free of stress. The thirteen-page 
form to be completed by the interviewer during the interview provides a possible 67 
questions for a main applicant to answer. They cover the applicant‘s identity and country of 
origin; details about their journey to the UK; their education; their most recent employer; 
their children (including those left behind, with their addresses and telephone numbers); 
and the family‘s ―immigration history‖. 
    Some questions inevitably lead to stress: after the questions, ―Which airline did you 
travel with?‖ and ―What was the flight number?‖ the applicant is asked, presumably in the 
absence of a passport: ―What name did you travel under?‖ Under Article 31 of the Refugee 
Convention, arrival with no passport, or a false passport, should not generally be a problem: 
―The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who … enter or are present in their territory without authorisation 
…‖ (Convention and Protocol 1996:31). The interviewer, however, has instructions to 
threaten a penalty: ―If the applicant‘s explanation is not credible they must be warned that 
the Secretary of State finds their answer incredible and that this may affect their application 
for NASS
4
 support‖ (Screening Form 2004:5). This odd reference to the secretary of state – 
who does not yet know of the existence of the asylum seeker – seems to be a device for 
applying the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s. 57, which provides for ―an 
application [for NASS support] not to be entertained where the Secretary of State is not 
satisfied that the information provided is complete or accurate or that the applicant is co-
operating with enquiries …‖ (NIA 2002, s. 57). On the face of it, this instruction and this 
application of section 57 appear to breach Convention Article 31. 
    There may be other causes of stress during reception and screening. Interviewers may 
express scepticism, or make accusations or threats to asylum seekers. OH1‘s interviewer 
refused to believe anything she said: ―He said, ‗Why I believe you it‘s your name, or it‘s 
                                                 
4
 National Asylum Support Service – the Home Office directorate responsible since 2000 for providing 
support and accommodation for asylum seekers. In 2006 NASS ceased to exist as a directorate but the 
acronym is still often used to refer to the part of BIA which administers support to asylum seekers. 
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your birthday, or it‘s your country?‘ And ‗I can‘t believe it‘s your child – maybe you take 
another [person‘s] child?‘‖5 OH7‘s interview, conducted through an interpreter, was quite 
long: ―When I finish, interviewer say, ‗You are liar, you are not telling me the truth. You 
not come from Africa – you come from Europe.‘ He say they send me a letter, and he say, 
‗If I got your fingerprints, you and your children, I …‘ – what is it? – ‗I send you to jail.‘‖ 
She commented: ―I think I become crying.‖6 
    Interviewers may also go beyond the stated parameters of a first interview, ignoring the 
combined stresses of persecution and escape. S6‘s journey from Iran took at least three 
weeks. He had travelled in lorries, walked through the night, slept in rubbish bags during 
the day and finally arrived at Dover in a lorry with seven other people. On the road out of 
Dover, as the agent had instructed, they banged on the side of the lorry to attract the 
driver‘s attention, were let out and the police called. S6‘s interview took place three days 
later: ―They asked me a lot of questions about ‗Why you‘re coming to this country? How 
you coming? In which way? Why? What‘s the problem?‘‖ Contrary to the notion of a brief 
screening interview which takes account of vulnerability and stress, they asked him in 
detail why he wanted asylum. The point of this first interview was, he was sure, that ―you 
should be try to give your idea, your life, your history and you should be explain for them 
‗[this] happen to me, I have documents for to show you [that] my speaking is right.‘‖ He 
did so as best he could under the circumstances. But ―after that, they didn‘t believe [me].‖ 
The interviewer said, ―We don‘t believe you have these problems [in Iran]‖, and said he 
had come for ―money‖, not because of persecution.7 
 
5.3   Dispersal, accommodation and subsistence 
If you are considered ―destitute‖ – i.e. without ―adequate accommodation or support for 
[yourself] and [your] dependants for the next 14 days‖ (Treatment 2007:24) – you are 
entitled to ―emergency accommodation‖, which may be in a hostel, a hotel or a 
reception/induction centre. This temporary accommodation is provided under the Asylum 
and Immigration Act 1999, s. 98, and once your asylum application has been processed you 
will be moved to accommodation in a UK town or city designated as a ―dispersal‖ area. 
You cannot choose your destination, and your accommodation too is provided on a ―no-
                                                 
5
 Research interview, 17 January 2007. 
6
 Research interview, 18 January 2007. 
7
 Research interview, 23 August 2006. 
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choice‖ basis (Brief Guide 2005:1-2) under section 95 of the Act. The package also 
includes entitlement to subsistence payments ―at 70% of the income support level for adults 
and 100% for children‖ (Treatment 2007:25). Since July 2002 asylum seekers have not 
been allowed to work. If you have waited for an initial decision on your claim for 12 
months you can apply for permission to work but there is no corresponding right to apply if 
your appeal or its result is delayed. 
    If you make an in-country claim you have to do so at one of the two asylum screening 
units (ASUs) in the UK – at Croydon or Liverpool. If you are living with family or friends 
and wish to continue with that arrangement you may still be eligible for the subsistence 
payment. Yet, in spite of the provision of accommodation and cash, I argue that the system 
sets out to deter asylum seekers rather than welcome them. 
 
5.3.1   From “ad hoc” provision to “burden-sharing” 
Between 2000 and 2006 ―section 95 support‖ was organised by NASS. The creation of 
NASS took place under Labour‘s Asylum and Immigration Act 1999 and the government 
presented it as necessary in order to ―rationalise‖ an ―uncoordinated system‖ (Operational 
Reviews 2002, paras 1.1.2, 1.1.3): 
 
Prior to 2000, asylum seekers were supported in an ad hoc and uncontrolled way. 
Those who declared their asylum application at their port of entry were eligible for 
income support, housing and council tax benefit. Other destitute asylum applicants 
were supported by local authority social services departments. 
 
The ―rationalised‖ scheme, however, seemed to have deterrence, rather than protection, as 
its aim. It was constructed on ―twin pillars‖ (ibid.:1.1.3): the ―dispersal‖ of asylum seekers 
across the country without any choice of destination; and the provision of vouchers, 
exchangeable at designated supermarkets, instead of social security benefits. The 
―dispersal‖ of asylum seekers was declared to be an attempt to ―relieve the pressure‖ on 
London and the south-east ―through ‗burden sharing‘‖ (Sales 2007:148). But Sales argues 
that the primary aim of dispersal was in fact deterrence, citing home secretary Jack Straw‘s 
preface to the government‘s 1998 White Paper, which ―suggested that the new 
arrangements were needed to ensure that ‗genuine asylum seekers‘ were not left ‗destitute‘ 
while minimising ‗the attractions of the UK to economic migrants‘‖ (ibid.). Indeed, Straw 
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put the emphasis on deterrence and controls throughout the eight short paragraphs of his 
preface (Fairer 1998:3): there were, he said, ―genuine‖ applicants, but they often ―suffered, 
whilst abusive claimants and racketeers have profited‖ and ―[t]he cost to the taxpayer has 
been substantial and is increasing‖ (para. 2). He complained of ―too many avenues of 
appeal‖ and proposed ―a single appeal right … including removal arrangements‖ (para 3), 
promising ―increased effort to enforce immigration controls so that those who are refused 
understand that they must go‖ (para. 4). He had ―no doubt that large numbers of economic 
migrants are abusing the system by claiming asylum‖ and that ―[m]odernising our controls 
and simplifying our procedures will help to tackle that problem‖ (para. 5). 
    It is certainly the case that from its outset, whatever the need to rationalise the previous 
system, dispersal did not operate in a rational way and could only add more stress to the 
already stressful experience of applying for asylum. Kenny Hamilton (then director of the 
Scottish Refugee Council) described the system of reception in Glasgow as it operated in 
2001: 
 
A bus a day disgorges passengers at the reception centre at 6.30 am. We meet the 
bus, but there‘s no warning given about how many are coming. NASS gives single 
individuals an address for accommodation but people in a group don‘t get an 
address. NASS should send a list of names, but the system operates in a haphazard 
fashion. So you see what‘s available and offer it. NASS is mainly interested in 
getting people into the dispersal system and off their hands.
8
 
 
Dispersal ―often took place to areas without existing communities of fellow nationals‖ 
(Sales 2007:148) or any history of large-scale settlement of ethnic minority communities, 
such as Hull and Glasgow. Before dispersal began, Hull had been a city ―which was 
effectively … almost monocultural‖ (Craig et al 2004:9, n. 9). Kenny Hamilton said that 
Glasgow ―always had minority communities to some extent (e.g. Pakistani), but Glasgow is 
overwhelmingly ‗white‘‖.9 It was often the case that ―no preparatory development work 
had been undertaken to help local agencies or the settled population prepare effectively for 
their arrival‖ (ibid.). The consequences ―have been disastrous on occasions with racist 
assaults and murders‖ (ibid.). In Glasgow in 2001 Haitham Saada was beaten up ―by a 40-
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strong mob … outside his flat with baseball bats and bottles and was hospitalised with 
severe head and facial injuries, and broken ribs‖10 and Firsat Dag was murdered on the 
Sighthill housing estate (Journalists’ Guide 2003:37). 
     Vouchers had been used before. The previous Conservative government had introduced 
Regulations which removed all social security benefits from in-country applicants and 
those appealing against a refusal of their asylum claim. But a Zairean asylum seeker 
challenged the Regulations in court, where Lord Justice Simon Brown deplored the ―state 
of utter destitution‖ that asylum seekers were being forced into: ―[this] uncompromising 
draconian policy contemplates a life so destitute that to my mind no civilised nation can 
tolerate it‖ (cited Hayter 2000:106-7). After several court cases the government reluctantly 
provided some relief in the shape of vouchers. The vouchers attracted strong criticism: their 
value was about 70% of income support levels; they could only be exchanged at designated 
supermarkets; they were exchangeable for a limited range of goods which varied between 
supermarkets; they were issued in fixed amounts and no change could be given against 
them; and they tended to stigmatise asylum seekers. Sales describes how ―[c]heck-out 
operators were empowered to check eligibility and ensure that purchases did not include 
banned items such as cigarettes and alcohol, thus introducing an element of moral 
surveillance and exposing asylum seekers to racist abuse from other customers‖ 
(2007:147). The Refugee Council saw vouchers as ―stigmatising, humiliating and 
degrading‖ (cited Hayter 2000:110). In 2000 a Labour government would extend them to 
all asylum seekers. 
    Evidence that deterrence – and thus immigration control – was the aim of the policy 
came from the home secretary himself. In a press release announcing the Labour 
government‘s 1998 White Paper, which prepared the way for the 1999 Act, Jack Straw 
declared that his aim was to ―minimise incentives to economic migration by separating 
support for asylum seekers from the main benefits system and providing accommodation 
with no choice about its location.‖ (Future 1998:1). In the White Paper itself the argument 
for vouchers is presented solely in terms of immigration control, with no reference to the 
UK‘s obligations to protect refugees. The government had considered ―the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of cash-based support and provision in kind [i.e vouchers]‖ 
(Fairer 1998, para. 8.20) and, although cash support ―is administratively convenient, and 
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usually … less expensive‖, decided on vouchers because ―this is less attractive and 
provides less of a financial inducement for those who would be drawn by a cash scheme‖ 
(ibid.). The government even argued that the scheme was good for asylum seekers 
themselves. Sales (2007:148) cites a Home Office document
11
 which claimed that 
 
―those who are genuinely fleeing persecution‖ would ―not be overly concerned 
about whether that support is provided in cash or in kind, nor about the location in 
which they are supported.‖ … Official thinking was that ―genuine‖ refugees would 
be prepared to undergo a temporary period of hardship since the process would 
weed out ―bogus‖ claimants, thus making their own position morally stronger. 
 
    Since then dispersal has remained, though vouchers have all but disappeared: most 
agencies and NGOs, including charities, churches and asylum support groups, were united 
in condemnation of them and now only refused asylum seekers on ―section 4 support‖ 
under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (for people who, for a variety of reasons, 
cannot be returned immediately to their country of origin) receive vouchers, which are 
exchangeable at post offices. Cash support, however, still amounts to only 70% of income 
support: as of April 2008 a single income support claimant aged 25 or more received 
£60.50 per week; a single asylum seeker of the same age received £42.16 per week.
12
 
Moreover, asylum seekers do not have access to the premium payments available to income 
support claimants, e.g. premiums for dietary needs, additional heating costs and disability 
(Craig et al 2004:89). 
 
5.3.2   Obstacles to receiving support: section 55 
Section 55 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 allows refusal of NASS 
support to an asylum seeker if ―the Secretary of State is not satisfied that the claim was 
made as soon as reasonably practicable after the person‘s arrival in the United Kingdom‖ 
(NIA 2002, s. 55 (1) (b)). The government‘s original assumption was that claims should be 
made immediately on arrival at the port of entry. But in December 2003, after several legal 
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 Asylum Seekers Support: an information document setting out proposals for the new support scheme for 
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 Department of Work and Pensions: Income Support rates as at April 2008 
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challenges intended to test the meaning of ―as soon as reasonably practicable‖, the 
government announced that the phrase meant ―within three days‖ (Treatment 2007:30). But 
applicants would ―have to provide a credible explanation of how they arrived in the UK‖ 
(Hungry 2004:11). There is no right of appeal under the section, although judicial review, 
on the grounds of procedural error or breach of ECHR Article 3, is possible (ibid.). 
    The section 55 measures were not contained in the White Paper which preceded the 
publication of the Bill (Secure 2001) but were introduced at a late stage in the House of 
Lords, with the House of Commons allowed only thirty minutes to consider them (Hungry 
2004:9). Parliament‘s Joint Committee on Human Rights was concerned that section 55 
would lead to violations of Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (right to an adequate standard of living), ECHR Article 3 
(right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment) and ECHR Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life) (cited Treatment 2007:30). Home secretary David 
Blunkett had assured Labour MPs that the provisions would only target illegal workers, 
overstayers, people making multiple asylum applications and students with expired visas 
(Hungry 2004:9) and ―[t]he House of Lords was also assured that these new measures 
would be enforced with caution so as to protect applicants with good reason to delay‖ 
(ibid.). However, once in operation, the impact of section 55 on asylum seekers coming 
within its scope was devastating (case studies, ibid.:18-19): 
 
 Aman‘s agent abandoned her at a bus stop; she went to a police station and from 
there by train to Croydon that same evening. The ASU office was closed, so she 
slept in the street and went for an interview the next day. She was refused NASS 
support: ―I eat food at the Refugee Council in Brixton Monday to Friday, and on 
Saturday and Sunday I eat at Queen‘s Park in Croydon. I sleep outside Migrant 
Helpline [a support agency] since one week. [They] gave me a blanket and sleeping 
bag. It closes at 11 pm, so I sleep with others outside. I‘m afraid. I don‘t sleep 
much.‖ 
 
 Jamal slept rough for two nights and found his way to Croydon. He was given 
emergency accommodation but then evicted when his NASS application was 
refused. He slept outside the Refugee Council offices and they gave him blankets: ―I 
haven‘t washed myself in a month – I had my first shower yesterday. I never have 
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enough food … the weather is cold and it‘s raining all the time. I feel scared.‖ Then 
the final irony: ―A few nights ago two people asked me for money and threatened to 
beat me.‖ 
 
Both these examples suggest that the ―credible explanation‖ demand imposes what amounts 
to a burden of proof. 
    Problems encountered as a result of section 55 refusals are (ibid.:23) 
 
 street homelessness 
 hunger 
 unhygienic conditions 
 overcrowding 
 inability to keep in touch with legal representatives or keep appointments – 
including Home Office interviews – due to lack of funds 
 lack of essential items 
 unmet special needs. 
 
Dwyer quotes a nurse who dealt with patients not eligible for support because of section 55 
(Dwyer 2005:631): 
 
A couple of weeks ago I had an eight-month pregnant woman who was destitute. 
She couldn‘t get social services to take her on as a pregnant woman, in relation to 
the unborn child, and NASS were saying that she‘d not applied for support in 
enough time. So obviously that had massive implications for her. 
 
In an exploration of housing issues in relation to dispersed forced migrants, Dwyer and 
Brown (2008) cite an example of an asylum seeker made destitute because of section 55, 
who told them (ibid.:212): 
 
To be honest sometimes, depending on the weather conditions we just find 
something to see us through to the next morning … just find a corner to sleep in … 
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At one stage it was terrible, very cold in the night and we didn‘t have enough to 
cover ourselves and it was traumatic. All night you are shaking, you are trembling. 
 
A Coventry Refugee Centre worker described one case: a ―visibly war-wounded‖ man 
refused support and ―sent out into the icy streets‖ (Hungry 2004:23). ―We were able to get 
him an injunction after two weeks,‖ added the worker. ―During this period I had to go to 
Kurdish shops and restaurants asking people if they would take him into their homes.‖ 
    The Home Office makes the assumption that everyone knows the rules about applying 
for asylum and should therefore obey them. In 2006 ND1, a participant in this study, was 
abandoned by his agent and slept rough in Glasgow for a week. He was arrested, then 
interviewed by a Home Office official. Asked why he had not applied for asylum before, he 
replied: ―I don‘t know about asylum because I am not traveller – I didn‘t travel in my life to 
any country, also I didn‘t leave my village to go to other places.‖13 Lord Joffe, a former 
refugee, would sympathise with ND1. During the 2002 debate on section 55 he told the 
House of Lords (Lords Hansard, 17 October 2002, cols 996-7): 
 
This clause is based on the premise that refugees know that they need to apply for 
asylum. It would astonish [noble Lords] to learn that … [i]t does not occur to many 
refugees until a considerable time after they arrive here that they need to [do so]. 
When I came to this country as a refugee 35 years ago, I thought that I would be 
welcome – as a lawyer, I ought to have known better. I did not know that in the 
United Kingdom, which was regarded as the one country that would be totally 
sympathetic to one, refugees needed to go through a process of applying for asylum. 
Many refugees still assume today that they do not need to do anything other than get 
to this country … Obviously, once [they] have been here for some time, almost all 
of them will learn otherwise. 
 
ND1 learned otherwise. He was refused NASS accommodation and continued to sleep 
rough until the Glasgow support group Unity found him accommodation. 
    In 2003 NASS screened 14,755 applicants under the section 55 provisions. 9,415 (64%) 
were refused NASS support, and refusals increased by more than 50% between the second 
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and third quarter of the year (Asylum Statistics 2003). Legal challenges were made and by 
October 2003 ―section 55 cases amounted to a quarter of all the judicial review cases 
lodged in the High Court and 800 cases were being processed‖ (Treatment 2007:30). The 
courts were under heavy pressure. Judges, however, were not inclined to declare destitution 
in itself a breach of ECHR Article 3. In Lord Justice Bingham‘s view, ―[a] general public 
duty to house the homeless or provide for the destitute cannot be spelled out of Article 3‖ 
(cited ibid.:31). But they were concerned that section 5 cases were, in the words of Mr 
Justice Maurice Kay, ―clogging up the processes of the Administrative Court‖ (Hungry 
2004:12) at a rate of 60 applications a week. In the end, Lord Justice Bingham brought 
matters to a head in the 2004 Limbuela case: ―I have no doubt‖, he said in his judgment, 
―that the [Article 3] threshold may be crossed if a late applicant with no means and no 
alternative sources of support, unable to support himself, is, by the deliberate action of the 
state, denied shelter, food or the most basic necessities of life‖ (cited Treatment 2007:31). 
    So the Home Office ―revised its procedures‖ under section 55 (Briefing Section 55 
2004:1). Section 55 assessments would now be made on the basis of the screening 
interview, not a separate section 55 interview; and a new NASS Eligibility and Assessment 
Team (NEAT) would make the decisions (ibid.:2). Apart from these purely procedural 
changes, the Home Office told the Joint Committee for Human Rights ―that since the 
Limbuela judgment, it does not refuse support under section 55 to anyone who does not 
have some alternative source of support available, including overnight shelter, adequate 
food and basic amenities‖ (Treatment 2007:31). Yet little seems to have changed: section 
55 has not been repealed and the Home Office continues to assess applications for support 
on the basis of its criteria, notably that you must show you applied for asylum within three 
days and you must give a ―credible‖ account of your arrival; it is still ―being used to refuse 
cash-only support claims from applicants with accommodation (such as staying with 
friends)‖ (ibid.). Indeed, the Inter-Agency Partnership (IAP)14 considers that ―the continued 
application of section 55 for subsistence-only claims potentially breaches … ECHR Article 
3 and ICESCR Articles 9 and 11‖ (cited ibid.). Moreover, ND1‘s account indicates that 
destitute applicants are still being refused both accommodation and cash support and, 
                                                 
14
 The Inter-Agency Partnership comprises six agencies: Migrant Helpline, Refugee Action, the Refugee 
Arrivals Project, the Refugee Council, the Scottish Refugee Council and the Welsh Refugee Council. 
It was formed in 1999 and in 2000 was contracted by NASS to provide advice, support and emergency 
accommodation to newly arrived asylum seekers and ongoing support to asylum seekers living in dispersal 
accommodation. 
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according to ICAR,
15
 section 55 remains a ―primary‖ cause of destitution among asylum 
seekers (Destitution 2006:3). The 2007 Joint Committee report notes that although, 
according to Home Office statistics, ―there has been a considerable reduction in the number 
of asylum seekers refused support under section 55‖ since the Limbuela judgment, there 
were still 895 such refusals during 2006 (Treatment 2007:31). 
    In the House of Lords in 2002 (Lords Hansard, 17 October 2002, col. 995) Lord Judd 
argued that 
 
what matters is that every single person who is entitled to asylum gets it. What 
matters, therefore, is the case for asylum, not an administrative consideration of 
when an application was lodged or from where, whether it was a suitable place 
administratively for the Home Office, and so on. The issue is the merit of the case 
before us. If we lose sight of that, we have lost sight of the whole principle of 
commitment to asylum. 
 
The evidence suggests that the intention behind section 55 is to deter refugees from 
applying for asylum in the UK and that it is part of a policy to control immigration rather 
than to fulfil the UK‘s Refugee Convention obligations. As such it undermines the right to 
asylum. 
 
5.3.3   Obstacles to receiving support: ASU provision and availability 
The fact that there are only two ASUs in the UK – one in Liverpool and one in Croydon –  
both with limited opening hours (9 am to 1 pm) is another cause of destitution and an 
obstacle not only to obtaining support but to entering the asylum process at all. Destitute 
asylum seekers are unlikely to reach an ASU quickly. They are, in the words of the agency 
Refugee Action
16
 in its evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, ―abandoned in 
the towns and cities where their agent has left them, with no means to get to Liverpool or 
Croydon … [They] are likely to be tired and confused, traumatised by [persecution] and by 
the journey to the UK‖ (Treatment 2007:27). Those who find their way to a police station 
are usually no better off, for ―although Home Office best practice advice is that 
                                                 
15
 Information Centre about Asylum Seekers and Refugees, an independent information and research 
organisation based at City University, London. 
16
 Refugee Action is a charity working with refugees and asylum seekers in the areas of reception, 
resettlement, development and integration, providing advice and support in 11 regions across England. 
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Immigration Officers should make every effort to attend to people ... at a police station … 
they are usually only able to do so for the most vulnerable applicants‖ (ibid.). According to 
Refugee Action, the police rarely allow people to wait in the police station and ―those who 
are not attended to by an Immigration Officer are routinely turned onto the streets‖ (ibid.).  
    Refugee Action believes that the difficulties encountered in trying to reach an ASU 
increase ―the likelihood of clients disappearing without engaging in the asylum process‖ 
(ibid.). It recommends that the package of emergency accommodation and travel to an ASU 
provided to vulnerable groups should be given to all single asylum applicants (ibid.: 27-8). 
IAP argued before the Joint Committee that ―the limited geographical presence and opening 
hours make it difficult to lodge a claim‖ (ibid.:27) and the Committee recommended 
government provision of ―locations for claiming asylum and support throughout the UK‖ 
(ibid.:28).  
 
5.3.4   Accommodation 
NASS subcontracts its duty to house destitute asylum seekers both to the public sector 
(local authorities) and the private sector (including registered social landlords). Pauline 
Brown, ESOL guidance officer at Hull College of Further Education, says that when Hull 
became a dispersal area in 1999 the city received only 250 asylum seekers; one year later 
there were over a thousand: ―In the early days, we had no infrastructure, no real knowledge, 
and we had to sort it out [and] learn on the hoof … There were plenty of greedy landlords 
around in this situation and it was important that accommodation was done on a contract 
basis.‖17 Nevertheless, in 2007, looking across the UK as a whole, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights found ―evidence that the quality of section 95 accommodation is 
unsatisfactory and falls short of the Article 8 ECHR right to respect for home, family and 
private life‖ (Treatment 2007:35). As early as 2001, one year after NASS was established, 
FS1 was sent to Hull, where ―they found us house to live … Well, those houses were very 
poor … houses – I don‘t think nobody live in those areas.‖18 In 2003 S7 spent his first year 
in Hull in a house with seven people: ―I don‘t like, because, you know, seven people live in 
one house – very busy.‖19 The Scottish Refugee Policy Forum‘s evidence had described ―a 
very poor level of accommodation in Scotland, where asylum seekers were housed in tower 
                                                 
17
 Research interview, 12 May 2006. 
18
 Research interview, 13 October 2006. 
19
 Research interview, 23 August 2006. 
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blocks awaiting demolition and essential repairs were not carried out‖ (ibid.). In 2008, after 
being refused accommodation for two years, ND1 was finally housed in a Glasgow tower 
block: on the day he moved into his ground-floor flat, a man was murdered several floors 
above and his body landed outside ND1‘s window.20 
    At another level, asylum seekers cannot always be sure that they will not be moved from 
their current accommodation, and when they are moved this may have detrimental effects 
on other aspects of their lives. The Scottish Refugee Policy Forum told the Joint Committee 
that ―asylum seekers were subjected to frequent moves which interrupted their children‘s 
education and public examinations and made it more difficult for them to integrate into the 
community‖ (Treatment 2007:35). In its information to asylum seekers on accommodation, 
the BIA seems to warn that such moves are likely to happen: ―We provide different housing 
at different stages of your application process‖ (Accommodation 2007). Yet, as the Joint 
Committee pointed out, ―[s]uch moves conflict with the UK‘s obligations under the EU 
Reception Directive, Article 14 (4) of which provides that member states shall ensure that 
‗transfers of applicants from one housing facility to another shall only take place where 
necessary‘‖ (Treatment 2007:35). 
    In the 2004 research by Craig et al, asylum seekers in Sheffield and Wakefield tended to 
express dissatisfaction with housing in the private more than in the public sector (2004:69): 
 
Considerable concern was expressed that NASS did not exercise any kind of 
effective quality control over the housing stock into which asylum seekers were 
housed; much of it, particularly in the private sector, was said to be in poor 
condition and respondents felt that NASS should inspect it and ensure that it 
reached nationally benchmarked quality standards before allowing it to be used. 
 
Most asylum seekers in that research were ―generally satisfied with their housing‖ (ibid.) 
and this holds true in this study. Nevertheless, the Joint Committee considered that ―in 
some cases the quality and terms of accommodation provision under section 95 of the 1999 
Act interferes with the rights of asylum seekers and their children to respect for family and 
home life under Article 8 ECHR, and the right to adequate housing under Article 11 
ICESCR‖ (Treatment 2007:35). 
                                                 
20
 Telephone conversation with ND1, 13 June 2008. Facts later confirmed by a Unity support group worker. 
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5.3.5   Detention 
Asylum seekers may be detained ―at any stage during the asylum procedure‖ (Information 
2003:2). The government does not publish annual figures on numbers in detention, but 
publishes a quarterly ―snapshot‖ of people in detention on a given day. Thus, ―on 26 March 
2005 … 1,625 asylum seekers were in detention‖ (Casciani 2005). It also publishes annual 
figures on the number of people leaving detention: in 2005 ―16,805 asylum detainees left 
detention during the course of the year, of which 59% were removed from the UK. The 
remainder were given temporary admission or released on bail‖ (Treatment 2007:69). There 
are no figures for length of detention. Using official figures for 2003 and 2004, Amnesty 
International estimated ―that 27,000 people who had at some stage sought asylum were 
detained in 2003 and, similarly, that upwards of 25,000 individuals were detained in 2004, 
some possibly just overnight, some for prolonged periods of time‖ (Seeking 2005:43). 
Detention is mostly associated with ―removal‖ (deportation) after the refusal of an 
application (see chapter 8) but we are concerned here with detention in the early stages of 
the asylum process. Several Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) ―hold asylum applicants 
who are at the beginning rather than the end of the asylum process and whose claims are 
considered suitable for ‗fast-track‘ asylum processing‖ (Treatment 2007:69). Home Office 
figures do not show how many are detained at this early stage. Fast-track procedures began 
at Oakington IRC, which opened in 2000 (Fit? 2008:55). Harmondsworth IRC began its 
fast-track operation in 2003 and Yarl‘s Wood in 2005 (Treatment 2007:72). The fast-track 
procedure is key to the New Asylum Model (NAM), with the Home Office aiming at the 
outset to process 30% of cases in this way as a first target (ibid.). 
    The setting of such targets seems to contradict the use of criteria, since targets need to be 
met regardless of other considerations. Nevertheless, criteria remain and those for early 
detention are much the same under NAM as under the old system. Detention may be used 
―to prevent absconding, to establish identity, to remove people … at the end of their case 
and for the purposes of making a decision on a claim for asylum that is deemed to be 
‗straightforward‘ and therefore ‗capable of being decided quickly‘‖ (Seeking 2005:38, 
citing the BIA‘s Asylum Process Manual). This last reason is usually given when you have 
come from a country designated by the government as ―safe‖.21 The Manual also stipulates 
                                                 
21
 The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides for a list of ―safe‖ countries from which your 
asylum or human rights claim is deemed to be ―clearly unfounded‖ unless you can persuade the secretary of 
state that it is not. There are 17 countries currently on the list: Albania, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ecuador, 
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establishing ―basis of claim‖ as a reason for using detention (cited ibid.:38, n. 66), which 
seems to make the criteria for using detention very broad indeed. Nevertheless, another 
manual, the Operational Guidance Manual, states that detention will ―only be used as a last 
resort‖ (cited ibid.:4). 
    The objections to detention at this early stage in the asylum process are broadly around 
the timescales involved, the vulnerability of many of the detainees and the strong pressures 
to make the timetables work. In 2003 the Inspectorate of Prisons deemed that the timescales 
used for processing fast-track detainees were ―inappropriate for full consideration of 
complex cases‖ (cited Fit? 2008:56). This is even clearer under NAM conditions, where 
―an applicant is interviewed on the second day of detention, served a decision on the third 
day and is given two days to appeal‖ (ibid.:55). A study of the fast-track process at 
Harmondsworth IRC in 2006 by Bail for Immigration Detainees
22
 concluded that ―the 
system is too fast to be fair‖ (Oakley & Crew 2006:5). Some of the figures certainly 
suggest unfairness and an unlikely success/failure ratio (ibid.:10):  
 
Estimates based on an analysis of published statistics for 2005 show that over the 
year, approximately 1500 men were detained for fast tracking at Harmondsworth. 
Fewer than 20 were recognised as refugees and granted asylum and none were 
granted discretionary leave or humanitarian protection. In the first three months of 
2006, of the 330 initial decisions made at Harmondsworth, 99% were refused and 
1% granted. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, testimony to the Joint Committee ―raised concerns about the 
quality of decision-making and procedural safeguards within the detained accelerated 
process‖ (Treatment 2007:72), and there are problems with legal representation on such 
short timescales. There was also evidence that ―torture victims were regularly detained for 
fast-track purposes because asylum seekers were not asked about their claim or about their 
                                                                                                                                                    
Ghana (males only), India, Jamaica, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria (males only), Romania, Serbia, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Ukraine. 
22
 BID is a registered charity set up in 1998 to challenge immigration detention in the UK. It seeks to secure 
the release of asylum seekers and migrants from detention, makes free applications for the release of detainees 
and provides information to enable them to make their own applications. It encourages legal representatives to 
make bail applications for their clients, undertakes research and publishes The Best Practice Guide to 
Challenging Immigration Detention. 
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health at the screening interview where the decision to detain was made‖ (ibid.) and doubts 
were expressed ―about the ability of victims of sexual violence to disclose the full extent of 
their experiences whilst detained in the fast-track process‖ (ibid.). Children can be detained 
but the Children‘s Commissioners told the Committee that they ―see no justification for 
detaining children on arrival in the UK for the purely administrative matter of processing 
their families‘ asylum claims‖ (ibid.:77). Finally, there is pressure to make the timescales 
work. A duty solicitor told the Independent Asylum Commission (Fit? 2008:57): 
 
The Home Office fight [sic] tooth and nail to keep to the timetable of the detained 
fast-track system, but this compromises the integrity of the system. There is a 
culture of inflexibility in the fast-track system which leads to vulnerable asylum 
seekers … being denied protection. The detained fast-track process is a gateway to 
injustice. 
 
Detention at this stage ignores the combined stresses of persecution and flight suffered by 
asylum seekers on arrival (4.7). There are also concerns about their treatment once they 
have been placed in the IRC. The Inspectorate of Prisons and a number of NGOs have 
raised concerns about treatment (cited Fit? 2008:58), including: 
 
a lack of recreational activities, overcrowded accommodation, mistreatment by 
centre staff, long periods kept in cells, lack of privacy, visiting restrictions, limits on 
making and receiving calls, an absence of 24-hour medical provision and no 
provision to deal with serious illnesses. 
 
    The experience of CC4 illustrates some of these concerns.
23
 She had escaped from prison 
in Côte d‘Ivoire, was smuggled to the UK and applied for asylum at Croydon the day after 
her arrival. After her screening interview she was detained at Oakington IRC because ―I 
didn‘t have any passport at all, I didn‘t have any tickets – nothing. That they told me. I say, 
‗OK‘ – I didn‘t know … what is detention.‖ CC4 cried as she described Oakington. ―I will 
never forget … Inside it‘s like prison.‖ She had no solicitor and was not given any 
opportunity to find one: ―You just stay there and they ask you the questions. They can‘t 
                                                 
23
 Research interview, 18 April 2007. 
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believe you and they tell you, ‗You have to go back to Ivory Coast.‘‖ She slept in a room 
with 12 other women with ―toilets downstairs – we have to go down every time.‖ One 
member of staff was helpful and took her to the medical centre when she was unwell. The 
rest of the staff ―were not friendly‖: 
 
They just came – one day, I remember, just came – and I was feeling very, very bad 
and they told me, ―You have to go downstairs for the TV room.‖ I said, ―No, I‘m no 
well now, and I want to be here.‖ [The warder shouted:] ―I said go down to the TV 
room NOW. What you do?‖ I said, ―Please, I want to sleep, I‘m not feeling well.‖ 
She said, ―No, you have to go down.‖ And she take me downstairs. 
 
    It seems clear that the speeding-up of the process does not facilitate protection. It does 
facilitate the removal of applicants and can best be understood as part of a policy to 
subsume asylum under immigration control. As such it undermines the right to asylum. 
 
5.4   Conclusion 
We have seen how queues, delays and lengthy ID procedures, together with the conduct of 
the screening interview itself, may turn what should be a ―brief‖, initial process into a long 
and stressful experience for vulnerable asylum seekers. We have seen how the dispersal of 
asylum seekers across the country and the provision of no-choice accommodation and low 
levels of financial support have deterrence as their aim and undermine the right to asylum. I 
have argued that refusing NASS support under section 55, the lack of ASU provision and 
the use of fast-track procedures and detention have more to do with controlling immigration 
and deterring applicants than with the UK‘s obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
Thus the procedures, regulations and legislation undermine the right to asylum at this early 
stage in the process. 
    In chapter 6 I examine the asylum interview and the initial decision-making process. 
 CHAPTER 6 
 
 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: MAIN INTERVIEW AND INITIAL 
DECISION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1   Introduction 
The main asylum interview is the moment when asylum seekers get the chance to explain 
the reasons for their application to the Home Office caseworker who will make the initial 
decision on their claim. In this chapter I examine the main issues arising at this stage of the 
process, including the problems of legal representation at the main asylum interview, and 
the consequences for asylum seekers of the limits to legal aid introduced in 2004. I show 
that the timescales under the New Asylum Model (NAM) deny asylum seekers a fair 
hearing.  I look at problems arising in the provision of interpreters and at the need for 
gender-specific interviewers. I critically examine the way that country reports are compiled, 
used and presented and look at the way that ―credibility‖ issues are used to justify refusal of 
asylum. I argue that the restrictive agenda makes refusal an objective of the asylum process 
at this stage, and that the priority given to a negative search for contradictions and 
inconsistencies in asylum-seeker accounts of their experiences undermines the right to 
asylum. 
     
6.2   No chance to explain 
In 2000 PB1
1
 had no complaints about the screening process in Dover. The interview was 
short: ―They just say, ‗Where you come from?‘ And they just organise everything to us 
from NASS.‖ Then, tired after the long journey from Iraq, he settled into his emergency 
accommodation at a hotel in Margate. He remembers that ―We were very happy with that at 
that time because, you know, you hopeless and [someone says], ‗We will try to sort your 
problem out.‘ … It was a really nice beginning, actually.‖ But the main interview, in early 
2001, was a difficult and puzzling experience: ―They wouldn‘t let me explain – they didn‘t 
give me a chance to explain all my problems.‖ Yet, according to the Home Office, 
                                                 
1
 Research interviews, 25 July 2006, 24 August 2006. 
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decisions on asylum are ―based on the details given at interview, and also sometimes in 
writing via a Statement of Evidence Form (SEF)‖ (Brief Guide 2005:1). PB1 had 
completed his SEF on time and was ready for the interview. But when he tried to go into 
detail, ―they just – they say, ‗No, we are not going to listen to you. We have just to ask you 
a few questions and you have to say yes or no – nothing else.‘‖2 So when the interviewer 
asked PB1 if he had specifically chosen the UK as his destination, he simply answered, 
―No.‖ His detailed answer would have been that he wanted ―my life be saved: I can find 
this [in] all the European countries, because there is the democracy, and there is the human 
rights, in all of the countries.‖ He would have explained that in the back of the lorry he 
knew his destination was Europe but he didn‘t know which country – ―Sometimes people 
want to go somewhere else, but [the driver] just take you back to his country.‖ But he was 
not able to give those answers. Interviewers ―also compare what you say during your 
interview with what you have written down on your SEF form‖ (Information 2003:2) and 
should give you a chance to explain any apparent inconsistencies (Henderson 2003, paras 
1.11ff). Not so in PB1‘s interview, where the interviewer had the SEF but described a 
different approach and procedure: PB1 didn‘t need to give details because ―‗your case [is] 
already in front of us – we [will] look at it after.‘‖3 Three weeks later his application was 
refused – a wrong decision, for when he appealed against the refusal the judge ―just gave 
me a chance to explain all my case and my problem‖ and granted PB1 indefinite leave to 
remain (ILR). But that was more than a year later, a year of unnecessary anxiety. 
 
6.3   Waiting for interview 
The period of waiting for the Liverpool or Croydon interview is a stressful period for 
asylum seekers, during which they will have a number of other things on their minds. They 
will be settling into the community to which they have been ―dispersed‖. They will need to 
learn about local amenities like post offices, GPs‘ surgeries, schools, further education 
colleges, the police and services provided by the local council. Parents will be concerned to 
get their children into a local school; adults may want to join English classes. Some of this 
information may be given by local accommodation providers, including the local council; 
some will be given by asylum support groups in the area. Staying with family or friends 
who can contribute their experience and local knowledge may make the process easier. 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless all this will be happening while waiting for the interview – and that will add 
to the stress. One thing most people will need to do quickly is find a solicitor. 
 
6.4   Legal representation 
Legal representation is essential at this stage. The main asylum interview is, explains the 
Home Office (Your Asylum Interview 2007), 
 
your only chance to tell us why you fear return to your country. You must be able to 
satisfy your [interviewer] about who you are and the country you are from. This is 
your opportunity to provide evidence of what you say and any papers you have to 
support your application. 
 
Unfortunately the Home Office does not believe that you need a solicitor at your interview. 
This is because ―[w]e give all applications for asylum a fair hearing in accordance with our 
obligations under the [Refugee] Convention‖ (Brief Guide 2005:1) and ―[w]e make 
decisions on asylum claims based on the detail given at interview‖ (ibid:2). So ―[a]pplicants 
may bring a legal representative to the interview if they wish, but we do not consider it 
necessary‖ and if the representative does not attend ―we will proceed without them‖ (ibid.). 
Moreover, the Home Office ―will not normally postpone your interview to give you more 
time to get legal advice or representation‖ (ibid.). Despite this, before 2004 you could get 
legal aid for your solicitor‘s attendance at your interview. Since 2004, however, the Legal 
Services Commission only funds attendance at interview if you have been detained as part 
of a fast-track process, if you have ―mental incapacity‖, if you are a minor, if you are to be 
interviewed under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act or if you are considered to be a 
threat to national security (API – Asylum Interview 2007:45; Shaw & Witkin 2004:48, 
n.11). 
    This fits with the government‘s view that ―in the majority of cases, attendance by a 
representative at interviews with the Home Office is unnecessary, of no benefit to the client 
and a waste of public funds‖ (HCL Research Paper 03/89 2003:15). Home Office-
commissioned research and the BIA‘s Asylum Policy Instructions (APIs) for caseowners 
and interviewers show how this approach permeates the interview process. The research 
indicated that caseworkers generally believed that, while solicitors could help to ensure that 
SEFs were completed correctly and within the deadline, ―the role of representatives in 
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interviews did not make a contribution towards the process or the decision‖ (Role 2005:7, 
14). Interviewers are instructed that ―[t]he legal representative‘s role is to observe the 
interview‖ (API – Asylum Interview 2007:41) and the following ―procedural statement‖ is 
made before it begins: ―I would ask your legal representative … not to interrupt during the 
course of the interview. If they wish to make any comments they will have the opportunity 
to do so at the end of the interview‖ (ibid.:19). 
    There are several arguments against this approach. First, immigration and asylum law, in 
its international and national aspects, is complex and asylum procedures are complicated. 
UNHCR‘s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria gives advice to asylum decision makers. 
Its section on the ―interpretation of terms‖ alone takes up paragraphs 35-110 to discuss the 
meaning of words, phrases and concepts contained in the Refugee Convention (e.g. ―well-
founded‖, ―fear‖, ―persecution‖). Other relevant international instruments may come into 
play, especially if your claim does not fit strict Convention grounds for refugee status, and 
your solicitor will be alert to this and give appropriate guidance. In terms of UK asylum 
law, since the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 there have been six separate 
statutes, several regulations and statutory instruments and many changes in procedure. 
Moreover, not only can a solicitor guide you through this complexity in preparation for the 
interview but, at the interview itself, would be able to ensure that the interviewer follows 
appropriate procedure. The Home Office research cited above (Role 2005:14) found that 
solicitors see their role as 
 
 supporting the applicant in feeling comfortable and open in answering the 
interviewer‘s questions 
 checking that all of the facts relevant to the claim are mentioned and any 
inconsistencies between the statement submitted and anything said at the interview 
are dealt with at the time of the interview 
 checking that the Home Office interpreter has interpreted correctly 
 ensuring that errors in recording do not lead to inconsistencies between what is said 
in the interview and the interview notes. 
 
In 1998 the government undertook to ―examine whether there is a need for the better 
provision of information for asylum applicants after interview on the availability to them of 
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legal advice‖ (Fairer 1998, para 8.10). Asylum Aid found it ―impossible to imagine any 
valid reason why legal advice should become necessary only after the interview, which is 
the crucial part of the whole asylum process‖ (Still No Reason 1999:67). 
    Secondly, the burden of proof rests on the asylum seeker (1.10.1), and this in a context 
where political discourse characterises asylum as a means to avoid immigration controls 
and regards asylum seekers as abusers of the system (4.3.1). Resulting laws and procedures 
seek to deter claims and make asylum part of the process of immigration control. No matter 
how much UNHCR may plead for a ―flexible and liberal process‖ (UNHCR 2003:2) or for 
giving asylum seekers the ―benefit of the doubt‖ (Handbook 1992:204), this context 
disadvantages them, and legal help – before, during and after the interview – is essential. 
Thirdly, asylum seekers are disadvantaged compared with suspects in criminal 
investigations, who have an established right to demand legal representation at interview. 
The asylum process, by contrast, cannot be held up for want of a solicitor. But Asylum Aid 
argues that the consequences of losing an asylum claim are not just in ―the difference 
between prison and freedom; they may involve life as well as liberty‖ (Still No Reason 
1999:68-9). Fourthly, the timescales under the New Asylum Model (NAM) make it even 
more difficult to amass the evidence for your claim. 
    So it is important to find a solicitor. Most asylum seekers do this through networks of 
friends or family, through local voluntary asylum support groups, who have lists of local 
solicitors, or through local council asylum support teams. Accommodation providers may 
include information about where to get legal advice in their ―welcome packs‖ (as in Hull4) 
but this is not always the case. Indeed, according to research in Sheffield and Wakefield 
neither the private accommodation provider nor the council ―appeared to offer information 
on where asylum seekers could receive legal help/advice‖ (Craig et al. 2004:54). The Home 
Office provides minimal information (addresses, telephone numbers, etc.) about the 
Community Legal Service, the Refugee Legal Centre, the Immigration Advisory Service 
and the Refugee Council but such generalised information has little meaning at this stage 
and asylum seekers, as they settle in, typically turn to friends, family and voluntary 
organisations for more practical help. Many, of course, find good solicitors in this way. 
Some, however, fall into the hands of incompetent or unscrupulous lawyers who handle 
cases carelessly or charge for their services instead of offering legal aid. CC3‘s solicitor 
                                                 
4
 Research interview with Pauline Brown, ESOL Guidance Officer, Hull College of Further Education, 
12/5/2006. 
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lost his file at an early stage: ―They took – what‘s call it? – all my paperwork and … they 
lost my file. It was a very difficult experience.‖5 At a later stage, and with a new solicitor, 
the barrister chosen to represent him at his appeal against refusal suddenly announced that 
CC3 would have to pay between £800 and £1,200 for his services. This was impossible for 
CC3, who was not allowed to work. He told the barrister the only way he could pay would 
be if he won his appeal and found a job: ―[The barrister] said to me, ‗No, here is zero, 
everything is money. If you want to pay, then pay. If you don‘t want to pay, leave my 
office.‘‖6 
    So asylum seekers need protection from maverick lawyers. Since 2004, however, they 
have increasingly needed protection from government policy. 
 
6.4.1   Legal aid 
Asylum seekers have the right to legal aid if they do not have the resources to pay. But in 
April 2004 a maximum legal aid entitlement of five hours was set for the time allowed to 
prepare an initial application to the Home Office and any further funding had to be ―merit-
tested‖ by the Legal Services Commission: the Commission would only grant funding in 
cases where it estimated the chances of success to be more than 50%. In 2003 home 
secretary David Blunkett had argued that such a move was necessary because unscrupulous 
lawyers were helping asylum seekers to lodge ―appeal after appeal with no prospect of 
success, all at taxpayers‘ expense.‖ (Asylum Measures 2003:1) Before the changes became 
law, however, Amnesty International had predicted a negative impact on asylum seekers, 
warning that there was already ―unequal provision of good quality legal representation 
around the UK and with the proposal to restrict publicly funded immigration and asylum 
work, many established solicitors might have to withdraw from this area of work‖ (Shaw & 
Witkin 2004:7). 
    The prediction came true. Refugee Action told the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
that ―in every region in which it worked, specialist immigration solicitors had been forced 
to reduce capacity or close as a direct result of the cuts‖ (Treatment 2007:34). Refugee 
Action was ―‗concerned that applicants who could have been granted refugee status are 
being refused and are unable to appeal‘‖ (ibid.). In Hull there are now no law firms 
specialising in immigration and asylum. Gary Power, who manages the 167 Centre, an 
                                                 
5
 Research interview, 18 April 2007. 
6
 Ibid. 
CHAPTER 6: SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK – INTERVIEW & INITIAL DECISION 141 
asylum support service in Hull, explained that ―it really is a problem for us to find a 
solicitor now that will take on a case that gets legal aid funding.‖7 The Centre has an 
agreement with a firm in Doncaster (60 miles away) to do weekly surgeries in Hull and a 
solicitor in Grimsby (30 miles away) takes Hull clients who are able to pay the fees. 
Amnesty International‘s concerns when it made its prediction were about the human rights 
questions raised by the government‘s policy; the government, on the other hand, was 
concerned about the financial costs of meeting its Refugee Convention obligations, erring 
in favour of cutting costs rather than ensuring representation at all stages of the asylum 
process.  
 
6.4.2    NAM, the SEF and reduced chances of finding a solicitor 
NAM timescales tend to reduce your chances of finding a solicitor before interview. If your 
country of origin is considered ―safe‖, the Home Office‘s aim is an interview in three to 
five days; if you are in the detained fast-track category the aim is an interview in two to 
three days; in most ordinary cases the interview takes place within eight to twelve days. 
Moreover, the SEF has been discontinued under NAM. Solicitors and NGOs criticised the 
SEF procedure because of the short 10-day deadline for its completion, giving asylum 
seekers little chance to recover from their journey, find a solicitor or (since the SEF had to 
be completed in English) find help with the language. Missing the deadline also put them in 
danger of refusal on grounds of ―non-compliance‖ with procedure. However, with a 
reasonable deadline the SEF would give them time to identify the relevant facts of their 
experience and the essence of their claim. Now, the Refugee Council observes, there is no 
time to recover, no period of preparation and reflection before having to disclose sensitive 
details of traumatic events, ―no opportunity to provide written evidence in an SEF, and no 
guarantee that an asylum seeker will have seen a legal representative prior to his or her 
substantive interview‖ (Briefing NAM 2007:5). 
    So despite claiming to give all asylum seekers ―a fair hearing‖ (Brief Guide 2005:1), the 
government restricts legal representation in this complex area of law. It justifies such 
restrictions by raising the spectre of angry taxpayers, feeding the prejudice already created 
by its public discourse on fraudulent claims (4.3.1). Its approach to legal representation can 
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be seen as part of a policy to deter asylum applications. It again places asylum policy in the 
context of immigration controls and undermines the right to asylum. 
 
6.5   The main asylum interview and the refusal letter 
At the interview, questions are asked in English, with the aid of an interpreter where 
necessary. The interviewer writes down the questions and answers on a form which, at the 
end of the interview, the applicant is asked to sign. The interview notes are no longer read 
back to applicants before signing, so they are being asked to sign an interview record, 
written in a language they do not understand, without being able to check its contents. 
Under NAM, if no solicitor is present the interview may now be recorded at the request of 
the applicant, who is then given a copy of the tape and of the notes. Several problems are 
associated with interviews: 
 
 interpretation may be poor or in the wrong language, particularly when the language 
required is unfamiliar in the UK 
 women may feel uncomfortable revealing details of abuse to a male interviewer 
 interviewers may lack the skills to put applicants at ease or may ask questions in an 
insensitive manner 
 they may fail to ask the sort of questions which would enable applicants to tell their 
story 
 they may have an inadequate understanding of an applicant‘s country 
 they may be aggressive or make accusations during the interview. 
 
Some of these problems become evident during the interview itself (and might be remedied 
with a solicitor present). Some problems are not evident until the arrival of a refusal letter, 
when the pieces have to be picked up after the event. 
 
6.5.1   Interpreters 
The ideal situation is to have your own interpreter present who, while not allowed to 
replace the Home Office interpreter, may be able to identify and correct misinterpretations. 
OH8‘s solicitor found an interpreter for her and no problems arose.8 Most participants in 
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this study seemed satisfied with their Home Office interpreters, though some were unsure 
because, in the nature of things, they could not judge the standard of translation into a 
language they did not know. TR2 felt vaguely ―unhappy with interpreter – because I said to 
her my story in Russian but what she said to [the interviewer] I don‘t know … Maybe she 
was good interpreter but for me maybe not enough good. I‘m not sure because … I didn‘t 
understand.‖  Later, when reading the transcript of her interview, ―I try to translate with my 
dictionary and I noticed some mistakes.‖ 
    Serious problems can arise if the interpreter speaks the wrong language or dialect. ND1 
from Sudan explained to Home Office officials that he spoke two African languages, but 
not much Arabic. They insisted that, if he was really from Sudan, he would speak Arabic. 
In fact, only 51% of Sudanese speak Arabic and there are 100 other local languages 
(Nations of the World 2001:330). ND1 was given an Arabic interpreter. He understood only 
part of what was said and he could not reply: ―[the interpreter] try to speak – many things I 
have to ask him … I didn‘t understand because it‘s not my language … Sometimes I try to 
describe with my hands.‖9 
 
6.5.2   Gender 
RWRP
10
 research notes that the gender of the interviewer and the interpreter is important to 
many women asylum seekers, for 
 
[m]any women have been abused by men. Coupled with a fear and distrust of 
authorities, this fact is likely to seriously inhibit the capacity of a woman to divulge 
details of her experiences to a male interviewer or through a male interpreter 
(Spreading Good Practice 2005, para. 5.20). 
 
For these reasons, UNHCR guidelines are clear: ―Claimants should be informed of the choice 
to have interviewers and interpreters of the same sex as themselves, and they should be provided 
automatically for women claimants‖ (Gender-Related Persecution 2002, para. 36:3). The 
Home Office does not follow this guidance, even though there is some awareness of the 
reasons for it in the APIs provided for caseworkers and others: the API on gender issues 
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 Research interview, 22 May 2007. 
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 The Refugee Women‘s Resource Project was set up by the NGO Asylum Aid in 2000 to focus on the 
particular needs of women asylum seekers. 
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mentions trauma after sexual abuse, and the consequent fear, loss of confidence and self-
esteem suffered by women, as well as lack of concentration, self-blame, shame and 
memory loss (API – Gender Issues 2006:12). The practice, however, is that ―[i]f … the 
claimant requests a gender specific interviewing officer or interpreter we should as far as 
possible
11
 accommodate the request [but this] will be subject to operational requirements as 
it will not always be possible to provide a same sex officer‖ (API – Interviewing 2006:4). 
In other words, it depends on how many female officers there are and how many are on 
duty on the day. 
    Staffing levels have not made it easy for officers to follow UNHCR guidelines: at Yarl‘s 
Wood Removal Centre, whose caseworkers ―currently deal only with female claimants‖ 
(Ceneda & Palmer 2006:126), there were only two females out of six caseworkers in the 
fast-track system according to Robin Edwards, Home Office gender policy adviser, as late 
as September 2005 (ibid.:68). By February 2006 David Dunford, head of fast-track at 
Yarl‘s Wood, was claiming that ―the proportion of female caseworkers [there] had risen to 
half of all caseworkers in the Detained Fast-Track Process‖ (ibid.). Moreover, both 
Edwards and Dunford claimed that ―they had no problems accommodating requests for 
female interviewers as they had enough caseworkers and would postpone an interview if 
necessary‖ (ibid.). This claim seems questionable: only 50% of caseworkers here are 
women and, although UNHCR guidelines stipulate that same-sex interviewers and 
interpreters ―should be provided automatically for women claimants‖ (Gender-Related 
Persecution 2002, para. 36:3), Home Office APIs still allow ―operational requirements‖ to 
interfere with their provision and thus do not require officers to fulfil the guidelines. 
Moreover, in their 2006 research, Ceneda and Palmer (2006:67) cited a witness from a 
women‘s project who told them that 
 
even when there‘s a formal request on the file from a legal representative this … is 
often blatantly disregarded … So … you can have an interview … that even though 
it‘s been clearly stated that part of the … basis of this claim is to do with sexual 
violence … there‘ll be a male immigration officer and a male interpreter. … I‘ve 
never heard of a case where we‘ve been involved where that‘s been pointed out and 
the immigration officer has agreed to reschedule. 
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A Kosovan woman whose solicitor was not funded for the interview requested a female 
interpreter and a taped interview. Neither was granted and she ―felt that the [male] 
interpreter became hostile when she mentioned her history of sexual assault and [that he] 
made errors of interpretation‖ (ibid.:69). TR5 was told that she couldn‘t ask for a female 
interviewer: ―You can‘t. They say to you – ‗This is the – your Home Office [interviewer]‘ 
and … you can‘t ask [for a] woman, no.‖12 So it was difficult for her to talk about personal 
details: 
 
It was really painful, you know? They ask you the questions. You can‘t tell, you 
know, sometimes they ask you questions regarding your life ... You can‘t explain 
[what] you‘re feeling. Sometimes you are afraid. Because it is painful to tell to 
someone you don‘t know. 
 
Not surprisingly, this may lead to a woman concealing a significant part of her reason for 
seeking asylum: Ceneda and Palmer (2006:70) cite an Asylum Aid case study where lack of 
a gender-specific interviewer and interpreter ―meant that the claimant did not disclose her 
experience of rape, which remained undisclosed even at initial appeal.‖ This clearly 
undermines the right to asylum. 
 
6.5.3   Country reports: getting the information 
Information on the country of origin of an asylum seeker is essential to the asylum process, 
for the Home Office needs ―detailed, accurate and up-to-date information‖ if it is to ―make 
an informed decision on an asylum claim‖ (Shaw & Witkin 2004:9). The Home Office 
therefore compiles country information on a number of refugee-producing countries, 
updating the top 20 countries twice a year. Until 2005 this was done by the Country 
Information and Policy Unit (CIPU) within IND. In 2005 country information was 
transferred to the Research Development and Statistics (RDS) section of the Home Office. 
This change was partly the result of criticism that a conflict of interest existed because the 
role of provider of impartial information and that of policy maker were undertaken by the 
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same agency – although a simple move from one part of the Home Office to another is 
hardly likely to resolve that question. 
    Country reports are criticised in terms of their methodology, accuracy, reliability and the 
way they are used and presented. ―As a general rule‖, states one Home Office-
commissioned study, ―country officers do not undertake primary research‖ (Morgan et al 
2003:13). Instead they rely on secondary sources, ―[drawing] heavily on information 
collected, in the first instance, by academics, human rights organisations and journalists‖ 
(ibid.). While use of such material is a necessary part of gathering facts, ―the use of 
secondary sources alone is potentially problematic‖, leading to ―information round-
tripping‖ where ―information becomes ‗valid‘ as it is reproduced by different sources 
despite the fact that there may have been no clear investigation into its accuracy‖ (ibid.:13, 
15). Even after the Home Office initiated a series of fact-finding visits to refugee-producing 
countries problems still arose: Henderson noted that the first two reports ―appeared to lack 
any coherent methodology. They rely heavily on government sources, and non-
governmental sources are not identified‖ (2003, para. 17.22). Research conducted by the 
Immigration Advisory Service (IAS)
13
 the same year found that ―a significant amount of 
material in a number of CIPU Assessments was inaccurate, wrongly sourced and/or did not 
give information of key relevance to assessing asylum claims‖ (Carver 2003:7).  
    Sourcing is a perennial problem. The information in country reports ―is not exhaustive‖, 
warned the CIPU in 2000, but ―it is sourced throughout [and] is intended to be used by 
caseworkers as a signpost to the source material‖, most of which is ―readily available in the 
public domain‖ (CIPU Iraq 2000:1). In 2007 the RDS agreed: reports provide ―a brief 
summary of the source material … For a more detailed account, the relevant source 
documents should be examined directly‖ (COI Iran 2007:1). Caseworkers wishing to 
examine source documents directly, however, may encounter difficulties. IAS found a poor 
standard of sourcing in the September 2003 country reports and in April 2004 it found that 
―sourcing is still not up to a satisfactory level … and some Country Reports are as bad, or 
worse, than in April 2003‖ (IAS Summary 2004:7). Thus, contrary to the claim in para. ii of 
each report that ―[a]ll information in the Report is sourced‖ (COI Iran 2007:1), some 
statements are ―literally left without a source, others have been credited to a source which 
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does not give the relevant material as claimed‖ (IAS Summary 2004:7). In the Iran country 
report, ―in sections five and six alone there are 35 mis-sourced statements and 12 unsourced 
statements‖ (ibid.:7). In the Angola report, ―there are 27 mis-sourced statements‖ (ibid.). 
The Serbia and Montenegro report is ―so badly sourced and edited as to raise serious doubts 
about the validity of the whole report‖ (ibid.) and an endnote to one paragraph states ―no 
source found‖. In the Nigeria report out-of-date material is used, but made to appear current 
by the simple expedient of changing the year of the source. So material attributed to the US 
Department of State report for 2003 was in fact ―a direct quote from 2002 or 2001‖ 
(ibid.:8). 
 
6.5.4   Country reports: a lack of balance 
IAS research has consistently found a ―lack of balance‖ in many country reports, which 
leads to a ―positive gloss on the presentation‖ of the reports (IAS Summary 2004: 3). So in 
the case of Iran the writer of the report ―appears unable to accept that human rights 
conditions have deteriorated‖ (ibid.:2): 
 
Whilst ample information is given regarding the election of President Khatami and 
the reformists in 1997, 2000 and 2001, the Report gives barely any information with 
regard to the Majles [parliamentary] elections of February 2004 in which the 
conservatives won a landslide victory (following the disqualification of many 
reformist candidates). The Report repeatedly chooses to cite [more hopeful] UN 
sources from 1998 … rather than using more up-to-date sources. 
 
The resulting positive view of Iran was reflected in CC6‘s refusal letter in 2004, which 
declared that since the election of President Khatami CC6‘s claim of a lack of democracy in 
Iran was unfounded.
14
 CC6 had fled in December 2003 when, according to Amnesty 
International (AIR 2004:278), there were scores of arrests for political reasons, and 
 
at least a dozen … were detained without charge, trial or regular access to their 
families and lawyers. Judicial authorities curtailed freedoms of expression, opinion 
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and association … scores of publications were closed, Internet sites were filtered 
and journalists were imprisoned. 
 
    In the case of the Eritrea report, IAS research in 2004 found that it included ―two 
comments to the effect that the standard of human rights is better than under other military 
dictatorships found in neighbouring countries‖ (IAS Summary 2004:2). IAS comments that 
―this is not relevant information for a decision-maker trying to assess the protection needs 
of an Eritrean claimant. Information on the appalling detention conditions and torture and 
abuse by government forces would be better placed here.‖ On this point, Amnesty 
International had found that ―[t]orture continued to be used against many recent political 
prisoners and as a standard military punishment‖ (AIR 2005:103). Moreover, the list of 
people treated in this way included forcibly returned asylum seekers: they were ―beaten, 
tied hand and foot in painful positions and left in the sun for lengthy periods … or were 
suspended from ropes from a tree or ceiling‖ (ibid.). OH13‘s refusal letter contained a 
―positive gloss‖ on the Eritrean justice system: after rejecting his claim that he had engaged 
in serious political activity in Eritrea, his caseworker expressed the opinion that in any case, 
―if you were arrested upon your return Eritrea [sic] and charges were brought against you, it 
is considered that you would be arraigned before a properly constituted, independent court, 
have access to legal representation and be able to present evidence and cross examine 
witnesses.‖15 Amnesty International, however, found that fair trials after arrest were not to 
be taken for granted in Eritrea in 2004, the year that OH13 fled the country (AIR 2005:102): 
 
Hundreds of people were arrested for the peaceful expression of their opinions or 
religious beliefs. Political prisoners were held indefinitely without charge or trial, 
many incommunicado and in secret detention places. 
 
6.5.5   Country reports: taking governments at their word 
Where human rights violations by the authorities have taken place, Shaw and Witkin 
(2004:11) have identified a tendency in refusal letters to take at face value the official 
position of governments on human rights violations. Refusal letters assert that the accused 
authorities do not in fact condone such violations and have taken steps to put a protection 
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system in place. There is an API standard paragraph provided, with gaps to be filled in as 
required, to help caseowners refute claims on this basis and use country reports as evidence 
(cited ibid.): 
 
You stated that the [police/name of other body] [describe alleged actions]. The 
Secretary of State considers that these are the random actions of a few rogue [police 
officers/soldiers/individuals] abusing their official position. The Secretary of State 
is of the opinion that such actions are not knowingly tolerated by the authorities of 
[COUNTRY] and that the authorities are able and willing to provide effective 
protection [CITE CIPU REPORT]. 
 
A note explains how country reports should be used (ibid.:12): 
 
NOTE: caseworkers should cite the particular paragraphs in the relevant CIPU 
report which leads [sic] them to believe that the police are not complicit and that 
prosecution is actively pursued. 
 
Shaw and Witkin (2004:12) use an Algerian case in 2003 as an example. An asylum seeker 
complained of rape and torture in detention but the refusal letter stated that the secretary of 
state ―does not accept that they are evidence of persecution within the terms of the United 
Nations Convention‖, claiming that ―the Algerian government does not condone such 
violations.‖ This claim was seen as justified because ―[t]he Algerian government‘s stated 
position and instances where members of the security forces have been arrested for such 
violations is [sic] set out in … the current Home Office Country Assessment.‖ However, 
Amnesty International (AIR 2004:273) found that  
 
[t]orture remained widespread [in 2003] and was facilitated by the continuing 
practice of secret and unacknowledged detention. People suspected of … ―acts of 
terrorism or subversion‖ were systematically tortured. Legal safeguards against 
torture and secret detention were not respected by law enforcement agents. 
 
In these circumstances, to take the Algerian government‘s ―stated position‖ at face value is 
at best naïve and at worst life-threatening for asylum seekers. It should not be a practice 
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followed by the Home Office if it is mindful of its obligations under the Refugee 
Convention or ECHR. 
 
6.5.6   Country reports: familiarity breeds contempt 
There is evidence that some caseworkers feel that their experience relieves them of the need 
to consult country reports. Morgan et al (2003:40) noted: 
 
Caseworkers may consider that they are already familiar with the country of origin 
information for a case, as they may have previously consulted the information in 
order to conduct an interview or deal with similar cases. In these circumstances, 
they may decide not to consult the relevant country information. 
 
In the words of one caseworker interviewed (ibid.): 
 
We build up our knowledge because I work on top asylum producing countries – Sri 
Lanka, Iran – so you don‘t tend to look at it after a while … I have been here longer 
than most so I don‘t tend to use country information. The information [the 
Assessments] provide is so familiar we don‘t necessarily use any CIPU info. 
 
Shaw and Witkin believe that this approach is worrying particularly because it does not 
take account of the ―complexity of human rights situations in the two countries mentioned‖ 
(2004:11). 
 
6.5.7   Country reports: lack of knowledge of political parties 
PB1 and S1 both found themselves in the crossfire between the two main political parties in 
Iraqi Kurdistan and believe the Home Office‘s apparent lack of knowledge about these 
parties contributed to the initial refusal of both their claims.
16
 Home Office-commissioned 
research indicates that if country reports are deficient in information about political parties 
this part of the asylum claim may not be given sufficient consideration or any consideration 
at all. One caseworker told the researchers (Morgan et al. 2003:66): 
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We need to know whether particular groups or political parties exist, but instead we 
are told to say that the Secretary of State is not aware of this group so therefore it is 
unlikely to be of interest to the authorities. But really they have no information on 
whether the group existed. 
 
The Home Office then turns this ignorance into a denial of the asylum seeker‘s credibility. 
A Kurd from Syria was told in his refusal letter (cited Shaw & Witkin 2004:11): 
 
The basis of your claim is that you fear persecution in Syria because of your 
political beliefs. You are a member of the Hergirtin. The Secretary of State is not 
aware that this party actually exists. 
 
The adjudicator on appeal, however, accepted Amnesty International‘s evidence that 
―Hevgirtina Gel a Kurd li Sûriya … was founded in 1975, and was then named Partya 
Dêmokratî Kurd a Cep li Sûriya. It has been known as ‗Hevgirtina Gel‘ since 1980‖ (ibid.). 
 
6.5.8   Credibility: “… detrimental to the credibility of your claim”17 
Caseworkers frequently make ―unreasonable and unjustifiable assertions about asylum 
applicants which cast doubt on the applicant‘s individual credibility‖ (Shaw & Witkin 
2004:19). For Amnesty International this is part of ―a negative culture of decision making, 
which is often based on ‗catching applicants out‘ rather than investigating the substance of 
their claims‖ (ibid.). Questions of credibility range from minor discrepancies (dates, times, 
etc.) to major aspects of the asylum account. They may involve the timing of your 
departure, your means of travel or your motives for migration. The caseworker may 
question the plausibility of your own or other people‘s actions, mostly without any 
supporting evidence. 
 
6.5.9 Credibility: from ignorance to refusal 
In 2002 S1 claimed that the two main political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan (the KDP and the 
PUK) and the Islamic Party (IMIK) had targeted him because he was a member of the Iraqi 
Workers‘ Communist Party (IWCP). In dealing with the threat from IMIK, his interviewer 
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claimed that ―the Islamic movement are [sic] not there any more‖ and that ―all parties [in 
Iraqi Kurdistan] are working peacefully together‖.18 But Amnesty International (AIR 
2003:134) found that 
 
[s]poradic fighting between the PUK security forces and members of the armed 
Islamic group, Ansar al-Islam, continued during the year. Ansar al-Islam, a merger 
between two armed groups – Jund al-Islam and a splinter group from the Islamic 
Unity Movement – was said to be behind a number of bomb attacks targeting PUK 
government officials and buildings. 
 
The ―Islamic movement‖ was clearly still there. But the interviewer‘s wrong assessment of 
the situation was one of the reasons given for the initial refusal in S1‘s case. Nevertheless 
S1‘s case was a strong one: he managed to make a fresh claim and was finally granted 
asylum – but it took another five years of uncertainty and stress. 
 
6.5.10   Credibility: getting dates wrong 
S1‘s credibility was also questioned because he momentarily gave a wrong date: 
 
You claimed [in your written witness statement] you were arrested on 20 May 1995 
… At interview, when you were asked the date you were arrested you stated you 
were arrested on 20 November 1995, you then corrected this and claimed you were 
arrested on 20 May 1995 and allege you were released on 10 November 1995. 
When asked what happened on 20 November 1995, you said you made a mistake, 
you stated it was the date your brother was killed, but not the year.
19
 
 
There was nothing to cause suspicion here – S1 made a mistake about dates, then  
immediately corrected himself. During his interview with me, S1 explained: 
 
I had said the wrong date: ―What date your brother die?‖ Yeah? Because … I been 
shot with my brother. After three days my brother die in hospital. They ask me 
which day you and your brother been shoot? And which day your brother die? And 
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 S1‘s ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, para.15. 
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which day you run? Which day you leave your country. Is too many days, and I 
don‘t remember after four years all these dates.20 
 
At the time, the interviewer appeared to accept his correction of the date and moved on to 
other matters. In the refusal letter, however, she used his mistake to question his credibility 
when he had no opportunity to reply. She wrote: 
 
The Secretary of State notes your confusion, at interview, when asked about your 
alleged arrest. He considers that to confuse significant dates as [sic] the date you 
claimed to have been detained (20/5/1995) and the date you allege your brother was 
killed (20/11/1999), some claimed four and a half years later, detracts from the 
overall credibility of your account.
21
 
 
In their determined search for ―discrepancies‖, interviewers may use the slightest deviation 
regarding a date in order to construct a ―reason‖ for refusal. OH13 was informed: 
 
You have stated in your witness statement … that you were arrested on 5/8/2004. It 
is noted however that in your substantive asylum interview you have alternatively 
claimed that you were actually arrested on 4/8/2004. These statements are 
inconsistent and in light of your lack of certainty about the date of the event which 
led you to leave the country in fear of your life, your account of this matter cannot 
be accepted as being true.
22
 
 
The same formula is used when questioning credibility about periods of time and in these 
cases, too, a small mistake may cost you dear. Shaw and Witkin (2004:21) cite a refusal 
letter of March 2001: 
 
The Secretary of State also notes that there are significant differences between your 
various accounts, and that these cast doubts on the credibility of your claim. For 
instance, in your Statement of Evidence Form (SEF) you stated that you were in 
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hiding at your friend‘s house for 4 days but in your Asylum Interview this was 
reduced to 3. 
 
Amnesty International‘s comment (cited ibid.) was not only that this was a minor 
discrepancy but that it also concerned 
 
a time period that would have been frightening and uncertain for the applicant, 
making a confusion over the exact number of days understandable. In addition, it is 
not explained here why the number of days in hiding is central to the applicant‘s 
claim for asylum in the UK. 
 
6.5.11   Credibility: timing of departure 
The question of the timing of the asylum seeker‘s departure from their country of origin is 
frequently raised. At his interview, A
23
 described the Serb police‘s raids on his home in 
Kosovo, beginning in 1991. ―Why did you leave it until 1999 before leaving Kosovo?‖ 
asked the interviewer.
24
 The standard paragraph provided in the APIs for dealing with this 
in refusal letters (cited Shaw & Witkin 2004:28) reads: 
 
Further doubts as to your alleged fear of persecution can be drawn from the fact that 
you did not leave [COUNTRY] until [DATE]. The Secretary of State holds the view 
that if your fear of persecution by the [ ] authorities was genuine you would have 
left [ ] at the earliest opportunity and the fact that you did not casts doubt on your 
credibility. 
 
However, many reasons may govern the timing of a refugee‘s departure: the need to find an 
agent, raise funds to pay the agent (e.g. by selling property), obtain false documents. Even 
if the journey is through normal channels there will be family concerns which cause delay. 
Moreover, members of opposition groups committed to political change do not tend to give 
up their cause easily and may ―maintain [their] activism, until it becomes untenable or their 
life and safety are at risk‖ (ibid.:29). But the Home Office is often unwilling to take this 
point seriously (ibid.): 
                                                 
23
 An asylum seeker from Kosovo. I knew him before I started this research. 
24
 Asylum interview transcript, p. 7. 
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You claim to have first been detained in 1979 for four months, you also claim to 
have been detained in 1981, 1983, 1993 and 1997. You claim to have been kept in 
solitary confinement and tortured when detained. The Secretary of State has doubts 
as to your alleged fear of persecution from the fact that you did not leave Iran until 
1999. 
 
Similarly, an Ethiopian was told that, though arrested in January, he did not leave until May 
and that this ―detracts from the truthfulness of your claim to be a genuine asylum seeker‖ 
(ibid.:28). 
 
6.5.12   Credibility:  assumptions about behaviour 
Caseworkers often make assumptions about the behaviour of various people in the asylum 
account. They often express scepticism about the help given to applicants by friends, 
relatives or strangers: 
 
The Secretary of State looks at the manner of your escape from hospital. You have 
stated that your cousin who also happened to be a doctor at the hospital helped you 
to flee. He is of the view that if your cousin had overheard that you were going to be 
killed, he would not have played a role in your escape which invariably [sic] would 
implicate himself (cited ibid.:24). 
 
Similarly, CC4 was in prison in Côte d‘Ivoire and had hospital treatment. A doctor helped 
her escape from hospital and arranged her journey to the UK. CC4 said that her interviewer 
was sceptical and asked her: 
 
―Why these people help you come to the England? Did you know them? Why did 
they do that for you?‖ And I said, ―I don‘t know … Maybe because the doctor in the 
hospital know my parents and they know everything [the authorities do] on my 
parents is wrong.‖25 
 
                                                 
25
 Research interview, 18 April 2007. 
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CC4 was eventually granted ILR. Not so OH13. He claimed that a sympathetic prison 
officer had given him painkillers after he had been tortured. According to the caseworker,  
 
It is not accepted that those responsible for torturing you, to get you to give them 
information, would counteract their own work by medically treating you for injuries 
that they had themselves caused. Your account of this matter is therefore not 
accepted as being true.
26
 
 
6.5.13   Credibility:   the government steps in 
Caseworkers have always been free to raise credibility issues but they are now obliged to 
do so under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 
(AIA 2004): ―a deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimant‘s 
credibility, of any behaviour‖ specified as such (s. 8 (1)). IAS describes section 8 as ―a 
poorly conceived and damaging intervention‖ (Ensor 2006:1). It has created ―a process of 
credibility finding that looks only for reasons of doubt‖ and sets out an ―agenda of 
disbelief‖ (ibid.). Among the kinds of behaviour specified in section 8 as ―damaging the 
claimant‘s credibility‖ are 
 
 failure to produce a valid passport (s. 8 (3) (a)) 
 production of an invalid passport as if it were valid (s. 8 (3) (b)) 
 destruction or disposal of a passport (s. 8 (3) (c)) 
 ―failure … to answer a question asked by a deciding authority‖ (s. 8 (3) (e)), e.g. an 
interviewer 
 failure to claim asylum when passing through a ―safe‖ country (s.8 (4)).27 
 
    To take the first of these as an example: the offence of entering the UK without a 
passport was introduced by the 2004 Act, after a period of hostile government discourse 
towards asylum seekers, led by home secretary David Blunkett. One of the most common – 
                                                 
26
 ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, 2005, para. 18. 
27
 The Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility in Asylum and Human Rights Claims lists as safe all the 
EU member states plus Iceland and Norway. These are the countries to which section 8 applies: other 
countries (e.g. a country which has signed the Refugee Convention, including countries that border the 
asylum seeker‘s country of origin) may also be counted ―safe‖, but ―decision makers … are not obliged to do 
so under section 8‖ (API – Credibility 2006:16). 
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and true – explanations for the absence of a passport is that the agent who supplied it 
demanded the passport back before the end of the journey – typically, in the case of a 
regular flight, after take-off but before landing. According to Webber (2003), traffickers 
take back the passports to avoid detection of their routes and methods. Blunkett claimed 
that this explanation was not true. Asylum seekers ―destroy‖ their passports, he declared, 
because ―traffickers tell them it‘s their best chance of staying in the UK – by making 
fraudulent claims and making it difficult to remove them if their claims fail.‖28 In line with 
this philosophy, section 2 lays down that asylum seekers who arrive without a passport 
must ―prove that they have a reasonable excuse‖ for not having one (s. 2 (4) (c)) and 
section 8 specifically requires the caseworker to raise it as a credibility issue. However, 
obeying the agent‘s instructions is not counted as a ―reasonable excuse‖ for ―destroying‖ 
the passport unless you can show that ―in the circumstances of the case it is unreasonable to 
expect non-compliance with the instructions or advice‖ (s. 2 (7) (b)). The API on credibility 
stipulates that this ―excuse‖ will be counted as reasonable only in ―exceptional situations‖, 
such as in the case of ―unaccompanied minors, the very elderly or … people with mental 
disabilities‖ (API – Credibility 2006:15), or if ―a document was destroyed or disposed of as 
a direct result of force, threats or intimidation, e.g. where an individual was forced at knife-
point to give a document to someone else‖ (ibid.). No participant in this study offered such 
an extreme explanation: all those who travelled with false passports on regular flights in the 
company of their agent felt obliged to give them up when the agent demanded it. OH13 
came with his family from Eritrea. His wife told her interviewer: ―The passport I had was 
Sudanese but the agent took it away.‖29 OH7‘s agent took her passport before the plane 
landed and then he disappeared.
30
 OH9‘s agent took her passport during the flight, 
disembarked when the plane landed at Rome and left her to travel on to Heathrow alone.
31
 
There is, in fact, no need for ―knife-point‖ threats: asylum seekers hand their passports back 
because, dependent as they are on their agents, they feel they have no choice but to obey. 
    ―With section 8 [of the 2004 Act]‖, writes Ensor,32 ―the government has for the first time 
stepped into this [credibility assessment] process, requiring decision makers to take certain 
behaviours or actions to be ‗damaging to the claimant‘s credibility‘‖ (2006:1). He calls on 
                                                 
28
 Home Office Press Release PR 296/2003. 
29
 Official Screening Research interview notes of her Research interview, provided by OH13. 
30
 Research interview, 18 January 2007. 
31
 Research interview, 19 January 2007. 
32
 Senior research officer, Research and Information Unit, IAS. 
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decision-makers to ―move beyond the agenda of disbelief set out in section 8, and examine 
instead the reality of the experiences faced by those who travel to the UK to seek asylum‖ 
(ibid.:3). With this in mind it is interesting that the API on credibility itself contains advice 
on good practice which, if followed, would go against the grain not only of section 8 but of 
all the examples of credibility assessment cited here. Decision-makers are told to consider 
facts which ―go to the core of the claim‖ (API – Credibility 2006:8). They are told that 
findings should focus on ―material facts that are serious and significant in nature‖ (ibid.) 
and that it is ―generally unnecessary, and sometimes counter-productive … to focus upon 
minor or peripheral facts that are not material to the claim‖ (ibid.). The evidence suggests, 
however, that this advice is frequently disregarded as the government‘s restrictive agenda 
takes precedence over good practice. 
 
6.6   The case of FS3/4 
Many of the issues raised here about the interview, the initial decision-making process and 
the practices adopted by caseworkers are illustrated in the case of FS3 and FS4, a couple 
who participated in this research. In addition to their interview with me they provided me 
with FS3‘s official asylum interview record, his witness statements, his refusal letter and 
his responses to it, as well as the eventual judgment of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. I 
highlight this case because it provides an example, in a single case, of how the ―agenda of 
disbelief‖ operates. 
    FS3 and FS4 came to the UK from Iran. FS3 applied for asylum, with FS4 as his 
dependant. He claimed that in July 1999 he had joined students at Tehran University 
(where he had previously been a student) to protest against attacks on them by the police 
and security forces during a demonstration the previous day (at which he had not been 
present), attacks which had led to the death of at least one student and the blinding of 
another. He claimed that he was arrested during the protest, then detained and tortured for a 
month. After his release he went back to running his manufacturing business but as a result 
of his experiences he began to support the aims of the unregistered political party Hezb-e-
Mellat, finally joining it in 2000. On the first anniversary of the 1999 demonstration, a 
commemorative demonstration was held which was attacked by the police and security 
services, many students were beaten and arrested, at least one died and a senior party 
member disappeared. FS3 escaped arrest and the couple went into hiding. Their home was 
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searched, FS4‘s father was arrested for questioning, and FS3 and FS4 felt their lives were 
in danger. They decided to seek asylum abroad, arriving in the UK in September 2000. 
    FS3 filled in his SEF, had his interview, was given an initial refusal and went to appeal. 
We are interested here in the interview and the arguments leading to the refusal. I look at 
the stated grounds for refusal, relating them to the official interview record and FS3‘s first 
witness statement and noting the practices adopted by the caseworker. 
 
6.6.1   “Incredible”, “implausible” and no chance to answer 
The attempt to undermine FS3‘s credibility begins at paragraph 5 of the refusal letter, 
where his presence at the students‘ protest and his account of it are questioned. His account 
is summarised as follows: ―You say … you went to have a look, and the security forces 
arrested you, and detained you for one month.‖33 The caseworker then comments: ―You 
were not a student at the university, therefore it is unclear from your narrative why you 
went to the [students‘ residence] the next day, nor is it clear why you were arrested.‖34 The 
reasons in both cases, however, were quite clear from FS3‘s narrative. In his witness 
statement he explains that he went to the students‘ residence because he ―sympathised with 
the students that were killed [at the previous day‘s demonstration].‖35 Moreover, he did not 
say he ―went to have a look‖ but ―I went … to find [out] what was happening‖.36 He is 
arguably describing an act of solidarity. Neither was there any mystery about the reasons 
for his arrest: he was arrested for protesting, like the other people taken away that day: 
 
Q 22: Under what circumstances were you arrested? 
 
A: I was arrested by the Hebezat Etalaet police which is the intelligence part of the 
police. I was arrested and taken away. 
 
Q 23: Where were you and what time of the day was it? 
 
A: I was at the students‘ residence in the university at about 10 o‘clock in the 
morning. 
                                                 
33
 FS3‘s ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, 2001, para 5. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 FS3‘s first witness statement, para. 3. 
36
 Main asylum interview transcript, 2001, answer to Question 21. 
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Q 24: Was anyone else arrested? 
 
A: There were other people arrested. 
 
Q 25: What were you doing when you were arrested? 
 
A: Just looking. 
 
Q 26: On what charges? 
 
A: For taking part in the demonstration which took place the day before …37 
 
Thus the caseworker not only misquoted FS3‘s words but dismissed his reasons and 
explanations without giving a single reason for doing so, and this when the Home Office 
country report itself acknowledged that ―there are human rights abuses in Iran and 
membership of or even sympathy with opposition groups is actively put down by the 
authorities.‖38 There was also specific evidence from Amnesty International, in the public 
domain at the time of FS3‘s asylum interview (AI Press Release 1999), about the first 
demonstration mentioned by FS3 and the increasing violence of the security forces in the 
days that followed. The caseworker should at this point have followed UNHCR guidelines, 
which advise caseworkers to use ―all the means at [their] disposal to produce the necessary 
evidence in support of the application‖ in a shared ―duty to ascertain and evaluate all the 
relevant facts‖ (Handbook 1992, para. 196). FS3‘s caseworker did not do so, and neither 
did he follow the alternative advice in the same paragraph: 
 
[T]here may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases … 
[the asylum seeker] should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given 
the benefit of the doubt (ibid.). 
 
Instead, without any supporting evidence, the caseworker asserted: 
                                                 
37
 Ibid., Questions 22-26. 
38
 Cited by the adjudicator in the AIT ―Determination and Reasons‖, para. 12, in FS3‘s case (2002). 
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You did not attend the demonstration, and were not a member of any political 
parties at that time. The Secretary of State considers that your account lacks 
credibility.‖39 
 
    Another example of such practice can be seen in paragraph 8 of the refusal letter, which 
refers to the events of July 2000. The caseworker deals with FS3‘s account of that 
demonstration, mostly by reference to his first witness statement: ―You say that the security 
forces told the demonstrators to gather in the University Gymnasium. You did not comply, 
but fled …‖40 This was not surprising, for FS3 had explained that ―the university gym ... 
was now under [the security forces‘] custody.‖41 But the caseworker then attempts to cast 
doubt on his account by raising a trivial point: 
 
You then noticed that some members of the security forces were Arabic. As you 
fled, one of these Arabic gentlemen followed you. It is unclear from your account 
how you identified the origin of your pursuer. Your account is implausible.
42
 
 
A charge of implausibility should only be made in relation to a material fact – a fact which 
―goes to the core of a claim and is fundamental to why an individual fears persecution‖ 
(API – Credibility 2006:6). Whether or not some members of the security forces were 
Arabs does not seem to be a ―material fact‖ on this definition. Moreover, the API states that 
any charge of implausibility must be ―based on reasonably drawn, objectively justifiable, 
inferences‖ and ―it is not enough to simply say that the event could not have happened‖ 
(ibid.:10). Furthermore, the caseworker‘s doubt was raised only in the refusal letter: FS3 
was given no inkling of it during the interview, and therefore no opportunity to answer it by 
expanding on his explanation. Yet the API on interviewing is clear: ―If there is reason to 
doubt a certain element of a claim it is important that the claimant has the chance to address 
the points of contention …‖ (API – Interviewing 2006, para. 2.2). If he had been given such 
a chance he might have explained, as he did in his appeal statement, that he had ―noticed 
that only [a] few of the security forces members were speaking Farsi [the language of Iran], 
                                                 
39
  ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, 2001, para. 5. 
40
 Ibid., para. 8. 
41
 FS3‘s first witness statement, para. 15. 
42
  ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, 2001, para. 8. 
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the rest of them were using Arabic.‖43 As it was, he first learned of the caseworker‘s doubts 
– and indeed his conclusion – from the refusal letter. FS3‘s caseworker has used the 
category of ―implausibility‖ inappropriately and then denied FS3 the chance of any reply, 
simply concluding, ―Your account is implausible.‖ Such practices show no regard for the 
state‘s Convention obligations and they undermine the right to asylum. 
    Another example of a credibility issue occurs at paragraph 9 of the refusal letter, where it 
is argued that FS3‘s account of the arrest and disappearance of party members and of his 
fear for his own life could not be true because ―[y]ou, personally, were not approached by 
the security forces.‖ There was, however, a good reason why they did not ―approach‖ or 
arrest him: FS3 was in hiding. The security forces went to his home address
44
 but he was 
not there. They told his father-in-law that ―if he gave them my hiding place I won‘t be 
executed …‖45 FS3‘s caseworker took no account of this, did not express any doubts during 
the interview and therefore FS3 had no opportunity to resolve them. By the time of the 
refusal letter it was too late and FS3 was simply informed that ―[t]he Secretary of State … 
doubts the credibility of your account.‖46 
 
6.6.2   Taking a government at its word 
FS3‘s refusal letter provides an example of the tendency noted above (6.5.5) for the Home 
Office to accept assurances by governments that they do not condone torture. Torture is 
then attributed solely to individuals breaking the rules. In this scenario it is assumed that 
the government concerned would punish such individuals and protect their victims and that 
therefore a claim for asylum could not be substantiated on Convention grounds. In FS3‘s 
case, the Home Office used a truncated version of this formula which did not even mention 
the Iranian government: FS3 described being beaten, kicked and burned with a cigarette 
end, and the refusal letter simply declared that ―[t]he Secretary of State considers that the 
actions which you have described are in the nature and are the result of individuals abusing 
their official positions.‖47 No evidence is cited in support of this opinion. 
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 Asylum interview transcript, 2001, answer to Question 57. 
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6.6.3   Lack of knowledge of political groups 
We have seen how the Home Office‘s lack of knowledge of political parties may lead to the 
refusal of an asylum claim (6.5.7). In his witness statement, FS3 claimed that ―[i]n 
February 2000 I joined Hezb-e-Mellat Iran‖ and gave some details of its origins and 
history.
48
 Both in this statement and in his interview he explained that there was secrecy 
about membership numbers both nationally and locally because of recent persecution, 
including the jailing of senior members and the assassination of its leader, Dariush Foruhar, 
and his wife in 1998. He explained the local party structure in the following terms: ―I was 
in charge of five people. And five people like me had one boss. That was to keep it secret 
and if anyone got arrested the damage would be minimal.‖49 But FS3‘s caseworker had no 
knowledge of the party, and unfortunately this ignorance became a plank in the rejection of 
FS3‘s asylum claim: ―There are several political groups in Iran, but this does not appear to 
be one of them. The Secretary of State therefore doubts the veracity of your statement.‖50 
Amnesty International, however, describing the human rights situation in Iran during 1999 
(AIR 2000:132), reported ―the detention of four members of the Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran, Iran 
Nation Party‖ on charges of violence and ―counter-revolutionary‖ activity. Moreover, 
within days of the demonstrations described by FS3, the International Secretariat of 
Amnesty International had publicly called on the Iranian authorities to grant ―fundamental 
rights‖, describing the violence by the security forces in the days following the first 
demonstration and noting: ―According to other unconfirmed reports, two members of the 
Iran Nation Party (Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran), an unauthorized but tolerated opposition group, 
have also been arrested‖ (AI Press Release 1999). 
 
6.6.4   Time of departure 
We have noted that the Home Office uses the timing of an asylum seeker‘s departure from 
their country to question credibility (6.5.11). FS3‘s caseworker doubts his credibility 
because ―you did not leave Iran until September 2000‖.51 This ignores what Amnesty 
International calls ―the enormity of the decision … to leave [your] country of origin without 
hope of return‖ (cited Shaw & Witkin 2004:29). FS3 had explained at interview that he had 
not thought of leaving Iran until July 2000. Before then he hadn‘t thought his life was in 
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danger, ―I just realised that I had a record with them.‖52 But after the July demonstration, 
when one of his friends was killed and another went missing, his house was raided by the 
police and his father-in-law taken in for questioning, FS3 and his wife went into hiding and 
a senior party member ―advised me to get out of Iran if I could‖.53 Even then he hesitated: 
―I had a family in Iran, I had a lot of property in Iran, I did not want to leave. But I was 
frightened for my safety.‖54 None of this was unreasonable or slow. In the event he made 
the arrangements quite quickly – financial and travel arrangements, false passports – and 
left in September. Unfortunately, none of this impressed his caseworker, who insisted that 
his departure was tardy: ―The Secretary of State holds the view that if your fear of 
persecution by the Iranian authorities were genuine, you would have left Iran at the earliest 
opportunity, and the fact that you did not do so casts doubt upon your credibility.‖55 
 
6.6.5   Passing through a “safe” country 
Failure to claim asylum when passing through a ―safe‖ country is one of the ―credibility‖ 
issues which caseworkers are obliged to address under section 8 of the 2004 Act (6.5.13). 
The caseworker raised this issue in FS3‘s case but the accusation bore no relation to the 
facts. The caseworker set out the accusation in paragraph 11 of the refusal letter: 
 
In your statement you claim that you travelled to Turkey then to the United 
Kingdom concealed in the back of a lorry. You would therefore have travelled 
through a number of European countries which are signatories to the 1951 United 
Nations Convention, and are therefore safe countries that are obliged to consider 
any asylum applications made upon their territory. There is no reason to believe that 
these countries would not fulfil their [Convention] obligations … The fact that you 
failed to claim asylum [in one of these countries] therefore further reduces your 
credibility. 
 
Unfortunately, the fact on which this conclusion is based is no fact at all. FS3 and his wife 
did not ―travel to Turkey then to the United Kingdom concealed in the back of a lorry.‖ 
They arrived by plane: 
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We entered the plane with passports provided by the agent. The passports were 
taken away from us by the agent‘s representative at the Transit Hall of Stansted 
Airport, in the United Kingdom.
56
 
 
The agent had provided two sets of false passports. The first set was used for the journey 
from Iran to Turkey.
57
 They then spent two days in a lorry, travelling from Turkey to ―a 
country whose name I do not know‖ (ibid.). During those two days they did not get out of 
the lorry either for food or to relieve their bodily functions: ―[W]e got on a container on a 
lorry. We were given a carrier bag for discharges (toilet, etc.) and protein food like 
chocolate.‖58 After that they boarded the plane. The caseworker knew that FS3 had arrived 
by plane, not only from FS3 himself at the main asylum interview but from the record of 
his screening interview. At best the caseworker‘s accusation arose from a careless disregard 
for the details of FS3‘s account. At worst, it derived from an eagerness to attach as many 
―credibility‖ issues to his case as possible under pressure from the government‘s restrictive 
agenda. 
 
6.6.6   Mistake or misrepresentation? 
Paragraph 6 of FS3‘s refusal letter deals with his detention and torture. Its main conclusion 
is found in its last sentence: torture in Iran is perpetrated by ―individuals abusing their 
official positions‖. The rest of the paragraph is little more than insinuation aimed at 
discrediting FS3‘s account of his detention. None of it stands scrutiny. First, the caseworker 
writes: 
 
You say that whilst in detention, you were beaten, kicked, and ―a crazy person‖ 
burnt you with a cigarette. It is unclear whether the crazy person was a member of 
the security forces, or another detainee. 
 
It is perfectly clear in FS3‘s account that the ―crazy person‖ was a member of the security 
forces. FS3 is telling a story of abuse by the authorities in the detention centre. It is clear 
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that when he claimed that he had been ―beaten up, kicked‖ and that ―my face was swollen, 
with blood pouring out of my nose‖59 he was accusing the staff at the centre. When he 
claimed that he heard ―the cry of others who were being tortured in other rooms‖60 and that 
he ―could hear the cry and begging of other prisoners‖61 he meant they were being tortured 
by the guards. When he said, ―At the end a crazy person came and put his cigarette out on 
my hand‖,62 the culprit was clearly a guard, not ―another detainee‖. 
    Secondly, the caseworker writes
63
: 
 
When I asked you how often you were beaten Q36 [question 36], initially you were 
unable to say, then you responded ―4-5 hours‖, during which your [sic] sustained a 
bloody nose, and eye. 
 
The impression given is of a man who was uncertain of the story he wanted to tell, finally 
inventing an implausible four- to five-hour beating, from which he emerged with no more 
than ―a bloody nose, and eye‖. However, virtually none of the interviewer‘s account is true. 
FS3 was perfectly able to answer question 36, and he did so immediately and appropriately 
– but it was not the question the caseworker claimed it to be: 
 
Q36:  Could you tell me how you were beaten? 
A:  Some of them punched me and some kicked me. My nose was bleeding and my 
eye. At the end a crazy person came and put his cigarette out on my hand …64 
 
FS3 then replied immediately to question 37, which did ask how often he had been beaten. 
However, he did not claim to have been beaten for four or five hours but to have been 
beaten four or five times: 
 
Q37:  Could you tell me how often you were beaten? 
A:  I did not know from the day to the night. I would say about four or five times 
but I don‘t know if it was day or night.65 
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Paragraph 6 can be read as a misrepresentation of FS3‘s account of his detention or as the 
product of the interviewer‘s poor memory and his misreading of the interview record. But 
FS3‘s claim to have been tortured was an important part of his claim for asylum and should 
have been considered carefully, at length and in detail. Instead, his experience was 
discounted in a mish-mash of inaccuracies and unsustainable accusations. 
    Whatever view is taken of these and other inaccuracies in FS3‘s case – whether they are 
misrepresentations or mistakes – the restrictive agenda, which places asylum in the context 
of immigration control and makes refusal an objective of the asylum process, turns that 
process into a search for contradictions rather than an attempt to discover the truth, 
prioritises the burden of proof rather than the benefit of the doubt and turns the asylum 
interview into a confrontation between the caseworker and the asylum seeker. Yet the 
UNHCR Handbook describes not confrontation but cooperation between ―the examiner‖ 
and the ―applicant‖. They have a shared responsibility (1992, para. 196): 
 
Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to 
ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the 
examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at 
his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application. 
 
This shared responsibility precludes a negative search for inconsistencies and 
contradictions and instead demands from the examiner a positive approach to the asylum 
account (ibid., para. 199): 
 
… it may be necessary for the examiner to clarify any apparent inconsistencies and 
to resolve any contradictions in a further interview, and to find an explanation for 
any misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. Untrue statements by 
themselves are not a reason for refusal of refugee status and it is the examiner‘s 
responsibility to evaluate such statements in the light of all the circumstances of the 
case. 
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Finally, ―[i]t will be necessary for the examiner to gain the confidence of the applicant in 
order to assist the latter in putting forward his case and in fully explaining his opinions and 
feelings‖ (ibid., para. 200). Such an approach is consistent with a commitment to 
obligations under the Refugee Convention and ECHR and helps to uphold the right to 
asylum. The practices described above are not consistent with such a commitment, put the 
victims of persecution in danger and undermine the right to asylum. 
 
6.7   Conclusion 
I have argued that legal representation is essential at this stage of the asylum process, in 
particular at the asylum interview, but that restrictions on legal aid and reductions in 
timescales and deadlines are detrimental to asylum seekers‘ chances of a fair hearing. I 
have argued that failure to provide gender-specific interviewers and interpreters makes it 
less likely that vulnerable and abused women will be able to explain their case, thus 
undermining their right to asylum.  In the context of the main asylum interview where 
asylum seekers have their main chance to explain their reasons for applying for asylum, I 
have shown that there are problems in the decision-making process in the way country 
reports are compiled, presented and interpreted and in the way ―credibility‖ issues are used 
in a negative search for contradictions and inconsistencies in asylum seekers‘ accounts. I 
have argued that the restrictive agenda makes refusal an objective of the asylum process 
and that this undermines the right to asylum. 
 
    The asylum interview and initial decision is not the last stage for asylum seekers, for if 
asylum is refused they may have rights of appeal. I look next at the appeals process. 
 CHAPTER 7 
 
 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1   Introduction 
―[I]f an asylum or human rights claim is refused,‖ writes home secretary Jacqui Smith, ―the 
claimant has a right of appeal to the independent Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT), 
and if appropriate, onwards to the Court of Appeal.‖1 I look now at the appeals process. In 
this chapter, I chart the history of government attempts to restrict the appeal rights of 
asylum seekers, and I give an account of the changes proposed in 2003, most of which were 
incorporated  in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004. I 
examine the merits test, which restricts the availability of legal aid, and the effect on rights 
of appeal of the increasing use of fast-track procedures. I critically assess the way country-
guidance cases are established and applied and note how the appeals process is affected by 
poor Home Office decision-making at earlier stages in the asylum process. I examine two 
experiences of appeal which illustrate the flawed nature of the appeals procedures. 
  
7.2 Asylum appeals: a history of rights reduced 
Until 1993 asylum appeals were dealt with under the Immigration Act 1971. But in 1993 all 
asylum seekers were given a right of appeal to the Immigration Appeals Authority (IAA) 
under the new Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. The appeal was heard by a single 
adjudicator, appointed by the Home Office, and if it failed the applicant could seek leave to 
appeal to the Immigration Appeals Tribunal (IAT), which comprised three members 
appointed by the lord chancellor. However, rights of appeal for asylum applicants have 
since been modified by five major pieces of legislation as part of government attempts to 
reduce the number of appeal applications (Process 2007:2). This has taken place in a 
context where, as Thomas (2006:1) notes, ―the government has consistently argued that 
                                                 
1
 Letter to Alan Johnson MP, 7 November 2007. I had requested Alan Johnson, my local MP, to ask the home 
secretary a number of questions arising from an answer given by Geoff Hoon, government chief whip in the 
House of Commons, during Question Time on BBC-1 on 20 September 2007. 
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there is a culture of abuse of the appeal process by unmeritorious applicants who are only 
seeking to string out their cases for as long as possible in the hope that they can delay 
removal.‖ Rights of appeal against negative decisions in asylum cases ―have been 
increasingly restricted over the last few years [and] as a result there are certain categories of 
asylum seekers … unable to pursue an appeal within the UK‖ (Process 2007:6). These 
include: 
 
 claims certified by the secretary of state as ―manifestly unfounded‖, usually because 
the country of origin is on the government‘s list of ―safe‖ countries (5.3.5) 
 cases where the asylum seeker has passed through a ―safe third country‖ and 
―failed‖ to apply for asylum there 
 cases where the secretary of state certifies that the matters under appeal should have 
been raised in an earlier appeal 
 cases where the applicant was granted leave to remain of 12 months or less. 
 
7.2.1   Determined to restrict: the case of the 2004 Act 
The government has been determined to change the appeals system in recent years. There 
have been four major Acts of parliament on immigration and asylum since Labour 
succeeded the Conservatives in 1997, and reforms have followed one another so swiftly 
that some have found it difficult to evaluate one batch before another has followed to 
replace it. The package of reforms to the appeals process proposed in 2003 for what would 
become the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 is a good example 
both of the trend to reduce rights and of the speed with which reforms follow upon one 
another. The Bar Council‘s Law Reform Committee, in its evidence to the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, saw little justification for further reforms so 
soon after the 2002 Act, noting that ―there has been no sudden crisis or change of 
circumstances since the enactment of the 2002 Act‖ (Appeals 2004, para. 22) and 
concluding that ―[i]t would be premature to judge the final effectiveness of the 2002 appeal 
provisions‖ (ibid.). Mr Justice Ouseley, president of the IAT, wrote to the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee on the same theme, pointing out that ―[n]obody yet has any real 
knowledge of the operation of the [current 2002] system‖ and that ―[t]he proposed changes 
will be the third major set of reforms on this issue in the last few years‖ (ibid., para. 21). 
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    The proposals were on the table, however, the main ones being (a) the replacement of the 
two-tier appeal system (adjudicator hearing/IAT appeal) by a single-tier system (one right 
of appeal to a new Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT)) and (b) increased powers to 
regulate unqualified legal advisers. This last change, at least, might have been seen as a 
positive move aimed at protecting vulnerable people from exploitation. Protection, 
however, did not seem to be the objective. In a joint press release, the Home Office and the 
Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA) explained that the measures were part of a 
―crackdown on abuse‖ and aimed ―to reduce the length of time and cost to the taxpayer of 
the current multi-layered appeals system which is open to abuse by unfounded asylum 
claimants and unscrupulous legal advisers‖ (Asylum Measures 2003:1). Home secretary 
David Blunkett explained that having 
 
speeded up the beginning of the [asylum] process … [w]e must now speed up the 
appeals process. Too often unscrupulous and unqualified legal advisers are 
encouraging claimants to lodge appeal after appeal with no prospect of success, all 
at taxpayers‘ expense (ibid.). 
 
Secretary of state for constitutional affairs Lord Falconer said that the proposal for a single-
tier tribunal ―represents the Government‘s commitment to provide an appeals system … 
that is not open to exploitation by unsuccessful appellants seeking to use the system to 
delay their removal‖ (ibid.:2). While the press release also included a more positive 
reference to the need for the tribunal to provide ―consistency, quality, justice and fairness‖ 
(ibid.), the tone was predominantly negative, linking ―unfounded asylum claimants‖ with 
―unscrupulous legal advisers‖ in a narrative which suggested a conspiracy of ―abuse‖ which 
would eventually undermine the system‘s credibility. David Blunkett pursued his theme of 
regulating ―legal advisers who are simply giving advice on how to defraud the system‖ and 
added another proposal: ―new restrictions on legal aid to stop money being wasted on 
groundless cases‖ (ibid.). The message was that abuse all round now warranted a further 
reduction in rights of appeal. Moreover, under the then current appeals system there was a 
chance of reaching the Court of Appeal, and even the House of Lords. Now the two 
secretaries of state issued a warning: ―We are also looking at ways to restrict access to the 
higher courts‖ (ibid.:3). These themes continued in the consultation document itself: ―The 
government is determined … to safeguard the appeals system from misuse and protect the 
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credibility of the process‖; a single-tier system was necessary because ―[t]he current 
appeals system … provides people with opportunities to abuse the system in order to cause 
delay or abscond‖ (cited Appeals 2004, para. 36). 
    This negative approach – based on assumptions about unfounded applicants, fraudulent 
solicitors and claims that the system was being milked and taxpayers robbed – informed all 
the proposals on appeals, whether it was for the single tier (one aspect of which, noted the 
Refugee Council, was the removal of ―all scrutiny of tribunal decisions by the higher 
courts‖ (Briefing A & I Act 2004:9)), the regulation of legal representatives or the 
reduction in legal aid. People fleeing persecution, however, wanted protection and a 
measure of justice. 
    Was it possible to square this circle? On the question of moving to a single-tier process, 
the Constitutional Affairs Committee found no advantage in doing so unless there was an 
improvement in decision-making. This applied, first, to poor initial decision-making by the 
Home Office, which had consequences for the appeals process. The Committee cited Law 
Society evidence (Appeals 2004, para. 11) that ―[t]he poor quality of initial decisions means 
that the hearing carried out before a special adjudicator is often the first proper factual 
assessment of the case‖ and that it was essential to improve the initial decision-making 
process before removing the second-tier of appeal. Secondly, improvements were needed in 
decision-making at the first (adjudicator) stage of the appeals process. The organisation 
JUSTICE
2
 told the Committee (ibid., para. 42) that the IAT‘s role was vital in addressing 
first-tier adjudicator error, since ―60% of appeals to the IAT result in the decision of the 
first-tier being reversed or reconsidered.‖ In these circumstances the abolition of the second 
tier of appeals would mean that ―the approximately 60% of cases in which errors occur 
would simply go uncorrected and unaddressed.‖ The Committee recommended that  ―the 
removal of a formal tier of appeal should not be undertaken until … there has been a 
significant improvement in initial decision-making and the rise in the number of successful 
first-tier appeals has been substantially reversed‖ (ibid., paras 44-46). 
    Nevertheless the two-tier system was abolished by the 2004 Act. But in face of wide 
criticism (including a potential ―full-scale rebellion‖ in the House of Lords (Watt 2004)) 
the government reluctantly conceded some access to the higher courts: ―Where a decision is 
                                                 
2
 JUSTICE is an all-party, law reform and human rights organisation, aiming to achieve greater fairness, 
effectiveness and advancement of human rights in the legal system. JUSTICE works largely through policy-
orientated research; interventions in court proceedings; education and training; briefings, lobbying and policy 
advice. 
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reconsidered and still refused‖, explained the Refugee Council, ―there is a right of appeal, 
on a point of law only, to the Court of Appeal‖ (Briefing A & I Act 2004:9). This happens, 
however, only after a complicated and questionable process: if your appeal is refused by the 
AIT you can ask for a ―reconsideration‖ of the decision on the grounds that the judge had 
made an ―error of law‖, but this would not necessarily involve any rehearing of the 
substance of your claim. Moreover, you apply to the same body against which you are 
appealing (the AIT) and if it grants a reconsideration order it is the AIT again who does the 
reconsidering. If the AIT again rejects your case you can ask the High Court to order a 
review – again by the AIT – but only on the basis of the papers in the case: you will not 
have an oral hearing. Only after this procedure, which the Constitutional Committee 
objected to because it amounted to ―tribunals exercising a supervisory jurisdiction over 
themselves‖ (Appeals 2004, para. 52), can you apply to the Court of Appeal. The Refugee 
Council feared that, while this possibility did retain ―some element of judicial oversight‖, 
―procedural and practical barriers will, in effect, undermine it‖ (Briefing A & I Act 
2004:9). What seems clear in this tortuous process is the government‘s reluctance to 
concede any access to the higher courts and its continued adherence to the prejudicial 
notions expressed in the joint press release. 
    The government‘s determination to limit access to the higher courts can also be seen in 
the time limit set for appeal applications and in the merits test invented to reduce the 
chances of receiving legal aid. The time limit was wholly unrealistic: applications to the 
High Court had to be made within five days after an AIT refusal. There was criticism of the 
proposal from several sources, including the Law Society and UNHCR, and the 
parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights sceptically listed the tasks to be 
accomplished within the five days (cited ibid.:10): 
 
An application for reconsideration will require the applicant‘s legal representative to 
receive a copy of the decision, read it, marshal any necessary evidence (which may 
require a meeting with the applicant at which an interpreter might well be required), 
to draft the legal grounds of challenge, and to lodge the grounds at the High Court. 
 
The Committee concluded: ―We consider the five-day limit to be far too short for the right 
of access to the High Court and beyond to be practically effective‖ (ibid.). But the five-day 
limit remained. 
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    The proposals on the legal aid scheme, too, were designed to reduce access to the higher 
courts. The government‘s original proposal was that legal aid should be granted on a ―no 
win-no fee‖ basis, the tribunal itself making or refusing the award retrospectively. The 
government‘s hope was that this would discourage solicitors and barristers from taking 
cases unless they could be sure of success. The scheme was based on the notion that 
taxpayers‘ money was ―being wasted on groundless cases‖ (Asylum Measures 2003:2) by 
asylum seekers and lawyers and it was intended to deal with both classes of offenders at a 
single stroke. But the government withdrew due to opposition, particularly from members 
of the House of Lords, who threatened to delay the Bill. The government, however, was 
later able to achieve the same result through its power to make regulations on legal aid. It 
promptly did so and invented the merits test. 
 
7.2.2  Determined to restrict: the merits test 
In order to do legal aid work a solicitor must have a contract with the Legal Services 
Commission (LSC).
3
 The LSC imposes cost limits on asylum work done – a threshold of 
five hours‘ work for the initial decision-making process and a limit of £1,600 for work on 
appeals – and applies a ―merits test‖ to cases. The operation of the merits test means that 
the solicitor has to ―consider what are the prospects of the appeal being successful.‖ 
(Wilson 2005:8). If there is more than a 50% chance of success, the solicitor may take the 
case on a legal aid basis. If the outcome seems ―unclear‖ or ―borderline‖, the solicitor 
should refuse the case, except in very limited circumstances. If the assessment is that the 
chances are ―poor‖, the solicitor should refuse the case in all circumstances (ibid.). 
Solicitors who first have to put their assessments to the LSC may have their request for 
funding rejected. Solicitors who, on their past record of successful appeals, can act on their 
own initiative will receive retrospective funding by order of the judge if the appeal is 
successful. If it is not, they will not be paid. If they continue to lose appeals their LSC 
contract may be in jeopardy – in the words of the LSC contract itself: ―Persistent failure to 
apply the [merits test] criteria … may lead to a contract sanction‖ (cited ibid.:4). Not 
surprisingly, ―Many suppliers [solicitors] are not willing to take the risk‖ (ibid.:11). 
Moreover, not only does the LSC contract threaten ―sanctions‖ on solicitors, its language 
also carries echoes of the government‘s negative assumptions about asylum seekers: where 
                                                 
3
 The LSC is a public body sponsored by the Ministry of Justice and runs the legal aid scheme. The lord 
chancellor and the secretary of state for justice are accountable to parliament for its activities. 
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an application is made for an extension of time and legal aid, the contract warns that 
―[e]xtensions will not be granted where the client‘s application is hopeless, vexatious or an 
abuse of process‖ (cited ibid.:11). 
    The government‘s purpose here was to ―filter out weak applications … therefore 
lowering the costs of the appeals process‖ (Process 2007:16). In light of the concerns about 
poor decision-making and the bad practices described in chapter 6, the Home Office‘s 
assessment of what is a ―weak‖ case may not be the same as that of a tribunal judge, and 
therefore rights of appeal are important. Solicitors should not be asked to second-guess the 
outcome of appeals. The Constitutional Affairs Committee, in its report on legal aid, 
believed ―the level of the test is … set too high‖ (Legal Aid 2005, para. 31): 
 
It might be acceptable for lawyers not to be paid if the case they brought was 
entirely without merit, or had never had more than a 50% prospect of success … 
[But unless] a case is completely clear cut, it is difficult to see how lawyers will 
always be able to make an accurate assessment … Lawyers considering whether 
applicants face possible human rights concerns, if deported, should not have to 
gamble on funding decisions. 
  
    The steady decline in asylum seekers‘ appeal rights is of concern to refugee NGOs. The 
Refugee Council and Refugee Action noted in March 2006 that solicitors were 
―increasingly hesitant to take on cases where the outcome is unclear‖ (Joint Response 
2006:3) They noted that ―[t]he daily lists of the AIT reveal that an average of 15 per cent of 
appellants appear [at the hearing] legally unrepresented‖ and that ―[a]ll of the advice 
services in our One Stop Shops are dealing with increasing numbers of clients whose 
solicitors are no longer representing them‖ (ibid.). They argued against proposals for LSC 
contract sanctions on solicitors with less than a 40% success rate in appeals work, stressing 
that ―access to an appeal process with high quality legal advice and representation is central 
to a fair asylum system‖ (ibid.:2). They warned: ―Any diminution of access to legal advice 
and representation is likely to result in flawed asylum decisions leading to the removal of 
asylum seekers with a continuing need for protection that has not been fully tested before 
the law.‖  
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7.2.3   Determined to restrict: the fast track 
The fast-track process, too, reduces rights of appeal. Fast-track appeals are governed by the 
Immigration and Asylum (Fast Track Procedure) Rules 2003. They apply what the 
Immigration Law Practitioners‘ Association (ILPA) describes as ―extraordinarily tight time 
limits‖ throughout the appeal process (Henderson 2003:512). You may be subjected to the 
fast-track process if, when you apply for asylum, the Home Office decides that your claim 
is ―straightforward‖. This may be because you come from a country designated by the 
government as ―safe‖ (5.3.5), and your case is thus ―certified‖ as ―clearly unfounded‖, or 
the government may make the decision on other grounds (Process 2007:18-19). Either way, 
―Home Office practice in cases which it hopes will be subjected to the Fast Track Rules is 
to detain the claimant on arrival, conduct the asylum interview on the day after the arrival, 
and decide the claim on the day after that‖ (Henderson 2003:512). If the asylum application 
is refused, ―the applicant continues to be detained during the appeal process pending 
removal from the UK‖ (Shaw & Witkin 2004:8). 
    Before the New Asylum Model (NAM), the aim of the Home Office was to complete the 
entire process, including appeals, in 22 days. Under NAM, timescales are shorter: you are 
screened on the first day, have your main asylum interview on the second or third day, are 
told the decision on the third or fourth day, any appeal will take place on the ninth or tenth 
day and, if it fails, you will be deported any time after the tenth day (Briefing NAM 
2007:3). In fact the only route to an appeal in most fast-track cases is to apply for a judicial 
review. The judge will review the Home Office decision to certify the claim as ―clearly 
unfounded‖, and the test to be applied is whether the decision to certify was so 
unreasonable that no ―reasonable public body‖ could have made such a decision (Process 
2007:9). ―This is a very narrow test‖, comments the ILPA, ―and limits the courts‘ power to 
supervise the executive‖ (ibid.). If the review is in your favour, you will have the right to 
appeal against the initial refusal. If the review goes against you, you will be deported back 
to your country of origin, with no right of appeal in the UK. You may have a right to appeal 
from your country of origin but this seems an unlikely prospect: ―in practice‖, notes the 
ILPA, ―it is extremely difficult … to appeal from abroad‖ (ibid.:19); indeed, you may be 
persecuted after deportation, not given the right to launch an appeal. So the Asylum Rights 
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Campaign
4
 believes that ―any reasoned dispute over the safety of [a] country of origin 
should always attract an in-country right of appeal‖ (cited ibid.). 
    The fast-track process since 2003, both before and after NAM, clearly limits asylum 
seekers‘ rights of appeal. Indeed, the short timescales, the limited grounds of appeal, the 
narrow test applied at judicial review and the absence thereafter of any appeal rights from 
within the UK seem to undermine the government‘s Refugee Convention obligations to 
protect people from persecution. However, they are all consistent with other aims, 
expressed in government legislation and discourse, to restrict, discourage and remove. 
 
7.3   The AIT: making decisions and shaping policy 
Access to the appeals process is important. The rate of appeals allowed ranged between 
20% and 25% of cases heard by the AIT in the years 2006-2008 (Statistical Summary 2008, 
table 2c) . Such rates seem to justify concerns about poor Home Office decision-making at 
the initial stage. Access to the AIT, therefore, gives asylum seekers a chance to take issue 
with the initial decision to refuse and, where necessary, to question practices of the kind 
described in chapter 6. The AIT thus has an important role in the asylum process. Two 
other aspects of the AIT‘s role add to its importance: first, ―the AIT … periodically issues 
‗Country Guidance‘ determinations that provide guidance for future Tribunals on the 
approach they should adopt in similar cases‖;5 secondly, these decisions ―then feed into the 
development of country specific asylum policy, guidance on which is provided to BIA Case 
Owners‖,6 i.e. to interviewers and caseworkers. The AIT, therefore, ―not only provides 
independent consideration of appeals against BIA decisions but also plays a role in shaping 
country specific asylum policy.‖7 We will look at a number of law reports and the 
Immigration Advisory Service (IAS) research into country-guidance cases (Yeo (ed.) 2005) 
and consider how satisfactory this process is from the point of view of the asylum seeker. 
 
7.3.1 The purpose of country-guidance cases 
The first stated aim of the use of country guidance cases is ―to assure consistency in 
decision-making‖ (the second is ―to save public time and money by avoiding the need to 
                                                 
4
 The Asylum Rights Campaign is a consortium of churches, refugee community groups, agencies and human 
rights organisations committed to upholding the right to seek and enjoy asylum. 
5
 Letter from home secretary Jacqui Smith to Alan Johnson MP, 7 November 2007. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
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revisit country conditions repeatedly‖) (Carver 2005:31-2). The idea of achieving 
consistency by establishing the facts of the situation in a country, and using those facts as a 
precedent for later cases (a ―factual precedent‖, similar to a legal precedent in questions of 
law), was mooted as early as 1997: in the Manzeke case Lord Woolf, in the Court of 
Appeal, thought it would be useful, in assessing the facts in a case, for judges ―to have the 
benefit of the views of a Tribunal in other cases on the general situation in a particular part 
of the world, as long as that situation has not changed in the meantime‖.8 In 2002 Lord 
Justice Laws, in S and Others, reasoned that refugee claims from any particular country 
―are inevitably made against a political backdrop which over a period of time … is, if not 
constant, at any rate definable.‖ 9 If this is borne in mind, the facts in a case may be used as 
a precedent for subsequent cases as long as certain safeguards are adopted, particularly (a) 
that all the relevant issues in the case are addressed so that the decision is ―effectively 
comprehensive‖ and (b) that individual asylum seekers are given a chance to show how 
their case is different. Yeo notes that both in Manzeke and the 2003 case of Shirazi ―the 
Court of Appeal … states that flexibility is needed, strongly implying that there would be 
no error of law in failing to follow such precedents if reasons are given‖ (Yeo 2005:14). 
The IAT began to establish country-guidance cases in 2003. In 2005 IAS research 
identified a number of problems associated with the designation and use of such cases. 
    IAS found no information about why any particular case is given ―country-guidance‖ or 
―country-guideline‖ status. By 2004 there were about 300 country-guidance cases (ibid.:6), 
some of which were historical cases elevated to country-guidance status retrospectively by 
the AIT (ibid.:11), yet ―[t]he criteria for designating individual cases as having ‗Country 
Guideline‘ status have never been published, if such criteria exist at all‖ (ibid.). Indeed, the 
entire process by which such status is given is unclear and the most that IAS researchers 
could reliably say (ibid.) was that  
 
it is known that the Tribunal has organised itself into country groups, believed to be 
chaired informally by a Tribunal Vice-President, to whom interesting-looking cases 
are perhaps referred or who co-ordinates the work of the group in some other way, 
including ―de-designating‖ cases that are deemed no longer to be appropriate as 
Country Guideline cases. The membership of the groups is believed to rotate. 
                                                 
8
 Cited in R (Iran) and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] Imm. AR 547. 
9
 Cited ibid. 548. 
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Yeo comments (ibid.): ―It is difficult to trust or have faith in the decision-making process 
when one is so unaware of what it is or what it involves …‖ 
 
7.3.2   “Effectively comprehensive” analyses: key requirements 
In S & Others the Court of Appeal indicated what constitutes an ―effectively 
comprehensive‖ analysis of material before the court in a country-guidance case and Carver 
(2005:33) identifies the key requirements, including: 
 
 careful referencing of materials in determinations 
 using the most recent reports 
 giving reasons for preference of one source over another. 
 
She cites several examples of the way that ―[m]any Country Guideline cases fail to meet 
these … requirements‖ (ibid.:33). 
 
7.3.2.1   Referencing 
The AIT appears to have similar problems to the Home Office in referencing its sources 
(see 6.5.3). One of the purposes of good referencing in AIT determinations is to provide a 
clear record of what was or was not before the tribunal and to indicate what was or was not 
considered by it. The Court of Appeal referred S & Others back to the AIT precisely 
because, although there were two UN country reports before the tribunal during its 
deliberations on the case, it had apparently read neither of them. Moreover, good 
referencing of materials helps future claimants and representatives to assess whether a 
decision might be challenged. Poor referencing, writes Yeo, ―is extremely effective in 
insulating such cases from future challenge‖ (ibid.:19) for ―[i]f the claimant does not know 
what evidence the tribunal used to make its earlier decision, he or she cannot possibly point 
a future … tribunal to different or new evidence and persuade them to depart from the 
earlier case‖ (ibid.). 
    A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a country-guidance case relating to 
Ethiopia, provides an example of poor referencing practice. While the tribunal had listed its 
sources at the beginning of its determination, it ―then engaged in substantial analysis of an 
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unnamed article which claimed that the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea had 
broken down‖ (Carver 2005:35). Although the article had used the word ―breakdown‖, the 
tribunal concluded, ―[w]e do not … consider that … the peace process has broken down‖ 
(cited ibid.). This conclusion, writes Carver, dismissed ―a key plank of evidence submitted 
on behalf of the claimant‖ (ibid.). Yet the article is unnamed and unlisted in the 
determination, making it impossible to trace and its contents impossible to check. Carver 
speculates that it may be a BBC Internet report of November 2003 but ―this cannot be 
confirmed with any confidence‖ (ibid.:35, n. 42). Thus an important element in an asylum 
appeal was discounted on the basis of an article entirely unreferenced in the record of the 
proceedings. Such practices make it difficult for future claimants and representatives to 
assess whether a case might be successfully challenged. They also undermine confidence in 
the country-guidance system and in AIT decision-making generally. 
 
7.3.2.2   The most recent reports 
According to the 1996 Ravichandran case, country conditions are always to be assessed ―at 
today‘s date‖ (Yeo 2005:16). In the case of S & Others in 2002, the Court of Appeal 
criticised the tribunal for not taking account of two recent UN reports, and this ―means  that 
the duty [to give reasons in a decision] has not been fulfilled‖ (cited Carver 2005:36). The 
failure was even more obvious since the tribunal had itself observed that because ―the 
situation is somewhat fluid [in the country concerned] … it is necessary to look particularly 
at the most recent reports.‖ 
    That necessity was not observed in NL v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a 
retrospective country-guidance case heard in August 2002 dealing with issues of mental 
health and family support in Pakistan. According to the principle in Ravichandran and S & 
Others, the Home Office should have submitted its latest (April 2002) country report on 
Pakistan to the tribunal. Instead, it submitted its October 2001 report, which had no specific 
information on mental health services in Pakistan. Moreover, one section of that report 
relied on material published in 2000 which ―refers to events in 1999 or before‖ (Yeo 
2005:17) and another of its sources was published in 2001 and refers to events in 2000. The 
Home Office report also cites Canadian research completed in 1994, eight years before the 
hearing. Yeo notes (ibid.:18) that the case of NL ―is nevertheless a Country Guideline case, 
considered by the Tribunal to be binding on adjudicators.‖ 
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    The problem in the case of NL has its roots in the way the Home Office prepares and 
utilises its country reports (6.5.3).  But the principle of assessing ―at today‘s date‖ strongly 
suggests a duty on the AIT, too, to ensure that it does at least consider the most recent 
reports. Failure to do this necessarily undermines confidence in the AIT and the appeals 
process generally. 
     
7.3.2.3   “What sources … can we attach most weight to and why?”10 
The third factor constituting an ―effectively comprehensive‖ analysis of a case concerns the 
need to give reasons for preferring one source over another. In S and Others, Lord Justice 
Laws ruled that ―effectively comprehensive‖ meant that the tribunal ―should address all the 
issues in the case capable of having a real … bearing on the result, and explain what it 
makes of the substantial evidence going to each such issue‖ (cited Yeo 2005:13) or, as Lord 
Justice Sedley put it in Karanakaran, ―everything capable of having a bearing has to be 
given the weight, great or little, due to it.‖11 The IAS researchers found ―a shocking 
disregard for this approach‖ (Carver 2005:39). For example, IAS researchers found that 
while careful methods of assessing evidence at a tribunal are ―applied scrupulously to 
material submitted on behalf of the claimant, the same cannot be said for that submitted by 
the Secretary of State‖ (ibid.:40). In particular, tribunals may assume the reliability of 
Home Office country reports, ―despite the fact that they are produced by one side in an 
adversarial process‖ (ibid.). Carver cites the case of Devaseelan (ibid.:41), where a report 
by the Medical Foundation
12
 was criticised because, said the tribunal, it was 
 
a reply to (or rebuttal of) the Home Office‘s reasons for refusing many Tamil 
asylum claims. Nobody could regard the whole report as anything other than 
partisan. It is written against the [Home Office], by those who have taken the side of 
[the] Appellants. In its proper place, it is none the worse for that. But it should not 
under any circumstances be regarded as ―objective evidence‖. 
 
                                                 
10
 Question to be asked, according to Dr H.H. Storey, Vice-President, Immigration Appeals Tribunal, in the 
case of VL (Risk-Failed Asylum Seekers) (Democratic Republic of  Congo CG) [2004] UKIAT 00007, para. 
51. 
11
 Karanakaran [2000] Imm AR 271, para. 137. 
12
 The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture is a registered charity dedicated solely to the 
treatment of torture survivors. It provides medical consultation, examination and forensic documentation of 
injuries, psychological treatment and support and practical help. 
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The tribunal did recognise that the Home Office country report was also ―a partisan 
document‖. But it defended its reliability in the following terms (ibid.): 
 
It is, however, little more than a compendium of material from other published 
sources, which are listed in the bibliography. They range from reports of 
international organs, through various governmental bodies in Britain and abroad, to 
news reports around the world. The Bulletin is arranged in such a way that the 
source of each statement in it can readily be traced. 
 
In the same way, the tribunal in the case of Badzo (ibid.) 
 
considered counsel for the claimant to be ―wrong to stigmatise the [Home Office] 
report … as being self-serving.‖ In the Tribunal‘s opinion, the … report ―offers a 
balanced, objective and proportionate summary of evidence, often with different 
viewpoints. The quotations are properly cited and can be checked against the 
references given.‖ 
 
In the case of AW, too, the tribunal stated its opinion of the Home Office report (cited 
ibid.:43-4): 
 
… it is clear from its terms that it is well-researched and fully sourced throughout. It 
attempts to provide a balanced assessment of the current position in Somalia, 
drawing for its information on a number of normally reliable and impartial sources. 
We are therefore satisfied that it provides a reliable, reasonably impartial and up-to-
date assessment of the current general position in Somalia. 
 
In the light of the evidence of the Home Office‘s poor sourcing practices identified earlier 
(6.5.3) and relating to the same time period, and its tendency (7.3.2.2) to submit outdated 
sources to tribunals, Carver‘s conclusion (ibid.:44) may be seen as a justifiable health 
warning both against the way the Home Office compiles and uses country reports and the 
way tribunals often read them: 
 
CHAPTER 7: SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK -- APPEALS 183 
The Tribunal may observe that the report is sourced, but it is not in a position to 
know or investigate just how poorly sourced the report may be. The Tribunal may 
observe that the report carries a range of opinions from reputable sources … but it is 
not in a position to know or investigate how selectively these sources have been 
quoted, often to the extent of complete misrepresentation. The Tribunal may 
observe that a particular sentence in a report emanates from a particular source, but 
it is not in a position to know whether this is actually the case … The Tribunal may 
observe the date of the sources used … but it is not in a position to know or 
investigate how often the … report misrepresents the date of the document in 
question. 
 
It seems clear that a tribunal should take the partisan nature of Home Office evidence at 
least as seriously as it does that of the claimant. 
    Most of the examples of doubtful preference cited by IAS involve giving preference to 
Home Office country reports. This is done not only against organisations like the Medical 
Foundation or individual witnesses, who the tribunal may think have ―an axe to grind‖ 
(ibid.:54), but even against UNHCR evidence accepted by the tribunal as objective. In the 
2004 country guidance case FD, ―UNHCR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe strongly indicated that minorities, particularly Serbs and Roma, faced what they 
considered a real risk of persecution in Kosovo‖ (ibid.:62). The Home Office country report 
―appeared to indicate some risk, but not a significant risk‖ (ibid.). According to Symes and 
Jorro (2000:728), ―where there is a divergence of specialist opinion as to the objective 
situation in the country from which the asylum claimant is in flight, it is proper to give the 
appellant the benefit of the doubt.‖ This might have been expected in FD since it had 
spoken highly of UNHCR‘s evidence, saying that ―[t]he UNHCR Paper is derived from its 
sources in the field and they must be well placed to provide sound information; it would 
then have been through a process of consideration through the UNHCR hierarchy, so it 
should be regarded as a responsible, well researched and considered analysis‖ (cited Carver 
2005:64, n. 150). The Parliamentary Assembly report had undergone a similar process. Its 
evidence was based on a fact-finding mission, evidence from NGOs and other sources, 
including the authorities in Kosovo (ibid.:64). Moreover, its report was recent (two months 
old at the date of the hearing) and the UNHCR evidence reflected events up to 2004. The 
Home Office report, on the other hand, ―selectively quoted UN material over two years 
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old‖, (ibid.:63). Nevertheless the tribunal preferred the Home Office report but did not 
explain why. It noted that UNHCR made ―a clear recommendation about return whereas the 
[Home Office report] contains no such conclusion; as is normal with such reports, it leaves 
the question of safety on return to those who have to make the decisions‖ (cited ibid.: 64-
65). The tribunal then made its decision: it was safe to return FD to Kosovo. Carver 
comments: 
 
It might be the case that the Tribunal‘s conclusions could be justified. As with many 
other Country Guideline findings, however, the failure to analyse and engage with 
the evidence in a critical manner leaves the reader confident neither that the 
conclusions reached are justified nor [that they are] justifiable‖ (ibid.:49). 
 
In 2007 Home Secretary Jacqui Smith described how the AIT not only gives ―independent 
consideration of appeals against [Home Office] decisions‖ but also ―plays a role in shaping 
country specific asylum policy‖13 through its country-guidance determinations. However, 
we have seen that trust in this process is marred by Home Office bad practice at earlier 
stages, which feeds into tribunal proceedings, by lack of openness about the way the AIT 
designates country-guidance cases and by weaknesses in the way tribunals reach their 
decisions. These factors raise questions about the reliability and fairness of the appeals 
process. The experience of two participants in this study exemplify some of the problems. 
 
7.4   OH13 and FS3: two experiences of appeal 
7.4.1   The case of OH13 
OH13 arrived from Eritrea with his wife and five children in 2004 and was refused asylum 
and humanitarian protection in 2005. At his AIT appeal, the judge accepted major aspects 
of his account that had been denied by the Home Office: 
 
 She accepted that he had been a long-standing member of the ELF-CC party in 
Eritrea because he had ―demonstrated adequate knowledge of the party at interview 
and at the hearing‖,14 and she thus rejected the Home Office‘s view that ―[i]n light 
                                                 
13
 Letter from home secretary Jacqui Smith to Alan Johnson MP, 7 November 2007. 
 
14
 Determination and Reasons in OH13‘s AIT hearing, 2005, para. 13. 
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of your demonstrated lack of knowledge of this [party], your account of your 
political activities for the ELF is not accepted as being true.‖15 
 She accepted that OH13‘s café had been closed down for six months in 1997 
―because of official suspicion about his political views.‖ 16 
 she found his account of how the authorities might have suspected him of illegal 
political activities ―persuasive‖.17 
 
She did not, however, accept that he had been detained and tortured in 2004, or that he had 
been released by way of a bribe. She did not explain why, except that his account was ―so 
vague that I have no doubt that it did not occur‖18 and that his wife, who might have 
corroborated his evidence, was never called as a witness. Judge Henderson did not believe 
that his home had been raided by the police and his papers stolen,
19
 or his account of how 
he had obtained the party membership documents he had presented as evidence.
20
 Once 
more his wife had not been called to corroborate his account. Moreover, as far as the 
documents were concerned, the judge believed that they had been ―created since the 
appellant‘s departure from Eritrea in order to support his claim for asylum.‖21 But she 
added: 
 
I consider that they might well reflect what I have already found to be a truthful part 
of his claim, namely, that he has some long-standing involvement with the ELF. To 
that extent the documents are not particularly damaging to his case.
22
 
 
She nevertheless dismissed the appeal both on asylum and human rights grounds. She did 
so, however, not simply because of her particular doubts about his story but because she 
chose to rely on a 2004 country-guidance case, a case which included outdated information 
and poorly sourced or unsourced material. On the question whether members of opposition 
                                                 
15
 OH13‘s ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, 2005, para. 16. 
16
 Determination and Reasons in OH13‘s AIT hearing, 2005, para. 14. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid., para. 15. 
19
 Ibid., para. 18. 
20
 Ibid., para. 17. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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groups were in danger simply because they were opponents of the regime, the judge 
acknowledged that 
 
Eritrea has been an authoritarian one party state since independence in 1993 and … 
there is evidence that opponents, even low level opponents, are sometimes detained 
without legal safeguards and are sometimes at risk of being seriously ill-treated.
23
 
 
She nevertheless agreed with the conclusions of the 2004 country-guidance case AN (ELF-
RC – low level members – risk) Eritrea, taking the view that ―the available background 
evidence does not establish that there is a real risk to members of the political opposition 
per se.‖24 But was it safe to draw this conclusion from the determination in AN? AN seems 
at first sight an appropriate case for providing relevant and up-to-date information for 
OH13‘s 2004 appeal. Indeed, the AN tribunal had cited the latest Home Office country 
report of 2004 in its determination. However, that country report had itself selectively lifted 
earlier material, almost word for word, from a 2002 Amnesty International report without 
acknowledging that source.
25
 We get here a flavour of the Home Office‘s cut-and-paste 
approach to information-gathering and its careless attitude to sourcing discussed earlier 
(6.5.3). The material in this plagiarised passage was mostly historical description and, 
standing alone, would not in itself be detrimental to OH13‘s case. But it was put into a 
section of the country report whose aim was to show that ―low-level‖ members of 
opposition groups were not at risk in 2004 and it was not capable of doing this.  Moreover, 
even older evidence turned up in OH 13‘s case: when the judge assessed the Home Office‘s 
conclusion accepted in AN, she said:  
 
I consider that the background evidence does establish that an individual‘s 
susceptibility to official ill-treatment is generally dependent upon the authorities‘ 
perception of that individual‘s profile within the opposition.26 
 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., para. 19. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Paras 6.87 and 6.88 of the country report are almost entirely lifted from Eritrea: arbitrary detention of 
government critics and journalists (2002), Amnesty International, London, p. 3. 
26
 Determination and Reasons in OH13‘s AIT hearing, 2005, para. 19. 
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But this seems to be adapted from another quotation based on outdated material. The 
country report, cited by the AN tribunal, had put it like this: 
 
… the government‘s reaction to returning members of ELF or ELF-RC will depend 
on the position held in the organisations and the type of activity undertaken.
27
  
 
Similar words are found in OH13‘s refusal letter, but they are attributed not to the country 
report but to a statement by the British embassy in Eritrea. The embassy had declared that 
 
the Government‘s reaction to the return of the individual would depend on the 
position he had held in the organisation and on the type of activity he was thought 
to have carried out.
28
 
 
But, as the refusal letter showed, this embassy statement was made on 3 March 2000, and 
by 2004 this was very outdated information indeed. 
    To sum up, a different verdict was possible in OH13‘s case: the judge showed 
ambivalence about some aspects of OH13‘s story – for example she did not believe that he 
had been detained and tortured, but she thought that there was ―nothing inherently 
implausible about the appellant‘s account;‖29 she did not believe that his ELF membership 
documents were genuine, but she did believe he was a member of the ELF and ―the 
documents are not particularly damaging to his case.‖30 In the event, relying on a country-
guidance case which, we have seen, turns out to contain outdated, poorly sourced and 
plagiarised material, she dismissed the appeal. 
 
7.4.2 The case of FS3 
We examined the case of FS3 in chapter 6 (6.6) and identified a number of problems with 
his asylum interview and his refusal letter. FS3 appealed against his refusal to the AIT. 
    At the hearing the adjudicator outlined the reasons for refusal and accepted some of 
FS3‘s account. He believed that FS3 was a member of the Hezb-e-Mellat party. He 
believed that ―it may have been his support for this party that caused him to leave Iran with 
                                                 
27
 Paragraph 6.90 of the country report, cited in Determination and Reasons in the case of AN, para.10. 
28
 OH13‘s ―Reasons for Refusal‖ letter, 2005, para. 12. 
29
 Determination and Reasons in OH13‘s AIT hearing, 2005, para. 15. 
30
 Ibid., para. 17. 
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his wife‖31 However, like the Home Office, he did not believe that FS3 had been involved 
in any demonstrations but did not give any convincing reasons for his disbelief (―he was 
running a successful company, he was 32 years of age, he had attended university, was 
married‖32). Like the Home Office, he did not believe he had been detained and tortured but 
he gave no reason. The adjudicator did not deal with any of the problems identified in 
chapter 6 concerning his refusal letter (the ignoring of FS3‘s explanations, the misquoting 
of his words, the reliance on the Iranian government‘s word, the denial that FS3‘s political 
party existed, the mis-citing of questions and answers from the asylum interview (6.6)). He 
dismissed the asylum appeal. 
    He did, however, allow the human rights appeal. FS3 had not ―established a well-
founded fear of persecution both in respect of his time in Iran and if he returned‖33 but 
 
[w]ith regard to the human rights appeal, the Appellant would in my view come to 
the authorities‘ attention on his return as a member of [Hezb-e-Mellat]. It may well 
be that the reason he left Iran was because of the detention of one or more of his 
colleagues. The objective evidence is quite clear that the Iranian authorities do not 
tolerate political dissent and even as a low-level activist, I consider that the 
Appellant would fall into this category … [T]here is reliable evidence that he would 
be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment if returned to Iran. 
 
To an untrained eye, this is a hair-splitting exercise, but it nevertheless gave FS3 
humanitarian protection. It must be a concern, however, that if the tribunal had identified 
and dealt with the issue of bad practice in FS3‘s case, he might have been granted asylum 
and refugee status. This raises the question of whether tribunals can be relied upon to give 
effective redress for earlier Home Office bad practice. 
 
Conclusion 
We are left with a number of concerns at the end of this chapter. I have argued that the 
government has sought to reduce asylum seekers‘ rights of appeal by focusing on claims of 
abuse of the system rather than on protection for vulnerable people fleeing persecution and 
                                                 
31
 Determination and Reasons in FS3‘s case, para. 19. 
32
 Ibid., para. 21. 
33
 Ibid., para. 23. 
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that the introduction of such restrictions has more to do with controlling immigration and 
deterrence than the government‘s obligations under the Refugee Convention. The abolition 
of the second tier of appeal, the setting of unrealistic time limits, the introduction of a 
merits test and the use of fast-track processes and detention were all aimed at reducing 
access to the higher courts, and this in the context of poor decision-making at earlier stages 
in the process. I have shown the unsatisfactory nature of the use of country-guidance cases, 
in terms of the way they are established, analysed and referenced and in the AIT‘s 
treatment of sources. 
    Despite these concerns, however, for most people this is their last chance to be heard. All 
that remains is either voluntary departure or detention and enforced deportation. 
   
  
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: DETENTION AND DEPORTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1   Introduction 
Once you reach the end of the asylum process and receive a final refusal, you will be 
required to leave the country. This may entail what the government calls ―enforced 
removal‖, or you may ―volunteer‖ to leave under your own steam or under the 
government‘s voluntary returns programme. Enforced removal may include detention prior 
to removal and by definition will include deportation against your will to your country of 
origin. In this chapter, I chart the increasing use of detention over the past decade, 
identifying as reasons the development of fast-track processes and the setting of targets for 
removal rates. I describe the difficulties in getting bail and legal representation at this stage 
and show that victims of torture and people with medical, including mental health, 
problems are regularly detained, as well as families with children. I examine the role of the 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to the detention of asylum seekers and 
consider the experience of detention from asylum seekers‘ viewpoints. I then examine the 
process of forcible detention and deportation and the use of section 9 of the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and of section 4 of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999. 
 
8.2   Targets for removal 
Many asylum seekers fleeing persecution have spent periods of imprisonment in their own 
countries and have fled in order to avoid further detention or imprisonment. When 
considering the treatment of asylum seekers, the Joint Committee on Human Rights stated 
that Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ―guarantees the right 
to liberty and sets out the exceptions when detention can be lawful‖ and that ―[t]he 
exceptions to liberty must be narrowly interpreted‖ (Treatment 2007:70). The committee 
cited the Home Office‘s Operational Enforcement Manual to much the same effect 
(ibid.:71): 
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… there is a presumption in favour of temporary admission or temporary release. 
Detention should be used only as a matter of last resort … Once detention has been 
authorised, it must be kept under close review to ensure that it continues to be 
justified. 
 
Another Home Office manual, Enforcement Instructions and Guidance, is in tune with this 
approach: ―detention must be used sparingly and for the shortest period necessary‖ 
(Enforcement 2007, para. 55.1.2). 
    Yet the use of detention has increased: in mid 1997 there were about 200 places in UK 
detention centres; ten years later there were 2,545 places (Treatment 2007:69). Two policy 
developments largely account for this rise: fast-track procedures and the stated aim of 
increasing the removal rates of refused asylum seekers. Indeed, the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ―formally changed the name of detention centres to 
removal centres to reflect the increased use of detention in the removal of asylum seekers 
from the UK‖ (ibid.:69). The Enforcement Instructions and Guidance manual recalls that in 
1998 the government‘s White Paper had made clear that ―wherever possible, we would use 
alternatives to detention‖ (Enforcement 2007, para. 55.1). But after March 2000 asylum 
seekers could ―be detained at Oakington Removal Centre [when] it appears that their claim 
is straightforward and capable of being decided quickly‖ (ibid.). When the detained-fast-
track process opened at Harmondsworth Removal Centre in 2003, the so-called ―Oakington 
criteria‖ were ―widened so as to be capable of applying to a fast track process at any 
removal centre‖ (ibid.). This was the first of two Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) to 
adopt the ―super fast track‖ process (the second being Yarl‘s Wood from 2005) in which 
―the asylum applicant is interviewed on day two, served with a decision on day three, has 
two days to lodge any appeals, and the appeal hearing is on day nine‖ (Treatment 2007:72). 
    In 2004 another measure was introduced to increase removals: section 9 of the Asylum 
and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act made provision for the withdrawal of 
support from refused asylum-seeking families with children if they did not agree to return 
to their countries of origin, either by arranging their own departure or signing up to the 
voluntary returns programme run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1
 
                                                 
1
 Founded in 1951 to help with the resettlement of refugees after the Second World War, IOM now works 
with governments and civil society partners on migration issues. In terms of refugees, it undertakes 
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If after support was withdrawn they still did not ―volunteer‖, their children could be taken 
into care. The government pursued this policy against concerted opposition from NGOs and 
voluntary agencies. Then in 2004 prime minister Tony Blair announced a government 
target for removals, declaring that ―we want the monthly rate of removals to exceed the 
number of unfounded applications‖ (Blair 2004). This eventually became the aim that the 
number of refused asylum seekers removed each month should exceed the number of 
arrivals predicted to be refused that month (Target 2007). 
 
8.3   Bail and legal representation 
Asylum seekers may be able to secure their release from detention by applying for bail 
either to 
 
the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) or the immigration authorities, 
including in some cases the police. Bail is not often granted by the immigration 
authorities, partly because they require substantial amounts from sureties (£2,000-
£5,000), which in most cases an asylum seeker is unlikely to be able to provide. 
This has led to more detainees requesting bail from the AIT instead (Fit? 2008:58). 
 
Under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, there was an apparent intention to provide an 
automatic right to bail hearings. Such a right had not existed before, since ―t]he decision to 
detain is taken by the executive alone‖,  with ―no automatic judicial oversight of whether 
the individual concerned should indeed be detained in the first place‖ (Seeking 2005:55). 
But Home Secretary Jack Straw (Commons Hansard 1999, col. 39) committed the 
government to 
 
a more extensive judicial element in the detention process. That will be achieved by 
introducing routine bail hearings for those detained under immigration legislation. 
 
According to the Act, the Secretary of State had a statutory duty to arrange such a hearing, 
your case being heard either by a magistrates‘ court, the Special Immigration Appeals 
                                                                                                                                                    
―programmes which facilitate the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees, displaced persons, migrants 
and other individuals‖ (IOM Mission Statement: http://www.iom.int – accessed 18 February 2009). Its 
membership includes 125 member states. 
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Commission, the Court of Appeal or, in Scotland, an adjudicator (IAA 1999, s. 44). 
However, as Amnesty International points out, these provisions ―were never implemented 
and were, in fact, repealed under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002‖ 
(Seeking 2005:8). 
    Nevertheless, though there is no automatic right to bail hearings, asylum seekers in 
detention can, after seven days, apply for bail to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
(AIT). However, the Joint Committee was concerned by ―considerable evidence that … in 
reality many detainees are unaware [of], or unable to exercise, this right because of 
language difficulties, a lack of legal representation and mental health issues‖ (Treatment 
2007:84). Legal representation is important here and may well lead to the solution of the 
other difficulties. Yet Anne Owers, the chief inspector of prisons, told the committee 
(ibid.:85) that 
 
as a general rule, it remains extremely difficult for detainees to find a competent and 
available legal representative; there is a national shortage of competent specialist 
legal advisers, and this is compounded by detainees‘ moves away from a home area 
where they may have had contact with a solicitor. 
 
She said that ―less than half of the detainees we have surveyed have had a legal visit in 
detention‖ (ibid.). Chapter 6 showed how changes to legal aid have reduced the chances of 
legal representation to asylum seekers in general (6.4.1). The evidence is that the problem 
becomes worse if you are detained and, in her July 2004 report on the Dover removal 
centre, the chief inspector found that ―access to competent and independent legal advice is 
becoming more, not less, difficult as fewer private practitioners offer legally aided advice 
and representation‖ (cited Fit? 2008:59). Her report on Dover between 18 and 21 July 2005 
(Dover IRC 2005, para. 2.8) found that a previous recommendation that ―arrangements 
should be made to allow all detainees to have on-site access to competent independent legal 
advisers‖ was ―not achieved‖. She described a situation which shows inadequate action by 
the authorities at Dover and unnecessary distress caused to detainees (ibid.): 
 
The centre provided useful lists of immigration practitioners, but we met many 
detainees who had no legal representative. Some had used all their £5 weekly 
allowance on telephone calls without finding a legal aid practitioner prepared to 
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advise them. A local office of the Refugee Legal Centre was able to take on only 
some of the cases. Some detainees had had a legal representative in the past who 
had declined to continue with the case because Dover was too far away, or because 
the detainee could not pay them. 
 
There is evidence that some solicitors do not take on detention cases because they ―feel that 
they cannot sufficiently prepare a case within the restricted timeframe set out by the Legal 
Services Commission and there is often an assumption that the case will most likely fail‖ 
(ICAR Briefing 2007:9). This assumption also seems to be made when it comes to bail 
applications: Bail for Immigration Detainees (BID) cited a detainee on their files who 
reported (Oakley & Crew 2006:33): 
 
My solicitor didn‘t care that much. I asked him why I should be in the fast track 
because it meant that I couldn‘t access my documents or have my cell phone to 
contact anybody … I asked [him] about bail so I could print off documents from the 
internet and [he] didn‘t want to do it because he just said, ―They will not allow 
you‖. 
 
The Joint Committee noted that ―[b]ail hearings, when they occur, are usually 
unsuccessful‖ (Treatment 2007:84). There are sometimes problems with the quality of the 
applications for bail presented to the AIT and poor representation on both sides. AIT 
president Mr Justice Hodge noted that ―bail summaries vary in competence and quality‖ 
and ―something like 30% of bail applications are withdrawn, probably because the 
information is not full enough‖ (ibid.:85). He said that Home Office Presenting Officers 
(HOPOs) ―before our tribunals are often not as well briefed as we would like them to be‖ 
(ibid.). Indeed, the Committee found that there were ―cases where no Home Office 
representative turned up at all and therefore the immigration and asylum judge was not 
helped by anyone from the Home Office‖, and ―cases where the representation simply was 
not good enough to enable the judge to make an informed decision‖ (ibid.). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Home Office figures for Yarl‘s Wood bail hearings (ibid.:84) show that 
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between January 2005 and January 2007 there was a total of 149 applications for 
bail. Of these … 76 were refused and 54 were withdrawn. Only 19 applications 
were granted. 
 
8.4   To be detained only in “very exceptional circumstances” 
The Home Office‘s Operational Enforcement Manual identifies categories of people who 
are ―normally considered suitable for detention in only very exceptional circumstances‖ 
(cited ibid.:74). Included in this category are the following (ibid.):  
 
unaccompanied children, the elderly, pregnant women (unless there is the clear 
prospect of early removal), those suffering from serious medical conditions or the 
mentally ill, those where there is independent evidence that they have been tortured 
and people with serious disabilities. 
 
However, there is evidence that such people are regularly detained, often with serious 
consequences to their health and well-being. According to evidence given to the Joint 
Committee, ―despite the existence of guidance to the contrary, some vulnerable people are 
detained and … consideration of their vulnerability does not form part of the decision 
making process‖ (ibid.:75). According to BID‘s evidence to the committee, ―vulnerable 
people are detained, often without access to appropriate or adequate medical help‖ (ibid.). 
They included ―people with evidence of torture, rape victims, pregnant women and people 
with severe mental and physical health problems‖ (ibid.). 
 
8.4.1   Victims of torture 
Victims of torture are a particularly vulnerable group. Yet according to the London 
Detainee Support Group (LDSG),
2
 ―[t]he detention of torture victims remains routine, in 
contravention of Home Office policy that it will not normally be appropriate‖ (LDSG 
Memorandum 2007, para. 10). A report in July 2007 by the NGO Medical Justice
3
 (Beyond 
                                                 
2
 LDSG aims to improve the welfare of immigration detainees, primarily those held at Harmondsworth and 
Colnbrook Immigration Removal Centres near Heathrow airport in London. It publishes reports and makes 
recommendations on policy and its volunteers regularly visit detainees. 
3
 Medical Justice facilitates the provision of independent medical advice, as well as legal advice and 
representation, to asylum seekers detained in immigration removal centres. It publishes reports on the 
treatment of detainees. 
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2007:12) found that 20 out of 56 detainees in four IRCs, examined by Medical Justice 
experts on torture and scarring, 
 
gave a history of torture and had physical signs ―consistent with‖, ―highly consistent 
with‖ or ―typical of‖ torture (using the definitions established by the Istanbul 
Protocol on the Reporting of Torture). In no case had the Home Office investigated 
the allegations of torture or offered medical assistance, even when it had been 
appropriately reported to Home Office officials and doctors. 
 
The 20 people had been kept in detention either despite evidence of torture or without the 
prescribed medical examination, laid down in the Detention Centre Rules 2001,
4
 which 
could have discovered such evidence. Indeed, Medical Justice believes the failures by the 
Home Office in these cases ―were in breach of the statutory duties imposed by the 
Detention Centre Rules, in particular rules 33, 34, and 35‖ on healthcare (ibid.). Medical 
Justice cites Mr Justice Davis in the 2006 case D & K, where he deplored ―the cross-the-
board failure to give effect to the requirements of Rule 34 [on the mandatory medical 
examination within 24 hours of entry]‖ (cited ibid.). The Home Office regarded compliance 
―as ‗neither necessary nor appropriate‘. I repeat what I have said earlier: that is not 
acceptable‖ (cited ibid.). 
    In January 2007 Home Office minister Baroness Scotland sought to reassure parliament 
that the government was complying with the Rules. As part of her answer to a question 
from Lord Hylton (Lords Hansard 2007, col. WA25), she said that the system for reporting 
allegations of torture was 
 
laid down in the Detention Centre Rules 2001. An allegation of torture is reported to 
the case holder in the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, and they investigate 
using the detainee‘s medical records. Where it is judged appropriate the detainee‘s 
case is referred to the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. 
 
                                                 
4
 Detention Centre Rules 2001, Rule 34 (1): ―Every detained person shall be given a physical and mental 
examination by the medical practitioner … within 24 hours of his admission to the detention centre.‖ The 
Rules are found in Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 238, available at http://www.parliament.uk 
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Apart from the fact that IRC medical practitioners are required not simply to report an 
allegation of torture but also their own concerns that torture may have taken place,
5
 the 
Medical Foundation‘s refugee policy officer, David Rhys Jones, told the New Statesman 
(O‘Keeffe 2007:25) in the wake of the Medical Justice report: 
 
Immigration officers have never made referrals of torture victims to the Medical 
Foundation, and no formal mechanism exists for them to do so. Baroness Scotland 
subsequently claimed that health care staff at one detention centre had made several 
such referrals. We are satisfied that in each case the prime referrer was in fact the 
Immigration Advisory Service [NGO] at the centre. 
 
Moreover, Lord Hylton‘s original question was about numbers: ―How many persons who 
were raped or tortured abroad have been held at … removal centres since April 2005; and 
for what purpose?‖ (Lords Hansard 2007, col. WA25). Baroness Scotland refused to 
provide the figures because it was too expensive to do so: ―While there are allegations of 
torture abroad made in centres,‖ she answered, ―these allegations are not centrally recorded 
and could be collated only at a disproportionate cost‖ (ibid.). Yet the Detention Centre 
Rules give such allegations considerable importance: the medical practitioner must report 
to the manager in the case of 
 
 anyone whose health is likely to be ―injuriously affected‖ by detention (Rule 35 (1)) 
 anyone suspected of having suicidal tendencies (Rule 35 (2)) 
 anyone who may have been the victim of torture (Rule 35 (3)). 
 
In such cases, the manager ―shall send a copy of any report … to the Secretary of State 
without delay‖ (Rule 35 (4)). The vulnerability of all these categories of people is 
presumably the reason for such a sense of urgency in the Rules and the reason why such 
categories are precluded from detention, barring ―very exceptional circumstances‖. It is 
surprising, therefore, that basic statistics about them are not centrally recorded and 
unacceptable that government ministers can avoid questions about them on that basis. 
                                                 
5
 Detention Centre Rules 2001, Rule 35 (3): ―The medical practitioner shall report to the manager on the case 
of any detained person who he is concerned may have been the victim of torture.‖ 
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    Further evidence of Home Office failures and breach of the regulations is found in a 
report by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF).
6
 Seven out of 13 detainees, referred to the 
organisation by BID, told the MSF doctor that they had experienced severe ill-treatment in 
their countries of origin. MSF then found (MSF 2005:39) that 
[d]espite documentation of these experiences in four of the detainees‘ medical notes 
there was no evidence that the detention health care team had followed through 
with, for example, referrals to the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of 
Torture, nor offered follow up with any form of care and support. From the medical 
notes, it was unclear as to whether health care staff had notified the appropriate 
management in three of these cases, as required in the detention centre rules ... 
    The detention of torture victims and the failure to comply with regulations concerning 
their health and welfare has a devastating impact on many asylum seekers: 
 
 Toure Abu was assessed by the Medical Foundation as a torture victim, but only 
after he had already spent two months in Colnbrook IRC. He was a member of the 
RDR party in Côte d‘Ivoire, opposed to the military dictatorship. Arrested and 
accused of hoarding weapons for the RDR, he suffered interrogation, beatings and 
torture. He applied for asylum in the UK in 2004 and was refused. ―In the detention 
centre‖, he remembers, ―the guards would come early in the morning [and] brutalise 
you psychologically … I was told I was being deported to the Côte d‘Ivoire; in that 
environment you can imagine the stress and depression‖ (Falsely Accused 2007:2). 
Toure witnessed the attempted suicide of another detainee and eventually suffered a 
psychological breakdown. He was released after the Medical Foundation 
assessment, but only on condition that he wore a leg tag. The Medical Foundation 
reported that, ―in spite of government policy … that torture survivors are exempt 
from tagging owing to its ‗invasive‘ and potentially psychologically harmful nature, 
it was two months before the tag was removed‖ (ibid.). 
 Forty-five-year-old Sarah7 was a torture victim. She fled from Uganda, having 
suffered beatings, rape and torture, with external and internal injuries that made it 
                                                 
6
 MSF is an international humanitarian aid organisation which provides emergency medical assistance to 
populations in danger in over 70 countries. 
7
 Not her real name. 
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difficult for her to walk. After eight years in the UK awaiting a decision on her 
asylum claim, she was detained at Yarl‘s Wood. She took medication several times 
a day, but was not allowed to keep it with her – it was ―held for ‗safekeeping‘ at the 
medical centre, a long and painful walk from her room‖ (O‘Keeffe 2007:24-25). 
―Immigration think they are God,‖ she told Alice O‘Keeffe. ―They do not believe in 
people. What is a human being to do?‖ (ibid.:25). 
 
8.4.2   Initial medical examination, follow-up and unidentified medical needs 
Although Rule 34 requires a medical examination within 24 hours of arrival at the IRC, 
MSF found that ―initial health assessments of detainees on arrival to [sic] the facility were 
not carried out in all cases  and, even where they were, concerns were not followed up in a 
systematic way‖ (MSF 2005:42). The consequences for detainees may be dire when serious 
medical conditions go undiagnosed. MSF (ibid.:8) found  
 
a variety of medical conditions among 12 of the 13 adult detainees that required 
attention. These included auditory hallucinations, a breast lump, a persistent cough 
possibly indicating TB, the need for an urgent referral back to a genito-urinary 
clinic and the need for a genito-urinary check for sexually transmitted infections 
post-rape. It was apparent from both medical notes and the description given by the 
individual detainees that health care staff were not addressing these conditions or 
appeared unaware of the health need. 
 
There was apparent reluctance in some cases to facilitate referrals to secondary-care 
services or to services not available within the IRC. There were examples of detainees not 
getting appropriate referrals to ―a psychiatrist; a genito-urinary clinic; a tuberculosis clinic; 
and HIV services‖ (ibid.:43). MSF considered that the apparent ―reluctance of health care 
staff to facilitate these referrals … may reflect the perception of staff that the removal of 
detainees from the UK is inevitable and imminent‖ (ibid.): 
 
Yet we noted that of the detainees we visited, some were still within the asylum 
process, possibly going on to appeal a negative decision. This can be a lengthy 
process, after which they may well receive leave to remain in the UK. 
 
CHAPTER 8: SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK – DETENTION AND DEPORTATION 200 
Moreover, four detainees had been detained for more than one year. 
 
8.4.3   Mental health 
MSF had concerns about the mental health of all the adult detainees examined. There were 
―features of depressive illness‖ in 11 of the 13 and ―features of post-traumatic stress‖ in 
nine (MSF 2005:38). There were examples of self-harm and suicide attempts, one of the 
latter almost successful. There was ―considerable illness … associated with stress and 
anxiety including headaches and gastro-intestinal problems‖ (ibid.). ―Seven reported to the 
MSF doctor that they had experienced ill-treatment prior to coming to the UK: such 
traumatic experiences are among those likely to be reactivated by the trauma of detention‖ 
(ibid.:41). The Royal Society of Psychiatrists gave evidence to the Joint Committee about 
Campsfield House IRC (Treatment 2007:88): 
 
There were no regular visits to the centre by qualified mental health staff, no 
equivalent to community mental healthcare, no daycare and no outpatient care. The 
Society expressed concern about the lack of specialised provision for torture victims 
and the absence of protocols for the identification, assessment and treatment of 
substance misusers. 
 
According to the Detention Centre Rules, IRC medical practitioners are required to ―pay 
special attention to any detained person whose mental condition appears to require it, and 
make any special arrangements (including counselling arrangements) which appear 
necessary for his supervision or care.‖8 Yet MSF reported (MSF 2005:43): 
 
Most facilities had no such services available, and even in the very serious cases we 
documented there had been no attempt to refer to outside specialist help nor any 
indication that medical staff had registered their concern over the impact of 
continuing detention on the detainee‘s mental state. 
 
MSF noted that there was ―deterioration of the health status, in particular mental health, of 
detainees during detention‖ (ibid.:42). The experience of an asylum seeker in Colnbrook 
                                                 
8
 Detention Centre Rules 2001, Rule 35 (3). 
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IRC, reported by the BBC (Life Inside 2005), illustrates the point. In a telephone interview 
from a corridor at the centre, Forard
9
 claimed: ―There are people here who are mad; they 
were normal people when they came in but now it‘s like their brains have been disturbed. 
They walk in circles all day …‖ A loud scream in the corridor interrupted the interview, 
followed a few moments later by the heavy slamming of a door. ―This is the frustration that 
I have been talking about,‖ said Forard. ―Sometimes [this man] talks, sometimes he will go 
and just scream like this, sometimes he will go and slash his hands – he has scars all over 
his hands.‖ 
    John Oguchukwu, a 27-year-old Nigerian priest, had twice attempted suicide in 
Harmondsworth IRC before he was moved to Dungavel (Mackay 2004:1). After eight 
months there, and following the suicide of another detainee, he became suicidal again. He 
was not put on suicide watch but transferred to Greenock Prison, amid conflicting 
arguments about the reason for the transfer: was it because he was suicidal (the Home 
Office denies this), because he had been violent (he denies this) or because he had informed 
refugee support groups of the suicide of the other detainee? What is clear is that, despite his 
record of suicide attempts, he was not given the care and attention mandatory under Rule 
35 and he was not put on suicide watch, either in Dungavel or in Greenock. Oguchukwu 
told the Sunday Herald (ibid.:2): 
 At the time I was just so down that I actually was passing out. I was feeling very 
low. I was clinically depressed. At one point I didn‘t eat for two weeks. I was 
moved to Greenock three weeks ago … I didn‘t commit any crime. Why am I in this 
place? Everyone here is a criminal. I am not. I feel very depressed again. This move 
has taken me from bad to worse. 
8.4.4   The detention of families and children 
In 1998 government policy was that the detention of families and children ―should be 
planned to be effected as close to removal as possible so as to ensure that families are not 
normally detained for more than a few days‖ (Fairer 1998, para. 12.5). By 2001, however, 
the policy had changed. The government explained the new arrangements in its 2001 White 
Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven: families could ―where necessary, now be detained at 
other times and for longer periods than just immediately prior to removal‖ (Secure 2001, 
                                                 
9
 Not his real name. 
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para. 4.77). Such detention ―could be whilst their identities and basis of claim are 
established, or because there is a reasonable belief that they would abscond‖ (ibid.). These 
stated reasons for detention gave the Home Office wide scope to detain, especially since 
establishing the ―basis of claim‖ is the very purpose of the asylum process. 
    There are good reasons for preferring the earlier policy, particularly where children are 
involved: in the words of a Save the Children report, detention is ―no place for a child‖ 
(Crawley and Lester 2005). In a 2003 report the chief inspector of prisons spelt out her 
view of why the detention of children should be ―an exceptional measure‖ (Dungavel 
2003): 
 
The key principle here is not the precise number of days [in detention] … It is that 
the welfare and development of children is likely to be compromised by detention, 
however humane the provisions, and that this will increase the longer detention is 
maintained. 
 
A Commission for Social Care Inspection report in 2005 by the joint chief inspectors
10
 also 
expressed concern about ―the adverse effect of detention on the welfare and development of 
children‖ (Safeguarding 2005, para. 7.33): 
 
The process of removal from familiar surroundings, which often occurs with no 
notice, can have a traumatic effect on children who are removed from their peer 
groups and schools. There are examples of the removal of pupils who had spent up 
to four years in school and were shortly to complete GCSEs … Educational 
provision in all immigration removal centres [is considered] deficient for all but the 
youngest children. 
 
The joint chief inspectors were even more concerned about 
 
                                                 
10
 The joint chief inspectors were David Behan CBE, Chief Inspector, Commission for Social Care 
Inspection; David Bell, Her Majesty‘s Chief Inspector of Schools; Eddie Bloomfield, Her Majesty‘s Chief 
Inspector of Court Administration; Andrew Bridges, Her Majesty‘s Chief Inspector of Probation; Sir Ronnie 
Flanagan GBE MA, Her Majesty‘s Chief Inspector of Constabulary; Stephen J Wooler CB, Her Majesty‘s 
Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service; Anne Owers CBE, Her Majesty‘s Chief Inspector of 
Prisons; and Anna Walker CB, Chief Executive, Healthcare Commission. 
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the effect of detention itself on a child, which is likely to compromise children‘s 
ability to thrive. Children may have had traumatic experiences in their home 
country before coming to the UK. Inspectors found evidence that the additional 
effects of restrictions on children‘s movements and activities and of witnessing their 
parents‘ powerlessness had led, in some cases, to eating and sleeping problems and 
depression (ibid., para. 7.34). 
 
The deterioration in health of adult detainees while in detention, noted above (8.4.3), also 
applies to children. The two-year-old girl examined by MSF (MSF 2005) 
 
showed regressive behaviour and some apparent weight loss on assessment. The 
[girl of 12 and the boy of 10] had experienced deterioration of their health since 
being detained … Prior to detention the parents of these children reported stability 
in their home and school situations. 
 
Even if they are not detained themselves, children are affected ―by the detention of one of 
their parents, in cases where a family is split up‖ (Fit? 2008:61). Moreover, ―[v]isiting 
detained family members is made even more difficult by the fact that a higher proportion of 
dispersal operates in the north of the UK and the majority of IRCs are located in the south‖ 
(ibid.). 
 
8.4.5   Counting heads 
Crawley and Lester found that it was ―virtually impossible to assess the extent to which 
children are detained in the UK or the average lengths of time spent in detention‖ (2005:7). 
When Lord Roberts asked Baroness Scotland in the House of Lords, ―How many children 
were detained in immigration removal centres in each month of 2006?‖ she replied, as she 
did to the question on victims of rape and torture (8.4.1), that it was too expensive to 
provide the figures: ―The exact information requested is not available; it would be available 
only by examination of individual case files, at disproportionate cost.‖11 Crawley and 
Lester note (ibid.) that the government‘s published statistics 
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 Lords Hansard, 8 January 2007, col. WA22. 
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do not include information on the total number of children detained over a period of 
time, the age of these children, at what stage of the family‘s case they were 
detained, nor the outcome of the detention, including whether or not these children 
are subsequently removed from the UK. Neither do they show the length of time for 
which the children are detained. 
 
Baroness Scotland did point out that ―snapshots are published showing the number of 
people detained under Immigration Act powers on the last Saturday of each quarter.‖12 On 
the basis of these ―snapshots‖, ministers have insisted that numbers of detained children are 
low: in the House of Lords in 2004 Lord Bassam, minister of state at the Home Office, 
regretted that 
 
the misconception that there are large numbers of families detained for lengthy 
periods continues to prevail in some quarters. At any one time there are very few 
families in detention – something we have been saying for some time, but it is a 
message we must repeat (cited Crawley & Lester 2005:12, n. 25). 
 
However, based on figures given by Lord Bassam himself that, during March and April 
2004, 323 children were taken into detention, Crawley and Lester calculated that if ―the 
number of children detained over this two-month period were to be replicated across a 12-
month period … around 2,000 children [would be] detained with their families every year 
for the purpose of immigration control‖ (ibid.:7). A finding by the Joint Committee 
supports this figure: ―In 2005, 1,860 children were detained under immigration powers (not 
including those whose age is disputed), the majority of whom (85%) were asylum 
detainees‖ (Treatment 2007: 76). 
 
8.4.6   “Invisible” children 
In light of its detrimental effects on children, their detention ―only in very exceptional 
circumstances‖ might seem an essential caveat. There is strong evidence, however, that 
their needs are ignored and that, indeed, they become ―invisible‖ during the asylum 
process. The notion of the invisibility of children was raised by the chief inspector of 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
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prisons. Speaking of the initial decision to detain a child, she told the Joint Committee 
(Minutes 2007, Question 151) that 
 
we do not routinely find any evidence that the interests of the child are considered at 
all in making that initial detention decision. In our view the child becomes invisible 
at this point and there is no consideration of whether the welfare of a child in a 
family will be adversely affected by the process of detention. 
 
Once children are detained, she recommended reviews by an independent body which 
would be fed into further decisions on continued detention. This was because ―detention 
should be a measure of last resort, should be exceptional, and in the way that these 
decisions are made and continued there is not sufficient evidence that those considerations 
have played a proper part‖ (ibid.). 
    On the question of welfare assessments of children once they have been detained, the 
Joint Committee found that it was ―not clear that the evidence presented in [welfare reports] 
about the welfare of a child was ever considered by the Immigration Service or an 
immigration judge‖ (Treatment 2007:79). A local authority social worker told the 
Committee that ―he had never been asked to give evidence directly to a judge‖ and Judge 
Nehar Bird told the Committee: ―I have been sitting at Yarl‘s Wood for about a year. I have 
not seen a welfare report from staff at Yarl‘s Wood‖ (Minutes 2007, Question 450). On the 
day that that evidence was given, the hearing was briefly suspended for a House of Lords 
division. When it was reconvened, Mr Justice Hodge told the Committee (ibid., Question 
453): 
 
In the interlude we [Judge Bird and Mr Justice Hodge] have had a discussion. We 
are not familiar with any kind of process which produces a social work report out of 
a removal centre or a detention centre into paperwork for us. It is possible that they 
go into the bail summary in some way or another, but we are not familiar with that 
happening so we do not see them. 
 
The Joint Committee concluded that ―the current process of detention does not consider the 
welfare of the child‖ (Treatment 2007:80): 
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The detention of children for the purpose of immigration control is incompatible 
with children‘s right to liberty and is in breach of the UK‘s international human 
right‘s obligations … We believe that the detention of asylum seeking children 
constitutes a breach of the UK‘s human rights obligations. Asylum seeking children 
should not be detained. 
 
8.4.7   International human rights standards 
The detention of children certainly raises the question of where the UK stands in relation to 
international human rights standards. The Children‘s Commissioner for England had 
―concerns as to whether the detention of children is compatible with international human 
rights instruments (including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC] and the 
UN Rules on Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty [UNJDL]‖) (Treatment 2007:76). He told 
the Joint Committee that ―Home Office policy prior to October 2001 was broadly in line 
with most of these international standards in that it required detention to be effected as 
close to removal as possible‖ but this was no longer the case once it was ―changed so as to 
allow detention of families whose circumstances justified it‖ (ibid.). UNJDL requires that 
juveniles should only be deprived of liberty in exceptional cases, the length of detention 
determined judicially with the possibility of early release and an age limit set below which 
children are not detained. The Commissioner concluded that the government‘s policy of 
―[a]dministrative detention of children for immigration purposes, which is not time-limited, 
sets no minimum age and is not used as a measure of last resort, is therefore in clear breach 
of the UNJDL rules‖ (ibid.). 
 
8.5   European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the rescue? 
Human rights instruments and laws relate not just to children but to all asylum seekers. The 
Joint Committee on Human Rights asked the Home Office to explain why it uses detention 
and when it regards it as appropriate (Treatment 2007:70). The Home Office explained that 
 
… immigration detention is used to prevent unauthorised entry into the UK or when 
action is being taken with a view to removal or deportation from the UK. Detention 
may for example be appropriate in the following circumstances: where a person‘s 
identity and basis of claim are being decided; where there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that a person will fail to comply with the conditions of temporary 
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admission or release; to effect removal; and for applicants whose asylum claim 
appears to be capable of being decided quickly as part of a fast-track process. 
 
Shayan Baram Saadi was detained at Oakington IRC, released, and then refused asylum. 
After two years in the appeals process, he was finally granted asylum. But Saadi continued 
to complain about the detention he had suffered during the application process and took his 
case as far as the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The importance of his 
case is that, because the decision in the European Court on his detention went against him 
by only four votes to three, he appealed to the court‘s Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber 
upheld the judgment, however, and the issues it discussed were relevant to the Home 
Office‘s explanation of detention policy cited above. The arguments used by the court 
suggest that states are allowed wide discretion in the formulation of policy on detention and 
that the ECHR does not give asylum seekers as much protection from wrongful detention 
as might be supposed at first reading. 
    First, the court accepted that Saadi‘s detention ―had to be compatible with the overall 
purpose of ECHR Article 5, to safeguard the right to liberty and ensure that no-one should 
be dispossessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion.‖13 In order ―to avoid being 
branded as arbitrary‖, the court declared, the detention had to satisfy a number of criteria, 
one of which was that ―it had to be closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorised entry …‖14 The court accepted that Saadi had not sought to gain entry 
illegally but, on arrival at Heathrow, had ―immediately claimed asylum‖.15 Saadi 
nevertheless fell foul of the court‘s reading of Article 5. The court ―considered that, until a 
State had ‗authorised‘ entry, it was ‗unauthorised‘ and the detention of a person who 
wished to enter the country concerned and who needed but did not yet have authorisation to 
do so, could be to ‗prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry‘.‖16 Specifically, the court 
denied that if an asylum seeker ―surrendered himself to the immigration authorities [i.e. 
applied for asylum], he was seeking to effect an ‗authorised‘ entry …‖ So it agreed with the 
earlier decisions of ―the [UK] Court of Appeal and the House of Lords … that the detention 
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 Saadi v. UK – appeal judgment (Grand Chamber, 16 May 2007) – press release issued by the Registrar of 
the European Court of Human Rights, p. 3. Available at http://www.statewatch.co.uk and accessed 7/10/2008. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., p.1. 
16
 Ibid., p. 3. 
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[of Saadi] was ‗to prevent unauthorised entry‘‖,17 despite his immediate asylum 
application. The court‘s broad argument on Article 5 was that 
 
while the general rule set out in Article 5 (1) was that everyone had the right to 
liberty, Article 5 (1) (f) provided an exception, permitting States to control the 
liberty of aliens in an immigration context. States were permitted to detain would-be 
immigrants who had applied for permission to enter, whether by way of asylum or 
not.
18
 
 
Thus all asylum seekers might be seen as attempting unauthorised entry and liable to 
detention and, on this reading, Article 5 provides a basis for EU states to place asylum 
policy in the context of immigration control rather than protection. 
    Secondly, the court decided that the fast-track process was appropriate in Saadi‘s case, 
without ever asking why that should be so. The fast-track system may be used because the 
applicant is seen as likely to abscond, but this was not the case with Saadi: the court noted 
that Oakington was ―a new detention facility for asylum seekers considered unlikely to 
abscond‖.19 The fast-track system is most often used for people whose claims can be 
quickly decided because they are ―manifestly unfounded‖. It is not clear how this could be 
true of Saadi, an Iraqi Kurd, a member of the Iraqi Workers‘ Communist Party, who had 
helped others to escape and had now escaped himself. The Iraqi regime was regarded by the 
UK in 2000 as a regime which denied human rights and committed atrocities against its 
own people, especially the Kurds. The court, however, simply relied once more on previous 
decisions by the UK Court of Appeal and the House of Lords that his ―detention was lawful 
in domestic law‖.20 
    Thirdly, the court approved of Saadi‘s detention on grounds of administrative 
convenience. The growing use of detention for this purpose has been a concern of NGOs 
and voluntary organisations for some time. Amnesty International‘s concern is that ―many 
asylum-seekers are detained to permit the Home Office to make a quick decision on 
straightforward claims, the main factor being the asylum-seekers‘ nationality‖, and 
Amnesty ―believes that the use of fast-track procedures, where the time limits are so tight, 
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19
 Ibid., p.1. 
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is not conducive to fair decisions and that asylum-seekers are detained for administrative 
convenience‖ (Seeking 2005:62). The European Court, however, ―recalled that the purpose 
of the Oakington regime was to ensure the speedy resolution of some 13,000 of the 
approximately 84,000 asylum applications made in the United Kingdom per year at that 
time.‖21 The House of Lords had previously made a similar point when it considered 
Saadi‘s case, finding that ―given the high number of interviews every day (up to 150), 
detention was necessary for the speed and efficiency of the system.‖22 Now the court in 
Strasbourg gave preference to administrative convenience over human rights and once 
again agreed with their Lordships. It concluded that ―given the difficult administrative 
problems with which the United Kingdom was confronted during the period in question, 
with an escalating flow of huge numbers of asylum-seekers, it was not incompatible with 
Article 5 (1) (f) to detain the applicant … to enable his claim to asylum to be processed 
speedily.‖23 
    The court had declared itself against arbitrary detention, recognising that asylum seekers 
were not criminals but people ―who, often fearing for their lives, had fled from their own 
country.‖24 It is worrying that its expressed concern for vulnerable people had no bearing 
on its eventual decision: it concluded that Saadi‘s detention had not been in violation of 
ECHR Article 5 (1). 
 
8.6   Life inside 
We met Forard earlier (8.4.3). He fled from torture in Zimbabwe. At the time of his BBC 
interview he had been detained at Colnbrook IRC for four months awaiting deportation. 
Forard described Colnbrook (Life Inside 2005): 
 
The structure of this building is just like a jail. Inside the rooms there are toilets 
with no doors. The ceiling is dark blue, close to black and they lock us up at 10 pm 
and they open in the morning at 7.30, sometimes 7.45. There is no way you can get 
out of the room. It feels that there is no air coming in, there is artificial ventilation 
but it feels like it is blocked most of the time. It gets very hot sometimes and I have 
to fan myself with a newspaper at night and there is no way you can open windows. 
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The view from his room was of razor wire and solid fences. There was 
 
nothing much to see, you look from the room to the fence, the way I had seen the 
inside of a jail on television, this is what I see here. In Dungavel the toilets are 
outside the rooms and you can get out of the room and go to television rooms and 
you come out and you can play games. Your rooms are not locked at night. Here, 
when they lock, you are locked in and there is nothing else you can do. 
 
The Joint Committee met a Pakistani family at Yarl‘s Wood: a husband, wife and two 
children aged eight and 10 (Treatment 2007:78). They had 
 
been detained at 6 am one morning. His wife has severe arthritis. The family had 
been moved around the detention estate, spending time at Dungavel, Liverpool, 
Tinsley House and Harmondsworth as well as Yarl‘s Wood. The journey from 
Dungavel to Yarl‘s Wood had involved an eight hour journey in a freezing cold van. 
That family told us that living conditions were satisfactory at Yarl‘s Wood, 
although staff did not always show respect. They had been unable to access legal 
advice and were due to be removed shortly. 
 
    Though good relations have been reported between IRC staff and detainees, there are 
many cases where staff ―did not always show respect‖. Crawley (2007:154-5) cited the case 
of a 16-year-old boy who reported: 
 
I tell you, what bothered me most was [that the guards] used to make fun … they 
make noises over the loudspeaker. It used to be very loud. They would say Ab-dull-
ah like the sound of the call for prayer. Then we could hear them laugh. 
 
Asylum seekers sometimes compare conditions of detention in the UK favourably with 
detention or prison conditions in their country of origin. This was so in the case of children 
interviewed by Crawley. Sixteen-year-old Raheen
25
 said (2007:154): 
                                                 
25
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It was a lot different between Oakington Centre and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan 
there was no food, no drink and they would beat me a lot and work me a lot. It is 
like a hotel in Oakington and they treat me very well. 
 
Sixteen-year-old Soran remembered: 
 
While I was detained I didn‘t think about anything, just eating and drinking … All I 
care is I‘m happy because I‘m alive. 
 
However, the boy who had been worried about the guards‘ mockery of the Muslim call to 
prayer felt stressed and unhappy at a number of levels: 
 
You know, when I was in Oakington I came out and looked at all the barbed wire, 
the security, I felt maybe I have committed a crime … It was utter boredom and 
anxiety. I just try to play table tennis to pass the time … The common room was full 
of smoke. I couldn‘t go out and get fresh air because it was cold. 
 
There were certainly problems at Oakington. In 2005 a BBC documentary, Detention 
Undercover, showed racist abuse taking place, filmed by reporter Simon Boazman, who 
had posed as a trainee security guard. Oakington security guard Brian Davidson explained 
to the ―new recruit‖ his own view of the detainees (Detention 2005): 
 
They‘re no good at all in society. They‘re not even good in their own society – 
that‘s why they come here: they want to get it all for free. Their own country don‘t 
give them fuck all ‘cos they deserve fuck all. 
 
The company running the centre, GSL, claimed to be ―committed to tackling institutional 
discrimination and to promoting understanding and respect for cultural difference and 
diversity‖ (ibid.). It provided human rights training which underlined the need to treat all 
detainees with respect and Boazman believed that many officers tried to do that. Yet based 
on his three-month experience he believed that racist abuse was practised by ―a significant 
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minority‖ at Oakington. On his shift, security guard Jason Martin (nicknamed ―Wolfie‖) 
was filmed telling Boazman (ibid.) that in the morning he had to 
 
get  ‘em out of fucking bed. Never leave the room until all of them are out of bed, 
all the lights on, all the curtains open. Plenty of fucking shouting. 
 
Martin took loud music with him into the communal bedroom as part of the waking-up 
procedure. There was concern about the mental health of one of the detainees shown on the 
programme, who was seen as particularly vulnerable. Nevertheless, accompanied by 
raucously loud music, Martin shouted him awake (ibid.): 
 
Get out of fucking bed before I do you some damage … I don‘t give a toss about 
Oakington, I don‘t give a toss about this wanking job, either. I especially don‘t give 
a toss about a wanker like you: you really get on my fucking tits. You just don‘t 
want to [get up] because I‘m white and you think you won‘t do anything because a 
white man tells you what to do. Well, I‘m afraid you‘re wrong. My great-
grandfather shot your great-grandfather and nicked your fucking country off you for 
200 years. So I won‘t be messed with. 
 
He then tipped him out of bed on to the floor. Alun Baxter, one of eight staff responsible 
for dealing with race-related problems at Oakington, boasted that no complaints about 
racist staff went further than him because ―I always talk [the detainees] out of it‖ (ibid.). He 
also claimed that no complaints had been upheld. He explained some of the code language 
used between officers to describe detainees: ―‗TGB‘: thieving Gypsy bastard; ‗forks‘: 
knives, forks and spoons – coons.‖ Another officer said, ―It‘s fucking Pakiland in here‖ 
(ibid.). 
    After the programme there was an investigation by prisons and probation ombudsman 
Stephen Shaw. The government included all Shaw‘s 54 recommendations in its ―action 
plan‖ to solve the problems and declared that its focus was not just on Oakington but that 
the lessons learned ―will be applied across the whole detention estate‖.26 It is worrying, 
therefore, that in June 2006 the chief inspector of prisons was 
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extremely disappointed to find that there continued to be insufficient attention to 
basic protective race relations structures, such as effective ethnic monitoring 
procedures. Given our previous recommendations, and the report of the Prisons and 
Probation Ombudsman, there can be no excuse for failing to put in place effective 
mechanisms to detect and prevent racial discrimination – even though staff–detainee 
relationships appeared to be essentially sound. 
 
Yet even if conditions were improved and ill-treatment checked, detention in itself is 
inappropriate for a number of reasons. Asylum seekers are detained without being charged 
with any offence or suspected of being engaged in any criminal activity – in the words of 
former Yarl‘s Wood detainee Codson Chapfika: ―Imagine, these people are being detained 
for an indefinite period of time without committing any crime‖ (Mitchell 2002:2). Many of 
them have experienced detention or imprisonment in their home countries and have sought 
protection in the UK for that reason. Just as any detention of children, even for a short time, 
is detrimental to their welfare and development, so any detention, however short, may 
revive memories that adults had fled to forget, and may also cause the recurrence of 
previous trauma. 
 
8.6.1   Responses to detention: protest and self-harm 
Since the mid-1990s there have been protests by detainees against their detention, their 
conditions and the treatment they have received. At Campsfield House in 2001, ―detainees 
went on hunger strike, complaining that they were being treated like prisoners when they 
had done nothing wrong‖ (Mitchell 2002:2). Much of Yarl‘s Wood IRC was destroyed by 
fire in 2002 during protests, partly over the handcuffing of a female detainee on her way to 
medical treatment (Eye-witness 2002:1). Protests, hunger strikes, even riots continue to take 
place across the ―detention estate‖: BID‘s written evidence to the Joint Committee (BID 
Memorandum 2007, para. 10) reported that 
 
there has been an increasing incidence of hunger strikes in the detention centres. In 
BID's experience, prior to 2006, there would be one or two hunger strikes a year in 
one or two detention centres. Since January 2006, there have been hunger strikes in 
Colnbrook, Haslar and Yarl's Wood. In April 2006, 100 people were involved in a 
CHAPTER 8: SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK – DETENTION AND DEPORTATION 214 
hunger strike in Colnbrook and in July and August 2006, the parents of children 
held at Yarl's Wood undertook a hunger strike. 
 
Self-harm and suicide are also responses to detention. BID told the Joint Committee (BID 
Memorandum, para. 10) that 
 
in April 2006, 187 people were kept under surveillance in case they harmed 
themselves; 19 of those people required medical treatment. From April 2005 to 
March 2006, 231 people self-harmed and needed medical treatment; 1,086 were put 
on self-harm watch. Suicide verdicts have been recorded for two people in 
immigration detention and a further five inquests are to be heard into deaths over 
the last two years in detention centres. 
 
The National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns (NCADC)
27
 obtained figures under 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Incidents 2008:1) which told them that 
 
there were 48 incidents of Self-Harm requiring medical treatment in Jan/Feb/Mar 
2008 [and] this is an increase of 54% on the last quarter of 2007 … during which 
time there were 31 incidents … 361 individuals were put on Formal Self-Harm at 
Risk in Jan/Feb/Mar 2008, a 28% increase on the last quarter of 2007 … during 
which time there were 282 incidents. 
 
Such responses to detention for deportation is not surprising. Asylum seekers‘ fears of 
returning to their home countries are real. When asked if he thought he would be deported, 
S1 said simply: 
 
No … if one day I knew they going to send me back I will kill myself [gesture 
across throat] before they send me back … [I know] when I go back I get shoot 
very easy … I don‘t want to be like that again.28 
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Some detainees self-harm or attempt suicide when being deported. Security guards showed 
the BBC‘s undercover reporter in the escort service at Heathrow airport an album of 
photographs of the inside of a van covered in a detainee‘s blood (Detention 2005). In the 
light of the Home Office‘s presumptions of guilt, the poor decision-making at all levels and 
the lack of interest in monitoring returns, there can be no confidence that the decision to 
refuse and return is necessarily a safe one. In these circumstances, an assumption of risk 
may be better than an assumption of guilt. Indeed, if assumptions of guilt and the focus on 
immigration control were abandoned and, instead, Refugee Convention and human rights 
obligations were put at the forefront of the asylum process, with improvements made in 
decision-making to match those changes, the practice of detention for removal would be 
rarely needed. Certainly, a fairer process at the outset would mean fewer people at the final 
stage who were fearful of return. If the process is unfair and prejudicial from the start, 
however, the outcome will continue to be resistance at the end. 
 
8.7   Dawn raids 
The Home Office‘s stated policy of using detention to effect removal regularly involves 
immigration officers and police forcibly transporting asylum seekers from their homes to an 
IRC, and from there to an airport for deportation. These events are widely known as ―dawn 
raids‖, due to the early hour at which they usually take place. They are officially called 
―immigration enforcement operations‖ or ―operational visits‖.29 Robina Qureshi, director of 
Positive Action in Housing (PAIH),
30
 told the BBC in December 2006: ―Three or four 
dawn raids are now happening [in Glasgow] every week‖ (Raids 2006:1). Across the UK in 
2005, according to immigration minister Liam Byrne, there were 8,865 police-supported 
raids and in 2006 there were 13,963, ―some of which will have been undertaken early in the 
morning for operational reasons‖ (Commons Hansard 2007). According to The Scotsman  
newspaper, the Home Office ―confirmed that removals operate ‗365 days a year, 24 hours a 
day‘‖ (Gray 2006:1). 
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 Immigration minister Liam Byrne‘s answer to Written Question No. 460, House of Commons, 24 January 
2007. 
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 PAIH is a Scottish charity based in Glasgow. It provides housing-related advice and information to new 
migrants, refugees and established ethnic communities. 
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8.7.1   The Hani family 
One family in Scotland who received an operational visit came to the attention of Amnesty 
International: the Hani family were visited one morning at 6 am (Seeking 2005:15), when 
 
several officials came to their flat. They knocked loudly, shouting ―this is the Home 
Office‖ … Some entered the flat and some remained outside and in the lift. Sergei‘s 
11-year-old son was asleep and neither [Sergei] nor his wife was allowed to wake 
him. Instead, he was woken up by the officials, which the boy found extremely 
traumatic. The officials made his wife go to the toilet with the door open. 
 
When they arrived at Dungavel IRC, 
 
the child locked himself in the toilet and refused to come out for a long time. He did 
not speak to his parents and communicated with them by passing notes to them 
under the toilet door. The whole experience has left him profoundly distressed; he is 
seeing a psychologist and finds it difficult to sleep (ibid.). 
 
The family were eventually released and made a fresh asylum claim, which suggests that 
their detention was unnecessary. They were not alone: Home Office figures show that in 
the second quarter of 2006, 40.1% of detainees were released into the community,
31
 raising 
the question of why they had been detained in the first place. 
     
8.7.2   The Bokhari family 
Sibtain Bokhari was a rights lawyer, a member of the Bar in Lahore, Pakistan. He was a 
Shi‘a Muslim in a Sunni-dominated area. ―His chambers were trashed‖, said Austin 
Mitchell, his constituency MP in Grimsby,
32
 ―his home was stoned and he was threatened.‖ 
His asylum claim was refused and he lost his appeal. He and his wife Tahira, with their four 
children, were deported after a 6 am ―operational visit‖ to their home at 6.30 am on 9 
January 2007. Austin Mitchell had managed to secure their release on a previous occasion, 
but was not able to prevent their deportation this time. On 6 February 2007, however, he 
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did get a debate in the House of Commons on the dawn raid. The raid was described by a 
neighbour, who was woken by the noise: 
 
The children were brought out one by one and put into a car, then Mrs Bokhari was 
brought out. Mr Bokhari was brought out screaming. He only had his nightwear on 
and no shoes. Two of them put Mr Bokhari in a separate car, pulling him down the 
street. These children will be scarred for life. They looked so frightened.
33
 
 
The family were taken to Yarl‘s Wood IRC. While there, Sibtain became unwell because he 
did not have time to retrieve his diabetes medicine before being taken from his home. In a 
fax to Austin Mitchell after the family‘s return to Pakistan, Tahira explained that Sibtain 
had been taken handcuffed to the clinic at Yarl‘s Wood and came back ―injured on his fore-
head and both wrists due to hand cuffing from backside.‖34 He later lost consciousness ―due 
to not giving medicine‖. On 22 January the Bokharis were deported to Pakistan. Their 
resistance to the detention and deportation process suggests real fears about returning there. 
In her fax Tahira simply relates that after their arrival they went  
 
to Lahore by train but we are staying in a hotel one day and then we moved to my 
relative‘s house. We did not go to our actual residence as that place is still 
dangerous for us. As some people put a sign of a cross on our building wall, so we 
are avoiding to go that place [where] we were attacked and persecuted very badly. 
 
8.7.3   Detained while signing on 
Most asylum seekers have to sign on at a Home Office reporting centre, every week or 
fortnight, while their application is in progress. During this signing-on procedure, asylum 
seekers may be detained without warning and deported. This happens so frequently that the 
Unity Centre in Glasgow, situated 100 yards from the reporting centre, operates a system 
whereby asylum seekers write their names on a piece of paper on their way to the centre 
and cross the name off on the way back. If names are not crossed off at the end of the day, 
workers at the centre make enquiries, call solicitors, contact supporters by email, in order to 
prevent the deportation. The people detained while signing on, like those who experience 
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dawn raids, include families with children. A Unity Centre worker explained
35
 that the vans 
in which they are transported have darkened windows and the inside of the van is a cage. 
Asylum seekers are put inside by armed guards who first shut the cage, then the van doors. 
Children who experience this, added the worker, often still show signs of trauma years 
later. 
 
8.8   Section 9 
The government has another means of forcing families to leave once they have reached the 
end of the asylum process and exhausted their rights of appeal. At that point, according to 
section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, you become 
a new category of person: ―Fifth class of ineligible person: failed asylum-seeker with 
family‖ (AIA 2004, s. 9 (1)). If you do not ―take reasonable steps to leave the United 
Kingdom voluntarily‖ or ―place [yourself] in a position‖ to do so (e.g. by signing up to a 
voluntary returns programme or applying for travel documents), the secretary of state may 
issue a certificate stating that you have ―failed [to do so] without reasonable excuse‖ and 
your asylum support will end. The government believes that this will ―persuade‖ you and 
your family to leave: immigration minister Beverley Hughes told the House of Commons 
Home Affairs Select Committee that ―I want to try to persuade as many families as 
possible, when they come to the end of the road, to go back in a dignified way, with 
support, on a voluntary basis‖ (Home Affairs 2003, para. 60). 
    Section nine was not successful, even in terms of this stated policy aim. The government 
had set up a pilot scheme in Manchester, Leeds and London involving 116 families and by 
January 2006 it was clear that it was not working: the Refugee Council and Refugee Action 
found that only one family had left the UK; only three had signed up for voluntary return; 
and only 12 had taken steps to obtain travel documents (Inhumane 2006:2). In terms of care 
taken in planning the project, 75% of clients could not fully understand the letter sent to 
them to explain their position and its tone ―made them feel threatened and insecure‖ 
(ibid.:4); 30% of families had ―outstanding asylum claims or other legal representations‖ 
(ibid.) and thus should not have been included at all. Moreover, section nine caused 
considerable difficulties to local authorities trying to support families with dependent 
children. From the start local authorities were unclear about their legal obligations, the 
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options open to them under the Act and how to reconcile section 9 requirements with their 
duties under the Children Act 1989 (ibid.). That Act places a ―general duty‖ on local 
authorities to ―safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in need‖ and ―to 
promote the upbringing of such children by their families by providing … services‖ (CA 
1989, s. 17 (1)).  But under section nine asylum support is ended and, as Lewis notes, 
―local authorities were prohibited from providing support to families, unless children were 
treated under [section 20 of] the Children Act 1989, separated from their parents, and taken 
into care‖ (2007:63). The children‘s charity Barnardo‘s, in its report End of the Road, set 
out some of the options available to local authorities in the light of section nine. When 
asylum support for a family ceases, the local authority cannot pay ―subsistence money … to 
the parents without breaching section 9, nor can it be paid to the child‖ (Barnardo‘s 
2005:14). It could pay ―another adult with whom the family was living‖ but with little 
control over whether the money reached the child. The authority may take the child into 
care with the child‘s consent, but Barnardo‘s considered such consent ―highly unlikely‖ in 
the circumstances (ibid.:15). The authority may argue that the parents are not ―able to 
provide accommodation‖, in the words of the Children Act (s. 20 (7)), but since such 
inability arises from the direct action of NASS, Barnardo‘s describes this solution as ―a 
little perverse‖ (2005:16). The charity concludes that ―the three principal options open to 
local authorities seeking to support families affected by section 9 are problematic: at a 
fundamental level the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and the 
Children Act 1989 appear incompatible‖ (ibid.:17). Moreover, local authorities are obliged 
to work in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European 
Convention on Human Rights into UK law. Barnardo‘s argued (ibid.) that there was a 
potential breach, not only of Article 8 of the Convention (right to private and family life) 
but also of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment).  
    During the pilot scheme in Leeds, the Social Services Department and the local council 
made a judgement on their conflicting duties and obligations: they considered the removal 
of ―these children [from their families] to be against the best interests of the children and 
contrary to childcare legislation and accepted practice‖ (Lewis 2007:17). Describing the 
situation of one family, Anne James, team manager of the Children‘s Asylum and Refugee 
Team in the Social Services Department, concluded that ―to ask me to remove those 
children would be against all social work ethics‖ (ibid.). Social Services and the council 
therefore continued support for children and refused to separate them from their parents. 
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    In terms of humane treatment, the Refugee Council and Refugee Action found that, 
across the pilot scheme as a whole, 60 of the families had no NASS or other support and 
four children had been taken into care (Inhumane 2006:5, 6). They concluded that 
―[s]ection nine has caused immense distress and panic among families who face destitution, 
homelessness and having their children taken into care‖ (ibid.:2). Thirty-two families had 
―gone underground without support, housing or access to health and welfare services‖ 
(ibid.:3). Leeds Social Services found that the pilot scheme there had ―caused widespread 
fear among families of their children being removed‖, and Lewis argues (2007:17) that 
―[t]his is likely to encourage families to distance themselves further from the Home Office 
and refugee agencies, and to therefore cause the destitution of children.‖ Beverley Hughes, 
however, blamed the families themselves: she told the Home Affairs Committee that the 
purpose of the policy was ―to ensure that people who are under a legal duty to leave the 
country have no incentive to frustrate and draw out the process‖ (Home Affairs 2003, para. 
62). She thought that ―some families might decide not to leave the country even at the risk 
of destitution for themselves and their children‖ (ibid., para. 63) but the government 
―cannot know what proportion of families would act in such an irresponsible way: I hope it 
will be small‖ (ibid.). Cunningham and Tomlinson (2005:258) note that ―Hughes shifts the 
concept of ‗irresponsibility‘ quite clearly away from government policy, preferring to 
locate it instead in the actions of ‗irresponsible‘ asylum-seeking parents.‖ They cite the 
view of the Refugee Children‘s Consortium36 that ―the notion that the government is not 
responsible for the suffering of children resulting from the laws it passes ‗is very dangerous 
and unjust‘‖ (ibid.). Certainly, the idea that families might resist deportation because they 
were afraid to return seems not to have occurred to the minister. 
    In the end, pressure from asylum support groups, NGOs and others led to the 
government signalling that it would abandon the use of section 9. Rod McLean, head of the 
Asylum Policy Unit at the Home Office, told me
37
 that section 9 would be abandoned 
―because it hasn‘t worked‖. When I asked whether he meant that people were disappearing 
rather than volunteering to leave, he agreed. He said the policy had not been thought 
through at the beginning because home secretary David Blunkett had introduced it ―with an 
eye to the media‖ who wanted tougher measures on removals. There would be an 
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announcement in a week or two that the policy had been abandoned. However, no 
announcement was made for more than a year: on 29 June 2007 the Home Office 
announced that ―there was no significant increase in the number of voluntary returns or 
removals of unsuccessful asylum-seeking families‖ under the scheme and therefore section 
9 would ―not be implemented on a blanket-basis‖.38 However, on 6 July 2007 the BIA 
announced: 
 
We intend to keep section 9 on the statute books as we think it is a measure that 
should be available to case owners when dealing with particularly uncooperative 
families or in circumstances where its use is considered appropriate. It is important 
that we retain an ability to withdraw support from families who are wilfully not co-
operating in the process.
39
 
 
While section 9 remains for use when ―appropriate‖, NCADC believes that, on the basis of 
its admitted failure, legal advisers might be able to argue that caseowners ―should now 
exercise their discretion and discontinue‖ its use.40 In terms of government policy, 
however, it might be more appropriate not just to abandon the section but to repeal it. 
     
8.9   Refused and made destitute 
Though families with children are specifically targeted by section 9, single adults and 
childless couples are also liable to lose their support and become destitute. Amnesty 
International explained in 2006 that ―[o]nce the applicant‘s claim has been rejected and 
there is no outstanding appeal they are expected to leave the country within 21 days‖ 
(Down and Out 2006:5). After that time financial support and accommodation are stopped. 
If you have been allowed to work your employer is informed that you can no longer be 
employed and you will lose your job. You are then expected to sign up to a voluntary return 
scheme or apply for a travel document and make arrangements to leave. If you do so you 
may be able to receive ―section 4 support‖ under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 if 
you are destitute and also qualify for one of the following reasons: 
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 you are physically unable to travel or have some other medical reason 
 the government says there is no safe route of return to your country (e.g., Iraq 
from December 2004 to July 2005) 
 you have applied for, and been granted, a judicial review hearing 
 you have made a fresh claim or have been granted an appeal hearing out of time, 
in which case refusal of accommodation would breach your human rights. 
 
Section 4 support is accommodation on a no-choice basis ―and £35 of subsistence vouchers 
per week (no cash)‖ (ibid.). The low level of subsistence, however, is not the only problem 
with section 4 support and the way it is applied. Many asylum seekers do not apply for it at 
all, since it entails giving up their asylum claim and being returned to danger. They 
therefore go underground and become destitute. Gary Pounder of the 167 Centre in Hull 
explained that 
 
a lot of the clients that we‘ve got have still got problems in their own country … 
whether it be political or whether it be because of a particular social group … the 
problems are still there. So … the client will say, ―Well, we‘re not going to go back 
to our own country, it‘s not safe for us to go back‖, which then puts them back out 
on the street again, because there‘s no support or anything whatsoever there … 
[W]e‘ve got people that are living on the streets. … [R]ound the back of this 
building [there‘s] a derelict car … and … one of our clients that come in here that‘s 
actually sleeping in that car – and he has been for the past 3 months. 
 
S1 explained what happened to him: 
 
I get a refuse. Alright. Still I been working, I been working up to now. And last 2 
weeks, immigration is been visit to my company … and they check … everybody 
there, if anybody have been refuse.
41
 
 
                                                 
41
 Research interview, 24 July 2006. 
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S1 was sacked and ―now, I am living with my friend, because I have to give back my flat to 
my [landlord].‖42 S2 was interviewed with the help of an interpreter, who explained: 
 
He been employed [since 2003] up to last two weeks … He had [heard nothing] 
from immigration. Last two weeks ago, immigration visit … his company [and said] 
he had no to work because his case is over.
43
 
 
S5 was also sacked. When I interviewed him he was living in a garage ―somewhere near‖. 
The owner of the garage, 
 
she say, ―[S5], I‘m sorry, I can‘t take you [in] my house because I got boyfriend: 
maybe my boyfriend thinking something going on between me and you.
44
 
 
When I asked him what happened to his previous accommodation he seemed to rebuke me 
for not knowing the answer: 
 
Come on, I rent [a] flat from you. Every week I was paying you, but now I haven‘t 
got a job. Are you going to let me to stay house? No.
45
 
 
PB1, a recognised refugee who now works for the 167 Centre, thought the application of 
section 4 in this way would have social consequences. He estimated that there were more 
than a thousand destitute asylum seekers in Hull in 2006: 
 
So that‘s why we get more problems, if we just leave them like that. Because some 
of them, they have a friend – so … they will … live with them. But some of them 
sleep on the street. [But] they don‘t want to sleep on the street … They are looking 
for to steal something, because they are hopeless. They have no way to choose, 
actually.
46
 
 
                                                 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Research interview, 24 July 2006. 
44
 Research interview, 26 July 2006. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Research interview, 24 August 2006. 
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He predicted that ―[i]f the Home Office leave them like that for one year, two years, three 
years, we [will] still [be] getting problems from them.‖47 
    Asylum seekers who do apply for section 4 support, however, are also likely to encounter 
problems. Research undertaken by the Asylum Support Appeals Project (ASAP)
48
 found 
that out of 117 section four refusal letters from NASS over 80% contained a misapplication 
or misinterpretation of the law, or of NASS‘s own policy (Failing 2007:4): there were 
examples of the wrong test being applied for destitution (ibid.:18, 19); of NASS judging the 
merits of a fresh claim instead of assessing the need for support (ibid.:20); and of refusal 
for not making an application sooner (ibid.). ASAP case studies demonstrate the 
consequences for asylum seekers of such errors and practices (ibid.:18): 
 
 ―Bina‖: Bina had been homeless for 3 months, sleeping rough in a squat with a man 
who gave her money in exchange for sex. He also expected her to have sex with his 
friends. Bina suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which caused her to 
sleepwalk, putting her in danger on the streets at night. She applied for section 4 
support because she had made a fresh claim. NASS said she was not destitute 
despite evidence to the contrary from charities and the police. 
 
 ―Mohammed‖: Mohammed had been staying in a mosque for 6 weeks. Members 
had been giving him food and sometimes he could have a shower and wash his 
clothes at a friend‘s house. Sometimes Mohammed would have to sleep outside if 
he could not get into the mosque: he would go onto a night bus, without paying, to 
be in the warm and off the streets. He was sometimes caught but could never pay 
the fine. Despite letters from mosque members NASS said he was not destitute. 
 
A Refugee Council case study highlighted the case of ―Kadir‖, who had been tortured and 
fled to the UK.  He was refused asylum and became destitute, sleeping rough and relying 
on churches and friends. He told the Refugee Council (Case Studies 2007:1): 
 
                                                 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Asylum Support Appeals Project (ASAP) is an advocacy organisation working to reduce destitution 
amongst asylum seekers in the UK by protecting their legal rights to food and shelter. ASAP provides free 
legal advice and representation in asylum support appeals, as well as legal advice and training on asylum 
support law for refugee community organisations. 
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I feel really depressed, unhappy and hopeless. I smell filthy and cannot walk 
amongst other people. I feel less than human – like an animal. I hate myself. I left 
my country to escape imprisonment, suffering and death. Here I fear hunger and 
homelessness. 
 
    Applicants may also have problems while waiting for a decision to be made. The Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust commissioned a destitution survey in Leeds (Lewis 2009), 
following on from similar surveys in 2006 and 2008. Four participant agencies identified 
long and variable waiting times for decisions on section 4 applications as a major problem. 
―‗Waiting for section 4 support to begin‘ was the reason for destitution for 33% of 
individuals in the 2009 survey‖, plus four families out of 21 with dependent children 
(ibid.).Waiting times ―can be up to several months, a particular concern for pregnant 
women‖ (ibid.:11). During Lewis‘s 2006 research (2007:53), the Home Office had 
indicated that ―transition from NASS to section 4 is an area they are working to improve‖. 
On the evidence of her 2009 research, she concludes that in fact ―waiting for section 4 is a 
worsening cause of destitution in Leeds‖ (Lewis 2009:11). 
 
8.10   Conclusion 
I have shown the increased use of fast-track processes, the setting of targets for removal 
rates and the growing use of detention in recent years. I have shown that asylum seekers at 
this stage find difficulty in getting bail hearings and legal representation, and that 
vulnerable people, including torture victims and children, are regularly detained. I have 
critically examined the treatment of vulnerable people in detention, citing evidence that the 
detention of children is detrimental to their well-being and that children‘s welfare is being 
ignored in the interests of immigration control. I show that detainees regularly respond to 
detention by self-harming or attempting suicide. 
    I critically examine the role of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the 
detention of asylum seekers, and conclude that its interpretation of Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights may fail to give asylum seekers protection from 
wrongful detention. I consider the experience of detention from asylum seekers‘ viewpoints 
and suggest that poor conditions, poor treatment make protest by detainees more likely, 
including through self-harm and attempted suicide. I then examine the process of forcible 
detention and deportation and the use of section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration 
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(Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and of section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999 and the harmful effects of both on asylum seekers. The way these factors operate at 
this last stage of the asylum process shows little concern on the part of the government for 
the UK‘s obligation to protect under the Refugee Convention. Instead the focus is on 
immigration control and this undermines the right to asylum. 
 
     
    
 CHAPTER 9 
 
 
SEEKING ASYLUM IN FRANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1   Introduction 
In this chapter I examine what it is like to apply for asylum in France. I begin by describing 
how asylum seekers are detained on arrival, with limited rights and in danger of having 
their request for asylum declared ―manifestly unfounded‖ without proper consideration. I 
examine the application process at the préfecture and argue that it is an obstacle race 
designed to deter applicants. I show how the fast-track procédure prioritaire is used to deny 
asylum seekers a fair hearing and prevent them from pursuing their claims.  I critically 
examine the provision of accommodation and support, in particular showing how the use of 
accommodation centres (CADAs) is intended to facilitate deportation. I argue that the 
procedure followed by OFPRA (the agency which examines asylum claims), with its short 
timescales and deadlines, the non-mandatory nature of asylum interviews, OFPRA‘s power 
to declare claims ―manifestly unfounded‖ and the difficulty of obtaining legal advice and 
representation undermines the right to asylum. I stress the importance of the appeals 
tribunal, but argue that its procedures and practices also often undermine the right to 
asylum. I describe the procedures which operate at the end of the asylum process after final 
refusal, involving detention and deportation. I examine the living conditions in CADA‘s, 
the protest movements against deportation and aspects of the deportation process itself.  
 
9.2   Detained on arrival: the zone d‟attente 
You can ask for asylum either on arrival or ―in country‖. In both cases your official 
application must be lodged at a préfecture (a police headquarters, usually in the area where 
you are living) and is then passed to the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et 
Apatrides (OFPRA), where the decision is made to grant or refuse protection. However, if 
you indicate at your port of arrival that you want asylum you will be detained in a holding 
centre (zone d‘attente) by the border police (Police aux Frontières – PAF) while the interior 
ministry decides, after advice from OFPRA, whether to allow you on to French territory to 
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make your claim. Zones d‘attente (found mainly at ports, airports and train stations serving 
international routes) are areas where foreigners, including asylum seekers, are detained, 
mostly because they don‘t have valid travel documents.  There are 99 zones d‘attente in 
metropolitan France and 24 in France‘s overseas departments. Though the zone d‘attente 
includes the arrival and departure areas and the customs area, it may also be extended to the 
local magistrates‘ and other courts, the police station, the hospital and surrounding hotels. 
This ensures that, wherever you are taken, you are always in the zone d‘attente, never on 
French territory (Castagnos-Sen 2006:26). 
 
9.2.1   Rights 
Since 1995 certain NGOs having as their aim ―[the provision of] aid or assistance to 
foreigners, the defence of human rights, [the provision of] medical or social assistance‖1 
(ibid.:37) have had rights as observers in the zones d‘attente, together with rights to report 
on the conditions they find there and on the treatment people receive. These organisations 
include the Association Nationale d‘Assistance aux Frontières pour les Étrangers 
(ANAFÉ), the Red Cross and Amnesty International. By 2006 their number had grown to 
13 and asylum seekers now have a number of rights in a zone d‘attente. There are time 
limits on your detention, which will last only for ―the time strictly necessary for an 
examination to assess if [your] claim is not manifestly unfounded‖ 2 (CESEDA 2008, Art. 
L.221-1). You can be detained in the first instance for 48 hours, which the PAF 
administration can extend by 48 hours if no decision has yet been made in your case. Any 
further extension must be by order of a judge, and must be no longer than eight days. In 
exceptional circumstances, a judge may grant a further extension of up to eight days, 
bringing the total to 20 days (Castagnos-Sen 2006:28). The decision on whether your claim 
is ―manifestly unfounded‖ is made by the interior ministry, on advice from an OFPRA 
official who interviews you in the zone d‘attente. If your claim is not rejected, or if a 
decision is not reached within the 20-day limit, the PAF will give you a ―safe-conduct‖ pass 
so that you can make your asylum application at a préfecture. However, if your claim is 
rejected you will be liable to immediate deportation, usually to your country of origin. 
                                                 
1
 … l‘aide ou l‘assistance aux étrangers, la défense des droits de l‘homme ou l‘assistance médicale ou sociale 
… 
2
 … le temps strictement nécessaire … à un examen tendant à déterminer si sa demande n‘est pas 
manifestement infondée. 
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    Other rights include: rights to contact a lawyer, to medical care, to communicate with 
anyone of your choice (individuals or organisations) and to ―a clear day‘s notice‖ (―un jour 
franc‖) before deportation. However, there are obstacles to the delivery of these rights: 
 
 although the right to a lawyer includes provision of ―an area allowing lawyers to 
conduct interviews with foreigners in confidence‖3 (CESEDA 2008, Art. L. 221-2), 
in practice ―foreigners do not generally have the name of a lawyer on their arrival in 
France and there is no permanent office provided‖4 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:31). 
Moreover, lawyers are generally refused access to zones d‘attente and usually do 
not meet their clients until they are due to appear in court (ibid.) 
 although the law gives the right to consult a doctor (CESEDA 2008, L. 221-4), 
medical facilities are provided as part of the regime only at Roissy-Charles de 
Gaulle airport (Procédure 2006:21). No other zone d‘attente provides such facilities 
(Castagnos-Sen 2006:31) 
 the right to communicate with any person or organisation of your choice is limited 
by each zone d‘attente‘s prescribed visiting hours, though communication may also 
take place by telephone 
 
 the ―clear day‘s notice‖: before November 2003 you could only be deported from a 
zone d‘attente after a full day‘s notice of the ministry‘s intention to do so 
(Procédure 2006:17), which gave you time to consider options and seek advice. 
Since November 2003, however, you can only benefit from the clear day‘s notice if 
you ask explicitly to do so. Human rights commissioner of the Council of Europe 
Alvaro Gil-Robles reported examples where the right was not claimed due to the 
lack of an interpreter and of any understanding of the legal terminology. Moreover, 
he noted that, ―in certain cases, the police would use the foreigners‘ ignorance of 
laws, procedures and language to persuade them to renounce this right.‖5 (Gil-
Robles 2006:53). 
 
                                                 
3
 … un espace permettant aux avocats de s‘entretenir confidentiellement avec les étrangers … 
4
 … les étrangers ne possède généralement pas le nom d‘un avocat à leur arrivée en France et il n‘existe pas 
de permanence organisée. 
5
 … useraient de leur méconnaissance des lois, des procédures et de la langue pour les inciter à renoncer à ce 
droit. 
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9.2.2   “… information … communicated in a language that [you] understand”6 
The last example underlines the importance of your right to an interpreter (CESEDA 2008, 
Art. L.221-4), and you must be provided with one if you ―[d]o not speak French and cannot 
read‖7 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:31). But the interpreters provided are not always qualified or 
competent and an interpreter for your language may not be available. The interpreting 
service duty officer at Roissy zone d‘attente during ANAFÉ‘s inspection in 2006 stressed 
that ―the procedure is very arduous and complicated for [the service‘s staff]. They get the 
notification of non-admission and of detention in the zone d‘attente translated, in fact, by 
anybody who happens to speak a language that the foreigner is likely to understand: 
hostesses, maintenance staff and airport staff in general‖8 (Inaccessible 2007:16). 
Sometimes such members of staff are ―requisitioned‖ simply to ―ask the foreigner 
succinctly to sign a decision‖9 (ibid.). 
    At Roissy there are interpreters for the five official languages of the United Nations 
(English, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and Russian). For other languages an interpreter may be 
brought in or asked to translate by telephone but there are problems with this: it is difficult 
to check accuracy or ascertain whether the asylum seeker understands the interpreter or has 
confidence in their impartiality – indeed, the whole practice of translation by telephone was 
criticised by the Court of Appeal, which ruled that the interpreter had to be physically 
present. But in 2003 a new law specifically declared that ―the assistance of the interpreter 
can take place through means of telecommunication‖10 (CESEDA 2008, Art. L.111-8). 
    Dissatisfaction with the interpreting service relates to all stages in the zone d‘attente 
procedure. During inspections in 2002 ANAFÉ noted that ―foreigners often complained 
about not being understood during interviews with the PAF and the MAE [ministry of 
foreign affairs] … as well as during visits to the doctor‖11 (Difficultés 2003:22). Problems 
also arose during court proceedings, where ―French-speaking foreigners claimed … that 
interpreters did not translate anything to non-French speakers and that their role was often 
                                                 
6
 … informations … communiquées dans une langue qu‘il comprend (CESEDA, Art. L. 221-4). 
7
 … si l‘étranger ne parle pas le français et qu‘il ne sait pas lire … 
8
 …la procédure est très lourde et très compliquée pour eux. En fait, ils font traduire la notification de non-
admission et de maintien en zone d‘attente par toute personne parlant une langue que l‘étranger est 
susceptible de comprendre : hôtesses, personnel d‘entretien et tout le personnel de l‘aéroport en général … 
9
 … demander succinctement à l‘étranger de signer une décision. 
10
 … l‘assistance de l‘interprète peut se faire par l‘intermédiaire de moyens de télécommunication … 
11
 Les étrangers se plaignent souvent de ne pas avoir été compris lors des entretiens avec la PAF et le MAE … 
ainsi que lors des visites avec le médecin … 
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limited to signing the order extending the stay in the zone d‘attente‖12 (ibid.). These 
problems continue, although ANAFÉ reports an improvement in interpreting services 
during interview since 2004, when OFPRA became responsible for interviews. But 
interpreting problems remain elsewhere in the zone d‘attente process (Castagnos-Sen 
2006:31). 
 
9.3   Deprived of liberty 
The zone d‘attente is a fundamentally worrying and much-contested aspect of the French 
asylum system. People are deprived of their liberty although they have committed no 
offence.
13
 The legal status of people arriving in France without authorisation to enter the 
country has long been a grey area. Prior to 1992 they were deemed to be in a ―zone 
internationale‖, inside which French law did not apply, and they could be quickly deported. 
In 1992 this legal fiction, condemned by the courts, was replaced by the legal zones 
d‘attente. Yet there is still a legal fiction at work in the operation of these areas: in legal 
terms it is not a prison. If you are placed in a zone d‘attente, you are described as being 
―kept‖ there (―maintenu‖) not ―detained‖ (―retenu‖), for it is closed only on one side: 
theoretically, you can ―leave the zone d‘attente at any moment for any destination situated 
outside France‖14 (CESEDA 2008, Art. L.221-4). In practice, however, you are confined 
there, and when you are deported your destination will usually be your country of origin. 
Philippe Bolmin, a former official of the Appeals Commission for Refugees (CRR), takes 
the view that ―[i]f the zone d‘attente is, strictly speaking, not a detention centre, it 
resembles one like a twin brother and deprives foreigners of their liberty to come and go‖.15 
Moreover, the zone d‘attente may quickly become the route to a real prison. For, since you 
can only be ―kept‖ for 20 days, fear on the part of PAF officials that you will be released by 
a judge drives them into a ―race against time‖16 (Enfermement 2005:1): they ―do not 
hesitate to multiply their attempts at removal – including the use of physical duress‖17 
                                                 
12
 … des étrangers francophones ont relevé que les interprètes ne traduisaient rien aux non-francophones et 
que leur rôle se limitait souvent à signer l‘ordonnance de prolongation du maintien en zone d‘attente … 
13
 Under Article 35 of the Refugee Convention the lack of a passport does not constitute an offence: ―The 
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who 
… enter or are present in their territory without authorization‖ (Convention and Protocol 1996:31). 
14
 … quitter à tout moment la zone d‘attente pour toute destination située hors de France. 
15
 Si la zone d‘attente n‘est pas à proprement parler un centre de rétention, elle lui ressemble comme un frère 
jumeau, et prive l‘étranger de sa liberté d‘aller et venir. (Email to me from Philippe Bolmin, 22 April 2008.)  
16
 … course contre la montre … 
17
 … n‘hésite pas à multiplier les tentatives d‘éloignement y compris en usant de la contrainte physique. 
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(ibid.). If these attempts meet with resistance and, ―in spite of everything, they do not 
succeed in removing the foreigner, s/he is brought before a magistrates‘ court for ‗evading 
the implementation of an order of refused entry‘‖18 (ibid.), an offence which attracts a 
three-month prison sentence followed by a ban from French territory. This procedure is 
even applied to children: Mlle KM was 14 years old when she was sentenced to three 
months‘ imprisonment and then banned from entering France for three years (Roulette 
2003:28). 
 
9.3.1   Rights of appeal 
The question of enforced detention arises again in the context of the right to appeal. On the 
face of it, the existing rights of appeal seem to safeguard the right of the asylum seeker to 
be heard. The French legal system has two levels – the administrative and the judicial levels 
– each with its own courts and judges. A decision to refuse entry ―is an administrative 
decision, capable of challenge before an administrative judge with the power to quash the 
judgment.‖19 Such an appeal is ―suspensif‖, i.e. any deportation order against you is 
suspended until the judge has heard your appeal and made a decision. If the judge decides 
in your favour you will be allowed on to French territory to make your asylum application 
at a préfecture. But the alternative judgment gives rise to a major point of contention, for if 
the judge upholds the refusal of entry you will be kept in the zone d‘attente or in a detention 
centre to await deportation. You have no right of appeal against this decision to detain you 
against your will. An administrative judge cannot hear an appeal against detention since ―it 
is the judicial judge who has the responsibility of protecting liberties‖20 and you have no 
right of appeal to a judicial judge. Not surprisingly, NGOs like ANAFÉ protest against the 
fact that foreigners ―may be refused entry on to the territory and be detained against their 
will without being able to apply to a protection-of-liberties judge (the judicial judge) to 
have their cause heard.‖21 ANAFÉ therefore continues to argue for a fully ―suspensif‖ 
appeal against detention before a judicial judge.  
                                                 
18… malgré tout elle ne parvient pas à éloigner l‘étranger, celui-ci est présenté devant le tribunal correctionnel 
pour « soustraction à l‘exécution d‘une mesure de refus d‘entrée » … 
19
 … est une décision administrative susceptible d‘être contestée devant un juge administratif qui a le pouvoir 
d‘annuler la mesure. (Email to me from Philippe Bolmin, 22 April 2008.)  
20
 … le juge qui a la charge de protéger les libertés est le juge judiciaire. (Email to me from Philippe Bolmin, 
22 April 2008.) 
21
 … un étranger peut être interdit d‘entrée sur le territoire et être retenu contre son gré, sans pouvoir accéder 
au juge des libertés (le juge judiciaire) pour entendre sa cause. (Email to me from Philippe Bolmin, 22 April 
2008.)  
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9.3.2   “Manifestly unfounded”: no right to seek asylum 
The zone d‘attente undermines the notion of constitutional asylum (4.6.1). This is a 
―fundamental liberty‖ which ―has as its corollary the right to seek the status of refugee‖22 
(Conseil d‘État ordonnance, 25 March 2003, cited ibid.:33). But zone d‘attente procedures 
allow the immediate deportation of asylum seekers before they have been able to lodge 
their claims at the préfecture, thus undermining this right. Before 2004 the ministry of 
foreign affairs, not OFPRA, advised the interior ministry whether the claim was 
―manifestly unfounded‖. Yet neither ministry was qualified to decide the outcome of 
asylum claims: only OFPRA is legally authorised to do so and only OFPRA has ―adequate 
facilities at its disposal to undertake all the necessary research and investigations: a 
documentation centre, translations, expertise in dealing with documents and the verification 
and retrieval of information‖23 (ibid.:10).  
    The procedures as they stood in 2004 were defended on the basis that the two ministries 
were not concerned with the detail of claims for asylum but were looking only for the most 
obvious signs that they were unfounded. Once these were discovered, there was no need to 
probe more deeply. The intention was to filter out people who wanted to work, study, be 
reunited with their families, but who wanted to avoid the required visa-application 
procedures (ibid.). Then, in 2004, the task of advising on zone d‘attente claims was 
transferred to OFPRA – but the timescales are still short and it is still the ministry of the 
interior that makes the final decision. ANAFÉ argues that ―the fundamental question raised 
by the investigation of asylum claims at the border concerns the extent of the examination 
carried out‖24 by OFPRA and the interior ministry (ibid.:10). In theory (ibid.) the 
examination should  
 
consist only in verifying in summary fashion that the claimant‘s reasons correspond 
to a need for protection (in the widest sense, with reference to [Refugee] 
Convention criteria … or any other form of humanitarian consideration). It should 
                                                 
22
 … le droit constitutionnel de l‘asile, qui a le caractère d‘une liberté fondamentale, a pour corollaire le droit 
de solliciter le statut de réfugié … 
23
 … dispose des conditions adéquates pour effectuer toutes les recherches et investigations nécessaires : 
centre de documentation, traductions, expertise de document, vérification et recoupements d‘informations. 
24
 … la question fondamentale posée par l‘instruction des demandes d‘asile à la frontière concerne les limites 
de l‘examen pratiqué … 
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only be superficial, not a detailed examination of the basis of the claim for asylum 
...
25
 
 
Yet in practice it is clear that, both under the pre-2004 arrangements and under the OFPRA 
scheme, examinations have often strayed beyond the confines of a brief evaluation of 
obvious factors to examining the claim itself, and using certain details to justify 
deportation. This is clearly worrying because of the lack of time for proper investigation at 
this stage. But it also raises concerns about the dangers of interviewing vulnerable people 
who are suffering the combined stresses of persecution and flight (4.7). 
 
9.3.3   “Manifestly unfounded”: under ministry scrutiny 
Though the ministry of foreign affairs lacked both the authority and the expertise to give 
definitive advice on asylum claims, it constantly did so – using the details of its 
examination to justify refusing entry. In the 2003 case of KA from Bangladesh, for 
example, it categorised KA‘s account of his brother‘s arrest in 2002 as ―unconvincing‖26 
since ―none of the leaders of the Awami League [his political party] had been 
imprisoned‖27 (cited ibid.:15). But Amnesty International reported (AIR 2003:45): 
 
Several Awami League leaders were detained for long periods [in 2002] and 
reportedly tortured or ill-treated … Over a dozen Awami League politicians were 
arrested in December and continued to be detained under the [Special Powers Act], 
despite court orders for their release on bail. 
 
Nevertheless the ministry concluded that KA‘s evidence was ―of a kind to discredit the 
truth of the fears expressed and the well-founded nature of his claim‖,28 which was, 
therefore, manifestly unfounded (cited Roulette 2003:15). 
    In another 2003 case, MB claimed to have been an information officer for the president 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and to have been arrested after writing a 
                                                 
25
 … ne devrait consister à vérifier que de façon sommaire si les motifs invoqués par le demandeur 
correspondent à un besoin de protection (au sens le plus large : par référence aux critères énoncés par la 
Convention de Genève … ou toute autre forme de considération humanitaire). Il ne devrait s‘agir que d‘un 
examen superficiel, et non d‘un examen au fond, de la demande d‘asile … 
26
 … peu crédible … 
27
  … aucun des dirigeants de la ligue AWAMI ait été emprisonné. 
28
 … de nature à jeter le discrédit sur la réalité des craintes invoquées et sur le bien-fondé de sa demande … 
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paper on the collapse of the state. After repeated arrests, and harassment of both himself 
and his wife, he was accused of membership of a rebel movement, the MLC. His wife fled 
and applied for asylum in France and he eventually followed her. But the ministry quickly 
decided that his claims of harassment and arrest were not sustainable: ―… his declarations, 
as much concerning his so-called [political] activities as concerning his alleged successive 
arrests, are devoid of credibility: in effect it does not seem likely that he was arrested 
several times and then released‖29 (cited ibid.:18). The ministry also declared that 
―investigations undertaken with the service responsible for assessing asylum applications 
found no asylum claim lodged in the name of the woman he claims to be his wife‖30 (ibid.). 
Yet ANAFÉ easily contacted his wife and obtained her official préfecture receipt, evidence 
that her asylum application was in progress (ibid.). Moreover, ANAFÉ cites evidence that 
in the DRC a number of higher civil servants, like MB, were secret members of the MLC 
and had been arrested around the same dates as MB indicated (ibid.). Nevertheless the 
ministry concluded that his evidence was ―of a kind to discredit the sincerity and the well-
founded nature of his claim‖31 (ibid.). MB was deported to Morocco. 
    In some cases, the ministry sounds uncertain of its arguments. Several standard phrases 
give this impression: ―it is unlikely‖, ―it seems surprising‖, ―it is unconvincing‖, among 
others (ibid.:17).
32
 In a context where the task is apparently to show that the claim is 
manifestly unfounded, an argument for deportation based on such uncertainty cannot be 
satisfactory. Nevertheless, in the case of DE (cited ibid.:19) – where, after suggesting, with 
no supporting evidence, that his party membership card was false (―the supposed 
membership card‖33), it is said that various matters ―appear surprising‖ or ―seem 
unlikely‖34 – the conclusion is drawn that DE‘s evidence was ―of a kind to discredit the 
reality of the fears expressed, the sincerity and the well-founded nature of his claim‖35 
(ibid.:19) and that therefore the claim was ―manifestly unfounded‖. 
                                                 
29
 … ses déclarations tant sur ses soi-disant activités que sur les interpellations successives dont il aurait fait 
l‘objet sont dénuées de crédibilité : en effet, il paraît peu probable qu‘il ait été plusieurs fois arrêté puis 
relâché … 
30
 … les recherches menées auprès des services chargées d‘instruire les demandes d‘asile ont établi qu‘aucune 
demande d‘asile n‘a été déposée au bénéfice de sa prétendue épouse … 
31
 … de nature à jeter le discrédit sur la sincérité et sur le bien-fondé de sa demande. 
32
 ―il est peu vraisemblable‖, ―il paraît surprenant‖, ―il est peu crédible‖. 
33
 … la supposée carte de membre … 
34
 ―paraît surprenant‖,  ―paraît peu vraisemblable‖. 
35
 … de nature à jeter le discrédit sur la réalité des craintes invoquées, la sincérité et le bien-fondé de sa 
demande. 
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    The dangers inherent in these practices are seen in the final outcome of many cases: if 
someone is released from the zone d‘attente, has his or her claim heard in full by OFPRA 
and is then granted refugee status, the ―manifestly unfounded‖ applicant becomes a 
―recognised refugee‖: 
 
 TM‘s account of his reasons for fleeing the DRC in 1999 were described by the 
ministry as ―marked by vagueness‖36 (ibid.:29) and he was charged with resisting 
deportation and banned from French territory. He managed nevertheless to lodge his 
claim and was recognised as a refugee in 2000 
 NY‘s account (ibid.:30) was ―not very precise‖, the police raid on her home was 
―hypothetical‖ and ―unconvincing‖.37 Yet after a month in a French prison for 
resisting deportation she lodged a claim, which was judged well founded, and she 
was granted refugee status 
 YK‘s story was ―devoid of detail‖38 concerning his political activities in Côte 
d‘Ivoire (ibid.:30-31). His failure to describe the physical abuse he suffered was 
said to show the manifestly unfounded nature of his claim. But, after resisting 
several attempts at deportation, he was eventually granted refugee status by 
OFPRA. 
 
Without the authority, expertise or time to do so, the ministry examined these claims and 
found them wanting. Its approach seemed to cast applicants as defendants and then assume 
their guilt. Such practice is inconsistent with a commitment to the protection of refugees 
and undermines the right to asylum. 
 
9.3.4   Under OFPRA’s scrutiny: still “of a kind to discredit” 
The practice of examining details rather than obvious factors at this stage continued under 
OFPRA. In her report for the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l‘Homme 
(CNCDH),
39
 Castagnos-Sen (2006:34) describes how the zone d‘attente procedure under 
OFPRA 
                                                 
36
 … entaché d‘imprécisions … 
37
 ―peu précise‖, ―hypothétique‖, ―peu crédible‖. 
38
 ―dénuées de précisions‖. 
39
 CNCDH is a French human rights body with the aim of protecting and promoting human rights. It advises 
the French government and makes proposals on questions of human rights, law and humanitarian action. Its 
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goes well beyond the simple evaluation of whether the claim is ―manifestly 
unfounded‖: it involves a real pre-examination of the basis of the claim, undertaken 
in conditions which do not respect the minimal procedural guarantees associated 
with the normal examination procedure in a claim for protection. Now, this carries a 
serious risk of error in the evaluation, taking into account the time limits and the 
conditions under which it takes place.
40
 
 
She cites the 2005 case of ―Mr G‖, a persecuted opposition journalist from Eritrea. 
OFPRA‘s Bureau of Asylum at the Border (BAF) interviewed him and decided that his 
declarations contained ―numerous inconsistencies of a kind to discredit his assertions‖41 
and he was refused entry into France both by the ministry of the interior and by the 
administrative judge on appeal. After a recommendation by the European Court of Human 
Rights, Mr G lodged his claim with OFPRA and, after full consideration, was granted 
refugee status (ibid.:34-35). Castagnos-Sen goes on to make a policy recommendation 
intended to solve these problems (ibid.:35): 
 
The assessment of the validity of claims at the border must not go beyond the 
simple evaluation of whether they are ―manifestly unfounded‖, and must in no case 
become an examination of the basis of the fears expressed by the applicant 
regarding persecution.
42
 
 
This recommendation fails to solve the problems. The notion that an assessment of the 
―validity‖ of an asylum claim can be undertaken without examining its details is pure 
fiction. No ―simple evaluation‖ of the claim can avoid becoming ―an examination of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
members include government and parliamentary representatives, members of the Conseil d‘État and the 
judiciary and a diverse range of civil society representatives. It commissions regular reports on human rights 
issues and regards its diverse membership as a guarantee of its independence of government and state. 
40
 … va bien au-delà de l‘évaluation du simple caractère ―manifestement infondé‖ de la demande : elle 
implique un véritable pré-examen au fond de la demande, effectué dans des conditions qui ne respecte pas les 
garanties minimales de procédure attachées à la procédure normale d‘examen d‘une demande de protection. 
Or, cette procédure comporte un risque d‘erreur d‘appréciation compte tenu de la brièveté des délais et des 
conditions dans lesquelles elle se déroule. 
41
 … de nombreuses incohérences de nature à discréditer ses affirmations. 
42
 L‘appréciation de recevabilité des demandes à la frontière ne doit pas aller au-delà de l‘évaluation du 
simple caractère « manifestement infondé » de la demande et ne peut en aucun cas relever d‘un examen au 
fond des craintes de persécution invoquées par l‘intéressé. 
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basis of the [applicant‘s] fears … regarding persecution‖, since that is what the applicant‘s 
claim is all about. But the only information necessary at this stage is the asylum seeker‘s 
identity and country of origin. Any assessment now, before all the facts are in, is in danger 
of excluding applicants from the asylum process before it has begun and returning them to 
their countries of origin without properly examining their claims. Far from being part of 
France‘s refugee-protection policy, zones d‘attente can be seen as part of its attempt, 
together with other EU states, to extend immigration controls beyond its own borders – in 
French terms, control ―en amont‖ (upstream): according to the legal fiction of the zone 
d‘attente you are not on French territory, you cannot make an asylum application and you 
can be returned quickly to your country of origin. If the ―manifestly unfounded‖ rule were 
abolished, together with zones d‘attente and any ―assessment of the validity of claims‖ at 
the border, asylum seekers could instead be given the right to enter France, lodge their 
claims at the préfecture and have them considered carefully by OFPRA. 
 
9.4   Applying for asylum at the préfecture 
When you lodge your claim at the préfecture, you are essentially seeking temporary 
permission to stay in the country while your application is being considered by OFPRA. If 
that permission is granted, the préfecture will issue you with a temporary pass (autorisation 
provisoire de séjour – APS), valid for one month, and a dossier which you must complete 
in French and send to OFPRA within 21 days. 
    Between 2000 and 2004 reception conditions for asylum seekers at préfectures across 
France were very poor. In some departments, where ―hundreds of asylum seekers crowded 
in front of the préfectures‖43 (Main Basse 2007:3), a limited number of tickets were 
provided to allow entry into the building. At Lille in 2001, ―these tickets were distributed 
on a lottery basis‖44 and in Paris ―asylum seekers were often obliged … to ‗camp‘ around 
the entrance, sometimes for several nights, in the hope of getting inside the building‖45 
(ibid.). Cimade
46
 points out, however, that much has now changed at this early stage of 
                                                 
43
 … des centaines de demandeurs d‘asile se pressaient devant les services des préfectures … 
44
 … ces tickets étaient distribués par triage au sort. 
45
 … les demandeurs d‘asile étaient souvent obligés … de « camper » devant les portes d‘entrée, parfois 
durant plusieurs nuits, dans l‘espoir d‘accéder à l‘intérieur des locaux préfectoraux. 
46
 Cimade is an ecumenical agency, founded in 1939 to help displaced persons in camps in the south of 
France. During the Second World War it gave active support to the French Resistance against the Nazis. 
Today it works to provide a welcome to foreigners in France and to give them social and legal support. It is 
the only support group with a presence in immigration removal centres. It supports its partners in the 
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reception (ibid.). Pressure from asylum support groups, trade unions and local politicians, 
as well as the decline in applications in recent years, has meant that the physical conditions 
of reception at the préfectures are ―quite good in the majority of departments‖ observed by 
Cimade‘s researchers (ibid.). This improvement apart, however, application at the 
préfecture remains a difficult and stressful experience, part of an obstacle race designed to 
deter. 
 
9.4.1   The obstacle race: lack of information 
As a new arrival in France, you are unlikely to have any knowledge of the complexities of 
the asylum procedures. In 2005 UNHCR, the ministry of the interior and the NGO Forum 
Réfugiés
47
 produced a guide which provides basic information on the process. It was to be 
―given to asylum seekers in the préfectures, the sole places where they can make 
applications for asylum on French territory‖48 (Guide 2005:1). Cimade‘s researchers, 
however, found that the majority of the 20 or so préfectures they observed did not give 
applicants any information on procedures or on the support groups that exist to help them. 
In fact, only four distributed the Guide itself (which in any case is only available in French, 
English and Russian). At Arras a pile of them had been placed on the reception desk but 
were not distributed. Most préfectures claimed to be out of stock, ―although the Guide is 
downloadable from the ministry of the interior‘s website‖49 (Main Basse 2007:4). The 
préfectures at Dijon, Grenoble and Versailles provided addresses of local reception 
facilities in the department as well as of voluntary agencies; Nantes, Caen and Strasbourg 
put up notices for the same purpose, but only in French; Marseilles and Nice put up notices 
in several languages (ibid.). There is in fact a legal requirement on préfectures to furnish 
asylum seekers with information not only ―on the conditions of admission into France but 
on the documents and other items required in order that an application can be considered 
                                                                                                                                                    
countries of the south in projects linked to fundamental rights, aid to refugees and support for people returned 
to their countries of origin. 
47
 Forum Réfugiées is a non-profit-making organisation working to promote the right to asylum and the 
interests of refugees. It works with public and private partners, including government, EU institutions, 
UNHCR and numerous ―associations‖, such as ANAFÉ and CFDA, which support asylum seekers. It gives 
legal, administrative and social support to asylum seekers and refugees and provides accommodation in four 
reception centres (CADAs). 
48
 … remis aux demandeurs dans les préfectures, lieux uniques de dépôt des demandes d‘asile sur le territoire 
français. 
49
 … alors que le guide est téléchargeable sur le site du ministère de l‘Intérieur. 
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‗complete‘‖50 (Réforme 2007:7). So the current patchy provision of extremely limited 
information hardly fits the bill. CFDA agrees with Cimade: ―[I]t seems that in practice this 
obligation is not respected, the Guide du Demandeur d’Asile being, for example, only 
exceptionally handed out‖51 (ibid.). Certainly, at Créteil, ―Mdme S‖ found no sign of 
official concern that she should understand the procedures she was about to undergo: she 
waited in two different queues over a period of seven hours and, when it was her turn to be 
called (cited Main Basse 2007:4), 
 
a not very cheerful woman said to me, ―Good day, why have you come? Which 
country?‖ I told her I wanted to ask for asylum and that I had come from Mali. She 
handed me a paper to fill in and a list of documents that I had to provide (passport, 
address) and asked me to come back in 13 days.
52
 
 
Mdme S did in fact already have the items required in order to register her claim 
successfully, and wanted to hand them over there and then, but she was not allowed to do 
so: ―she told me to come back just the same‖,53 so the process remained an obstacle race. 
 
9.4.2   The obstacle race: demanding more than the law requires 
The Guide (2005:7) lists the main items you need to provide: 
 
 four identity photos 
 information relating to your name, date of birth, marital status, etc. 
 information about the way you entered France and your route there from your 
country of origin 
 proof of where you live. 
 
                                                 
50
 … sur les conditions de l‘admission au séjour mais aussi sur les éléments exigés pour qu‘une demande soit 
considérée « complète ». Original italics. 
51
 … il apparaît qu‘en pratique cette obligation n‘est pas respectée, le Guide du demandeur d’asile n‘étant par 
exemple qu‘exceptionnellement remis. 
52
 … une femme peu souriante m‘a dit ―Bonjour, vous venez pourquoi ? Quel pays ? » Je lui ai dit que je 
voulais demander asile et que j‘étais du Mali. Elle m‘a remis un papier à remplir et une liste de documents à 
fournir (passeport, adresse) et m‘a demandé à revenir treize jours plus tard. 
53
 … mais elle m‘a dit de revenir quand même. 
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Some préfectures, however, demand that you supply further items, and some of these 
demands are illegal. You do not, for example, have to produce a passport: this relates to 
Refugee Convention Article 31, which stipulates that non-possession of travel documents is 
not to be treated as an offence. Yet Cimade found that some préfectures (e.g. in Strasbourg 
and Nanterre) demanded passports as a condition of registering claims (Main Basse 
2007:5). Préfectures in Grenoble and Marseilles demanded that passports and other 
documents be translated into French at the applicants‘ expense (ibid.). Some préfectures 
demand five or six photos, not four. Where such demands are not met, the préfecture 
―blocks access to the asylum process by refusing to issue the APS and the OFPRA dossier, 
thus contradicting the constitutional principle that each individual has the right to seek 
asylum in France‖54 (Réforme 2007:8).  
 
9.4.3 The obstacle race: procédure prioritaire 
Préfectures can refuse to grant an APS, thus stopping your claim from proceeding any 
further, on a number of grounds: 
 
 if it is considered that, under the Dublin II agreement, another EU state should 
examine your claim 
 if you are considered to be a serious threat to public order (―hardly ever used in 
practice‖55 (Bousquet 2006:7-8)) 
 if your country of origin is considered ―safe‖ 
 if your claim is considered ―fraudulent or abusive‖. 
 
If you are refused an APS for any of the last three reasons, you can, through the préfecture, 
ask OFPRA to consider your claim, but only under the fast ―priority‖ procedure (procédure 
prioritaire). There are a number of disadvantages attached to this procedure: 
 
 with an APS, you have 21 days to complete your application form and send it to 
OFPRA – under the procédure prioritaire, you have only 15 days 
                                                 
54
 … bloque l‘accès à la demande d‘asile en refusant de délivrer l‘APS et le dossier OFPRA, en contradiction 
avec le principe constitutionnel selon lequel tout individu a le droit de solliciter l‘asile en France. 
55
 … en pratique quasiment jamais invoqué. 
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 with an APS you are entitled to accommodation in a CADA,56 as well as to the 
temporary benefit known as ATA,
57
 amounting to 10.38 euros per day per adult – 
under the procédure prioritaire you have no such entitlements 
 with an APS, your right of appeal is ―suspensif‖ (that is, any plans to deport you are 
suspended until your appeal is heard) – under the procédure prioritaire your right of 
appeal is ―non-suspensif‖, i.e. you may be deported before the hearing takes place. 
 
With your rights reduced in this way, it is important that you are not placed in the 
procédure prioritaire without good cause. Yet these decisions are often made in the absence 
of good cause. 
 
9.4.3.1   Procédure prioritaire: “late” claims 
The law allows the procédure prioritaire to be used in the case of a ―late claim justified by 
the asylum seeker with reasons devoid of foundation‖58 (Réforme 2007:3, n. 5). But 
interpretations of the word ―late‖ are variable across France, and ―subjective‖ according to 
Cimade (Main Basse 2007:25). CFDA noted that préfectures have a ―tendency to place 
applications abusively in the procédure prioritaire when they have been made [only] a few 
days or a few weeks after arrival in France‖59 (ibid.:3). The préfectures of Ain and 
Ardenne, notes Cimade (Main Basse 2007:25), 
 
refuse admission almost systematically on this basis. In these departments, not to 
hurry to the préfecture in the first hours after your arrival constitutes an ―abuse‖ of 
the asylum procedures.
60
 
 
Such practice deprives you of your rights, reduces your chances of obtaining a full and fair 
hearing of your claim and thus undermines the right to asylum.     
 
9.4.3.2    Procédure prioritaire: safe country of origin 
                                                 
56
 Centre d‘accueil des demandeurs d‘asile – an accommodation centre. 
57
 Allocation temporaire d‘attente. 
58
 … demande tardive justifiée par le demandeur d‘asile par des raisons dénuées de fondement … 
59
 … tendance à placer abusivement en procédure « prioritaire » des demandes déposées quelques jours ou 
quelques semaines après l‘arrivée en France … 
60
 … refuse quasi systématiquement le séjour sur cette base. Dans ces départements, ne pas se précipiter à la 
Préfecture dans les premières heures de son arrivée en France constitue un « abus » de la procédure d‘asile. 
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The préfecture may refuse you an APS and put you in the procédure prioritaire if your 
country of origin is on OFPRA‘s list of ―safe‖ countries, i.e. countries where persecution is 
regarded as unlikely. The EU had been discussing the creation of a common EU list for 
some years but had not been able to reach agreement. The UK introduced one in 2002 
(5.3.5), and in 2003 France introduced a clause into the law so that applicants could be 
refused permission to stay because they had ―the nationality of a country considered a safe 
country‖61 (CESEDA 2008, L.741-42). There was no list, just a general description: the 
country must respect ―the principles of freedom, of democracy and of a constitutional state, 
as well as the rights of man and fundamental liberties‖62 (ibid.). France eventually compiled 
a list in 2005, with further countries added in 2006, and it now contains 17 countries plus 
all the EU member countries.
63
 But CFDA points out that it includes ―countries suffering 
internal crisis, others where genital mutilation is currently practised and others where the 
death penalty has not been completely abolished‖64 (Réforme 2007:4). After examining the 
list, Gil-Robles declared: ―I seriously doubt that all these countries could be considered 
‗safe‘ … all the more so because [they] continue to produce refugees‖ (2006:62).65 CFDA 
found it ―difficult to consider as ‗safe‘ such countries as Bosnia-Herzegovina, from where 
there were 2,000 applications in 2004 and protection granted at a rate of 67.4%‖66 (Réforme 
2007:4) and Cimade sees what it calls the paradox of ―safe countries‖: although the creation 
of the list seems to have resulted in a considerable reduction in applications from these 
countries, ―the rate of recognition of refugee status for [their] nationals is rising and 
remains well above that of many ‗unsafe‘ countries‖67 (Main Basse 2007:23). OFPRA‘s 
reply to this is that there has been a ―qualitative‖ increase due to the ―quantitative‖ 
reduction (ibid.:24). However, it is only when the ―quality‖ applications reach the CRR that 
the rate rises: in 2005 OFPRA gave refugee status to 9.67% of ―safe country‖ cases; when 
cases proceeded to the CRR the rate was 27.17%. In 2006 the rates were 5.95% and 30.61% 
                                                 
61
 … la nationalité d‘un pays … considéré comme un pays d‘origine sûr. 
62
 … des principes de la liberté, de la démocratie et de l‘Etat de droit, ainsi que des droits de l‘homme et des 
libertés fondamentales. 
63
 Outside the EU the countries are: Albania, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Croatia, Georgia, 
Ghana, India, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania and Ukraine. 
64
 … des pays en crise interne, d‘autres où la pratique des mutilations génitales est courante et d‘autres où la 
peine de mort n‘est pas définitivement abolie. 
65
 … je doute fortement que tous ces pays puissant être considérés comme des pays d‘origine sûr … d‘autant 
plus que ces pays continuent à produire des réfugiés. 
66
 … difficile à considérer comme « sûr » des pays comme la Bosnie-Herzégovine qui représentait 2000 
demandes en 2004 pour un taux d‘accord de 67,4%. 
67
 … le taux de reconnaissance du statut de réfugiés pour les ressortissants de certains de ces pays est en 
augmentation et reste bien supérieur à celui de beaucoup de pays non « sûrs ». 
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respectively (OFPRA figures, cited ibid.). These figures show the importance in France (as 
in the UK) of rights of appeal. But they also show that OFPRA‘s apparent belief in a 
―qualitative‖ increase among these asylum claims has not led the agency to recognise more 
claims: for recognition, most of the ―quality‖ applicants have to reach the CRR. Certainly 
the doubts about ―safe‖ countries suggest that it is inappropriate to place their nationals in 
the procédure prioritaire. 
 
9.4.3.3   Procédure prioritaire: an abusive power of evaluation? 
In judging whether your claim is ―fraudulent or abusive‖, the préfectures have accrued what 
CFDA calls ―a very considerable power of evaluation‖68 of claims (Réforme 2007:3) and 
regularly ―encroach on the prerogatives of OFPRA and the CRR‖.69 In effect, states CFDA, 
in the course of deciding whether an asylum claim is abusive ―the préfectures tend to 
evaluate the basis of the claim, despite instructions to the contrary‖70 (ibid.). These 
instructions are contained in a government circular: ―As far as abusive use of the asylum 
procedures is concerned … this categorisation can in no way result from the content of the 
asylum claim, OFPRA and the CRR having exclusive authority to assess the reasons for the 
claim, but only from the administrative and procedural context in which it is presented‖71 
(cited ibid., n. 6). Nevertheless the evaluation of claims continues. In fact, concerns have 
been expressed because some préfectures include in the application form a section on the 
reasons for the application. Most may only ask for a sentence or two but ―it forms no part 
of the préfecture‘s role to judge whether the claim is well founded‖72 (Main Basse 2007:5). 
The inclusion of this section in the application form is at the very least questionable. When 
some préfectures began to ask for more detailed accounts, NGOs protested vigorously and 
they stopped doing so (ibid.). 
 
9.4.4   The obstacle race: accommodation and support 
Until 2001 reception procedures at the préfectures were based on a choice between living 
with family or friends, together with financial support from the state (the insertion 
                                                 
68
 … un pouvoir d‘appréciation très important … 
69
 … empiéter sur les compétences de l‘OFPRA et de la CRR. 
70
 … les préfectures tendent à apprécier le fond de la demande, malgré les consignes inverses … 
71
 … En ce qui concerne le recours abusif aux procédures d‘asile … cette qualification ne peut en aucune 
manière résulter du contenu de la demande d‘asile, l‘OFPRA et la CRR ayant compétence exclusive pour 
connaître des motifs de la demande, mais uniquement du contexte administratif et procédural dans lequel 
celle-ci est présentée (interior ministry circular, 22 May 2005, Art. II.2, p. 14). 
72
 … il n‘entre pas dans les prérogatives préfectorales du juger du bien-fondé de la demande. 
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allowance), or accommodation in a reception centre (centre d‘accueil pour demandeurs 
d‘asile (CADA)) or a provisional accommodation centre (centre provisoire d‘hébergement 
(CPH)), where they would receive administrative and social support. By 2001, however, the 
reception system was in crisis: many asylum support groups (the ―associations‖) were 
critical of the poor accommodation and services provided as well as the gap between 
demand and supply. In the year 2000 there were 5,000 places in CADAs and, despite the 
creation of 2,000 places in one year following the criticisms, CADAs only accommodated 
6.9% of asylum seekers. 
    Throughout these years there seems to have been little government concern for those 
denied state-provided accommodation. Some departments have transit centres for asylum 
seekers waiting for CADA places but, if there are no transit centres in the department, 
problems begin to multiply and Bousquet believes that ―[t]he maintenance of this gap 
between available accommodation and need has for a long time been part of a political 
strategy of dissuasion … based on the deliberate worsening of reception conditions in 
France‖73 (2006:14).  Certainly, the Guide, published in 2005, seems to reflect a casual 
approach to the plight of asylum seekers facing this problem: it simply informs applicants 
that ―[i]f the national reception system … cannot accommodate you or offer a provisional 
accommodation solution outside a centre, you will doubtless have to search for other 
accommodation‖74 (Guide 2005:20) and adds (ibid.:21): ―There is a telephone number, 115, 
that you can dial any day from any telephone kiosk … [and] you may be looked after for 
the night and accommodated in an emergency hostel for the homeless.‖75 It warns: ―This 
number is often busy and you have to keep trying‖76 (ibid.). As the Guide indicates, the 
accommodation is usually only for one night or, at most, a few days and it might have 
added that hostels do not usually provide meals. Bousquet notes a growing destitution 
among asylum seekers, many living rough on the streets or in inadequate, even dangerous, 
accommodation. The state has used ―temporary‖ solutions for more than a decade, among 
them ―very low-grade hotel rooms‖77 (Bousquet 2006:14): 
                                                 
73
 Le maintien de cet écart entre l‘hébergement disponible et les besoins a longtemps fait partie d‘une stratégie 
politique de dissuasion … basée sur la dégradation volontaire des conditions d‘accueil en France. 
74
 Si le dispositif national d‘accueil … n‘a pas vous accueilli hors centre, vous devrez sans doute chercher un 
autre hébergement. 
75
 Il existe un numéro de téléphone gratuit, le 115, que vous pouvez composer tous les jours à partir de 
n‘importe quelle cabine téléphonique … [et] vous pouvez être pris en charge pour la nuit et hébergé dans un 
centre d‘accueil d‘urgence. 
76
 Ce numéro est souvent occupé et il faut insister longtemps. 
77
 … chambres d‘hôtels de très basse catégorie. 
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Systematic recourse to this type of insecure accommodation can prove extremely 
dangerous, as is shown by the tragic events of the winter of 2005 during which 
dozens of immigrants, including a number of asylum-seeking families, perished in 
fires in the hotels where they were being ―temporarily‖ housed. Unfortunately, 
nearly 50% of offers of accommodation are in these inadequate premises.
78
 
 
Yet the government was worried too: it had to keep track of asylum seekers and deal with 
the problem of illegal working, a factor since 1991 when permission to work was abolished. 
Moreover, the European Council directive of 2003 on reception conditions also put 
pressure on the government: member states must take measures ―to guarantee adequate 
healthy living conditions and to ensure that applicants have enough for their subsistence‖79 
(Directive 2003, Art 13 (2)). So the French state eventually created 15,000 CADA places in 
five years, gave CADAs a new status within the asylum system and reformed the financial 
support package (9.4.4.2), now called ATA. 
 
9.4.4.1   CADAs 
CADAs are found in every department in France. They are mostly run by NGOs (e.g. 
Forum Réfugiés and France Terre d‘Asile80) but are under the auspices of the local 
préfecture and, at a national level, the ministry of employment and solidarity (Centre 
d’Accueil 2007:1). They provide a range of services throughout the asylum process: 
 
(a) accommodation and canteen/catering facilities; 
 
      (b) access to medical and psychological services; 
 
(c) administrative support, including help 
 
                                                 
78
 Le recours systématique à ce type d‘hébergement précaire peut se révéler extrêmement dangereux comme 
l‘ont montré les évènements dramatiques de l‘hiver 2005 durant lequel des dizaines d‘immigrés, dont un 
certain nombre de famille en demande d‘asile, ont péri dans l‘incendie des hôtels où ils étaient hébergés de 
façon « temporaire ». Malheureusement, aujourd‘hui près de 50% de l‘offre d‘hébergement se fait dans ces 
locaux inadaptés. 
79
 … garantir un niveau de vie adéquat pour la santé et d'assurer la subsistance des demandeurs. 
80
 France Terre d‘Asile is a non-governmental organisation which promotes the right of asylum and the 
integration of refugees.  
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 in dealing with OFPRA and the CRR 
 in preparing an account of the reasons for the application 
 in preparing for interviews or court appearances and finding legal 
representation; 
 
(d) children‘s activities and education; 
 
(e)  management of eventual departure from the CADA. 
 
However, the aim of the 2006 reforms was not to help the CADAs to provide services but 
to strengthen state control over them and increase surveillance of asylum seekers, making 
their deportation easier. The government has introduced a system which pressurises people 
into accepting CADA accommodation and penalises them for refusing it. Under the 
reforms, the préfecture has to make a formal offer of CADA accommodation to asylum 
seekers, ―who must immediately accept or refuse although there will be no question of a 
concrete offer with immediate take-up, just an offer in principle for when a place becomes 
available‖81 (Réforme 2007:12). Waiting lists ―may be very long (from several months to 
more than a year …)‖82 (Hébergement 2007:2). If they accept the offer they will be able to 
claim ATA while they are waiting; if, for whatever reason, they refuse the offer they will 
not be able to claim ATA. Yet there are several reasons why asylum seekers may want to 
refuse. Some people have 
 
family or friends who can put them up, [know] fellow nationals or [have] 
knowledge of the department where their claim has been made. But, if they accept 
the offer, applicants may be given a place in another department, sometimes far 
away, and be isolated physically and socially
83
 (Réforme 2007:13). 
 
                                                 
81
 … qui devra immédiatement accepter ou refuser, alors qu‘il ne s‘agit pas d‘une offre concrète et immédiate 
de prise en charge, mais d‘une offre de principe au cas où une place se libère. 
82
 … peut être très long (plusieurs mois, à plus d‘un an …). 
83
 … de la famille ou des amis qui peuvent les héberger, qui ont des compatriotes ou des connaissances dans 
le département où ils ont demandé l‘asile. Or, en acceptant l‘offre de prise en charge, les demandeurs peuvent 
se voir attribuer une place dans un autre département, parfois très éloigné, et se trouver isolés, tant 
physiquement que socialement. 
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Nevertheless none of this is taken into account and, if you refuse the CADA offer, you will 
not receive any state benefit. Neither will you get another chance to choose CADA 
accommodation: ―no other proposal of accommodation of this type will be offered to 
you‖84 (Guide 2005:20). Thus the government has created ―a quasi-obligation of residence 
in the CADAs‖ 85 (Main Basse 2007:7). 
    At the same time, the government subjects the organisations who run the CADAs to 
increasing state control, usually through changes in regulations and administrative 
instructions. These tend to reduce the role of the CADAs to the provision of 
accommodation, minimising their other work. CADAs continue to provide educational, 
medical, psychological and legal support but with less state sanction and funding. For 
example, language courses under the old regime were intended as a tool to prepare people 
for integration into French society. Under the new regime this is considered unnecessary: 
―the state‖, declared an immigration ministry circular, ―does not consider asylum seekers to 
be a population dedicated to integration‖86 (cited Accueil 2008:31), and therefore there was 
no need to give them a good grounding in French. The ministry did recognise, however, 
that people would need some basic French for everyday purposes in the centres and the 
circular thus allowed ―a system of initiation‖ into the language (cited ibid.). There is an 
implied assumption here that asylum seekers are not serious people, that their claims will 
be refused and they will soon be dispatched back home. In line with this, the control not 
only of entry into the CADAs but of departure from them is a crucial part of the new 
regime. 
    One of the government‘s chief aims in the reforms was to speed up the departure of 
refused asylum seekers (―déboutés‖) and recognised refugees from the CADAs, which 
contained increasing numbers of them. In the two-year period covering 2004 and 2005, 
―nearly 25,000 asylum seekers were given refugee status and 88,000 were refused and the 
departure measures in CADAs, already very fragile, could not cope with so many people‖87 
(ibid.:46). The government was determined to reduce the numbers, both in order to free up 
space in the CADAs and to demonstrate that France was being tough on ―false‖ asylum 
                                                 
84
 … aucune autre proposition d‘hébergement de ce type ne vous sera faite. 
85
 … une quasi obligation de résidence dans les CADA. 
86
 … l‘État ne considère pas les demandeurs d‘asile comme une population vouée à s‘intégrer … 
87
 … près de 25.000 réfugiés furent reconnus et 88.000 furent déboutés en deux ans et les dispositifs de sortie 
de CADA, déjà très fragiles, ne pouvaient pas gérer tant de personnes.  
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seekers. Thierry Coudert, a senior immigration ministry official, explained in a letter of 
instruction to prefects that they needed to improve their figures (cited ibid.:41):  
 
I attach particular importance to reducing the rate of the unwarranted presence in 
the centres of … déboutés for whom the consequence of refusal of refugee status … 
must be removal from the national territory against a time limit of one month … I 
would add that diligence concerning déboutés is a prerequisite for improving your 
results in the matter of removals [from the country].
88
 
 
The procedure put in place for reducing ―unwarranted‖ residents in CADAs is as follows: 
the prefect informs the CADA manager that a particular applicant has been refused asylum; 
the manager notifies the asylum seeker that he/she has one month to leave the CADA. This 
deadline may be extended by one month if the débouté signs up to a voluntary return 
scheme (ARV), which gives a grant of 2,000 euros to a single person, 3,500 euros to a 
couple and extra for the children. As in the UK many asylum seekers do not see this as a 
safe option and this scheme has a low take-up rate – according to the National Reception 
Agency for Foreigners and Migration (ANAEM),
89
 out of 4,000 departures from CADAs in 
2007 only 84 accepted ARV (cited ibid.:45). Faced with the one-month deadline, some try, 
with help from CADA staff, to obtain permission to stay on grounds of family connections 
or health needs; others seek a re-examination of their claims. If all attempts to prevent 
removal fail, the débouté has to leave the establishment within the deadline. Some find 
lodgings with family or friends; some may get emergency – and temporary – 
accommodation in a cheap hotel or a hostel. ―[T]he majority‖, states Cimade, ―risk finding 
themselves back on the streets‖90 (ibid.: 46). 
    Most CADA managers do their best to find déboutés accommodation or keep them in the 
centres for as long as possible. But there is heavy government pressure to remove their 
―unwarranted presence‖ and failure to do so attracts sanctions which threaten the CADA‘s 
                                                 
88
 J‘attache une particulière importance à la réduction du taux de présence indue dans ces centres … de 
déboutés pour lesquels la conséquence du refus du statut de réfugié … doit être l‘éloignement du territoire 
national dans un délai maximal d‘un mois … J‘ajoute que votre diligence, concernant les déboutés, 
conditionne l‘amélioration de vos résultats en matière d‘éloignement. 
89
 ANAEM was created in 2005 and brought together the Office des Migrations Internationaux (OMI) and the 
staff of the Service Social d‘Aide aux Émigrants (SSAE). It oversees legal procedures relating to employment 
and family reunification, as well as matters relating to integration, and manages the reception of asylum 
seekers. 
90
 … la majorité risque de se retrouver à la rue … 
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very existence: first, its annual grant may be reduced; secondly, its licence to operate may 
be withdrawn and the CADA will cease to exist. In these circumstances, the CADA 
eventually has to remove people in order to keep within the regulations and survive. So 
déboutés are reminded of the deadline through individual interviews, managers continue 
their efforts to find them alternative accommodation, but may stop the subsistence 
allowance paid to asylum seekers in CADAs – though they often try to continue paying it 
to families. Eventual departure may take place in a number of ways: déboutés may leave 
voluntarily; they may be called to an interview at the préfecture and removed to a detention 
centre for deportation; the police may wait for them outside the CADA and arrest them for 
non-possession of a valid APS; finally the CADA manager may remove the asylum seeker 
from the premises – most managers seek to avoid this confrontation, but are not always able 
to do so. Cimade cites a préfecture in the Haute-Garonne which regularly gives déboutés 
eight days‘ notice to leave the CADA (ibid.:47). A judge may extend the deadline, but in 
the end the manager confronts the débouté, 
 
and, even if the person refuses, removes their belongings, takes an inventory and 
leaves the person on the landing. In the Oise, management changes the locks and 
cuts off the electricity supply before emptying the lodgings and leaving all the 
belongings in rubbish bags (ibid.). 
 
The newspaper Ouest France reported the case of Iphigénie. When confronted by a CADA 
manager and his assistant, she did not understand what was happening (cited ibid.:48): 
 
They told me: ―You must leave. It‘s the procedure.‖ They had certainly received the 
letter from my lawyer but they were there, standing there, by the lift, telling me to 
take my belongings out of the room. They helped me finish filling the bags.‖ 
Iphigénie took her bits and pieces and left. The affair then took another turn. Her 
lawyer, strongly contesting ―the expulsion‖, made a first application to the 
administrative court. After failing there, she put in a second request … Today 
Iphigénie is destitute: ―The CADA helped me for three years. After that, they 
obeyed the orders of the préfecture. My only worry today is my health.‖91 
                                                 
91
 Ils m‘ont dit : «Vous devez partir. C‘est la procédure. » Ils avaient bien reçu le courrier de mon avocate 
mais ils étaient là, debout, devant l‘ascenseur, me demandant de sortir les affaires de la chambre. Ils m‘ont 
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André Harnard, the CADA manager, claimed that this was ―not a removal‖ (ibid.): 
 
At no moment did she refuse to leave. She did not rebel … We are under strong 
pressure from the préfecture to get refused asylum seekers out of the CADAs. But 
we stay within the law.
92
 
 
So the CADA may provide shelter and important help and advice to asylum seekers – yet it 
is in the end not a place of safety. The government‘s restrictive agenda leaves CADAs little 
choice but to collaborate in the expulsion of vulnerable people. 
 
9.4.4.2   Low levels of support 
Before 2006 the benefit available to asylum seekers as support (the ―allocation d‘insertion‖) 
was granted for only one year. Its successor (ATA), in line with EU harmonisation 
measures, is available throughout the asylum process. Despite this improvement, the 
support system still operates as an obstacle to pursuing an asylum claim. It still amounts to 
around 300 euros per adult per month, with nothing added for children. This means ―that a 
single person as well as a single-parent family with several children have to provide for 
themselves on less than 10 euros per day‖93 (Bousquet 2006:15). This benefit does not get 
paid for at least a month after application (ibid.) and sometimes not for six to eight weeks 
(Réforme 2007:12). Thus not only are asylum seekers ―deprived of all resources during this 
period‖ (Bousquet 2006:15) – a serious enough problem in itself – but their chances of 
having their asylum claims heard at all are put in jeopardy: the OFPRA form has to be 
completed and sent within 21 days and, in that time, documents need to be copied, 
translations made (at the applicant‘s expense) and registered letters posted. Without funds 
this will be difficult to achieve. Moreover, some asylum seekers are not eligible for benefit 
                                                                                                                                                    
aidé à finir les sacs ». Iphigénie prend ses cliques et ses claques et s‘en va. L‘affaire prend ensuite une autre 
tournure. Son avocate contestant fermement « l‘expulsion », saisit une première fois le tribunal administratif. 
Déboutée, elle dépose une seconde requête … Iphigénie est aujourd‘hui démunie. « Le CADA m‘a aidée 
pendant trois ans. Après, ils ont obéi aux ordres de la préfecture. Mon seul souci aujourd‘hui, c‘est ma santé 
». 
92… A aucun moment elle n‘a refusé de partir. Elle ne s‘est pas rebellée … Nous avons des pressions 
importantes de la préfecture pour faire sortir des CADA les personnes déboutées du droit d‘asile. Mais nous 
restons dans le droit. 
93
 … qu‘une personne célibataire aussi bien qu‘une famille monoparentale avec plusieurs enfants devra 
subvenir à ses besoins avec moins de 10 euros par jour. 
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at all (those in the procédure prioritaire, those waiting to be dealt with by another EU state 
under the Dublin II agreement or those who have refused CADA accommodation). Thus 
the benefit system seems designed for deterrence rather than support. 
 
9.4.5   The obstacle race: winding down reception “platforms” 
The so-called reception ―platforms‖ were created in the year 2000 to make up the 
deficiencies in reception facilities provided by the state and are mostly run by the 
―associations‖. In May 2007 there were 49 ―reception platforms‖ and 23 smaller ―reception 
points‖ across France. Their help today is particularly needed in the light of the 
consequences for asylum seekers of refusing CADA accommodation. As shown above 
(9.4.4.1), there are perfectly valid reasons for such refusals. There is also evidence that a 
mixture of a lack of information, language problems and avoidable misunderstanding leads 
to inappropriate refusals: the CADA offer is couched in technical terms and in French only, 
so ―[b]ecause they do not understand, some applicants do not sign or they tick the ‗refuse‘ 
box‖94 and the majority do not realise that they will lose their right to financial support if 
they refuse the CADA offer (Accueil 2008:5). Cimade shows that refusal rates vary from 
department to department, ranging in the Ile-de-France from 10% in Paris itself, 37% in 
Seine-Saint Denis and 70% in Val d‘Oise (ibid.). The services provided by the ―platforms‖ 
are important in these circumstances. Gil-Robles (2006:61) visited one in Paris, run by 
France Terre d‘Asile, and was 
 
impressed by the work carried out by its staff. Some 12,000 applicants are 
accommodated there; around 1,200 … attend each day. They come to get their post, 
information on emergency accommodation and legal advice. These platforms have 
become indispensable tools for managing asylum seekers.
95
 
 
Yet the CADA and ATA reforms threaten the work, even the existence, of many of these 
―platforms‖. First, an administrative system is being put in place which restricts the work of 
the platforms to registering CADA applications and involves them in a complex 
                                                 
94
 Parce qu‘ils n‘en comprennent pas le sens, des demandeurs refusent de signer ou cochent la case du refus. 
95
 … impressionné par le travail effectué par ses salariés. Quelque 12 000 demandeurs y sont domiciliés ; 
environ 1 200 … sont accueillis chaque jour. Ils viennent y chercher leur courrier, des informations sur les 
hébergements d‘urgence et des conseils juridiques. Ces plates-formes sont devenues des rouages 
indispensables à la gestion des demandeurs d‘asile. 
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bureaucratic process. Secondly, it involves the ―platforms‖ in enforcing the state‘s rules 
rather than providing good reception facilities. So if an asylum seeker fails to report to a 
―platform‖ to register an application for CADA accommodation, the ―platform‖ must 
inform the préfecture, the asylum seeker will be considered as having refused CADA 
accommodation and ATA will be discontinued. If the applicant fails to attend regularly to 
enquire about the progress of his or her application, the ―platform‖ has to send reminder 
letters (Accueil 2008:7). The restriction of their work to registration duties also involves a 
reduction in the state funding of the ―platforms‖ and the immigration ministry announced 
that 25 of them would be closed in 2008 in the name of rationalisation and regionalisation. 
Cimade shows how this process, undertaken in the name of efficiency and cost-saving, has 
led to a reduced number of ―platforms‖ in many regions, but with no corresponding 
increase in funding for those that remain. This was the case with closures in Saint-Brieuc, 
Vannes and Périgueux, and the Picardie region saw applications moved from its main city 
of Amiens to the Oise department, which had less means of coping (ibid.:9). There is 
certainly an administrative and cost-saving logic to this policy. But it also reflects France‘s 
restrictive agenda, which focuses on immigration control rather than protection, and thus 
undermines the right to asylum. 
 
9.5   The OFPRA procedure 
OFPRA was established in 1952. In the reforms of 2003-4 it became the only agency to 
which asylum claims in France may be made. Yet, despite its long experience and increased 
funding, there are serious concerns about its procedures, which seem part of France‘s 
restrictive agenda undermining the right to asylum. 
 
9.5.1   Timescales and deadlines 
If you are an asylum seeker the timescales and deadlines within which you must work are 
short. Even before the 2003-4 reforms you had to fill in the application form and deliver 
your completed dossier to OFPRA within one month. The deadline is now 21 days: if you 
miss it, your application will not be considered and your APS will not be renewed (Guide 
2005:9-10; Gil-Robles 2006:57). Such a deadline presents a particular range of problems. 
    Most applicants have little information at this stage to help them through the process, no 
legal advice and little money (Réforme 2007:6). Few will find a place in a CADA in time to 
get the necessary help to complete the dossier, and we have seen the tightening constraints 
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being placed on the ―platforms‖ (9.4.5). These problems are even more acute if you have 
been placed in the procédure prioritaire, where the deadline is just 15 days. Gil-Robles 
considered that ―the shortening of the timescales does not leave sufficient time for the 
applicant to complete the dossier, gather the necessary documents together and produce a 
coherent account‖96 of their story (2006:57). If they meet the deadline but the dossier does 
not include all the required documents, or if the form is not completed in French, OFPRA 
will refuse to register the application and although another application can be made it will 
be subject to the procédure prioritaire. Moreover, although the form has to be completed in 
French, interpreters are at the expense of the applicant and it seemed to Gil-Robles 
―obvious that the very large majority of asylum seekers do not have the necessary means to 
pay an interpreter‖97 (ibid.:58). He found the lack of interpreting facilities to be 
discriminatory and ―in direct contradiction to the Ordinance of 1945 which makes provision 
for an interpreting service‖98 (ibid.). The solution was clear: the French authorities should 
―reconsider their position and, if they continue to insist on French, [should] offer non-
French-speaking applicants the linguistic help that they need to deliver a duly completed 
dossier‖99 (ibid.). To date the authorities have not done so. Thus many asylum seekers find 
their right to asylum undermined at this crucial stage by a combination of tight deadlines, 
inflexibility about the required contents of the dossier and a lack of translation services. 
 
9.5.2   Procédure normale 
Once your asylum application has been registered with OFPRA, and you have presented the 
receipt to the préfecture, your APS will be renewed for three months and is renewable 
every three months until a decision is made on your claim.  
 
9.5.2.1   Asylum interview 
An asylum interview is a legal requirement and OFPRA may dispense with it for only four 
reasons (CESEDA 2008, Art. L.723-3; Guide 2005:11): 
 
                                                 
96
 … le raccourcissement des délais ne laisse pas suffisamment de temps au demandeur pour remplir le 
dossier, rassembler les documents exigés et produire un récit cohérent. 
97
 … évident que la très grande majorité des demandeurs d‘asile ne possède pas les moyens financiers pour 
rémunérer un interprète. 
98
 … en contradiction directe avec l‘Ordonnance de 1945 qui prévoit l‘interprétariat.  
99
 … reconsidérer leur position et, si elles maintiennent l‘exigence du français, [offrir] aux demandeurs non 
francophones l‘aide linguistique dont ils ont besoin pour déposer un dossier en bonne et due forme.  
CHAPTER 9: SEEKING ASYLUM IN FRANCE 255 
(a) if it decides to ―take a positive position based on the evidence in its 
possession‖100 (CESEDA 2008, Art. L.723-3), i.e. on the documents and other items 
you have sent in support of your claim; or  
 
(b)  if you come from a ―safe‖ country; or 
 
(c) if OFPRA thinks, on the evidence you have provided, that your claim is 
―manifestly unfounded‖; or  
 
(d)  if your medical condition makes an interview impossible. 
 
Nevertheless, the proportion of applicants called for interview is historically low: in 2003 
only 68% received a ―convocation‖ and Bousquet notes (2006:9): 
 
France does not intend to bring individual interviews into general use. It defends 
this position on the ground that it prefers quality rather than quantity in relation to 
interviews and therefore chooses to set aside a certain number of applicants on the 
basis of the information they have provided in their dossiers.
101
 
 
Such an approach presumes guilt and does not give people an opportunity to defend 
themselves. It also denies the constitutional right of all asylum seekers to have their claims 
heard (4.6.1; 9.3.2). Nevertheless there was a rise in the proportion called for interview in 
the following two years: 73% in 2004, 83% in 2005 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:102). 
    The figures on interviews that actually took place are more worrying: in 2003 only 49% 
kept the appointment. Once again the rate rose during the next two years, but it remained 
worrying: 51% in 2004, 61% in 2005 (ibid.). A number of factors help to explain this. 
Some people will not have received the notification in time, or at all (ibid.), and this is often 
linked to the problem of unreliable accommodation noted earlier (9.4.4). More important, 
as Bousquet noted (2006:9), non-attendance ―is explained particularly by the fact that the 
                                                 
100
 … prendre une position positive à partir des éléments en sa possession. 
101
 La France n‘entend pas généraliser l‘existence des entretiens individuels. Elle défend cette position au 
motif qu‘elle préfère la qualité des entretiens à la quantité, et choisit donc d‘écarter un certain nombre de 
demandeurs sur la base des informations fournies dans leurs dossiers. 
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costs of the interview (travel, lodgings …) are totally at the asylum seeker‘s expense.‖102 
Gil-Robles came to a similar conclusion and added that ―[t]his measure equally concerns 
applicants resident in the provinces [who] do not always possess the means to make the 
journey as far as Paris‖103 (Gil-Robles 2006:58). He recommended opening provincial 
OFPRA offices, particularly since OFPRA staff had told him that ―the number of 
applications in provincial préfectures is still rising‖104 (ibid.:59). The imposition of the 
costs of interview on the applicants themselves undermines the right to asylum, since 
failure to attend the interview may lead to the refusal of a claim: ―If you do not attend this 
hearing‖, warns the Guide (2005:12), ―your absence will have negative consequences on 
your claim for asylum‖.105 Thus far, however, the recommendation has not been adopted.     
    As to the conduct of interviews, Gil-Robles and his team took a fairly positive view 
(2006:59): 
 
We all noted the professionalism of the OFPRA officers who are given the 
responsibility of carrying out these interviews in order to check the consistency of 
what is said by the applicant. The officers are also specialised in what is certainly a 
large geographical area but, for the most part, have quite expert knowledge of the 
different countries of origin of the applicants.
106
 
 
Another positive point is that, at this stage, ―[t]he applicant may request the assistance of an 
interpreter, paid for by OFPRA‖107 (ibid.). This service was put on a more secure footing in 
2003, when OFPRA signed agreements with a number of agencies, which together provide 
translation services in 110 languages (Castagnos-Sen 2006:102). Problems arise, however: 
some languages are not covered, Chechen and Rom being prime examples (ibid.); and Gil-
                                                 
102
 … s‘explique notamment par le fait que les frais occasionnés par cet entretien (déplacement, hébergement 
…) sont totalement à la charge des demandeurs d‘asile. 
103
 Cette mesure concerne également les demandeurs résidant en province. Ces derniers ne possèdent pas 
toujours les moyens de faire le voyage jusqu‘à Paris. 
104
 … le nombre de demandes déposées dans les préfectures de province ne cesse d‘augmenter. 
105
 Si vous ne vous présentez pas à cette convocation, votre absence aura des conséquences négatives sur votre 
demande d‘asile. 
106
 Nous avons tous noté le professionnalisme des agents de l‘OFPRA chargés de mener à bien ces entretiens 
pour vérifier la cohérence des dires du demandeur. Les agents sont d‘ailleurs spécialisés sur une aire 
géographique certes large, mais ont, pour la plupart, une connaissance assez fine des différents pays d‘où sont 
originaires les demandeurs. 
107
 Le demandeur peut demander l‘assistance d‘un interprète, aux frais de l‘Office. 
CHAPTER 9: SEEKING ASYLUM IN FRANCE 257 
Robles (2006:59) observed an interview where the translation was inaccurate, not reflecting 
the meaning of the applicant‘s statements. 
 
9.5.2.2   “Manifestly unfounded” again 
We have seen that your claim may be declared ―manifestly unfounded‖ in the zone 
d‘attente (9.3.2-9.3.4) and that the préfecture may also deny you access to OFPRA (9.4.3). 
Now, however, under the procédure normale, OFPRA itself can reopen the ―manifestly 
unfounded‖ question and refuse an interview, thus denying you what Gil-Robles calls ―a 
thorough and careful examination‖108 of your claim (2006:63), including a chance to 
explain your case and resolve doubts. So OFPRA describes applicants‘ statements using the 
negative language noted earlier (9.3.3), and with as little justification: a claim is ―judged to 
be ‗devoid of all substance‘ or ‗lacking credibility‘‖, writes Castagnos-Sen, ―either because 
it is insufficiently detailed or personalised, or because the account is ‗stereotyped‘ or 
contains manifest contradictions and errors relating to events, dates or other objective 
matters‖109 (2006:102). OFPRA may decide that you have submitted false documents and 
that this casts doubt on your case. Castagnos-Sen notes that such an allegation is ―rarely 
substantiated by the Office‖.110 But rather than explore these matters in an interview, 
OFPRA can declare your case ―manifestly unfounded‖ without one. 
 
9.5.2.3   Legal help 
There is no provision in the law for free legal advice at this stage (Bousquet 2006:9) and no 
right to have a lawyer present during the OFPRA interview, since OFPRA ―does not yet 
accept the presence of a third party during interviews‖111 (Accueil 2006:35). Asylum 
seekers in a CADA receive legal and other advice but most people have to wait at least two 
months for a CADA place and have only 21 days to submit their dossier. By the time they 
get into a CADA, they may already have had their interview. They may find legal and other 
support through an ―association‖ (e.g. France Terre d‘Asile), but they must find it quickly – 
at a time when they are vulnerable, disoriented and possibly traumatised. Thus a 
                                                 
108
 … un examen complet et attentif  … 
109
 … qu‘il l‘estime « dénuée de toute substance » ou « dépourvue de crédibilité », soit qu‘elle est 
insuffisamment circonstanciée ou personnalisée, soit que le récit est « stéréotypé » ou comporte des 
contradictions et erreurs manifestes au regard d‘évènements, dates ou autre éléments objectifs. 
110
 … rarement étayée par l‘Office … 
111
 … l‘OFPRA n‘accepte pas encore la présence d‘un tiers lors des entretiens. 
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combination of tight deadlines and lack of any legal right to free representation at this stage 
undermines the right to asylum. 
 
9.5.3   Procédure prioritaire 
Under the procédure prioritaire OFPRA has only 15 days to make its decision, including 
the time needed to arrange and conduct an interview, but in practice the situation is worse: 
on average, decisions are made within six to eight days, and in July 2004 only 20% of 
applicants were called for interview; by the end of the year this had risen – but only to 35% 
(Gil-Robles 2006:63). The rate rose to 60% in 2005 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:99), but this still 
left 40% of applicants without the right to ―a thorough and careful examination‖ of their 
claims. The end results seem to reflect this rushed and detrimental procedure: asylum is 
granted at low rates in the procédure prioritaire – in 2004 acceptance rates ran at 1.8% (Gil-
Robles 2006:63), in 2005 at 2.5% (Castagnos-Sen 2006:99). 
    Use of the procédure prioritaire is growing: taking account both of initial claims and 
requests for re-examination after refusal, 10% of total asylum applications were placed in 
this procedure in 2003, 16% in 2004, 23% in 2005 and 30% in 2006 (Réforme 2007:3). 
This increasing use of a fast process, with its reduced rights and low acceptance rates of, 
undermines the right to asylum. Former CRR president Michel Combarnous warned in 
2005 that, if use of the procédure prioritaire continued to increase, ―the essential guarantee 
[of an OFPRA hearing] would tend to become a pretence‖112 (cited ibid.:3). In 2006 Gil-
Robles (2006:63) judged that the procédure prioritaire 
 
is far from offering the same guarantees as the claim to asylum in common law. In 
the end, it leaves only a tiny chance for applicants … There exists therefore in 
France a two-speed asylum system, which tends to be reinforced by the recent 
asylum reforms and the mistrust with which foreigners are generally surrounded.
113
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112
 … la garantie essentielle que constitue la possibilité pour le demandeur de saisir l‘office tendrait à devenir 
un faux-semblant. 
113
 … est loin d‘offrir les mêmes garanties que la demande d‘asile de droit commun. En définitive, elle ne 
laisse qu‘une chance infime aux demandeurs … Il existe donc en France un système de demandes d‘asile à 
deux vitesses, qui tend à être renforcé par les récentes réformes de l‘asile et la méfiance qui entoure de 
manière générale les étrangers. 
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9.6   Appeals to the CRR 
9.6.1   A difficult application process 
If your asylum application is refused by OFPRA you have the right to apply for an appeal 
to the CRR, and you have one month to do so after receiving your refusal letter from 
OFPRA. Unfortunately, the application process is difficult, as Gil-Robles reported 
(2006:60): 
 
Déboutés must, in particular, compose a letter in French, in which they must explain 
the reasons for their appeal, complete a new dossier and enclose all the documents 
required by the CRR.
114
 
 
The availability of help in the application process depends on your situation: you will get 
assistance if you are in CADA accommodation; if you are not in a CADA but you are in 
touch with an ―association‖, help may be available; if you are staying with friends or 
relatives, help is possible; but if your situation is less stable, you are much less likely to 
receive help. Furthermore, you may have problems even in a CADA. We have seen that 
government policy is to concentrate the work of CADAs on the provision of 
accommodation, reduce their support work, speed up procedures in general and increase the 
rate of departure (9.4.4.1). CADAs thus have less time to spend on guiding applicants 
through the appeals process. Moreover, pressure to accept CADA accommodation under 
the reforms led to more places being taken by individuals, which increased the number of 
individual claims in CADAs. Less time was then available to deal with each dossier and 
CADAs under pressure began to ―[send] asylum seekers to the associations [for help], 
citing lack of time‖115 (Accueil 2008:37). Whatever your situation, if time does run out and 
you do not meet the CRR deadline ―your appeal will be judged inadmissible – that is, 
rejected without examination‖116 (Guide 2005:14). In these circumstances, the appeals 
application process itself becomes another obstacle to the successful pursuit of an asylum 
claim. 
 
 
                                                 
114
 Le débouté doit en particulier rédiger une lettre, en français, dans laquelle il explique les motifs de son 
recours, remplir un nouveau dossier et réunir les documents exigés par la CRR. 
115
 … renvoyé des demandeurs d‘asile vers les permanences associatives en arguant le manque de temps. 
116
 … votre recours sera jugé irrecevable, c‘est-à-dire rejeté sans examen. 
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9.6.2   Judges, interpreters and legal representatives 
Once the CRR has received your application, it will send you an acknowledgement and you 
will receive one to three weeks‘ notice of the date of the hearing. You will be heard by a 
panel of three judges – a president, a member of the Conseil d‘État and a representative of 
UNHCR. You are entitled to a full, argued hearing of all the issues,
117
 at which you will be 
able both to question OFPRA‘s decision by citing your original grounds and to present new 
arguments not previously heard. The CRR will provide an interpreter in your preferred 
language. Moreover, there has recently been an important and positive change: you now 
have the right to a lawyer in court, paid for by the state. Previously, as Bousquet had noted 
(2006:25), legal representation was granted  
 
only to those who have entered French territory legally, yet many asylum seekers 
arrive clandestinely. Thus, less than 6% of foreigners who lodge appeals with the 
CRR benefit from this aid.
118
 
 
This policy represented a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right to asylum in 
France and was opposed by all the ―associations‖. Further, the European Commission was 
moving towards the granting of legal aid to all asylum seekers. But France opposed the idea 
―on the ground that it would cost too much‖119 (ibid.). In the end the European Commission 
issued the directive of 1 December 2005 which laid down that ―free legal assistance and/or 
representation be granted on demand‖120 (cited Castagnos-Sen 2006:118). France managed 
to get a delay in implementation until 1 December 2008, but since that date free legal 
representation in court has been available to all asylum seekers with insufficient resources. 
 
9.6.3   The importance of the CRR 
One month after the hearing the CRR will notify you of its decision: it will either reverse 
OFPRA‘s refusal and grant you refugee status or protection subsidiaire, or it will confirm 
OFPRA‘s decision and ask you to leave the country within one month (Livret 2006:17). 
Such powers make the CRR an important part of the asylum process. But it has become 
                                                 
117
 Un recours de plein contentieux. 
118… seulement s‘ils sont entrés légalement sur le territoire, or beaucoup de demandeurs d‘asile sont venus 
clandestinement. Ainsi moins de 6% des étrangers qui interjettent appel devant la CRR bénéficient de cette 
aide. 
119
 … au motif qu‘il coûterait trop cher. 
120
 … l‘assistance judiciaire et/ou la représentation gratuites soient accordées sur demande. 
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particularly important to asylum seekers because of what Gil-Robles calls the ―persistent 
differences between OFPRA and the CRR‖121 (2006:60). He means differences in 
outcomes, and gives an example: the nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina ―are, in their 
majority, refused by OFPRA although up to 78% of their claims are accepted by the 
CRR‖122 (ibid.). In 2004 OFPRA granted refugee status to asylum seekers overall at a rate 
of 9.3% (ibid.) and Bousquet (2006:13) complains that the relative stability of the rate of 
recognition of refugees since the 1990s (around 15-20%) hides the fall in rates of 
recognition by OFPRA, since 
 
today, nearly half the grants of refugee status are given by the CRR. Nearly 50% of 
people therefore obtain the status of refugee not from the administration with the 
responsibility for doing it but from the CRR, after an appeal by the applicant 
following a negative response from OFPRA.
123
 
 
Bousquet concludes (ibid.) that this shows OFPRA‘s shortcomings in its treatment of 
asylum claims and puts in question ―the reliability, even the seriousness and impartiality‖ 
of its decisions.
124
 Moreover, Gil-Robles criticises OFPRA because it ―does not always 
follow the jurisprudence laid down by [the CRR]‖125 (2006:60). All this increases the 
importance of the right of appeal and, not surprisingly, Castagnos-Sen found that 
applications to the CRR were ―quasi-systematic, 78% of OFPRA refusals being taken to the 
CRR‖126 (2006:111). Nevertheless, a number of serious problems arise at the appeals stage. 
 
9.6.4   Refusal by order 
The CRR, argues Castagnos-Sen, is often ―the only chance for an asylum seeker to be 
heard‖127 (2006:111) – except, she adds, in the case of ―rejections of appeal by order‖.128 
                                                 
121
 … divergences persistante qui existent entre l‘OFPRA et la CRR. 
122
 … sont majoritairement déboutés par l‘OFPRA alors que leurs demandes sont acceptées à hauteur de 78% 
par la CRR. 
123
 … qu‘aujourd‘hui, près de la moitié des statuts de réfugiés accordés le sont par la CRR. Près de 50% des 
personnes obtiennent donc le statut de réfugié non pas auprès de l‘administration en charge de le faire, mais 
auprès de la CRR et après un recours du demandeur ayant reçu une réponse négative de l‘OFPRA. 
124
 … la valeur voire le sérieux et l‘impartialité des décisions rendues par l‘OFPRA. 
125
 … ne suit pas toujours la jurisprudence établie par la Commission. 
126
 … quasi-systématique, 78% des rejets prononcés par l‘OFPRA faisant l‘objet d‘un recours devant la 
Commission. 
127
 … la CRR constitue encore souvent la seule chance pour le demandeur d‘asile d‘être auditionné … 
128
 … rejets du recours par ordonnances. 
CHAPTER 9: SEEKING ASYLUM IN FRANCE 262 
Your appeal may be dealt with by means of an order (ordonnance), i.e. a written judgment 
without a hearing. Ordonnances are made by a single judge, on advice from a ―rapporteur‖ 
whose report is based on the documentary evidence. There are two kinds of ordonnance: 
the ordonnance classique, used if you miss the CRR deadline of one month or if the judge 
decides that you lack evidence to support your appeal; and the ordonnance nouvelle, 
introduced as part of the 2003 reforms. The law of 10 December 2003 (CESEDA 2008, 
L.732-2) provides that ordonnances will be used in cases ―the nature of which does not 
justify the intervention of a collegiate bench‖129 (i.e. the three judges) and a later decree (14 
August 2004) specified that ordonnances could be used in cases ―which presented no 
serious facts capable of calling into question [OFPRA‘s] reasons‖ for its decision130 (cited 
Castagnos-Sen 2006:116). An ordonnance nouvelle is used (ibid.) if  
 
(a) the claim falls outside the strict categories of asylum; 
 
(b) you have asked for a ―re-examination‖ (réexamen) of your claim, where new 
facts are required, but you have not presented any new facts; 
 
(c) you did not turn up for an OFPRA interview; 
 
(d) OFPRA has refused an interview and declared your claim ―manifestly 
unfounded‖; 
 
(e) you are relying on the same facts and supporting evidence that you presented to 
OFPRA. 
 
So it is clear that at the CRR stage, as much as at earlier stages (9.3.2-9.3.4; 9.4.3), claims 
may be prejudged and filtered out, giving asylum seekers no chance to defend themselves. 
Gil-Robles (2006:60) described the criteria as ―flous‖ (vague, hazy). Yet 28% of appeal 
dossiers are dealt with in this way (ibid.), and no reasons have to be given for the decision. 
He considered that 28% was too high and that ―the increased workload the CRR has to face 
                                                 
129
 … dont la nature ne justifie pas l'intervention d'une formation collégiale. 
130
 … qui ne présentent aucun élément sérieux susceptible de remettre en cause les motifs de la décision du 
directeur général de l‘Office. 
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in no way justifies the massive use of ordonnances, which risks becoming abusive‖131 
(ibid.). The point missed here, however, is that any use of ordonnances with such ―vague‖ 
justifications contradicts the notion of a full, argued hearing (9.6.2). Moreover, criterion (e) 
above directly contradicts a principle of such a full, argued hearing, i.e. that applicants are 
not required ―to give reasons for their fears [or give] supporting evidence other than those 
presented at the first hearing‖132 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:116). 
    Another point should be made about ordonnances: a demand to prove ―serious facts‖ in 
advance 
  
shows ignorance of … the conditions in which asylum seekers prepare their appeals, 
often in a hurry without the help of a lawyer, the deadline for appeals before [the 
CRR] being one month while the deadline before administrative courts in common 
law is two months. We have here a procedure intended to reduce the argued element 
before [the CRR] … to the detriment of the imperatives of protection133 (Réforme 
2006:7). 
 
9.6.5   Desperately seeking downward trends 
Gil-Robles‘s reference to the CRR‘s workload highlights another problem and calls into 
question France‘s commitment to its protection obligations. From 2002 until 2004 there 
was a consistent rise in the number of appeals lodged with the CRR – 31,501 in 2002, 
44,201 in 2003 and 51,707 in 2004 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:112). The CRR saw its resources 
increased to cope with it and Gil-Robles described this as ―a very positive development‖134 
(2006:59). There was, however, a fall in 2005 of 25.4% on 2004 and the CRR immediately 
began to scale down its activities (Castagnos-Sen 2006:113), presumably on the assumption 
that the trend would continue. It began to lay off staff and did not renew the contracts ―of 
the great majority of the rapporteurs and secretaries recruited during the previous few 
                                                 
131
 … la charge de travail accrue à laquelle la CRR doit faire face ne peut en rien justifier l‘utilisation massive 
d‘ordonnances au risque qu‘elle ne devienne abusive.  
132
 … d‘invoquer des motifs de craintes et des éléments d‘appréciation autres que ceux présentés en première 
instance. 
133… méconnaît … les conditions dans lesquelles les demandeurs d‘asile rédigent leur recours, souvent dans 
l‘urgence sans l‘aide d‘un conseil, le délai de recours devant la Commission étant d‘un mois alors que le délai 
de droit commun devant les juridictions administratives est de deux mois. Il s‘agit donc ici d‘une procédure 
destinée à réduire le contentieux devant la Commission … au détriment des impératifs de protection. 
134
 … un développement fort positif. 
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months‖135 (ibid.). But assumptions about an increasingly downward trend were premature, 
since ―the number of appeals … did not fall in any spectacular way‖136 (ibid). This was not 
surprising, since the rate of refusals by OFPRA was rising – from around 85% to 90% in 
the last few years. Thus 8,326 appeals were lodged in the first quarter of 2006, against 
10,280 in the same quarter of 2005. The CRR acknowledged that it had seen ―not a fall [in 
appeals], but the prolonging of a modulated change already observed at the end of 2005‖137 
(cited ibid.). Unfortunately, the cuts affected the number of decisions made by the CRR in 
that quarter – down 55% on the same quarter of 2005. Any further reduction would lead to 
a bottleneck of dossiers and the lengthening of the appeals process, with an inevitable 
impact on asylum seekers. Castagnos-Sen cited a Senate report of April 2006 which 
―underlined the need for ‗OFPRA and the CRR [to have] sufficient means to face up to the 
inevitable fluctuations of asylum claims, and especially to avoid reducing … those means 
once a crisis has passed – risking the precipitation of the next one‘‖138 (ibid.).  
 
9.6.6   Priorities 
As in the UK, the right of appeal becomes particularly important in the context of poor 
decision-making at an earlier stage. Gil-Robles deplored the fact that, because of the low 
rate at which protection is granted by OFPRA, ―an appeal to the CRR seems like a normal 
route to obtaining asylum in certain cases‖139 (2006:60). It is, however, no easy route: the 
tight deadlines, the problem of finding help, the use of refusal by order and the willingness 
to reduce resources at the first sign of a fall in numbers suggest that the priorities of the 
government and the CRR lie in reducing costs, speeding up the appeal procedures and 
reducing the number of cases given a full, argued hearing. Such priorities work to the 
detriment of France‘s protection obligations and undermine the right to asylum. 
    Beyond the CRR there are just two possibilities of appeal. You can appeal to the Conseil 
d‘État, but this body will not consider the facts of your case, only legal technicalities. 
Moreover, ―[i]t is a long and costly procedure, necessitating a lawyer‖140 (Livret 2006:17) 
and although you may get legal aid the appeal is ―non-suspensif‖ – i.e. you may be 
                                                 
135
 … de la grande majorité des rapporteurs et secrétaires recrutés au cours des derniers mois. 
136…  le nombre de recours déposés entre janvier et mars 2006 n‘a pas diminué de manière spectaculaire ... 
137
 … pas d‘une chute mais du prolongement d‘une inflexion déjà observée à la fin de l‘année 2005. 
138… souligne la nécessité que « l‘OFPRA et la CRR disposent de moyens suffisants pour faire face en temps 
réel aux inévitables fluctuations de la demande d‘asile, et surtout d‘éviter de les réduire … dès qu‘une crise 
est passée – au risque de précipiter l‘arrivée de la suivante ». 
139… le recours devant la CRR apparaît comme une voie normale d‘obtention de l‘asile dans certains cas … 
140
 C‘est une procédure longue and coûteuse nécessitant un avocat … 
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deported before your hearing. The alternative is to ask for a re-examination (réexamen) of 
your case by OFPRA, but this is only possible if you have new facts to present (Bousquet 
2006:13) and the criteria for facts to qualify as ―new‖ are strict. In practice, the next step is 
deportation. 
 
9.7   Detention and deportation 
Once your claim has been finally refused, you have no right to remain in France. The 
préfecture will write to inform you that your APS is no longer valid and that you must leave 
the country. The law states that you ―have a month to leave French territory voluntarily‖ 
(CESEDA 2008, Art. L742-3). If you do not leave within the deadline, the préfecture will 
issue a deportation order (APRF) against you, enforceable after 48 hours. You have a right 
of appeal to an administrative court against the APRF and against the decision to specify 
the country of deportation. If you intend to challenge the specific-country decision, you are 
best advised to appeal against both at the same time, since the specific-country appeal alone 
is not ―suspensif‖, so you may be deported before the hearing (Diebolt 2008). The 
combined appeal, however, is ―suspensif‖. All this must be done within the 48-hour 
deadline, including obtaining legal advice and making the application in French (ibid.). 
 
9.7.1   Detention 
After receipt of the APRF, you are likely to be put in detention in one of the Centres de 
Rétention Administrative (CRAs). There are 24 of them, with a capacity of 1,700 people, 
and they are ―places of detention for foreigners in the process of expulsion‖141 (Main Basse 
2007:33). Detainees are subject to various expulsion or exclusion orders – some relating to 
the refusal of asylum, some to criminal or other illegal activities, some to arrests made 
during police trawls for illegal immigrants, such as those undertaken under ―Plan Ulysse 3‖ 
since May 2006, which target asylum seekers in the Calais region trying to get to the UK 
(ibid.:38). If you apply for asylum in the CRA the problems of deadlines are more acute: 
you have just five days to submit your dossier, in French, to OFPRA; OFPRA has 96 hours 
to decide your case. 
    In line with their restrictive agenda, and as a deterrent to asylum seekers, governments 
have long aimed at increasing the number of deportations and ―from 10,067 in 2002, 
                                                 
141
 … lieux d‘enfermement des étrangers en instance d‘expulsion. 
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removals to the border reached 16,660 in 2004 and 19,841 in 2005‖142 (Castagnos-Sen 
2006:196). Though this last was below the government‘s target for 2005 of 25,000, the 
upward trend continued and in February 2006 was 42% higher than in February 2005 
(ibid.). In this context, the length of detention was increased from 12 days to 32 and the 
capacity of the CRAs expanded. Nevertheless ―only around half of the foreigners in CRAs 
are effectively expelled‖143 (Gil-Robles 2006:69) and the minister of the interior told Gil-
Robles of his hope that the deportation figures for 2005 would turn out to be 50% up on 
2004. The commissioner, however, had other concerns (ibid.): 
 
Setting quotas is a shocking practice which is liable to result in the use of devices 
such as mass arrests in targeted zones to meet the stated objectives, stopping and 
questioning people who come to the préfecture to deal with their formalities, and in 
various abuses.
144
 
 
9.7.1.1   Living conditions 
Conditions in the CRAs, reported Gil-Robles, ―vary from one CRA to the other‖145 
(2006:65). He visited the CRAs at Arenc (near Marseilles), Mesnil-Amelot (near Roissy-
Charles de Gaulle airport) and the Palais de Justice in Paris. His findings raise grave 
questions about human rights in France and about the right to asylum. At Arenc, where the 
CRA is housed on the top floor of a warehouse, he reported complaints about lack of 
hygiene, difficulty in getting medical care and infrequent access to the ―cramped, wire-
fenced‖ courtyard. The CRA was almost filled to capacity (59 detainees out of a possible 
60, including four women). ―The common room‖, he reported, 
 
was small, smoky and cruelly lacking in ventilation, and reflected the generally 
dilapidated state of the premises. Generally speaking, I can only emphasise the 
                                                 
142
 … de 10 067 en 2002, les reconduites à la frontière sont passées à 16.660 en 2004 et 19.841 en 2005. 
143
 … seule près de la moitié des étrangers placés en CRA sont effectivement expulsés … 
144
 Le fait d‘énoncer des quotas est une pratique choquante qui présente le risque de conduire à la mise en 
place de dispositifs tels que les arrestations massives dans des zones ciblées pour remplir les objectifs fixés, 
les interpellations aux guichets des préfectures, et à un certain nombre d‘abus.  
145
 … varient d‘un CRA à l‘autre. 
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necessity of closing the Marseilles-Arenc centre without delay in August 2006
146
 
(ibid.). 
 
    In Paris, Gil-Robles had problems gaining access to the Palais de Justice. His careful 
language suggests there was an attempt to keep him out: ―I am glad that my visit – which I 
was absolutely determined to carry out – finally took place despite initial problems 
apparently caused by organisational difficulties‖147 (ibid.:66). The CRA took up two levels 
underground, ―each as dilapidated as the other‖ (ibid.): 
 
The premises are cramped, badly lit; hygiene is cruelly lacking, the bathrooms are 
in a deplorable state. Television is the only occupation offered to the detainees. 
They certainly have access to a courtyard, but it is only a few square metres in size. 
Furthermore, nearly a third of the ground surface of the courtyard is covered by a 
grid which overlooks the courtyard for the detainees in the lower basement. The 
courtyards, if such a description can be used for these places, constitute the single 
source of natural light. All that the detainees in the lower basement can see are the 
shoes of those in the upper basement and the cigarette ends they have stuck in the 
grid.
148
 
 
The women‘s section at the Palais de Justice was 
 
in a much better state. Clean, better ventilated, it offered more acceptable conditions 
to the 12 women who were detained there during our visit … I can only underline 
the remarkable work carried out by the nuns of the religious order who, by 
                                                 
146
 La salle commune, petite, enfumée et manquant cruellement d‘aération, illustre l‘état général dégradé du 
bâtiment. De manière générale, je ne peux qu‘insister sur la nécessité de fermer sans délai le centre de 
Marseille-Arenc en août 2006. 
147
 Je suis content que la visite de ces lieux que je tenais absolument à effectuer ait finalement pu se faire 
malgré quelques problèmes initiaux apparemment provoqués par des difficultés organisationnelles. 
148
 Les locaux sont exigus, mal éclairés ; l‘hygiène fait cruellement défaut, les sanitaires sont dans un état 
déplorable. La télévision constitue la seule occupation proposée aux retenus. Ils ont certes accès à une cour, 
mais elle ne fait que quelques mètres carrés. De plus, près d‘un tiers de sa superficie au sol est couverte par un 
grillage, qui donne sur la cour réservée aux retenus qui occupent le deuxième sous-sol. Les cours, si un tel 
qualificatif peut être employé pour ces endroits, constituent l‘unique source de lumière naturelle. Les retenus 
qui sont placés au deuxième sous-sol n‘ont pour seule perspective que les chaussures de ceux du premier 
sous-sol et les mégots coincés dans les grilles par ces derniers. 
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arrangement with the prison authorities, look after the women‘s area of the CRA 
…149 
 
Gil-Robles praised the nuns. He had an altogether different message for the government on 
the Palais de Justice facility for men: 
 
These inhuman and degrading conditions are not only unacceptable for the 
detainees who are placed there but also for the officials who work there. It is more 
than urgent to close this place which represents in itself a blatant and serious 
violation of human rights.
150
 
 
    The CRA at Mesnil-Amelot was a different story. With separate accommodation for men 
and women, but free movement throughout the premises during the day, the site had been 
recently renovated and detainees had access to sporting activities, as well as a library 
provided by the Red Cross. There were problems of hygiene and constant noise from the 
planes at Roissy. But it seemed almost a model CRA and Gil-Robles had no difficulty 
gaining access. 
    Marseilles-Arenc did close, to be replaced by Marseilles-Le Canet.
151
 The Paris CRA for 
men also closed. In September 2006, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(CPT) noted that there had been improvements in CRAs since its report in 2000, declaring 
many of the conditions to be ―satisfactory‖ (Torture 2007, para. 67). Yet no wide-ranging 
reforms had taken place: as in the UK (8.10), the authorities simply caught up with the 
latest critical report, addressed some of the issues and waited for the next complaint and 
another report, while the poor conditions and abuses moved from one CRA to another with 
no concerted attempt being made to bring them to an end across the board. So in October 
2006 the CPT found that the women‘s CRA in Paris, praised by Gil-Robles in February, 
suffered from two major faults (ibid.): 
 
                                                 
149
 … en bien meilleur état. Propre, mieux aérée, elle offre des conditions plus acceptables aux 12 femmes qui 
y étaient retenues lors de notre visite … [J]e ne peux que souligner le travail remarquable effectué par les 
sœurs de la congrégation religieuse qui s‘occupent, en collaboration avec les services pénitentiaires, de la 
partie femmes du CRA … 
150
 Ces conditions inhumaines et dégradantes sont inacceptables pour les personnes retenues qui y sont 
placées, mais également pour les fonctionnaires qui y travaillent. Il est plus qu‘urgent de fermer cet endroit 
qui représente à lui seul une image flagrante d‘une violation grave des droits de l‘homme. 
151
 Report in L’Express, 3 January 2008 (http://www.LEXPRESS.fr – accessed 6 April 2008). 
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… weak, even very weak, availability of natural light in all the premises and totally 
deficient ventilation during the visit. Such faults – which would already be difficult 
to accept in a brief period of detention – are totally unacceptable where people are 
detained for a prolonged period, which may extend up to 32 days.
152
 
 
At Vincennes the Committee found overcrowding, some areas almost unfit for human 
habitation, the presence of fleas and ticks, detainees with insect bites on their bodies; they 
also heard complaints, from detainees and staff, about rats on the site (ibid., para. 68). 
    Support services in CRAs are mostly provided by Cimade, the only NGO authorised to 
do so (Main Basse 2007:33). Cimade staff advise detainees of their rights, give guidance on 
procedures and provide, where possible, interpreting services and legal advice. The 
government agency ANAEM also has staff in the CRAs to advise on asylum procedures 
and how the CRA operates. Gil-Robles noted (2006:66) that detainees 
 
seemed to prefer the help and advice of Cimade representatives to those of ANAEM 
staff. The latter … gave them the impression of wanting to dissuade them from 
applying for asylum more than of wanting to see them through the process.
153
 
 
Nevertheless, the presence of both ―greatly contributes to calming the highly palpable 
tensions I could feel in each of the centres I visited‖154 (ibid.:67). As in the UK, these 
tensions often result in protests and disturbances. 
 
9.7.1.2   Protest movements 
On 22 June 2008 part of the CRA at Vincennes was damaged by fire during a 
demonstration by detainees. Cimade was not surprised: ―We have been telling the 
préfecture for months about the explosive situation brewing at Vincennes‖,155 a 
                                                 
152
 … un faible, voire un très faible, accès à la lumière naturelle dans tous les locaux et une aération des 
locaux totalement déficiente lors de la visite. De tels défauts - qui seraient déjà difficilement admissibles pour 
une période de garde à vue - sont totalement inacceptables pour un lieu d‘hébergement où des personnes 
peuvent être retenues pour une période prolongée, pouvant aller jusqu‘à 32 jours. 
153
 … semblaient préférer l‘aide et les conseils des représentants de la CIMADE à ceux des collaborateurs de 
l‘ANAEM. Ces derniers … leur donnaient plus l‘impression de vouloir les dissuader de demander l‘asile que 
d‘encadrer leurs démarches. 
154
 … contribue grandement à apaiser les tensions fortement palpables, que j‘ai pu ressentir dans chacun des 
centres visités. 
155
 Depuis des mois, nous avons rappelé à la préfecture la situation explosive qui couvait à Vincennes. 
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spokesperson told the newspaper Le Monde (Incendie 2008). Indeed, just two weeks before 
the fire, an official report
156
 had warned of the ―climate of tension and violence which 
reigns permanently in all the CRAs, especially at Vincennes where a tiny incident [would 
be] enough to set fire to the powder‖157 (Rapport 2008). Vincennes site 1 was set on fire at 
the beginning of 2007 and again when it reopened a month before Christmas. In January 
2008 there were protests at both Vincennes sites and at Mesnil-Amelot. Detainees at 
Mesnil-Amelot presented a letter outlining grievances to the director and went on hunger-
strike. At Vincennes protesters occupied the courtyard for part of one night, but were 
forcibly returned to their rooms. 
    The protests were about conditions in the centres – but also about wider issues: ―the most 
important thing, deprivation of our liberty‖,158 as the detainees‘ letter to the Vincennes 
management put it (Étrangers 2008). For France Terre d‘Asile, the issue was ―the policy of 
mass deportations, [which] ignores individual situations in order to reduce them to a 
statistical target which is purely arbitrary‖159 (Manifestations 2008).  Cimade called for the 
abolition of expulsion quotas and for CRAs to be limited to 100 places – Vincennes housed 
280. 
    The drive to achieve mass deportations impacts not just on recently refused asylum 
seekers but also on those who, despite ―manifestly unfounded‖ verdicts, remained in 
France, started families and now have children in school. Some have applied for 
―régularisation‖ of their position (possible after 10 years but only given on a very 
discretionary basis). Cissé, from Mali, described his situation to Le Monde (Étrangers 
2008): 
 
I‘ve been here for 11 years. I was arrested on Monday at the Gare du Nord and they 
brought me [to Vincennes] although I was waiting for a reply to my application for 
regularisation … I have a job, payslips, tax records …160 
                                                 
156
 Report of 5 June 2008 by the Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Centres et Locaux de Rétention 
Administrative et des Zones d‘Attente. 
157
 … climat de tension et de violence qui règne de façon permanente dans tous les CRA et spécialement à 
Vincennes, où un rien suffit à mettre le feu aux poudres (cited ibid.). 
158
 … la chose la plus importante, la privation de notre liberté. 
159
 … la tentative de massification de la politique d'éloignement des étrangers ignore de fait les situations 
individuelles, pour les réduire à un objectif chiffré qui relève du plus pur arbitraire. 
160
 Je suis en France depuis onze ans. J'ai été arrêté lundi à la gare du Nord, et ils m'ont emmené ici alors que 
j'attends une réponse à ma demande de régularisation … [ j]'ai un emploi, des fiches de payes, de feuilles 
d'impôts ...  
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Cissé ―hovers between fear of the plane and the hope of being freed.‖161 Tamil Elanchelvan 
Rajendram may have had similar fears: deported to Sri Lanka from the Alsace region of 
France in August 2005 after the refusal of his asylum claim, he was shot dead by the Sri 
Lankan army in the courtyard of his home in February 2006. He was unarmed. His family 
informed OFPRA, the CRR and the préfecture which had had oversight of his claim in 
order to ―remind [them] that in the case of victims of persecution, expulsion may be 
synonymous with death‖162 (Débouté 2007). 
 
9.7.2   Deportation 
We have seen how the harsh Pasqua–Debré laws in the 1980s and 1990s enabled 
deportations under armed escort and how even regularisation measures were used to effect 
more deportations (3.19, 3.22, 3.25). In 2006 the government circular of 21 February laid 
down the rules for arresting people for deportation – at home, in the street, at préfecture 
enquiry offices, on the premises of ―associations‖, in hospitals, hostels and CADAs. The 
circular was opposed by ―professional organisations and associations for the defence of 
human rights and of refugees‖163 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:95) and Médecins du Monde164 
complained that the procedures undermined medical ethics. What the newspaper Libération 
called ―the hunting down‖165 of sans-papiers for deportation continued, however, often with 
damaging consequences for the hunted: in the space of a month and a half in 2007, four 
sans-papiers jumped from windows in order to escape their pursuers (Désespoir 2007): 
 
On 4 August, Sébastien, a young Congolese man, threw himself from the second 
floor of the premises of the border police (PAF) in Lyons. On 9 August, at Amiens, 
it was Ivan, aged 12, who fell from the fourth floor trying to flee from the police 
with his father. Last week … a young Tunisian, taken by the police to his sister-in-
                                                 
161
 … oscille entre la hantise de l'avion et l'espoir d'être libéré. 
162
 … rappeler que, dans le cas  de personnes victimes de persécutions, l'expulsion peut être synonyme de 
mort. 
163
 … plusieurs organisations professionnelles et associations de défense des droits de l‘homme et des réfugiés 
… 
164
 Médecins du Monde is an NGO which aims to provide medical care to vulnerable groups throughout the 
world. It undertakes medical and relief projects and campaigns against human rights abuse and other 
injustices. Its volunteers are medical and paramedical professionals. 
165
 La traque. 
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law‘s home in Rousillon (Isère), threw himself from the window of the fourth 
floor.
166
 
 
In the case of Sébastien, the doctors suspected a suicide attempt. In the case of 12-year-old 
Ivan, a police enquiry was ―discreetly closed‖167 a month later, with a statement that ―no 
criminal offence was found [against] the police officers‖.168 The fourth incident involved a 
Chinese woman who was seriously injured when she threw herself from a first-floor 
apartment in Paris. 
    In 2006 Jeff Babatundé Shittu, a 19-year-old lycée student from Nigeria, was 
deported.
169
 His application had finally been rejected after the Nigerian ambassador in Paris 
had reported that there was no substance to his case. The dangers of believing the claims of 
diplomatic or government sources in countries of persecution were discussed earlier (6.5.5). 
Shittu was nevertheless deported – but not without resisting. He had been supported 
throughout the asylum process by several ―associations‖, as well as individuals including 
his teachers and Assemblée Nationale deputy Patrick Bloche. On the day of his deportation, 
several passengers on the plane protested at his treatment and two were arrested. 
Eventually, however, the plane took off for Lagos with Shittu on board. 
 
9.7.3   Children 
Though children are protected from deportation in French law (CESEDA 2008, Arts L.511-
4, L.521-4) and from unlawful or arbitrary detention under the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Rights of the Child 1990, Art. 37(b)), children in France are 
nonetheless detained and deported. This is usually defended in terms of the ―best interest of 
the children [being] the non-separation of families‖170 (Castagnos-Sen 2006:196), and the 
whole family is normally deported and detained together. As a result of pressure by the 
Réseau Éducation sans Frontières (RESF),
171
 the government issued a circular, slightly 
                                                 
166
 Le 4 août, Sébastien, un jeune Congolais s'est jeté du deuxième étage des locaux de la police de l'air et des 
frontières (PAF) à  Lyon. Le 9 août, c'est Ivan, 12 ans, qui est tombé du quatrième étage en voulant fuir la 
police avec son père, à  Amiens. La semaine dernière … un jeune Tunisien, raccompagné chez sa belle-soeur 
par les gendarmes, s'est jeté par la fenêtre du quatrième étage, à  Roussillon (Isère). 
167
 … discrètement close … (ibid.) 
168
 … aucune faute pénale n‘a été relevée à l‘encontre des policiers … (ibid.) 
169
 ―Polémique autour de la reconduite à la frontière d‘un lycéen nigérien‖, Le Monde, 30 June 2006. 
170
 … l‘intérêt supérieur de l‘enfant étant apprécié dans le sens de la non séparation des familles. 
171
 RESF is an umbrella organisation, with more than 120 affiliated asylum support ―associations‖, which 
campaigns in particular for children of school age. 
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modifying its stance, advising préfectures ―not to implement, before the end of the school 
year, [expulsions] of families whose child has been in school for several months‖172 (cited 
ibid.). Even this advice, however, is ―largely ignored‖173 by the préfectures, and children 
continue to be detained and deported. Gil-Robles judged that ―[t]he legal and human 
problems posed by the presence of children in detention seem … totally underestimated by 
the French authorities‖174 (2006:70). 
 
9.8   Conclusion 
I have shown how the restrictive agenda in France towards asylum seekers operates from 
the zones d‘attente, where people have limited rights and where they may be subjected to 
deportation without proper consideration of their claims; to the préfecture, where their 
claim may again be judged as ―manifestly unfounded‖; and on to the OFPRA procedure, 
where the asylum interview is not mandatory, there is no state-funded legal advice and no 
right to any legal representation at interview, and where already short timescales and 
deadlines become even shorter in the procédure prioritaire. At the appeal stage, limited 
appeal rights, short timescales and the procedures of the CRR reduce the chances of a fair 
hearing and there are also concerns about the CRR‘s independence from OFPRA and from 
government. At the point of final refusal, asylum seekers are arrested detained and deported 
with little chance of appeal, while poor conditions and abuse in detention centres and the 
fear of return lead to protest movements and resistance to deportation, often taking the form 
of self-harm or attempted suicide. 
    I have argued that France‘s restrictive agenda means that the asylum process has become 
an obstacle race intended to deter and discourage applicants, with asylum seekers seen as a 
problem of immigration control rather than as victims in need of protection. Even the 
welcome widely given to the recently granted right to have a lawyer in court at the appeals 
stage must be tempered by the fact that this concession was extracted only with difficulty 
from an unwilling government (9.6.2) reluctant to accept its responsibilities of protection 
under the Refugee Convention. 
    In the next chapter I will review the findings of this study and suggest a way forward. 
                                                 
172
 … à ne pas mettre à exécution avant la fin de l‘année scolaire l‘éloignement de familles dont un enfant est 
scolarisé depuis plusieurs mois. 
173
 … largement ignorée … 
174
 Les problèmes juridiques et humains que pose la présence d‘enfants en rétention semblent … totalement 
sous-évalués par les autorités françaises.  
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10.1 Introduction 
I began by suggesting (Introduction, p.1) that the increasingly restrictive asylum policies of 
the UK and France, which reflected the trend across the EU, have undermined the right to 
asylum in those two states. In this chapter, I review the findings of the preceding chapters 
to show the contradictions between the duty to protect under the Refugee Convention taken 
on by the two states studied here and the laws, procedures and practices of both states as 
they deal with asylum seekers at their borders. I then make a number of recommendations 
for change both in terms of the asylum systems in both countries and in terms of wider 
issues beyond national borders. 
 
10.2   A duty to protect, a procedure to dissuade   
Although both the UK and France have signed and ratified the Refugee Convention and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), their response to asylum seekers at their 
borders suggests a reluctance to fulfil their obligations as signatories. The response of both 
states to the flow of refugees over the last two decades has been increasingly restrictive and 
we have seen this both in the legislation passed (2.17; 3.26; 4.3.1; 4.5), in the successive 
reforms undertaken (3.26; 4.4.1; 4.5) and in the asylum procedures and practices adopted 
(analysed and discussed in chapters 5-8 (UK) and chapter 9 (France)). What has emerged is 
the treatment of asylum seekers as part of a problem of immigration control rather than as 
people needing protection under international law. This is also reflected in the language 
used by politicians in their public discourse (4.3.1; 4.5). 
    Procedures and practices in both countries undermine the right to asylum. At the earliest 
stage in the UK, screening procedures are liable to be lengthy, stressful (5.2.1) and 
sometimes abusive (5.2.2). No-choice accommodation and low levels of financial support 
are organised specifically to deter applications (5.3.1) and accommodation and cash support 
may be denied if an application is not made shortly after arrival (5.3.2), a demand made 
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more difficult by the lack of provision of Asylum Screening Units (5.3.3). The increasing 
use of detained-fast-track procedures, where negative assumptions about claims are made 
without full examination, facilitates not protection but removal (5.3.5). Timescales and 
deadlines, particularly under fast-track procedures and the New Asylum Model (NAM), 
leave applicants little time to find legal advice and prepare their case (5.3.5). Moreover, 
legal aid has been restricted in a way that has forced many solicitors out of immigration and 
asylum (6.4.1). 
    In France at the earliest stage, applicants at the port of entry are placed in a zone 
d‘attente, a holding area not considered to be part of French territory. They have limited 
rights and their case may be declared ―manifestly unfounded‖ without proper consideration 
(9.3.2ff) and they may be quickly deported to their country of origin. On application at the 
préfecture, préfectures may demand documentation beyond the requirements of the law and 
refuse to accept claims without it (9.4.2), applicants may be given sparse information 
(9.4.1), will have to work to short deadlines and meet stringent requirements to complete 
their dossiers (9.5.1). If they do not meet these requirements the application will not be 
accepted and any further application will be placed in the procédure prioritaire. Applicants 
are increasingly placed in this procedure, where timescales are shorter, applicants have no 
entitlement to accommodation or benefit, are less likely to get an asylum interview, are less 
likely to receive protection and can be deported before their appeal is heard (9.4.3; 9.5.3). 
In terms of accommodation and support as deterrent factors, the choice is between, on the 
one hand, insecure accommodation and no state benefits (9.4.4) and, on the other, 
accommodation in CADAs, through which the state increasingly controls the facilities 
available to applicants  and more easily manages their removal (9.4.4.1). 
    At the interview and decision-making stage in the UK, the right to asylum continues to 
be undermined. Legal aid is not available for solicitors to attend the main asylum interview, 
despite the complexity of the law (6.4). There is frequent failure to provide female 
interviewers or interpreters for women applicants, contrary to UNHCR guidelines (6.5.2). 
Country reports are compiled, interpreted and used in ways detrimental to applicants‘ 
interests (6.5.3ff). The legal requirement to search for ―credibility‖ issues has encouraged 
an ―agenda of disbelief‖ which sends caseworkers searching for ―contradictions‖ and 
―discrepancies‖ in asylum-seeker accounts as a basis for refusal (6.5.8ff). Moreover, under 
pressure from the restrictive agenda caseworkers may misinterpret or misrepresent 
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applicants‘ written statements and their answers at interview and use the result to justify 
refusal of claims (6.6.6). 
    In France at this stage, the right to asylum is undermined by short timescales and 
deadlines (9.5.1), the denial of state-funded legal advice, the non-mandatory status of the 
OFPRA interview and the denial of any legal representation at all at that interview. 
Moreover, since applicants have to pay the travel costs to the interview, many cannot afford 
to keep the appointment and are thus deprived of a hearing (9.5.2.1). OFPRA also has the 
power to declare cases ―manifestly unfounded‖, often making no attempt to substantiate its 
charges (9.5.2.2). 
    Not surprisingly, a substantial proportion of initial decisions in both countries are 
overturned on appeal (7.2.1; 9.6.3) and appeal processes therefore play an important role 
for many asylum seekers in their search for protection. The restrictive agenda, however, 
impacts on these processes too. In the UK questions arise about whether the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal (AIT) can give adequate and consistent redress against the bad 
practices and poor decision-making of the earlier stages, as well as questions about its 
independence. The government has restricted rights of appeal by means of legislation 
(7.2.1) and a merits test for legal aid (7.2.2), both of which undermine the right to asylum. 
Moreover, the fast-track process works to tighter deadlines and reduces rights of appeal, 
and under NAM the timescales for appeals are shorter than before (7.2.3). Serious questions 
also arise about decision-making by the AIT: there are concerns about its role in shaping 
government policy through country-guidance cases, the way it analyses and references its 
material and uses its sources (7.3). 
    In France the short timescales for applications are particularly problematic and lead to 
difficulties in preparing for appeals (9.6.1) and there are questions about the independence 
of the Appeals Commission (CRR) (4.6.2.2). The CRR, moreover, decides 28% of its cases 
by order (ordonnance), thus denying applicants a hearing (9.6.4). In both countries limited 
appeal rights reduce the chances of a fair hearing and undermine the right to asylum. 
    The final stage of the asylum process is entirely about immigration control. The 
authorities presume that claimants have been proved guilty (by the decision made against 
them) and they must therefore be removed (4.3.2). So in the UK it is made difficult to get 
bail or legal representation (8.3), families and children are detained (8.4.4) together with 
victims of torture (8.4.1) and an armoury of legal and administrative devices is employed to 
persuade them, and finally force them, to leave (8.7-8.9). Fear of return, poor conditions 
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and abuse in detention centres (8.6) lead to protests and self-harm (8.6.1; 8.11). In France 
the restrictive agenda means that targets are set for deportations (9.7.1), people are 
unceremoniously expelled from CADAs (9.4.4.1) or are arrested in the street (9.7.1). Living 
conditions in detention centres (CRAs), the very fact of detention when no crime has been 
committed and the fear of return engender protest movements and resistance to deportation 
(9.7.1.2; 9.7.2). 
     
10.3   Determined to travel in the wrong direction 
Governments claim that the restrictive laws, procedures and regulations are necessary to 
deter unfounded applicants (4.3.1; 4.5; 5.3.1; 7.2) and UK governments in particular claim 
that they have succeeded in reducing numbers by these means (4.3.1). 
    It is certainly true that numbers have fallen in recent years. Claims in the EU fell by 19% 
in 2004 compared with 2003, according to UNHCR, and claims in the top 50 industrialised 
countries fell by 26% (cited BBC News 2005). Indeed, after the high of 655,130 
applications to the top 50 in 2001, there was a steady fall to 396,380 in 2004.  In 2006 
UNHCR used a measure which estimates the capacity of a country to absorb newcomers 
and showed that ―the UK was the 18th most popular destination out of 50 industrialised 
nations with 0.5 asylum applications per 1,000 people, compared with 0.8 in France ...‖ 
(cited BBC News 2006). The head of UNHCR‘s Europe bureau, Raymond Hall, judged 
that ―[i]n most industrialised countries it should simply not be possible to claim there is a 
huge asylum crisis any more‖ (ibid.). This success in reducing numbers, however, may not 
be anything to boast about: UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, 
surveying further falls in 2005, challenged the industrialised countries to ―ask themselves 
whether by imposing ever tighter restrictions on asylum seekers they are not closing their 
doors to men, women and children fleeing persecution‖ (ibid.). In relation to the UK, this 
point was reiterated in 2008 by Donna Covey, chief executive of the Refugee Council. ―Yet 
again‖, she wrote, ―the government takes pride in a fall in people seeking asylum‖ 
(Response to Statistics 2008). Yet this ―should only be celebrated if the world has become a 
safer place‖. However, ―with wars raging around the world and serious human rights 
abuses continuing in places like Zimbabwe, Darfur and Burma this is patently not the case‖ 
(ibid.). 
    This suggests a need for urgent action: first, in the words of High Commissioner 
Guterres, the industrialised states should ―devote more attention to improving the quality of 
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their asylum systems, from the point of view of protecting refugees, rather than cutting 
numbers‖ (BBC News 2006) and, secondly, the causes of flight in the countries of origin 
need to be addressed. 
    In fact UNHCR, the Refugee Council and Forum Réfugiés in France have long argued 
that such imperatives, rather than restrictions, should inform asylum policy. States, 
however, have not responded. In 2001 UK home secretary Jack Straw, in a speech to the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), set the tone for asylum policy in the EU for the 
first decade of the twenty-first century. The speech reflected thinking across the EU – but 
pointed in the opposite direction to that suggested by António Guterres. Straw claimed his 
objective was to make the Refugee Convention ―work as it was intended – to relieve the 
suffering of genuine refugees‖ (Straw 2001, para. 7). But if that was the case his words 
quickly disappointed. He identified three aims for the ―international community‖, the first 
two of which seem, at first sight, consistent with the stated objective. The first two aims 
were (ibid., paras 28-29): 
 
(1) to ―make conditions in the regions concerned better‖; 
 
(2) to ―make it easier for genuine refugees to access the protection regimes of Europe 
and other Western States, for example by making their journeys less hazardous‖. 
 
On a preliminary reading, Straw‘s first aim might be to address the causes of flight and find 
ways to dissuade regimes from persecuting, and even waging war on, their own citizens. 
This was not the case. His aim was simply to find ways of keeping people in neighbouring 
countries and preventing them travelling further: ―Action in the region of origin will reduce 
the pressure on refugees to travel further afield in search of protection‖ (ibid., para. 38). It 
would mean funding UNHCR refugee camps in regions of origin and giving priority to 
protection in those regions (ibid., para. 32), thus keeping most refugees out of the EU. 
    Yet it is not unreasonable to ask states to address the causes of flight when those states 
play a role in their creation. We saw how the economic policies of Western states and 
institutions have affected the ability of many Third World states to provide subsistence for 
their populations, and how this leads to poverty, protest, repression and an increase in the 
flow of refugees (1.4). Western arms sales are another important factor in creating the 
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refugees who turn up on the borders of Western states. Madgiguène Cissé, a spokesperson 
for French sans-papiers, told a 1997 conference in France (cited Hayter 2000:170-1): 
 
They tell you about the debt we must pay back, they tell you about public assistance 
for the development, but what they don‘t talk about is that a large proportion of this 
public assistance serves to arm the dictators. They say, ―We gave you x billion in 
aid‖, without mentioning that those billions were used to arm dictators such as 
Mobutu [of Zaire] … Whenever there are public disturbances, when the people are 
in the street, the French army is there to restore order. There are some very recent 
examples of this: Zaire, and Bangui where the French army took the liberty of 
conducting reprisals. 
 
In 2003 and 2004 Hawk jets and Scorpion tanks, supplied by the UK, were used for internal 
repression in Indonesia (Norton-Taylor 2003; Challenge 2004). Norton-Taylor also 
reported (2003) that ―exports approved for Colombia included … technology for the 
production of toxins … components for heavy machine guns, combat aircraft, combat 
helicopters, and small calibre artillery‖. ―All over the world‖, writes Hayter, ―refugees flee 
wars, repression and torture which are made possible with weapons and equipment 
manufactured and exported by the West‖ (2000:171). So the West needs to address the 
reasons for flight. It is beyond the scope of this study to give a detailed analysis of how this 
may be done, but the issues involved should include, first, the ending of arms sales to 
regimes which abuse human rights, oppress their own populations or engage in acts of 
aggression against neighbouring states. Secondly, it should include encouraging what the 
Refugee Council called ―joined-up policies of conflict prevention and [economic] 
development‖ (Vision 2004:19) and, in the case of the latter, debt should be cancelled and 
sustainable development devised and promoted to the advantage of those countries. In the 
context of these two aims, respect for human rights can be promoted. 
    Straw‘s second aim, too, raises hopes on first reading, since victims of persecution 
undoubtedly need easier access to protection. But, for Straw, making it easier to access 
protection did not mean easing restrictions. In particular it did not mean abolishing visa 
requirements for people from refugee-producing countries or abolishing the penalties on 
carriers who transport people with false travel documents (1.8.2; 2.17). He claimed that 
such abolition would mean refugee movements being ―determined … principally by 
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racketeers who control the trafficking routes‖ (ibid., para. 40). Most NGOs argue, on the 
contrary, that the traffickers‘ trade flourishes precisely because of the visa requirements and 
penalties. Nevertheless, Straw rejected abolition and instead supported an idea, already 
under discussion in the EU, which would keep numbers to a minimum. If implemented, ―an 
agreed number of refugees – and possibly others in need of protection – would be identified 
in their own regions and brought to the EU for resettlement‖ (ibid., para. 43). 
    Objections were quickly raised after the speech and Human Rights Watch feared that the 
plan ―to set quotas of refugees that European countries would accept from specific trouble 
spots, while insisting that the rest find protection in the region from which they come‖, 
would ―seriously compromise the security of refugees‖, many of whom ―are simply not 
able to find safety in neighbouring countries in their region of origin‖ (HRW 2001). Indeed, 
such a scheme would exclude participants in this study who fled when they had to, often 
precipitately, most without choice or knowledge of their destination. 
    Such concerns were proved justified when the Gateway Programme, based on these 
ideas, was introduced in the UK in 2003. The criteria for inclusion in the programme were 
strict and only 1% of the refugee population in the refugee camps concerned were selected 
(Gateway Presentation 2006). In March/April 2004, 69 people were ―resettled‖ in 
Sheffield; in November, 81 people went to Bolton; in 2005, 51 refugees were sent to 
Sheffield (Protection Programme 2005), 84 to Bury and Bolton combined and 115 to Hull 
and Rochdale (Gateway Presentation 2006). The numbers were low, as Human Rights 
Watch had feared. Fortunately there are still routes to protection outside such schemes. 
People who use them, however, have to negotiate the system described in this study, a 
system informed by the restrictive agenda which continued in the years that followed 
Straw‘s speech. Neither Straw nor his successors, nor his counterparts in France, have 
shown any sign of initiating reforms which would truly ―make conditions in the regions of 
origin better‖ or ―make it easier for genuine refugees to access the protection regimes of 
Europe‖. Instead they have continued to operate the restrictive agenda, take pride in 
reducing numbers, when there has been no corresponding reduction in persecution, and see 
asylum seekers as a challenge to immigration controls. 
 
10.4   No justification 
But the Refugee Convention is about the obligation to protect, not about immigration 
control, which should not be a consideration when dealing with asylum seekers. They 
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mostly come from countries known for human rights abuses. The only safe course is to 
accept their asylum claims unless there is clear and overwhelming evidence to the contrary: 
the burden of proof should be abandoned in favour of the benefit of the doubt. 
Unfortunately, this suggestion raises the spectre of the Third World poor migrating in 
uncontrollable numbers to the rich countries, a fear which prompted French prime minister 
Michel Rocard to say in 1990: ―France cannot welcome all the poverty of the world …‖1 
(cited Taïeb 1998:75). This fear is one source of the idea that most asylum seekers are 
economic migrants pretending to be refugees: surely Western countries must protect 
themselves from such people? Yet it is not the poor who make up the majority of migrants. 
Harris argues that international migration requires ―access to money well beyond the means 
of the poor‖ (2002:55). ―The poorest countries do not produce emigrants‖, he writes (ibid.), 
―and of those countries which do it is not the poor … who emigrate‖: 
 
Jullundur in the Punjab has produced a large number of emigrants, yet it is one of 
the richer districts of a relatively rich province. The people who leave are the better 
educated with family incomes that are around or above the average, not people from 
India‘s vast number of poor, who are concentrated in other provinces – eastern Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa. 
 
In the case of refugees, they move because they see ―a threat to life and liberty so great it 
makes the immense dangers and costs of flight acceptable‖ (ibid.). But in their case, too, 
the poor are not the first to move. S6 was accused of being an ―economic migrant‖ (5.2.2) 
but, he told me, the reason for his hazardous journey on foot and by lorry was not 
 
for money, for work. I was computer engineer [in Iran] and I had computer shop. 
Every month I [had my] salary – it‘s about 600 dollars – and you can live just in bad 
situation in Iran, 300 dollars, you know. Every month I [get] 600, or more [than] 
that. But I leave Iran just for save my life.
2
 
 
FS3 had property, his own business, and did not want to leave, but feared for his safety 
(6.6.4). 
                                                 
1
 La France ne peut pas accueillir toute la misère du monde ... 
2
 Research interview, 23 August 2006. 
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    It seems unlikely that easing restrictions would provoke mass migration. Hayter notes 
(2000:153) that when there have been no immigration controls (from the Commonwealth to 
Britain in the 1950s, from Puerto Rico and Cuba to the United States and from French 
overseas departments to France), 
 
migration has been large but only a small proportion of the population of both 
receiving and most sending countries. Between 1950 and 1980 … 0.6 of the 
population of the Caribbean emigrated per year, taking advantage of the absence of 
restrictions in former colonial powers and the United States. 
 
When the UK handed Hong Kong back to China in 1997, it was very reluctant to offer visas 
to its former citizens, since it feared a mass exit. In the end 20,000 were made available but 
only 10,000 were taken up (ibid.). 
    If Raymond Hall, head of UNHCR‘s Europe bureau, is right when he says that ―[i]n most 
industrialised countries it should simply not be possible to claim there is a huge asylum 
crisis any more‖ (cited BBC News 2006), then in the UK and France there is no 
justification for the restrictive agenda imposed on asylum seekers by these two signatory 
states to the Refugee Convention: not for visa restrictions and carrier sanctions or airline 
liaison officers abroad; not for poor support packages, reductions in legal aid or reduced 
rights of appeal; not for dawn raids, detention and enforced deportation. There is certainly 
no justification for the bad practices examined, for example, in sections 6.2 and 6.5-6.6 of 
this study. In their place a system is needed which, instead of presuming the guilt of asylum 
seekers, gives them a fair hearing, the benefit of any doubt, guaranteeing an interviewing 
and decision-making process which does not set ―credibility‖ and other traps for applicants, 
and ensuring a full range of rights to legal representation and appeals. 
 
10.5   Racism again 
The language used by governments to justify their policies is racist language. Indeed, 
politicians both in government and in opposition have at various times characterised most 
asylum seekers as ―bogus‖ or ―faux‖ (4.3.1; 4.5) and claimed that they are economic 
migrants not in need of protection. The discourse that developed was that of a revived 
racism, originally rooted in the colonial histories of both countries (chapters 2 and 3), and 
now adapted to the new situation (4.3.1; 4.5). On attitudes to immigration in general, 
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Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote: ―The Poles … have become the new blacks‖ (Alibhai-
Brown 2007). The Poles, of course, come to the UK and France by right in the expanded 
EU, though they still suffer this racism. But, in similar vein, ―Kosovan‖ has become a term 
of abuse against asylum seekers in some areas (for example in Hull, where there are few 
Kosovans and where most asylum seekers are Iraqi Kurds). The term serves a similar 
purpose to ―Paki‖ – it claims to identify and it insults.  
    The cost of playing the race card in politics is high: it is costly to society because it is 
socially divisive but its victims bear most of the cost. In the case of asylum this is seen 
most starkly at the end of the asylum process. The abuses inherent in dawn raids, detention 
procedures and enforced deportation (described in chapters 8 and 9) often result in protests, 
self-harm or suicide. They also result in people being sent back to their deaths (9.7.1.2). 
Moreover, as the Oakington documentary suggested (8.6), the racism resurrected by the 
government‘s discourse may find particularly virulent expression when hidden from public 
view in a detention centre. 
 
10.6   Change 
There is no sign that governments are changing their stance and there seems no end to the 
restrictive agenda. On 30 March 2009 the UK Court of Appeal ruled that ―failed asylum 
seekers‖ were not entitled to free National Health Service treatment in England, overruling 
an earlier High Court ruling that they were. One exception was allowed: if an asylum 
seeker cannot return home and cannot pay in advance hospitals must ―consider treatment‖, 
but they were ―at the mercy of the discretion of the hospital‖ (Access Denied 2009). Lord 
Justice Ward expressed his views on ―failed asylum seekers‖ clearly: they ―should not be 
here and should never have come in the first place‖ (ibid.). Health Secretary Alan Johnson 
was ―pleased with the Court of Appeal‘s judgment that asylum seekers cannot acquire 
‗ordinary resident‘ status‖ which would entitle them to treatment and a range of other 
services (ibid.). 
    If there is no sign of change on the part of governments, there is no sign either that 
asylum seekers will give up their demands for protection. Asylum seekers often express the 
view that, at an individual level, their persistence and continued presence can change 
people‘s perceptions of them. CB1 said that when he and others first arrived in Hull, ―there 
were always fights – people would beat us up and we were blamed, and then banned from 
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pubs and clubs.‖3 But, he said, ―we didn‘t go away, we stayed here, and now things are 
better.‖ S5 explained how this change starts. People were often hostile at first, but 
 
… we are mixed [into society] now. We are making friendly, we learn English. We 
know how we started [to be] friendly with the English people because we learn 
language. We work. We was explain why we coming here: ―We no coming here just 
for work. We no coming here just for going out with the English woman. We 
having a problem [in our country].‖ 
 
However, if governments are to change their policies and practices, they have to be 
challenged collectively and politically, and hope may lie in the fact that campaigns and 
movements have developed to do just this. Just as migrants increasingly found a voice and 
fought for their rights in the UK and France in previous decades (2.15f; 3.18ff), so recent 
asylum seekers have done the same. The sans-papiers movement in France has organised 
protests against deportation at airports and even on planes and there are ongoing campaigns 
by organisations like ANAFÉ and Cimade. In the UK a range of organisations like the 
Unity Centre in Glasgow and the 167 Centre in Hull, as well as national organisations, give 
support to campaigns and protests, provide advice and other support to asylum seekers 
challenging refusal and deportation, produce reports and lobby governments. It may be that, 
just as the UK‘s ―sus‖ laws were repealed in 1981 due to the resistance of its victims (2.15), 
the restrictive agenda‘s laws and practices will be removed by the concerted action of 
asylum seekers and their supporters and the involvement of concerned NGOs. If this 
happens, the EU states, by sharing the responsibility – not the ―burden‖ – of refugee 
protection, will be able to uphold the right to asylum and fulfil their obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. 
 
10.7   Conclusion: key findings and recommendations 
10.7.1 Key findings 
I have argued that, although both states studied in this research are signatories to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, their increasingly restrictive asylum policies (expressed in laws, 
procedures and practices) work against their duty under the Convention to protect victims 
                                                 
3
 Research interview, 8 November 2006. 
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of persecution and they thus undermine the right to asylum. I have argued that asylum 
seekers in the UK and France are treated as a problem of immigration control rather than as 
people needing protection. As a result, the asylum systems in both states are characterised 
by 
 
 measures to prevent refugees from reaching EU borders in the first place, including 
visa restrictions, carrier sanctions and airline liaison officers abroad (1.8.2-1.8.3) 
 lengthy and stressful screening processes on arrival, with limited rights of appeal 
(5.2; 9.2-9.3) 
 short timescales for making applications, with no time to recover from the 
experience of persecution and flight (5.3.2; 6.4.2; 9.5.1; 9.5.3) 
 poor accommodation and support packages (5.3; 9.4.4-9.4.4.2) 
 limitations on legal aid and representation (6.4; 7.2.2; 9.5.2.3) 
 the raising of spurious credibility issues in order to cast doubt on applicants‘ 
accounts of their experiences (6.5.8-6.5.13; 9.3.2-9.3.4; 9.4.3.3; 9.5.2.2) 
 increasing use of fast-track processes, making a fair and considered hearing less 
likely (6.4.2; 7.2.3; 9.4.3; 9.5.1) 
 restrictive and complex regulations which reduce applicants‘ rights to protection 
(4.4.1; 4.5) 
 limited rights of appeal (7.2; 9.6) 
 increasing use of detention to facilitate deportation at the end of the process, 
including detention of torture victims and children (8.4; 9.7) 
 
These elements in the asylum systems are accompanied by a political discourse which 
creates a culture of disbelief towards asylum seekers in both countries. 
 
10.7.2   Recommendations 
In terms of the asylum systems examined here: 
1. In both countries the initial screening interview should be as brief as possible (the 
whole process taking no more than 30 minutes), its purpose to record the identity of 
applicants and provide access to the asylum process. There should be no 
examination of the details of the claim, no assessment attempted and no question of 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS 286 
deportation at this stage. In France, zones d‘attente as de facto places of detention 
should be abolished. In the UK, section 55 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act 2002, which allows refusal of support if the asylum seeker does not 
apply within three days of arrival, should be repealed. Increase the number of 
asylum screening units across the UK and provide provincial OFPRA offices across 
France. 
2. In the UK, end dispersal and accommodation on a no-choice basis and give 
applicants an opportunity to choose their destination where possible and, in both 
countries, using reliable and well-regulated social partners, provide good-standard 
accommodation suitable to the asylum seekers‘ particular needs.  
3. Provide a financial support package at full income-support levels, together with 
rights to the premium payments (for heating, disability, etc.) available to income-
support claimants. 
4. Give all asylum seekers the right to work. 
5. Provide the right to free legal advice and representation at all stages of the process 
(including at the asylum interview), with no time restrictions and no merits test. In 
France, introduce the right to legal representation at the asylum interview. 
6. In the UK, repeal section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants) Act 2004, which obliges caseworkers to raise ―credibility‖ issues. I have 
argued that this makes refusal an objective of the asylum process (6.6.6). The repeal 
of section 8 will be an essential first step towards following UNHCR guidelines, 
which make the asylum interview not a search for contradictions but part of a shared 
responsibility between caseworker and applicant to establish the facts of a claim. It 
will also be a first step towards abolishing all the bad practice described in sections 
6.5-6.6. 
7. In the UK, improve the way that country reports are sourced, compiled and 
presented, ensuring that they are a fair and balanced representation of current 
conditions in the country being researched. The use of unidentified sources should 
end. Country reports should be used as part of the shared responsibility to establish 
facts, as described above. 
8. In both countries, timescales and deadlines should be lengthened to provide 
adequate recovery and preparation time before interview. 
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9. In both countries, fast-track procedures should be abolished in order to ensure a full 
and fair hearing for all applicants. 
10. In France, the OFPRA interview should be mandatory (with travel costs paid) and 
―manifestly unfounded‖ decisions without interview or justification of the denial of 
an interview should be prohibited. 
11. There should be full rights of appeal for all asylum seekers up to the highest court in 
each country, with free legal representation at all stages. Timescales should be 
lengthened to enable full preparation. In France the composition of the Appeals 
Commission for Refugees should be revised to make it more clearly independent 
both of OFPRA and of government. 
12. Detention at the end of the process should be deemed unnecessary except in the 
most extreme circumstances. It should be allowed only after an application before 
three Court of Appeal judges (UK) or three judicial judges (France), who should be 
unanimous in granting permission, with automatic rights of appeal up to the highest 
court in each country. Permission to detain should never be granted in the case of 
children or vulnerable people. 
 
In terms of wider issues beyond national borders, these recommendations would be 
facilitated by 
 
 a concerted approach on the part of states to end arms sales to regimes which 
abuse human rights or show aggression towards neighbouring states, 
together with the adoption of conflict-prevention strategies 
 international agreement to cancel the debt of the less-developed countries 
and a cooperative agreement with those countries to promote policies of 
sustainable development, linked with the promotion of human rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
Approach to the research 
Aware that we all bring social and political perspectives to our work, and that 
―interpretation-free, theory-neutral facts do not, in principle, exist‖ (Alvesson & Sköldberg 
2000:1), I am predominantly what Wolcott calls ―reform- or problem-based‖, judging that 
―things are not right as they are or are not as good as they might be‖ (1992:15) and having 
as an aim the promotion of change if this turns out to be the case. I do not think that this 
necessarily interferes with objectivity. If research is done, in the words of Miles and 
Huberman (1994:294), ―carefully, thoughtfully and correctly in terms of some reasonable 
set of standards‖, there is no reason why objectivity should be compromised. 
    With this in mind I note Solórzano and Yosso‘s view of educational institutions, which 
comes from a critical race theory perspective, and I apply it to the state and the EU: ―… 
educational institutions operate in contradictory ways, with their potential to oppress and 
marginalize coexisting with their potential to emancipate and empower‖ (2002:26). The EU 
states‘ ―potential to oppress and marginalize‖ can arguably be seen in their restrictive 
asylum measures (1.7, 1.8) and in the methods they use to enforce them.  Part of this is an 
apparent determination to recast asylum seekers‘ stories to meet the perceived interests of 
the state and I seek to retell those stories from asylum-seeker perspectives. I take a view of 
human rights which insists on the primary importance of protection for refugees – 
overriding the demands of economic interest, political and electoral calculations and the 
ever-shifting demands of security concerns. 
 
Asylum-seeker interviews 
Between July 2006 and May 2007 I interviewed 41 asylum seekers and refugees in the UK 
(Appendix II) in order to get first-hand accounts of the system from asylum-seeker 
perspectives. I make use of the documentation on their cases provided by several of them. I 
gained access to asylum seekers mainly through ―gatekeepers‖ in local asylum-seeker 
support organisations, charities, colleges and Hull City Council. I prepared a flyer for 
potential interviewees explaining my research and why I needed their help, and undertaking 
to observe anonymity and confidentiality throughout: individual respondents would not be 
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named; my records would not include their names; the dissertation would not include their 
names (each individual is identified by a code which tells me who they are and where I 
interviewed them, and the code is decipherable only by me). I also made clear that their 
cooperation was voluntary and that each respondent could decline to answer any individual 
question, end an interview at any point without offence or withdraw cooperation from the 
entire interview process at any time. I also made it clear that I had no connection with the 
Home Office. Although most gatekeepers explained the flyer to potential participants in 
advance, I went through it with each participant before the interview started to ensure that 
they understood and agreed to participate. 
    I envisaged potential problems with the gatekeeper strategy in that some might try to 
influence my choice of participants to suit their own agendas. Indeed, I introduced myself 
to the ARKH asylum support centre in Hull at a time when section 4 of the Immigration 
and Asylum Act 1999 (see 8.9) was being stringently applied to asylum seekers who had 
received their final refusal. This meant that many people had had their employment 
terminated or their benefit stopped, and were without accommodation. Lynne Coley, who 
ran the centre, was trying to get public support on this issue and was very keen to introduce 
me to these particular people. However, in the end, as well as introducing me to people she 
thought I should interview, she gave me free access to the centre and I was able to meet and 
interview a wide range of her clients. Elsewhere, I had no sense that gatekeepers wanted to 
restrict, influence or control my access to their clients. Most were concerned to ensure that 
people understood the purpose of the research, that everybody had a chance to participate 
but that nobody felt pressurised to do so. 
    Hull is where I am based and is a city where asylum seekers have been sent under the 
government‘s policy of ―dispersal‖ away from south-east England. Nevertheless, it 
presented a number of limitations that had to be overcome: all the clients I met at the two 
centres mentioned above were single male Kurds from Iraq or Iran: no women, married 
couples or families. Beata Barker (ESOL/Skills for Life curriculum leader at Hull College 
of Further Education) worked hard to find the right mix from among the students and 
provided, in addition to two single male Iraqi Kurds, one Iranian couple and one Afghan 
man. She also introduced me to a single Pakistani woman, who decided in the end not to 
participate. Steve Ibbetson, manager of the Hull City Council Asylum Support Service, and 
his staff provided one Chinese woman and a Palestinian man. They arranged an interview 
with a second woman, who did not turn up for the appointment and could not be contacted 
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later. It was clear that I would need a wider catchment area, not only in order to get a sense 
of what was happening in the UK as a whole but also to achieve some kind of balance in 
terms of individuals and their circumstances. London seemed a good choice, with its wide 
variety of countries of origin among asylum seekers, reflecting the well-established ethnic 
mix in the capital city. I had taught English at the College of North East London from 2002 
to 2003, had good contacts there, and the college was able to provide a range of potential 
participants of different origins, male and female, married and single, from asylum seekers 
awaiting deportation to recognised refugees. Glasgow, where many asylum seekers had 
been ―dispersed‖, was a city I knew well and where I  had previous contact with the 
Scottish Refugee Council. This time my main contacts were the charity Positive Action in 
Housing (PAIH) and the Unity support centre, which is run mainly by volunteers. 
    Interviews were semi-structured. I asked a limited number of main questions (Appendix 
III), allowing flexibility for people to answer in their own way, and allowing me the 
opportunity to seek clarification and elaboration where necessary. I asked each participant‘s 
permission to record the interview on tape or digital recorder, giving each an opportunity to 
refuse. All of them agreed to be recorded. At the early interviews I used a portable cassette 
recorder, but it turned out to be mechanically unreliable (to the extent that I had to re-
interview one participant) and I switched to a digital voice recorder which was not only 
reliable and clear but enabled me to store the recordings on my computer. There were few 
problems related to language. Students in the colleges were mostly studying English at 
ESOL Entry level 3 and above. In three or four cases, at these and other locations, a fellow 
asylum seeker with better English was able to help when a problem arose during an 
interview. 
    In deciding to cooperate with this research, participants were expressing their willingness 
to assist in its aims. There were pitfalls to avoid, however. There was a danger that 
participants would think that, in return for their cooperation, I might be able to solve 
problems where others (solicitors, local council staff, teachers, doctors, advisers, 
volunteers) had failed, or that I might ―put in a word‖ for them in the right quarters at some 
future stage. I made it as clear as possible that this was not the case, as did the relevant 
―gatekeepers‖ in the various centres and colleges. Conversely, some potential participants 
expressed scepticism of the research process. One participant (S5) agreed to participate, but 
did so with an undercurrent of scepticism. Too polite to accuse me personally, he 
nevertheless expressed his opinion that nobody believed asylum seekers or wanted to help 
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them: not his solicitor (―absolute rubbish. Doesn‘t want to [help] asylum seekers‖), not the 
ARKH support centre in Hull (―[This] place no working for asylum seekers. They going to 
say, ‗Yeah, yeah, yeah, I work for you‘, but it‘s a lie‖) and not the 167 support centre (―We 
no believe 167 … don‘t believe‖). Indeed, ―everyone getting money from asylum seeker, 
but nobody helps.‖1 Another (CC3) offered documentation on his case but withdrew the 
offer the next day, with profuse apologies, because, he said, his wife would not give her 
consent. Over time, however, a level of understanding and trust was established and 
compromises were reached: most sceptics gave me the benefit of the doubt and anyone 
looking for a problem-solver settled for my growing ability to understand the jargon of 
official letters. Another (CC9) expressed no doubts at the time of the interview and we 
exchanged email addresses so that he could update me on his case – but he subsequently 
avoided further contact by claiming that he had never met me, had not done an interview 
with me and that I must have a wrong email address. He subsequently phoned me to 
reiterate the point and I recognised his voice. However, I accepted what he said, did not try 
to contact him again and, although I knew his English teacher, decided not to discuss the 
matter with her. 
 
Transcription and analysis 
Once I had transcribed the asylum-seeker interviews, I read and re-read the transcriptions 
and set about identifying the themes that seemed to be emerging from them. I prepared a 
chart in order to show the experiences of the individual participants, starting with 
persecution and flight, what happened at each stage of the asylum process (arrival and 
screening, ―dispersal‖ to different parts of the UK, the main interview and initial decision, 
the appeals process and the final decision on the claim) and their present situation. In terms 
of the treatment of individuals at each stage, I looked for, and highlighted, good practice 
(e.g. providing female interviewers for women, allowing applicants to give full answers, 
allowing breaks during the interview) and bad practice (e.g. allowing only brief ―Yes/No‖ 
answers, giving no chance to explain inconsistencies, making accusations, aggressive 
questioning, misrepresentation of answers). I wanted to know how asylum seekers 
experienced the process so I highlighted, for example, how they described the conduct of 
the interview (―just like the police‖, ―aggressive‖, ―didn‘t believe anything‖, ―seemed to 
                                                 
1
 Research interview, 26 July 2006. 
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believe me‖) and of how they described their feelings at different stages of the process 
(―stressed‖, ―ashamed‖, ―worried‖, ―confused‖, ―crying‖, ―relieved‖, ―happy‖). 
    I was able to judge the reliability of participants‘ accounts in a number of ways. Some 
examples of bad practice were described by more than one participant, the subsequent 
individuals being unconnected with the first or with each other. Some were able to provide 
corroborating evidence in the form of official documentation (transcripts of Home Office 
asylum interviews, refusal letters giving the reasons for the refusal of protection, tribunal 
adjudicators‘ ―determination and reasons‖). Moreover, while Home Office Asylum Policy 
Instructions (APIs) often give advice on good practice (6.5.13) they also give rise to some 
of the bad practices claimed by participants (6.5.2; 6.5.5; 6.5.11). Asylum seekers‘ claims 
about their countries of origin are often supported by accounts from other sources, like 
NGOs in the field (6.5.4-6.5.12). Claims of human rights abuses in particular countries, 
denied by the Home Office, found corroboration from human rights organisations like 
Amnesty International (6.5.4), as did the existence of political parties (6.5.7; 6.6.3), also 
denied by the Home Office. 
    
Stakeholders 
The UK (interviews conducted May 2006-February 2007 and transcribed) 
I interviewed three stakeholders in asylum support groups in order to learn about the 
asylum system from people who work with it at all stages on behalf of their clients: Gary 
Pounder and Karwan Baba Ali of the 167 Centre provided insights into the workings of the 
system and the needs of their clients; Ian Chisholm (PAIH) had specific experience of 
housing problems and of the practice of ―dawn raids‖ for deportation purposes. I 
interviewed Pauline Brown (ESOL Guidance Officer at Hull College) who described the 
difficulties faced by asylum seekers and teachers in language learning and other areas of 
education. She also gave an account of the dispersal programme in Hull based on her early 
involvement in its development. Asmerom Woldegebriel (refugee support and development 
officer at the housing charity Centrepoint in London) explained how unaccompanied 
children are dealt with in the asylum system, as did Glen Hughes, personal adviser at the 
multi-agency Young People‘s Support Service in Hull. At the Home Office I interviewed 
Rod McLean, head of the Asylum Policy Unit, to get the official view of aspects of asylum 
policy. He offered, in his own words, to ―talk to you about the New Asylum Model and the 
METHODOLOGY 293 
changes that are currently taking place in the asylum process.‖2 In addition, although he 
claimed he was ―not the best person to speak to about detention and section 9‖ (on these, 
see chapter 8), he would, ―at least, try to set out what I think is the Home Office position on 
both issues‖.3 Alan Johnson, my local MP, obtained a reply from home secretary Jacqui 
Smith to my questions on the appeals process, and I interviewed Austin Mitchell, MP for 
Great Grimsby, on an asylum case in his constituency, and he provided excellent 
documentation on the case. 
 
France (interviews conducted August 2005-June 2007 and transcribed) 
I interviewed three stakeholders in France. A former employee of OFPRA and of UNHCR, 
Véronique Njo, put me in touch with two stakeholders: François Brun, an activist with the 
sans-papiers movement, who talked from the point of view of a group which works with 
and campaigns for asylum seekers; and Philippe Bolmin, a head of department at the 
Appeals Commission for Refugees (CRR),
4
 who could speak of the system from an official 
standpoint. In addition to a face-to-face interview and a telephone interview we exchanged 
emails on a number of legal questions. In Lyons I interviewed Clarisse Brunelle, project 
leader at Forum Réfugiés, a national non-profit-making organisation which promotes the 
right to asylum and provides administrative and social support to asylum seekers and 
refugees. She explained various aspects of the system and the organisation‘s concerns about 
it. 
 
Stakeholders in both countries answered in their own names. Only Rod McLean refused to 
be recorded, but he allowed me to take contemporaneous notes. 
 
                                                 
2
 Email to me, 6 March 2006. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Philippe Bolmin left the CRR in 2008 because he disagreed with the immigration policies of the government 
under President Sarkozy from 2007 (email to me, 20 April 2008). 
 APPENDIX II: UK ASYLUM-SEEKER/REFUGEE INTERVIEWEES 
(Interviews took place between 24 July 2006 and 22 May 2007) 
 
COI = country of origin; ILR = indefinite leave to remain; LR = leave to remain; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
 
Codename Gender 
(M/F) 
Married/ 
single 
COI Occupation 
in COI 
Reasons for 
leaving 
Means of 
travel 
Arrived Age on 
arrival 
Situation 
at time of 
interview 
CB1 M Single Iraq Worked in 
father’s 
restaurant 
Political 
persecution 
Lorry, 
train, boat 
2001 20 ILR 2004 
CC1 F Single Somalia None War Car, plane 1996 21 ILR 2004 
CC2 F Single Somalia None War Plane 2004 16 ILR 2005 
CC3 M Single Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Psychiatric 
nurse 
Political 
persecution 
Plane 2000 32 ILR 2007 
CC4 F Single Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Student nurse Political 
persecution 
Plane 2005 21 LR 5 yrs 
2007 
CC6 M Single Iran Revolutionary 
guard 
Political 
persecution 
Lorry 2003 35 Refused 
2004, 
destitute 
CC7 F Single Benin No job Political 
persecution 
Plane 1998 18 ILR 2007 
CC8 F Married Iraq Children’s 
nursery 
worker 
Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry, + 
son, 9 yrs 
2002 30 
 
LR 4 yrs 
CC9 M Single Kosovo Odd jobs Political 
persecution 
Lorry 2004 17 Awaiting 
decision 
CC10 M Married Kosovo Teacher Political 
persecution 
Plane, 
train 
1998 30 ILR 1999 
FS1 M Single Afghan-
istan 
Head teacher Political 
persecution 
Train, car, 
lorry 
2001 37 ILR 2005 
FS2 M Single Iraq Student Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 2002 20 ILR 2006 
FS3, FS4 M, F Married Iran Own company Political 
persecution 
Plane 2000 33, 31 ILR 2006 
MS1 M Married Lebanon No job Ethnic dis-
crimination 
Plane 2002 32 Refused, 
awaiting 
deport-
ation 
MS2 F Married China No job Unwilling to 
say 
Plane, + 
daughter,9 
yrs 
2003 37 Refused, 
awaiting 
deporta-
tion 
ND1 M Single Sudan Gardener Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Ship 2006 23 Refused, 
destitute 
OH1 F Single Somalia Student War Car, plane, 
boat, + 
son, 2 yrs 
2002 22 ILR 2004 
OH2 F Married Kosovo Student War Lorry, + 
husband, 3 
children 
1999 28 ILR 2005 
(amnesty) 
OH3  M Single Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Teacher, 
journalist 
Political 
persecution 
Plane 2002 24 Awaiting 
decision 
OH4 F Single Turkey Accountant Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Plane 1995  ILR 1996 
(amnesty) 
OH5 F Single Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Student Political 
persecution 
Plane 1994 20 ILR 1998 
OH5A F Married Turkey Shop worker Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Plane, + 
son, 4 yrs 
1992 22 ILR 1999 
(amnesty) 
OH7 F Married Somalia Housewife War Plane 2004 24 ILR 2005 
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Codename Gender 
(M/F) 
Married/single COI Occupation 
in COI 
Reasons for 
leaving 
Means 
of travel 
Arrived Age on 
arrival 
Status at 
time of 
interview 
OH7A F Married Turkey Housewife Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Ship 1998 25 ILR 2005 
OH8 F Single Turkey Factory 
worker 
Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Plane 1989 23 ILR 1992 
OH9 F Married Somalia Student War Boat/ 
plane 
2002 30 ILR 2003 
OH10 F Married Turkey Fashion 
designer 
Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 1999 28 ILR 2002 
(amnesty) 
OH11 F Married Iran Housewife Political 
persecution 
Plane 1999 22 ILR 2003 
OH13 M Married Eritrea Coffee shop 
owner 
Political 
persecution 
Plane 2004 45 Awaiting 
appeal 
OH14 M Single Somalia Student War Bus/ 
plane 
2004 17 ILR 2004 
PB1 M Married Iraq Political party 
worker 
Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 2000 30 ILR 2002 
S1 M Single Iraq Political party 
worker 
Political/  
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 1999 24 ILR 2007 
S2 M Single Iraq Shop owner Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 2003 23 Refused, 
destitute 
S4 M Single Iraq No job Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 2001 19 Awaiting 
appeal 
result 
S5 M Single Iraq Student Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 2000 20 Refused, 
destitute 
S6 M Married Iran Computer 
engineer 
Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry, 
walking 
2005 25 ILR 2007 
S7 M Single Iraq School 
student 
Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Lorry 2002 17 Awaiting 
appeal 
TR1 M Married Iran Wholesaler 
and importer 
Political 
persecution 
Lorry, 
walking 
2000 38 Refused 
2007, 
awaiting 
deport-
ation  
TR2 F Single Russia Worked  in 
commerce 
To find work Plane 2004 40 Refused, 
making 
fresh claim 
TR4 M Married Somalia  Farmer War Plane 2003 40 Refused, 
making 
fresh claim 
TR5 F Married DRC Secretary Political/ 
ethnic 
persecution 
Plane 2001 36 Appeal 
refused 
2006, 
awaiting 
deport-
ation 
  
APPENDIX III: QUESTIONS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS/REFUGEES 
 
 
 
Main questions 
 
 
Before coming to the UK 
 
1. Where are you from? 
 
2. What did you do there? (Job? Unemployed? Student?) 
 
3. Why did you decide to leave? 
 
4. When did you leave? 
 
5. Did you travel with your family? 
 
6. Did you want to come to the UK? (No – where was your first choice?) 
 
 
Journey to the UK 
 
7. How did you travel?  
8. Describe the journey. Were you afraid? What were you afraid of most? 
 
9. What other countries did you go through/stop in? How long did you stop there? 
Where did you stay? 
 
10.  What kind of travel documents did you have? 
 
 
Arrival in the UK 
 
11. Did you apply for asylum on arrival or later? 
 
12. What happened at your first interview (fingerprints, photograph, personal details, 
asking about why you left your country, asking about travel details, travel 
documents)? 
 
 Interpreter? 
 Lawyer? 
 [women] Was the interviewer a woman? Did you want a woman 
interviewer? Did you ask? 
 What part of your history did they say they didn‘t believe? 
 How did you feel about what was happening? 
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 Did you know what was happening to other members of your family? How 
did you feel about that? 
 
 
13. Did you have to fill in any forms? What help did you get? 
 
14. What were you told about legal advice (they gave you a list of solicitors, it was up to 
you to find a solicitor, legal advice was free, you had to pay)? 
 
15. Were you sent to a Reception/Detention Centre? (Yes – see Detention) 
 
16. Where did you stay? What kind of accommodation and support did you get? 
 
17. What happened at your main asylum interview (reasons for application, details of 
your country, how you travelled, how you got/why you didn‘t have travel 
documents)?  
 
 Interpreter? 
 Lawyer? 
 [women] Was the interviewer a woman? Did you want a woman 
interviewer? Did you ask? 
 What part of your history did they say they didn‘t believe? 
 Did you get a chance to say everything you wanted to say? How did you 
feel? 
 How did you feel about what was happening? 
 Did you know what was happening to other members of your family? How 
did you feel about that? 
 
 
Outcome of asylum claim 
 
18. How long did you have to wait for a decision? 
 
19. [refusal] Did you appeal? 
 
 How long before the hearing? 
 Were you satisfied with the legal help you had? 
 Interpreters? Did you speak in English? 
 Did you understand the court procedures? How did you feel in court? 
 How long did you have to wait for a decision? 
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Making changes 
 
20. For you, which aspects of the asylum process were bad and which were good? 
 
21. What would you change about it if you could? 
 
 
Present and future 
 
22. What is your job now? Possibilities of further training, computer, English? 
 
23. How do you see your future? 
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Detention 
 
 
Arriving in detention 
 
1.  Did anyone explain what a detention centre is? 
 
2.  Did anyone explain why you were in detention? 
 
3.  What was the name of the centre? Did anyone tell you where it was? 
 
4.  How long were you there? 
 
5.  [family] Were you together? What happened to other members of your family? 
 
6.  Were you given information about legal advice? 
 
7.  Were you told about bail? 
 
8.  Was your detention reviewed while you were there? 
 
 
Conditions and facilities 
 
9.  What were the conditions like? 
 
 How many people to a room? Who? 
 Furniture? 
 Were you locked in your room? – all the time, some of the time; could you 
lock it yourself? 
 Washing and toilet facilities? 
 Recreation? Education? 
 Children‘s education? 
 
10.  Were the staff friendly, helpful, hostile, indifferent? 
 
11.  Could you make/receive telephone calls? 
 
12. Were you allowed visitors? 
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Health 
 
13.  What happened when you were ill? -- medical facilities? 
 
14.  Did you get depressed (because of what happened to you in your country, because of 
what happened to you here)? 
 
15.  Could you speak to a counsellor or social worker? 
 
16.  Did you ask for that kind of help? 
 
 
Interviews 
 
17.  Were you interviewed about your application while you were there? 
 
18.  What happened at your asylum interview? (See Main questions, question 17.) 
 
 
Information and advice 
 
19.  Did you have to fill in any forms? Help? 
 
20.  How often were you updated on the progress of your application (regularly, only when 
you asked)? Who gave you that information (solicitor, governor, member of staff)? 
 
 Deportation 
 
21.  Did the authorities try to deport you while you were there? 
 
22.  What happened? Why were you not deported in the end? 
 
Release 
 
23.  How were you informed of your release? 
 
24.  How did you get somewhere to live after release? Did anyone explain about benefits? 
  
APPENDIX IV: STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
UK  
Pauline Brown is ESOL Guidance Officer at Hull College of Further Education. I 
interviewed her because of her expertise in the provision of English-language courses to 
asylum seekers and refugees and because she was involved from an early stage in the 
development of an infrastructure in Hull for the reception of asylum seekers. 
 
Ian Chisholm is a project officer at Positive Action in Housing (PAIH), a housing charity 
in Glasgow. I interviewed him with specific reference to his concerns about Home Office 
operational visits (sometimes called ―dawn raids‖), made for the purposes of detention and 
deportation. 
 
Rod McLean is Head of the Asylum Policy Unit at the Home Office, and I interviewed him 
about official perspectives on policy and about the New Asylum Model. 
 
Austin Mitchell is the MP for Great Grimsby. I interviewed him about an asylum-seeking 
family in his constituency whose case he took up between 2005 and 2007. The family were 
deported in January 2007, and Mitchell instigated a debate on their case in the House of 
Commons in February 2007. 
 
Gary Pounder is the manager of the 167 Centre, an asylum support group in Hull which 
works closely with the local council and other groups. It provides health advice, language 
and computer classes, and signposts its clients to solicitors for legal help and to various 
agencies for other specific kinds of help. 
 
Pauline Short is a voluntary worker at the Unity Centre asylum support group in Glasgow. 
I interviewed her about the work of the centre and the support it is able to give its clients 
during the asylum process. 
 
Asmerom Woldegebriel is the Refugee Support and Development Officer at Centrepoint, a 
London charity providing shelter and support services for homeless and unemployed youth 
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in London. He deals with asylum seekers and refugees between the ages of 16 and 25. As 
well as providing help with housing, he and a number of teams provide skills training and 
help to enable newcomers to live in the UK. 
 
 
France 
Philippe Bolmin was an official of the Appeals Commission for Refugees (CRR) and left 
the CRR in 2008 because he disagreed with the immigration policies of the government 
under President Sarkozy from 2007. He has expert knowledge of the asylum system in 
general, and a particular knowledge of the appeals process. 
 
François Brun is an activist in the sans-papiers movement, which campaigns for the 
legalisation of all illegal immigrants. He is an official of the Highways Department (Ponts 
et Chaussées) in Paris. 
 
Clarisse Brunelle is a project leader at Forum Réfugiés, a national non-profit-making 
organisation which promotes the right to asylum and provides administrative and social 
support to asylum seekers and refugees. 
  
APPENDIX V: QUESTION GUIDES FOR KEY INFORMANTS 
 
 
 
UK 
 
Pauline Brown (ESOL Guidance Officer, Hull College, and involved in the 
planning and development of reception facilities in general) 
 
 
Reception of asylum seekers in Hull 
1.  When did dispersal of asylum seekers to Hull begin? 
 
2.  Who came? – male/female, married/single, families with children, and where 
were they from? 
 
3.  How has the profile of arrivals changed over time? 
 
4.  What sort of numbers are we talking about? 
 
5.  What structures were there in place to deal with the arrivals? 
 
6.  How did you create an infrastructure? How has it developed since the beginning? 
 
7.  Who provides accommodation and how is it organised and managed in terms of 
standards? 
 
8.  How has Hull coped with the challenge and how could systems nationally and 
locally be improved? 
 
ESOL 
1.  Who can have ESOL classes? 
 
2.  Who pays for the lessons? 
 
3.  Were there problems for the college, and how did you deal with them? 
 
4.  Do you think the experience of forced migration and of asylum seeking impacts 
on the learning process in English classes? How? 
 
5.  Is it the same for recognised refugees? 
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Rod McLean (Head of Home Office Asylum Policy Unit)  
 
 
1. Why a New Asylum Model? 
 
2. What are its main features? 
 
3. What are ―segments‖ and how are they defined? 
 
4. The Refugee Council fears that the segmentation process undermines the 
principle of equal treatment of all asylum seekers with each case decided on its 
merits (especially in segments 4 and 5, where the concept ―late/opportunistic‖ is 
used and where there are said to be ―high‖ and ―low‖ barriers to removal). The 
Refugee Council believes that this shows a preoccupation with removal rather 
than protection? Can you answer these concerns? 
 
5. Segment 1 (passing through a safe third country): Why penalise someone for 
choosing the UK as their destination? 
 
6. Fast-track processing: the time between initial interview and initial decision is 
reduced from 2 months to 2 weeks. There are concerns that it will be difficult 
for applicants to obtain legal advice in the time available. 
 
7. The 2004 contract specification for solicitors in asylum and immigration cases 
seems to have made it more difficult for asylum seekers to get legal aid and 
good legal advice. Doesn‘t this undermine the right to asylum? 
 
8. The 2004 Act, s. 9: the Refugee Council and Refugee Action regard this as 
failing on its own terms: people are not returning or preparing to return in any 
substantial numbers, and both organisations say: ―Using the threat of destitution 
and the removal of children to bring about the policy objective of increased 
returns is abhorrent in a civilised society.‖ What is your view of that? 
 
9. One aim of the Five-Year Strategy is stricter border controls, with fingerprinting 
of all visa applicants and electronic checks on all those entering and leaving the 
country. Yet existing controls already make it difficult for refugees legally to 
enter the UK to seek asylum. Why do they need to be stricter? 
 
10. Why the five-year limit on refugee status/leave to remain? 
 
11. Why return refugees after 5 years because we think the situation in their country 
has changed? What are the criteria of such change? 
 
12. People often want to go home if their country becomes stabilised, and many do 
(Refugee Council). But why force them to go after giving them refugee status? 
Doesn‘t this undermine integration? And doesn‘t this period of uncertainty 
cause unnecessary stress to those who have already been traumatised? 
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Gary Pounder (167 Centre, Hull) 
 
 
1. What is the 167 Centre and what is your job? 
 
2. Are you independent of government? 
 
3. How is the Centre financed? 
 
4. What happens at the Centre (facilities, advice, legal services, etc.)? 
 
5. Where do asylum seekers and refugees in Hull come from (nationalities, 
countries)? 
 
6. Who comes (single, married, families with children, unaccompanied children)? 
 
7. What are some of their reasons for applying for asylum? 
 
8. Why have they come to Hull (choice, no choice, family, friends, problems in 
previous area)? 
 
9. What is the range of problems you have to deal with (legal matters, asylum 
process problems, detention, family, accessing services, health, language, 
accommodation)? 
 
10. What is the situation with section 4 support at the moment? 
 
11. What has been the response of local people to the arrival of asylum seekers 
(welcoming, hostile (why? – racism, ignorance, press))? 
 
12. What have you done to counteract negative responses? 
 
13. How do you see the future? 
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Asmerom Woldegebriel (Centre Point) 
 
 
1. What is your job (aims, responsibilities, etc.)? 
 
2. Why do asylum seekers come to Centrepoint? 
 
 What proportion of your clients are asylum seekers? 
 Are they referred by Home Office? 
 What age groups? 
 
3. What services do you provide? 
 
4. What kind of projects do you initiate or support? 
 
5. Do you provide legal advice? 
 
 lawyers employed by you? 
 lawyers hired from outside? 
 how do you choose them? 
 who pays? 
 
6. What are the problems your clients face? Which ones can you help them with 
and which ones not? 
 
7. What happens when they reach the age of 18? 
 
8. What proportion of them get refugee/HP, etc. status? 
 
9. What happens to those who don‘t? 
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France 
 
Philippe Bolmin (official of the Refugee Appeals Commission (CRR) 
 
 
1. Quel était l‘objectif de la réforme de la procédure d‘asile en 2003 ? (Loi du 10 
décembre 2003, décret du 14 août 2004.) 
 
2. CFDA dit que la réforme de 2003 marque le passage d‘une procédure de droit à une 
procédure de contrainte de sorte qu‘on ferme la porte aux beaucoup de gens qui 
fuient des persécutions. Que pensez-vous en général à cette critique ? 
 
3. CFDA critique, par exemple, la procédure prioritaire en disant qu‘elle ne permet pas 
au demandeur de voir sa demande convenablement examinée parce-que: 
 
 on n‘a pas accès aux prestations sociales 
 l‘instruction par l‘OFPRA se fait dans un délai réduit de 15 jours (96 heures 
en rétention) 
 le recours contre l‘OFPRA n‘est pas suspensif 
 
Par ailleurs : 
 
 les préfectures, en considérant certaines demandes comme abusive, tendent à 
apprécier le fond de la demande, ce qui est dans les compétences de 
l‘OFPRA  
 les préfectures ont tendance à placer en procédure prioritaire des demandes 
déposées quelques jours ou quelques semaines après l‘arrivée en France 
ainsi que la plupart des demandes de réexamen 
 
Est-ce-que cette critique est justifiée ?  La question est importante compte tenu que 
la procédure prioritaire est en constante augmentation : ils représentaient 10% de la 
demande globale en 2003, 16% en 2004, 23% en 2005 et 30% en 2006, si on prend 
en compte les premières demandes et les demande de réexamen.  
 
[Gil Robles, ancien Commissaire aux Droits de l’Homme du Conseil de l’Europe a 
dit que « la procédure prioritaire est loin d’offrir les mêmes garanties que la 
demande d’asile du droit commun. Elle ne laisse qu’une chance infime aux 
demandeurs. » Il a fait le point que « chaque dossier doit faire l’objet d’un examen 
complet et attentif. »] 
 
4. « Pays sûrs » : Le 30 juin 2005, l‘OFPRA a adopté une liste de 12 pays d‘origine 
sûr, une liste élargie à 17 le 30 juin 2005. Est-ce-que tous les pays son vraiment 
sûrs ?    [Le Rapport Gil Robles « doute fortement que tous les pays puissent être 
considérés comme des pays d’origine sûrs … d’autant plus que ces pays continuent 
à produire des réfugiés. » CFDA cite comme exemple la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui 
représentait 2,000 demandes en 2004 pour un taux d’accord de 67,4%.]  
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5. L‘utilisation d‘une telle liste, ne suppose-t-elle pas une discrimination entre réfugiés 
en raison de leur nationalité, ce qui est interdite par la Convention de 1951 ? 
N‘existe-t-il pas une présomption d‘un caractère « manifestement infondé » au 
début, difficilement réfutable par la suite ? 
 
6. Selon CESEDA, « La prise en compte du caractère sûr du pays d‘origine ne peut 
faire obstacle à l‘examen individuel de chaque demande. » Cette garantie, ne 
devient-il illusoire pour les gens placées en procédure prioritaire ?    [Le taux de 
placement en procédure prioritaire des ressortissants de ces pays est passé de 4,8% 
en juin 2005 à 80% dès le mois de septembre suivant.] 
 
7. En principe les associations sont d‘accord que c‘est une bonne chose si la durée de 
la procédure d‘asile soit réduite. Mais selon CFDA les réductions des délais de 
dépôt (21 jours, procédure normale ; 15 jours, procédure prioritaire 5 jours en 
rétention) sont contestables compte tenu que le demandeur doit préparer son dossier, 
chercher un conseiller juridique, et compte tenu la précarité des demandeurs, qui ne 
bénéficient généralement d‘aucune pris en charge social. Est-ce-que cette critique 
est juste ? 
 
8. Est-ce-que le demandeur d‘asile a un droit à l‘aide judiciaire pendant toute la 
procédure d‘asile ? 
 
9. Est-ce-que le demandeur d‘asile a le droit à l‘aide linguistique s‘il en a besoin pour 
déposer son dossier et pendant l‘entretien avec l‘OFPRA ? 
 
10.  En zone d‘attente, est-ce-que le demandeur d‘asile a le droit à un recours suspensif 
en cas d‘un refus d‘entrée par le ministère de l‘intérieur ? 
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François Brun (sans-papiers movement) 
 
 
Choses à discuter 
Contexte de l‘immigration en général 
l‘histoire (écon. et démogr.) et la présente politique 
assimilation et la république, le foulard 
les banlieues 
critique de l‘approche anglo-saxone 
 
Le système 
les différentes possibilités et issues 
demandes à la frontière 
zones d‘attente, centres de rétention 
« manifestement infondée » ou examen au fond ? 
demandes sur le territoire (ministère, OPFRA, préfecture) 
le droit d‘avoir un avocat, un interprète ou d‘être accompagné 
changements récents 
la judiciaire et le Conseil d‘État contre gouvernement/ministres 
décisions, appels, recours 
prestations sociales 
travail 
 
Clandestins 
pourquoi clandestin ? Combien entre eux sont les réfugiés ? 
régularisation 
organisations de soutiens 
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Clarisse Brunelle (Project Leader, Forum Réfugiés) 
 
 
1. Qu‘est-ce que Forum Réfugiés ? 
 
2. Est-ce que Forum Réfugiés est indépendant vis-à-vis le gouvernement ou les 
autorités en général ? 
 
3. D‘où viennent les fonds pour votre travail ? 
 
4. De quels pays viennent les chercheurs d‘asile en France ? 
 
5. Pourquoi la France (choix, accident) ? 
 
6. Et qui viennent spécifiquement – célibataires, hommes, femmes, familles, enfants 
isolés ? 
 
7. Quel est le rôle de Forum Réfugiés dans le système d‘asile (hébergements, conseils 
juridiques, administratifs, sociaux, aide à comprendre et négocier les procédures) ? 
Est-ce que vous avez des avocats sur place ?  
 
8. Est-ce que vous fournissez un hébergement simplement dans les centres d‘accueil 
ou est-ce que les appartements vous sont disponibles au dehors des centres ? Qui 
paie ? 
 
9. Est-ce que les gens habitent dans la société en général ou seulement dans les centres 
d‘une sorte ou une autre ? 
 
10. Est-ce qu‘on peut travailler ? Le droit aux prestations sociales ? 
 
 
Demande à l‟entrée 
 
11.  Quelles sont les procédures si on fait la demande à l‘entrée ? Qu‘est-ce qui arrive ? 
[police, zone d’attente, examen, pièces à fournir, évidences] 
 
12. Quel est l‘objet de l‘entretien ? [motifs, « manifestement infondée »] [interprète ? 
avocat ?] 
 
13. Comment décider qu‘une demande est « manifestement infondée » ? [rapports 
officiels sur le pays ; le pays n’est pas sur la liste des pays sûrs ; documents 
fournis/non-fournis] 
 
14. Si on décide que la demande n‘est pas « manifestement infondée » ? [APS ; 
OFPRA] [logement ? prestations sociales ?] 
 
15. Si on décide que la demande est « manifestement infondée » ? [refoulement] 
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16. Est-ce qu‘on a un recours dans ce cas ? 
 
 
Demande à l‟intérieur de la France 
 
17.  Si on fait la demande à l‘intérieur de la France, quelles sont les procédures ? 
[préfecture, APS ? OFPRA] 
 
18. Que fait la préfecture ? 
 
19. Faut-il fournir des pièces et des documents ? Lesquels ? 
 
20. Et si on n‘a pas certains documents ? [difficile ou impossible à obtenir, on part à 
toute vitesse] 
 
21. On attend la décision combien de temps ? 
 
 
Rejet 
 
22.  Est-ce qu‘il y a la possibilité de faire un appel contre une décision négative ? 
[Commission des recours des réfugiés] 
 
23. Pour faire un appel contre un rejet qu‘est-ce qu‘il faut faire ? [pièces, délais, 
renouvellement du récépissé du demande d’asile  logements ?  prestations 
sociales ?] 
 
24. Peut-on se faire assister par un avocat et demander l‘aide juridictionnelle ? 
[Commission des recours des réfugiés] 
 
25. Et en cas de rejet est-ce qu‘il y a encore un recours ? [en cassation] 
 
26. Est-ce que le recours est suspensif ? 
 
27.  Dans votre Journal en avril, vous avez dit que la France « est rentrée dans une 
période de réforme quasi-permanente » : quelles sont les réformes qui vous 
inquiète ? 
 
28.  Quelles changements voudriez-vous faire au système, aux procédures ? 
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Autres questions 
 
a  Rapports officiels : crédible ? à jour ? 
 
b  Les pays sûr, sont-ils vraiment sûr ? [voir liste] 
 
c  Pays sûrs : est-ce qu‘on a recours ? 
 
d  Documents, etc. : Est-ce que c‘est un désavantage si on ne les a pas ? 
 
e  Il s‘agit des circonstances personnel et il faut fournir la preuve individuelle : est-
ce qu‘on peut considérer les ressortissants de certains pays comme particulièrement 
en danger et donc qu‘il est probable que leurs demandes sont justifiées ? (Voir 
procédure accélérée pour ressortissants des pays sûrs ; pourquoi pas pour les pays 
particulièrement dangereux ?) 
 
f  Est-ce qu‘il y a un recours contre le refoulement, puisqu‘il est interdit dans la 
Convention ? 
 
g  Si on n‘a pas reçu la lettre de rejet, la silence est considérée comme le rejet : 
dangereux ? [erreurs ; la poste ; préjugés ; appel impossible ?] 
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